Acta Juridica, 51. by unknown
Volume 51 > Number 1 • March 
Editor-in-Chief. VANDA LAMM 
L C I R 
Hungarica 
Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies 
AKADÉMIAI KIADÓ 
Acta Juridica Hungarica 
HUNGARIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
Acta Juridica Hungarica publishes original papers on legal sciences with special emphasis on 
Hungarian jurisprudence, legislation and legal literature. The journal accepts articles from every 
field of legal sciences. The editors encourage contr ibutions from outside Hungary, 
w i th the aim of covering legal sciences in the whole of Central and Eastern Europe. 
The articles should be written in English. 
• 
Abstracted/indexed in 
Information Technology and the Law, International Bibliographies IBZ and IBR, Worldwide 
Political Science Abstracts, SCOPUS. 
• 
Manuscripts and editorial correspondence should be addressed to 
ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 
P.O. Box 25, H-1250 Budapest, Hungary 
Phone: (+36 1)355 7384 
Fax: (+36 1) 375 7858 
• 
Subscription price 
for Volume 51 (2010) in 4 issues EUR 304+VAT (for North America: USD 424) 
including online access and normal postage; airmail delivery EUR 20 (USD 28). 
• 
Publisher and distributor 
AKADÉMIAI KIADÓ 
Scientific, Technical, Medical Business Unit 
P.O. Box 245, H-1519 Budapest, Hungary 
Phone: (+36 1)464 8222 
Fax: (+36 1)464 8221 
E-mail: journals@akkrt.hu 
www.akademiai.com;www.akademiaikiado.hu 
• 
© Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 2010 
ISSN 1216-2574 
AJur 51 (2010) 1 
Printed in Hungary 
Acta Juridica Hungarica 
HUNGARIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
Editor-in-Chief 
VANDA LAMM 
Editor 
RÉKA FRIEDERY 
Editorial Board 
ANDRÁS BRAGYOVA, GÁBOR HAMZA, 
TIBOR KIRÁLY, LAJOS LÖRINCZ, FERENC MÁDL, 
ANDRÁS SAJÓ, TAMÁS SÁRKÖZY 
Volume 51, Number 1, March 2010 
AKADÉMIAI KIADÓ 
M E M B E R O F W O L T E R S K L U W E R G R O U P 
M A G Y A R 
WUTOfWÄNYOS AKADÉ(№A 
KÖNYVTÁRA 
Published by the financial support of the 
Committee on Publishing Scientific Books and Periodicals, 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
Cover design: xfer grafikai műhely 
CONTENTS 
S T U D I E S 
KANIYE S . A . EBEKU 
T A M Á S NÓTÁRI 
O L E N A MELNYCHUK 
BALÁZS FEKETE 
Revisiting the Acquittal of 10 Policemen: Issues of Judicial 
Independence, Trial by Media and Fair Trial in Cyprus 1 
On Quintus Tullius Cicero's Commentariolam petitionis 35 
Contemporary Interpretation of the Conception 
of World Heritage in International Law and Practice 54 
Practice Elements in the Hungarian Legal 
Education System 67 

1216-2574/USD 20.00 
© 2010 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 
A C T A J U R I D I C A H U N G A R I C A 
51. No 1. pp. 1-34 (2010) 
DOl: 10.1556/AJur.51.2010.1.1 
K A N I Y E S . A . E B E K U * 
Revisiting the Acquittal of 10 Policemen: 
Issues of Judicial Independence, Trial by Media and Fair 
Trial in Cyprus 
Abstract . In a recent j u d g m e n t in the Efstathiou c a s e , the Assize Court o f Nicosia , Cyprus, acqu i t t ed ten Policemen 
charged wi th criminal o f f ences related to a l leged bea t i ng in 2005 of t w o Cypriot students. T h a t verdict led to 
spon taneous reactions across the country, with p e o p l e publicly pro tes t ing against and c r i t i c iz ing the judiciary. 
A m o n g those that made sca th ing public c o m m e n t s were the At torney-Genera l of Cyprus and senior Cypriot 
lawyers . In its judgment , the cour t had suggested tha t media comments abou t the case undu ly interfered with the 
fair trial o f the case and a m o u n t e d to contempt o f cou r t . On the whole, th is case raises the i ssues o f independence 
of the judic iary , trial by med ia and fair trial. T h e r e a re two opposing v i e w s on the propriety or otherwise of the 
media cove rage of the case as wel l as on whether, a n d if so, to what ex ten t , the judiciary can b e proper ly criticized. 
Essential ly, this article seeks to consider the issues o f judicia l independence , trial by media and fair trial as well as 
the c lose ly associated issue o f contempt of court a r i s i n g f rom the Efs ta th iou case and in re la t ion to the common-
law rooted Cypriot legal sys tem. It argues that the r ight to fair trial is an inseparable part o f a democra t ic society 
and that wh i l e the right to f r e e d o m of expression is a fundamental h u m a n right and undoub ted ly the bulwark o f 
a democra t i c society, it is not realizable without a n independent j u d i c i a r y which is equal ly indispensable in a 
democra t ic society. Hence, there is a great need to recognize the l imits o f the right to f r e e d o m of expression in 
order to sustain the independence of the judiciary a n d ensure the right to a fa ir trial. 
K e y w o r d s : Judicial Independence , Trial by Media a n d Fair Trial, Con tempt o f Court , C o m m o n - l a w / C o m m o n w e a l t h 
Count r ies , European Conven t ion of Human Righ t s and European Cour t o f Human Rights, C y p r u s and Cypriot 
Law 
The author dedicates this article to all those 
who believe in Judicial Independence world-wide. 
1. Introduction 
On 19 March 2009 the Assize Court of Nicosia, Cyprus, stirred up a hornet's nest by its 
decision to discharge and acquit the ten policemen accused of various criminal offences in 
the case of Republic v. Efstathiou & Others.' The criminal charges had emanated from an 
alleged incident of high-handedness and brutality visited on two hapless Cypriot students 
by the accused persons in December 2005. Importantly, the unfortunate incident was 
allegedly captured by a secret video which was repeatedly shown on television programmes 
and published in print and online newspapers before and allegedly during the trial. The 
revulsion of the civil society over the incident was great, and so was a yearning for the 
* Professor of Public Law and Chair, University of Nicosia Law School, Cyprus. Also, Visiting 
Professor of Law, University of Kent Law School , Canterbury, UK. 
I am indebted to Athanasiou Thanasis Michalakis for his research assistance in writing this 
article. I am also grateful to him for the generous support he extended to me during my six years so-
journ in the Republic of Cyprus. 
E-mail: ebeku.k@unic.ac.cy, ksael@hotmail.com 
1
 Republic v. Efstathiou & Others (Case No. 17179/06), unreported Judgment of 19 March 2009 
(Assize Court, Nicosia, Cyprus). 
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perpetrators to face Cypriot criminal justice. Expcctedly, the criminal justice system was 
put in motion against the accused persons and this ran into full course on 19 March 2009 
with the verdict of the trial court (the Assize Court of Nicosia). 
Going by media accounts of the incident, including the video footage, the accused 
persons were 'guilty as charged'. However, the three-member panel of judges that heard the 
case thought and decided otherwise; as earlier mentioned, they found the accused persons 
'not guilty as charged' and accordingly set them free. This led to public outrage and 
spontaneous popular street protests against the Cypriot judiciary for what was considered to 
be an unjust decision.2 The next day and on several occasions subsequently, local newspapers 
were awash with various reactions to the judicial verdict-mostly critical of the decision (see 
below). Surely, this may well be cxcused going by the general public sentiment against that 
incident, though this is not to suggest that it was entirely proper. It may well be that the 
trial judges were wrong in their decision on the case. However, this is to be ultimately 
decided locally by the appeal court-the Supreme Court of Cyprus.3 Even so, there is no 
guarantee that the Supreme Court would necessarily satisfy the public's sense of justice.4 
In the end, although the decision may rightly be criticized in the future for being 
erroneous in point of law (in the interim, it is sufficient to say that there are some difficulties 
in understanding the general approach and reasoning of the judges in relation to the merits 
of the case), it is important to consider, at this stage, the crucial issues raised by the various 
protests in relation to the working of the legal system. As will become clear below, the 
decision and various reactions thereto, have raised issues of independence of the judiciary, 
trial by media and fair trial. This article seeks to consider these issues here together with the 
closely related issue of contempt of court. As a point of departure, section 2 of this article 
will provide the background and context by outlining some of the reactions to the judicial 
2
 Public protests against the decision continued for several days and weeks. See Hazou, E.: Lat-
est protests over police acquittal "We are not doing this for our own kids, but rather for the children of 
other families who might get the same treatment". [CyprusMail (Internet Edition), 24 March 2009]; 
Theodoulou, J.: Police beating appeal court date set for September. [CyprusMail (Internet Edition), 
28 April 2009]. Note that all references here to articles published in the (CyprusMail Internet Edition) 
are permanently searchable through its website: <http://www.cyprus-mail.com/news/>. 
3
 The Supreme Court set down 14-18 September 2009 for the hearing of the appeal filed by 
the prosecution. See Theodoulou: Police beating appeal... op. cit. However, it had to hear first a pre-
liminary objection filed by counsel for the first respondent in the appeal seeking to dismiss the ap-
peal in limine for abuse of judicial process in that the Attorney-General had issued public statements 
declaring lack of confidence in the Cypriot judiciary after the decision of the trial court in the case. 
Although the application was found to be almost on all fours with the decision of the Supreme Court 
in Constantinides v. Vima Ltd., Cyprus Law Reports, (1983) 348, the court was able to distinguish it, 
inter alia, on the ground that the Attorney-General was not a party 'stricto sensu' in the present appeal 
and accordingly dismissed the objection. The court frowned at the impugned statements, suggesting 
that they were contemptuous. However, that was not the question before them (only the 'contemnor' 
Attorney-General had the power to bring such contempt proceedings before the court). See Attorney-
General of the Republic v. Efstathiou (Criminal Appeal No. 56/2009), unreported Ruling (in Greek) 
of 8 October 2009 (Supreme Court of Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus). As at 22 March 2010 the appeal was 
still pending. 
4
 After exhausting the local remedies, the victims might further seek redress from the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg if they are unsatisfied with the outcome. In this regard, 
they would be suing the State for the violation of their human rights. However the accused persons, 
once acquitted by the Supreme Court, cannot be retried by the ECHR. 
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verdict. This will be followed in section 3 by an analysis of the focal issues in the context of 
the Cypriot common-law rooted legal system,5 as influenced or modified by it's member-
ship of the Council of Europe as well as the European Union. The last section, section 4, 
will be devoted to concluding remarks. It is hoped that this article will generate a lively 
debate, especially within the legal community in the country, which could lead to better 
appreciation of the working of the legal system by the general society and, perhaps, any 
necessary changes in the extant law. 
2. Public Reactions: Background and Context 
Media reports of reactions to the recent judicial verdict in the Efstathiou case show that 
they cut across the whole strata of the Cypriot society. Apart from the general public, there 
were also reactions from President Demetris Christofias of the Republic of Cyprus, senior 
Cypriot lawyers, professional associations (particularly the Cyprus Bar Association), and 
the Attorney-General of the Republic of Cyprus Petros Clerides. Furthermore, there was 
also a counter-reaction by the Supreme Court of Cyprus. For present purposes, some of 
those reactions-particularly those mentioned here-are briefly recounted hereunder. 
It needs to be made clear from the outset that the present concern of this article is not 
with the merits of the court's decision. In other words, the article is not concerned with the 
question whether or not that decision was wrong. This could come in the future. Positively 
stated, this article is concerned with the propriety of the various reactions to the judicial 
verdict in the Efstathiou case-especially the reactions of the Attorney-General of the 
Republic of Cyprus, the President of the Republic of Cyprus, members of the legal 
profession in Cyprus (lawyers), and the Supreme Court of Cyprus. More specifically, this 
article is concerned with some of the issues raised by the various reactions as adumbrated 
above. 
From available sources, the Attorney-General of the Republic of Cyprus (the Chief 
Legal Officer of the State of Cyprus6) was so furious about the verdict that he attempted 
to interrupt the judges while reading their judgment, but was refused.7 Thereafter, he issued 
a press statement condemning the verdict thus: 'The Criminal Court's decision is wrong, 
from start to finish, and unfortunately it has harmed the prestige of the judicial system 
irreversibly... We can't always trust court decisions; each civilian has the right to judge 
them for themselves.'8 He rejected the reasoning of the judges that the media's projection of 
the case amounted to trial by media and affected the rights of the accused persons to fair-
hearing: 'In such a matter of importance and public interest, don't the media have the 
right to show scenes and make comments? ... The media did their jobs well and not only did 
they have the right, they had an obligation to inform the public'.9 He also appeared on 
5
 In Constantinides v. Vi ma Ltd [at p. 355], the Supreme Court of Cyprus noted that '[t]he ad-
ministration of justice in Cyprus is modelled on the administration of justice under the common law 
judicial system... ' 
6
 The office of the Attorney-General is one of the independent offices established under Part 
6 of the Constitution of Cyprus 1960. Holders of the office enjoy security of tenure as a judge of the 
High court. 
7
 Theodoulou, J.: AG: Court decision wrong from start to finish [CyprusMail (Internet Edi-
tion), 21 March 2009]. 
» Ibid. 
« Ibid. 
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television programme, condemning the judicial verdict in very strong terms.10 A former 
Deputy Attorney-General of Cyprus and former Cypriot Judge of the European Court of 
Human Rights, Loukis Loucaides, agreed with the position of the Attorney-General. He also 
launched a serious attack on the judges thus: 'There is something wrong with the way the 
judges approached the evidence. They may be not sufficiently trained.. . ' ." Moreover, with 
a seeming tang of incontrovertible authority, he declared: 'The media influence is irrelevant 
to the proceedings, yet the court went out of its way to touch on the matter. ECHR [European 
Court of Human Rights] case law is clear on this. In the cases of professional judges (with 
no jury), the issue of media influence does not arise')2 
On his part, the President of the Republic of Cyprus expressed surprise at the decision, 
stating that it was a 'provocation to the sense of justice of every citizen of the Republic'.13 
Importantly, he also expressed his respect for the independence of the judiciary. 
Further reactions, as indicated above, came from members of the legal profession and 
the Supreme Court. Speaking on behalf of the Cyprus Bar Association, its President, Doros 
Ioannides, cautioned against making public statements 'when a decision is under appeal'.14 He 
insisted on the need to respect the integrity of the courts, arguing: 'Statements and counter-
statements ... will not help justice. Cyprus justice has helped this country and under no circum-
stances should we try to diminish its role'.15 On the contrary, the President of the Limassol Bar 
Association (Limassol Branch of the Cyprus Bar Association), Christos Melides, argues that 
lawyers, the general public and the media 'have the right to criticize the decision and make 
statements on the subject';16 for him, this is part of the freedom of expression or the right to 
free speech.17 It should be mentioned that on this position he is in tandem with a large section 
of the Cypriot society, including (particularly) the gentlemen of the press. 
Lastly, the Supreme Court of Cyprus-reacting directly to the caustic public 'criticisms' 
of the Assize Court judges and the Cypriot judiciary by the Attorncy-Gencral-said in a public 
statement that it was shocked and discontented with the 'inappropriate statements of the 
Attorney-General to the media'.18 The statement continued: 'The Attorney-General should 
be better aware of the fact that if he disagrees with a decision, the legal means he has at his 
disposal is to appeal, and not attack the courts and justice system through television... The 
Supreme Court condemns without reservations the televised attempts to diminish the 
prestige of the judicial system...'.19 
10
 See: What sort of example are our justice officials setting? [CyprusMail (Internet Edition), 27 
March 2009] See also the view of Hazou, E. contained in Pissa, M.: Banana republic - rejoice in your 
justice system [CyprusMail (Internet Edition), 20 March 2009]. 
11
 See Evripidou, S.: Former European Court of Human Rights Judge says cops acquittal "stu-
pid and absurd" [CyprusMail (Internet Edition), 22 March 2009]. 
12
 Ibid (emphasis added). 
13
 See Theodoulou: AG: Court decision... op. cit. 
14
 Theodoulou, J.: Black page in the history of Cypriot justice. [CyprusMail (Internet Edition), 
21 March 2009], 
13
 Ibid. 
16
 llassapi, A.: Limassol Bar Association speaks out against court decision acquitting police of-
ficers [CyprusMail (Internet Edition, 25 March 2009]. 
17 Ibid. 
18
 Theodoulou: AG: Court decision... op. cit. See also Theodoulou: Black page in the history... 
op. cit. 
19 Ibid. 
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Interestingly, the recent development in Cyprus recalls similar incidents around the 
world: riots following acquittal on criminal charges. Two examples will suffice to illustrate 
this point. First, in 1992 the acquittal of the four policemen charged in California v. Powell 
et ai with the beating of Rodney King 'unleashed the rage of many in L.A. [Los Angeles]';20 
it caused terrible rioting. In a cruel coincidence, that incident, like the recent one in Cyprus, 
was caught on video when it occurred in 1991. The second example is Jessica La! case that 
caused serious protests and riots in India in 1998. In fact, such was the impact of the riots 
that the government of India was forced to order a retrial of the case.21 Importantly, both of 
these incidents, like the present Efstathiou case in Cyprus, raised the questions of trial by 
media and fair trial. 
3. Analysis/Critique 
From all the foregoing public reactions, it is clear that issues of judicial independence, trial 
by media and fair trial have been raised, among others. This article will attempt to briefly 
address the specifically mentioned issues here. For convenience and clarity, these issues 
will be addressed in two sub-sections. The first sub-section will address the issue of 
independence of the judiciary while the succeeding sub-section will deal with the issue of 
trial by media and fair trial as well as the closely related issue of contempt of court. 
3. I. Independence of the Judiciary12 
Judges individually shall be free, and it shall be their duty, to decide matters before 
them impartially, in accordance with their assessment of the facts and their 
understanding of the law without any restrictions, influences, inducements, pressures, 
threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.23 
20
 Cannon, L.: Rodney King's Legacy, <http://www.courttv.com/archive/casefiles/rodneyking/> 
(accessed 27 April 2009). 
21
 Samanta, N.: Trial by Media - Jessica Lai Case. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1003644> (ac-
cessed 22 April 2009). 
22
 There is a large body of literature on the concept of independence of the judiciary in re-
lation to both national and international-regional courts and tribunals. See, by example, Bradley, 
A.W.-Ewing, K. D.: Constitutional and Administrative Law, 14,h ed. Essex 2007, 388-395; Kirby, 
M.: A global approach to judicial independence and integrity, University of Queensland Law Jour-
nal 21/2 (2001) 147-159; Larkins, C. M.: Judicial independence and Democratization, American 
Journal of Comparative Law, 44 ( 1996) 605-626; Mackenzie, R.-Sands, P.: International courts and 
tribunals and the independence of the international judge. Harvard International Law Journal, 44 
(2003) 271 285; Olbourne, В.: Independence and Impartiality: International Standards for National 
Judges and Courts. The Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, 2 (2003) 97-126; 
Claus, L.: Constitutional Guarantees of the Judiciary: Jurisdiction, Tenure, and Beyond. American 
Journal of Comparative Law, 64 (2006) 459-483; Lord Hope of Craighead: Judicial Independence. 
Scots Law Times, 13 (2003) 105— 111; Plaxton, M.: The Neutrality Thesis and the Rothstein Hear-
ing. University of New Brunswick Law Journal, 58 (2008) 92-104. 
23
 Article 2:02 of the Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice (the 'Montreal Dec-
laration'); quoted in Olowofoyeku, A. A.: Suing Judges: A Study of Judicial Immunity. Oxford, 1993, 
1. The author explained the importance of this international instrument thus: 'The declaration was 
adopted at the first plenary session of the Is1 World Conference on the Independence of Justice which 
was held at Montreal on 10 June 1983. It was [and still is] a universal statement of principle. It stated 
the independence which "national judges" ought to enjoy.' Ibid. More recently, Article 1 of the Uni-
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As a concept, independence of the judiciary (or judicial independence) is well-
understood in most, if not all, parts of the world and has been defined or described by 
various authors24 as well as in various national and international instruments, including the 
UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary 19 8 5,25 the Latimer House 
Guidelines on Parliamentary Sovereignty and Judicial Independence 1998, and the Cairo 
Declaration on Judicial independence 2003. For present purposes, it is sufficient to refer to 
only two descriptions/definitions of the concept. According to Chris Maina Peter: 
Independence of the judiciary means [that] every judge or magistrate, as the case may 
he, is free to decide matters brought before him in accordance with his assessment of 
the facts and his understanding of the law without any improper influence, inducements, 
or pressures direct or indirect from any quarter or for any reason. There is a tendency 
of thinking that independence of the judiciary means just independence from the 
legislature and executive. In reality it means more than that. It also means independence 
from political influence whether exerted by the political organ of the State, or by 
political parties, or the general public...26 (emphasis added). 
Importantly, the above statement echoes the provision of Article 2 of the UN Basic 
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary 1985, which states that ' the judiciary shall 
decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the 
law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or 
interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason'. Based on this, it is 
important to underline that judicial decisions arc based on facts placed before the court and 
the extant law (lex lata), and not on de lege ferenda (the law as it ought to be). 
versai Charter of the Judge 1999 provides that 'the independence of the judge is indispensable to 
impartial justice under the law. It is indivisible. All institutions and authorities, whether national or 
international, must respect, protect and defend that independence'. More importantly, Article 2 thereof 
provides, inter alia, that ' . . .The Judge, as a holder of judicial office, must be able to exercise judicial 
powers free from social, economic and political pressure...' The Charter was adopted at the meeting 
of the Central Council of the International Association of Judges in Taipei (Taiwan) on 17 Novem-
ber 1999. See further Recommendation No. R (94) 12 (on the independence, efficiency and role of 
Judgesj-adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 13 October 1994, esp. 
Principle 1; European Charter on the Statute for Judges (adopted at a multilateral meeting held 8 -10 
July 1998 in Strasbourg, under the auspices of the Council of Europe). 
24
 See Canivet, G.-Andcnas, M.-Fairgrieve, D. (eds.): Independence, Accountability, and the 
Judiciary. London, 2006. 
25
 Adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treat-
ment of Offenders held at Milan from 26 August to 6 September 1985 and endorsed by General As-
sembly resolutions 40/32 of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985. 
26
 Peter, C. M.: Independence of the Judiciary in Tanzania: Many Rivers to Cross. In: Jjuuko, 
W. F. (ed.): The Independence of the Judiciary and the Rule of Law: Strengthening Constitutional 
Activism in East Africa. Kampala, 2005, 58. See also the speech of the Chief Justice of South Af-
rica, Mohamed С. J.: The Role of the Judiciary in a Constitutional State, South Africa Law Journal, 
(1998) 111, at 112-113: 'What judicial independence means in principle is simply the right and 
the duty of judges to perform the function of judicial adjudication, through an application of their 
own integrity and the law, without any actual or perceived, direct or indirect interference from or 
dependence on any other person or institution... ' The speech was given at the occasion of the first 
orientation course for newly appointed judges in South Africa. 
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In summary, one can say that independence of the judiciary essentially requires that 
judges should be free to decide cases brought before them without fear of any reprisal 
against them. This ensures that they dispense justice fairly, impartially and without fear or 
favour. To be sure, the impartial dispensation of justice is in the interest of the society in 
general. As the Kenyan Section of the International Commission of Jurists (KSICJ) explains, 
'the judiciary is the guardian of the rights of man and it protects the rights from all 
possibilities of individual and public encroachments'.27 (One critical question raised in the 
recent Cypriot case under consideration here is whether the judiciary has failed in its 
constitutional role, but this is beyond the scope of the present article). This is why most, if 
not all countries of the world, institute constitutional, statutory and other measures to ensure 
the independence of the judiciary, including the concept of judicial immunity which 
insulates judges from legal (civil and criminal) actions based on what they said or did in the 
course of judicial proceedings. At the international level, Article 2: 24 of the Universal 
Declaration on the Independence of Justice (the 'Montreal Declaration') 1983 provides that 
'Judges shall enjoy immunity from suit, or harassment, for acts and omissions in their 
official capacity'. Furthermore, the 1985 UN instrument on the independence of the judiciary 
enjoins States to guarantee the independence of the judiciary and enshrine it in the 
Constitution or the law of the country.2" On the aspect of judicial immunity at the national 
level, Olowofoyeku has explained the general position in the common-law world as 
follows:29 
Judges arc not free from error and some do not always take good care. The errors or 
lack of due care may, if and when they occur, have disastrous consequences for a 
litigant. The problem is the correct course of action when such a situation occurs. 
Various legal systems have developed their own ways of coping with the problem. The 
common-law world [including Cyprus] has generally adopted a rather benign approach 
than stoning the judges-it has shrouded them in an almost impregnable protective 
cloak. A judge could go to sleep during trial, spend four years in reaching a decision, 
be slanderous, and yet anyone aggrieved by his behaviour will usually have no 
recourse. This is known as absolute immunity.30 
This is consistent with the exposition of Lord Denning in his speech in Sirros v. 
Moore,21 thus: 
Ever since the year 1613, if not before, it has been accepted in our law that no action is 
maintainable against a judge for anything said or done by him in the exercise of a 
jurisdiction which belongs to him. The words which he speaks are protected by an 
27
 Kenyan Section of the International Commission of Jurists, Best Practice Guide for Judicial 
Independence. Nairobi, 2007. 
2
» Article 1. 
29
 Olowofoyeku: op. cit. 2. 
30
 The author referred to relevant material drawn from common-law countries such as the U.K, 
U.S., New Zealand and Nigeria. Note that this author believes that the common law position needs 
reconsideration, especially in contemporary times. See Olowofoyeku, A. A.: Accountability versus 
Independence: The Impact of Judicial Immunity. In: Canivet-Andenas-Fairgrieve (eds.): op. cit. 357, 
esp. at 383. 
31
 Sirros v. Moore [1975] Queen's Bench, 118. Note that the common law position re-stated by 
Lord Denning is reinforced by section 2(5) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 which absolves the 
Crown of any liability for any person discharging judicial or quasi-judicial functions. 
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absolute privilege. The orders which he gives, and the sentences which he imposes, 
cannot be made the subject of civil proceedings against him. No matter that the judge 
was under some gross error or ignorance, or was actuated by envy, hatred and malice, 
and all uncharitableness, he is not liable to an action. The remedy of the party aggrieved 
is to appeal to a Court of Appeal or to apply for habeas corpus, or a writ of error or 
certiorari, or take some such step to reverse his ruling... The reason is not because the 
judge has any privilege to make mistakes or to do wrong. It is so that he should be able 
to do his duty with complete independence and free from fear. It was well stated by 
Lord Tenterden C.J. in Garnett v. Ferrand (1827) 6 B. & C. 611, 625: "This freedom 
from action and question at the suit of an individual is given by the law to the judges, 
not so much for their own sake as for the sake of the public, and for the advancement 
of justice, that being free from actions, they may be free in thought and independent in 
judgment, as all who are to administer justice ought to be".32 
With specific regard to Cyprus, it is important to note that the principle of judicial 
immunity is given expression in Articles 133(10) and 154( 10) of the Constitution of Cyprus 
1960 which provides that no action shall be brought against the President of the Supreme 
Court or the High Court or any other judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court for any 
act done or words spoken in his judicial capacity. The independence of the Cypriot judiciary 
is further guaranteed by other means, including: (1) the mode of appointment (designed 
to prevent executive or other institutional influence33); (2) security of salary (a judge's 
remuneration cannot be altered to his disadvantage after his appointment34 and constitutes a 
charge on the consolidated fund35); (3) security of tenure (once appointed, a judge cannot 
be removed until he/she attains the retirement age of 68 years, except for misconduct 
determined by an independent Council established under the Constitution36). In fact, in a 
recent report on the state of human rights in Cyprus it was acknowledged that the Cypriot 
judiciary is independent.37 
It is important to emphasize that the judicial immunity enjoyed by judges 'applies to 
both civil and criminal liability, and protests judges in respect of acts of a judicial nature'.38 
While the principle of judicial immunity do not purport to insulate judges against public 
32
 Sirros v. Moore [at p. 132]. See also Fray v. Blackburn (1863) 122 ER 217, where Crompton 
J. said: 'It is a principle of our law that no action will lie against a judge of one of the superior courts 
[as well as inferior courts and persons presiding over quasi-judicial bodies] for a judicial act, though 
it be alleged to have been done maliciously and corruptly...The public are deeply interested in this 
rule, which, indeed exists for their benefit, and was established in order to secure the independence of 
judges ' . See further Scott v. Stansfield ( 1868) LR 3 Ex 220, 223 per Kelly CB. 
33
 See generally Constitution of Cyprus, Articles 133 and 153. 
34
 Articles 133(12) and 153(12). 
33
 Article 166(l)(b). 
36
 See Constitution of Cyprus, Articles 133(7) & (8) and 153(7) & (8). The retirement age of 
first instance judges is 63 years. See Courts of Justice Law 14/60 (as amended), section 8(2). See also 
Constitution of Cyprus, Article 158(3). 
37
 US Department of State, 2008 Human Rights Report: Cyprus (Washington, DC 2009) sec-
tion 1(e), <http://www.state.gOv/g/drl/rls/hnpt/2008/eur/l 19074.htm> (accessed 23 April 2009). 
38
 Olowofoyeku: op. cit. 77. However, with regard to criminal liability, the immunity is not 
absolute. See I bid. 76. 
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criticisms,39 it is contended that certain kinds of public criticism-especially by certain 
responsible and highly-placed persons in the society (such as high officers of government 
and lawyers)-could amount to intimidation or political pressure and, more seriously, have 
the capacity to instill fear in judges40 apart from their potential to undermine public 
confidence in the judiciary and/or lower the integrity and prestige of the courts in the eyes 
of the people. When this happens, the hallowed independence of the judiciary (or 
'independence of justice', as the 1983 Montreal Declaration calls it)41 is compromised, to 
the detriment of the judicial system and the society in general. This appears to be the present 
situation in Cyprus as a result of the high-profile criticisms of the judiciary by the President 
of the Republic of Cyprus, the Attorney-General of the Republic Cyprus and senior Cypriot 
lawyers, inter alia, following the decision of the Nicosia Assize Court to acquit the ten 
policemen charged with assaulting two young Cypriot students.42 
In Britain, the need to preserve and protect the independence of the judiciary explains 
the existence of the British constitutional convention which forbids members of Parliament 
from asking Ministers questions which border on the criticism of judges in the Parliament.43 
This is also why British Ministers generally refrain from criticizing judges publicly, though 
instances of such criticisms can be pointed to.44 It is possible that the President of the 
Cyprus Bar Association had this approach in mind when he issued the statement earlier 
stated above. Arguably, the British approach reflects the acceptable approach in the Republic 
of Cyprus as it is consistent with the general approach within the commonwealth. Viewed 
this way, it is submitted that the reaction of the Attorney-General of Cyprus (as briefly 
stated above) was unrestrained, precipitate, and against the spirit of independence of the 
judiciary, and probably unprofessional. Similar comments could apply to the reaction of the 
President of the Republic, but it is important to note that he recognized that his criticism 
might impinge on the independence of the judiciary and declared his respect for it. 
Importantly, the President's recognition of the independence of the judiciary is in line with 
Article 2: 04 of the 1983 Montreal Declaration which states that 'the judiciary shall be 
independent of the executive and the legislature'. 
All in all, there is no gain-saying that the independence of the judiciary is important 
and indispensable in all democratic countries. In this context, Olowofoyeku has rightly 
stated: 
39
 See The Role of the Judge in Contemporary Society, United Nations Crime and Justice Re-
search Institute (UNICRI) Publication No 24, 1984, where it was stated: 'Independence does not, 
however, mean absence of responsibility for his own actions. The concept which regards the judge as 
unrestrained by law (legibus solitus) would end, sooner or later, in protecting not so much his neces-
sary freedom, as the arbitrariness of his decisions'. Ibid. 20. 
40
 Bradley and Ewing note that 'judicial independence requires that judges should be protected 
from political pressure to reach decisions which suit the government or other powerful interests' See 
Bradley-Ewing: op. cit. 390. 
41
 For a recent and interesting discussions and debate on the independence of the judiciary in 
some parts of the world, see Canivet-Andenas-Fairgrieve (eds.): op. cit. 
42
 Compare Addo, M. K.: Freedom of Expression and the Criticism of Judges: A Comparative 
Study of European Legal Standards. Dartmouth, 2000; Cornelia, F.: Freedom of Expression in Politi-
cal Contexts: Some Reflections on the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights. In: Wo-
jciech Sadurski (ed.): Political Rights Under Stress in 21s' Century Europe. Oxford, 2006, 116. 
43
 See Bamett, H.: Constitutional & Administrative Law., 7th ed. Oxford, 2009, 388. 
44
 See Bradley-Ewing: op. cit. 390-391. 
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In a publication released jointly by the International Association of Judges and the 
United Nations Social Defence Research Institution,45 judicial independence was seen 
as an essential prerequisite for guaranteeing all the basic rights and freedoms 
acknowledged by modern civilized society. As such, the legal system [of all countries 
of the world, especially common law countries such as Cyprus] must protect such 
independence against any encroachment by other powers, and must clearly provide the 
means to defend the judge against all abuses and pressures from individuals or 
groups.46 
The next question is whether the Supreme Court of Cyprus was right to issue a public 
response to the reaction of the Attorney-General. This is not an easy question which could 
be answered simply by 'yes' or 'no ' . Going by English experience, and this is by no means 
a universal one, judges hardly respond to press criticisms. In an annual lecture of the Judicial 
Studies Board entitled 'Judicial Independence', delivered on 5 November 1996, Lord 
Bingham suggested that judges should be 'thick-skinned' enough to ignore press comments 
or criticisms.47 On this view, judges should refrain from personal response to criticisms. 
This was also the view expressed by Lord Denning in R. v. Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner, Ex parte Blackburn48 and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 
the Case of Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria49 Yet, it has been asked, 'if the judge decides 
not to respond, who is to speak on behalf of the judiciary?'50 Perhaps, this should be left for 
a Minister-particularly the Minister in charge of the Department of Justice, as in the U.K.51 
In fact, section 3 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 imposes a duty on the Lord 
Chancellor (i.e. U.K Minister of Justice) to uphold the continued independence of the 
judiciary.52 Even so, it has also been forcefully and rightly argued that 'where necessary, an 
independent judiciary should be defending itself'.51 An exemplary occasion, it has been 
suggested, is when a judge suffers a well-publicized and personal attack by a journalist of 
considerable seniority and influence.54 It is submitted that caustic and sustained criticisms 
45
 See UNICRI publication. 
46
 Olowofoyeku: op. cit. 1-2. 
47
 Bingham, T.: The Business of Judging. Oxford, 2000, 61-62. The expression "thick-skinned" 
enough to ignore press comments' was a summary made by Alisdair Gillespie. See Gillespie, A.: The 
English Legal System. Oxford, 2007, 205. 
48
 R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Ex parte Blackburn [1968] 2 All England Law Re-
ports, 319, at 320. ('Those who comment can deal faithfully with all that is done in a court of justice. 
They can say we are mistaken, and our decisions erroneous, whether they are subject to appeal or not. 
All we would ask is that those who criticize us will remember that, from the nature of our office, we 
cannot reply to their criticisms.') 
49
 Case of Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, Judgment of 26 April 1995, Series A vol. 313, 
para. 34 ( ' . . . judges who have been criticized are subject to a duty of discretion that precludes them 
from replying'). 
50
 Pannick, D.: Should judges respond to criticism? (The Times, 27 November 2008). 
51
 Sec Gillespie: The English Legal System, op. cit. 206-207. 
52
 The duty extends to other Ministers (including the Prime Minister) and 'all with responsibil-
ity for matters relating to the judiciary or administration of justice'. Ibid. This may be regarded as a 
codification of a long-standing constitutional convention. See further Article 6 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights (made applicable domestically in the U.K by the Human Rights Act 1998). 
53
 See Pannick: Should judges respond... op. cit. Lord Pannick, QC is one of the top 10 most 
influential UK lawyers. See 'The Times Law 100 2009' (The Times, 23 July 2009). 
34
 Ibid. 
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by an Attorney-General, senior lawyers and/or other influential members of the society 
would qualify as such occasion. Hence, the Supreme Court of Cyprus was arguably right to 
have issued a statement in response to the avowed criticism by the Cypriot Attorney-General 
of the recent decision of the Nicosia Assize Court. Surely, it is respectfully submitted, the 
reaction of the Cypriot Attorney-General and other senior lawyers, more than that of the 
society in general, greatly damaged the legal profession and the integrity and prestige of the 
courts, judges and the entire Cypriot judicial system. 
In 2008, the British Judicial Communications Office issued a brief written statement in 
response to a critical media statement of the Editor of Daily Mail against a judge.55 The 
then Lord Chancellor, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, also gave an interview defending judicial 
independence. Importantly, the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution 
approves and encourages this approach. There are also instances in Britain when judges had 
felt able to defend themselves from public criticisms by sending their response as a letter to 
the press.56 Interestingly, the response of the Supreme Court of Cyprus is in line with the 
approach of Lord Chancellor Lord Irvine of Lairg in 2003 in response to the criticism of 
judges by the Home Secretary. He said: 'Maturity requires that when you get a decision that 
favours you, you do not clap. And when you get one that goes against you, you do not 
boo'.57 The Supreme Court of Cyprus said much the same when it suggested that in 
attacking the judges/judiciary the Attorney-General of Cyprus had lost his 'self-control'.58 
3.2. Trial by Media versus Fair Trial54 
"Trial by newspaper," like all catch phrases, may be loosely used, but it summarizes an 
evil influence upon the administration of criminal justice...60 
Another important issue that arose in the Efstathiou case was whether the media publicity 
of the unfortunate incident compromised fair trial in the case.61 The trial court stated in its 
judgment that the media coverage of the alleged criminal act (before and during the 
proceedings)62 'constituted serious interference in the course of justice and pre-empted the 
outcome of the trial',63 and that 'it constitutes a usurpation of the judicial authority and 
contempt of court'.64 However, it has been doubted whether the media publications really 
affected the outcome of the case; if it did, it has been argued, the outcome of the case would 
55
 Ibid. 
* Ibid. 
57
 Ibid. 
58
 See Theodoulou: Black page in the history... op. cit. 
59
 See generally, Law Commission of India: 200lh Report on Trial by Media: Free Speech and 
Fair Trial under Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. New Delhi, 2006; available at: <http:/ / lawcom-
missionofindia.nic.in/reports/rep200.pdf > (accessed 27 April 2009); Eady, D.-Eady, A.-Smith: 
On Contempt, 3rd ed., London, 2005; Bonnington, A. J .-Mclnnes, R.-McKain, В.: Scots Law for 
Journalists 7,h ed., Edinburgh, 2000. 
60
 Per Justice Frankfurter in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946), at 351. 
61
 The Supreme Court of Cyprus condemned 'trial through the press' in Constantinides v. Vima 
Ltd., [at p. 359]. 
62
 By the judges' count, the number of articles written in relation to the case amounted to 361. 
See Charalambous, L. Police acquittal sets an eerie precedent for Helios trial [CyprusMail (Internet 
Edition), 29 March 2009]. 
63
 Reproduced in Evripidou: Former European Court of Human Rights Judge... op. cit. 
64
 Ibid. 
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have been different.65 Even so, it must be recognized that 'the principle of the independence 
of the judiciary entitles and requires the judiciary to ensure that judicial proceedings are 
conducted fairly and that the rights of the parties are respected'.66 Burges has succinctly 
explained the difference between 'trial by media' and 'fair trial', when he said:67 
[Tjrial by media by its very nature detracts from the notions of what the law describes 
as a fair trial. That is a trial free from prejudice. A trial where jurors [and judges] 
already have preconceived notions of the guilt or innocence of the accused can hardly 
be said to be "a fair and impartial trial" as defined in The King v. MacFarlane, ex par-
te О Tlanaghan and О Kelly ( 1923) 32 CLR 518, 541-542. 
The evil of trial by media was also disapproved in Attorney-General v. English.™ Lord 
Diplock explained that the public policy that underlies the strict liability rule established 
under section 1 of the English Contempt of Court Act 1981 is 'deterrence'. He then 
declared: 
Trial by newspaper or, as it should be more compendiously expressed today, trial by 
media, is not to be permitted in this country [U.K. and, indeed, elsewhere in the world]. 
That the risk that was created by the publication when it was actually published does 
not ultimately affect the outcome of the proceedings is, as Lord Goddard C.J. said in 
Reg. v. Evening Standard Co. Ltd. [1954] 1 Q.B. 578, 582, "neither here nor there..."69 
Under the Cypriot legal system, as is the case in all common law countries, an accused 
person is presumed innocent until he has been found guilty in a judicial proceeding. Article 
12(4) of the Constitution of Cyprus 1960 is categorical on this: 'Every person charged with 
an offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law'.70 The problem 
with media reporting of criminal acts or pending cases is that it often tends to find the 
accused guilty before trial or conclusion of trial, contrary to the requirements of fair 
hearing.71 As Naylor categorically states, 'it is clear that some media reporting poses a 
threat to the fair trial of the defendant'.72 In the same way, the Media Institute of Kenya has 
frankly admitted that 'in the coverage of court proceedings by the press, there arc cases 
where such coverage can imperil the administration of justice'.73 Hence, the law of contempt 
of court is meant to deter the potential effect of publications on an accused's right to fair 
65
 Ibid (per Loucaides: 'if the media really had influenced opinion then the judges would not 
have acquitted the ten officers'). 
66
 UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary 1985, Article 6. 
67
 Burgess, C.: Can "Dr Death" Receive a fair Trial? OUT Law & Justice Journal, (2007), 2; 
available at: < http://www.austlii .edu.aU/au/journals/QUTLJJ/2007/2.html > (accessed 24 April 
2009). 
68
 Attorney-General v. English [1983] 1 Appeal Cases, 116. 
« Ibid. 141. 
70
 This is exactly the provision of Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights 
1950. 
71
 This is not to suggest that issues of public interest should not be reported or discussed; far 
from that. What is objectionable is the tendency to interfere with judicial proceedings or find an ac-
cused person guilty on the pages of a newspaper. 
72
 Naylor, В.: Fair Trial or Free Press: Legal Responses to Media Reports of Criminal Trials, 
Cambridge Law Journal. 53 (1994) 492, at 501. 
73
 Makali, D. et. al: Fair Trial and the Freedom of the Press. In Makali, D. (ed.): Media Law 
and Practice: The Kenyan Jurisprudence. Nairobi, 2003. 
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and impartial trial as well as to protect the honour and integrity of courts of law. As 
adumbrated above, section 1 of the English Contempt of Court Act 198174 establishes 'strict 
liability rule' for contempt of court cases - defined to mean 'the rule of law whereby conduct 
may be treated as a contempt of court as tending to interfere with the course of justice in 
particular legal proceedings regardless of intent to do so'. According to section 2(2) thereof, 
this rule applies only to 'a publication which creates a substantial risk that the 
course of jus t ice in the proceedings in quest ion will be seriously impeded or 
prejudiced ' . 7 5 Importantly, the rule applies only if the proceedings in question are 'active'76 
as explained in the Act: for example, from arrest with or without warrant to the conclusion 
of the case - say by acquittal or sentence.77 
In Cyprus, the law of contempt of court is contained in the Courts of Justice Law 
14/60™ (as recently amended by the Courts of Justice (Amendment) Law 36( l)/2009).79 
Article 44(1) thereof provides in part, as follows:80 
Any person who, 
a) within the premises in which any judicial proceeding is being had or taken, or within the 
precincts of the same, shows disrespect, in speech or manner, of or with reference to 
such proceeding or any person before whom such proceeding is being had or taken,81 or 
b) causes an obstruction or disturbance in the course of a judicial proceeding, or 
c) while a judicial proceeding is pending. ..publishes any writing, makes any speech, or does 
any act misrepresenting such proceeding or is capable of prejudicing the fair trial of such 
74
 Revised Laws of the UK, Cap 49. 
75
 See generally, Miller, C. J.: Contempt of Court, 2nd ed., Oxford, 1990, Chapter 10. The law of 
contempt of court in England can partly be found in the common law. 
76
 Contempt of Court Act 1981, section 2(3). 
77
 Contempt of Court Act 1981, section 2(4) and schedule I. This provision is based on the 
leading case of Hall v. Associated Newspaper (1978) SLT 241 (Scotland). 
78
 This provision is largely based on Article 49 of the previous Cap. 8. Note that the law of 
contempt of court in Cyprus was made pursuant to Article 162 of the Constitution of Cyprus 1960. 
Furthermore, Articles 150 and 162 of the Constitution give the Supreme Court and the High Court 
respectively power to punish for contempt of itself. 
79
 The law was earlier amended by Law 166/1987. The amendment effected by Law 36(l)/2009 
was principally designed to bring the procedural aspects of contempt in the face of the court in Cy-
prus in line with the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Kyprianou v Cyprus (App 
No. 73797/01) ECHR, Judgment of 27 January 2004. Essentially, while Cypriot courts still have the 
power to punish for contempt committed in the face of the court, if the act constituting the contempt 
' tum against the person of the judge' (i.e. directed at the judge personally) he cannot adjudicate the 
matter personally but has to refer the matter to the President of the Supreme Court who may appoint 
another judge to adjudicate the matter. See Law 14/60 (as amended by Law 36(l)/2009), Article 44 
paras 2-10. The idea is to prevent an affected judge being a judge in his own cause, in breach of the 
right to fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
80
 I am grateful to my colleague, Dr Achilles Emilianides, for drawing my attention to the re-
cent amendment of Law 14/60 by Law 36(!)/2009. Moreover, 1 am grateful to him for translating the 
original Greek text of Law 36(l)/2009 into English for my convenience and for his useful comments 
on the draft of this article. Furthermore, I would also like to acknowledge the assistance of another 
colleague, Nicolas Angelides, who translated other Greek texts into English for me. However, I accept 
sole responsibility for any errors found in this article. 
81
 See Mantis v. The Police, Cyprus Law Reports, (1979) 125; Evangelou v. Police (No. 2) 
Cyprus Law Reports (2000) 224 (in Greek). 
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proceeding or of interrupting or delaying the course of justice or calculated to lower the 
authority of any person before whom such proceeding is being had or taken, or 
d) publishes a report of the evidence taken in any judicial proceeding at which, under this 
Law or any other Law for the time being in force, only the parties and their advocates or 
other representatives, if any, and the officers of the Court are permitted to be present, or 
e) publishes any writing, makes any speech or does any act containing scandalous matter 
respecting any Court which has adjudicated in any proceeding relating to any judicial 
proceeding, ... 
is guilty of a misdemeanour and is liable to imprisonment up to six months or to a fine not 
exceeding 450 CP [450 Cyprus Pounds (£CY450)] or to both sentences.82 
It is important to point out that the requirement of English law that to constitute 
contempt of court the criminal proceeding in question must be 'active' is generally the 
same as the requirement that the judicial proceeding be 'pending' under Cypriot law-i.e. 
from the time of arrest83 to the conclusion of the case. This is also the position in Nigerian 
law,84 as noted extra-judicially by Justice Alabi:85 'A criminal prosecution may be said to be 
pending...at any time after a person has been arrested and is in custody. It is not necessary 
that the accused person should have been committed for trial; nor is it necessary that he 
should have been brought before a court of summary jurisdiction'.86 Importantly, the same 
position holds in other common-law/commonwealth countries. For example, in AK Gopalan 
v. Noordeen87 the Indian Supreme Court held that a publication made after the 'arrest' of a 
person could be contempt if it was prejudicial to the suspect or accuscd. 
In fact, under the common law it is also contempt of court to publish prejudicial 
material about a criminal case when criminal proceedings are 'imminent'.88 Note that the 
82
 Since 1 January 2008 Cyprus has adopted the Euro as its national currency. The sum of 
£CY450 is now approximately €765 (seven hundred and sixty-five Euros). 
83
 This is consistent with the 24-hour rule under Article 11(5) of the 1960 Constitution of 
Cyprus: A 'person arrested shall, as soon as is practicable after his arrest, and in any event not later 
than twenty-four hours after the arrest, be brought before a judge, if not earlier released'. According 
to Hall's case, once a person is arrested he comes within the 'care and protection' of the court, as he 
has to be produced in court within 24 hours. In his introduction to the 200lh Report of the Law [Re-
form] Commission of India, the Chairman, Justice M.J. Rao, explains that: 'The reason for fixing 
arrest as the starting point is that, if a publication is made after arrest referring to the person's char-
acter, previous conviction or confessions etc., the person's case will be prejudiced even in bail pro-
ceedings when issues arise as to whether bail is to be granted or refused, or as to what conditions 
are to be imposed and whether there should be police remand or judicial remand. Such publications 
may also affect the trial when it takes place later'. See Law Commission of India: op. cit. 
84
 See generally, Fawehinmi, G.: The Law of Contempt in Nigeria (Case Book). Lagos, 1980. 
85
 Justice Alabi, A. A. was sometime the Chief Judge of Lagos State, Nigeria. 
86
 Alabi, A.A.: Contempt of Court and the Sub-Judice Rule. In Oyeyipo, T.A.-Gummi, L. H -
Umezulike, I. A. (eds.): Judicial Integrity, Independence and Reforms'. Essavs in Honour of Hon. 
Justice M.L Uwais. Enugu, 2006, 181, at 183. 
87
 A. K. Gopalan v. Noordeen (1969) 2 Supreme Court of Cases, 734. 
88
 Ibid. See also Rex v. Parke (1903) 2 KB 432, at 437^438; R v. Savundranayagan. All Eng-
land Law Reports (1968), 439, 441; Attorney-General v. News Group Newspapers pic [1989] QB 
110, at 125 and 130 (per Watkins LJ); R. v. Horsham Justices (1982) 2 QB 762 (dealing with the 
term' imminent ' in the 1981 Act, section 4(2)). Cf. R. v. Clarke, ex parte Crippen [1910] 27 TLR 32; 
James v. Robinson (1963) 109 Commonwealth Law Reports, 593 (High Court of Australia). Note 
that the English Contempt of Court Act 1981 only amended, and did not abolish, the common law of 
contempt of court. 
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contempt committed when a judicial proceeding is 'pending' or 'active' is known as sub 
judice contempt. Importantly, as can be gleaned from the provisions of Article 44 of Law 
14/60 (as amended by Law 36(l)/2009) the central purpose of sub judice contempt of court 
is to guarantee fair hearing. As Burgess rightly surmised 'the principal aim of sub judice 
contempt is to prevent publications that may damage fair trial before any damage is 
done'.84 Furthermore, note that a case remains sub judice until the time within which notice 
of appeal might be given has expired, or, if an appeal is brought, until the appeal is heard 
and determined. This is the common law position which still applies in Nigeria,90 Cyprus 
and some other common law countries (not including Britain). Hence, some of the 
unrestrained adverse comments in the media about the decision of the Nicosia Assize Court 
on the Efstathiou case before the time of appeal to the Supreme Court of Cyprus had expired 
and also after an appeal had been lodged and pending determination could well be 
contemptuous of the court and the entire Cypriot judiciary.91 In Britain, the Contempt of 
Court Act 1981 has given more latitude to freedom of speech by modifying the common 
law position in some important respects. For instance, Section 5 thereof exempts publications 
made as or as part of a discussion in good faith of public affairs or other matters of general 
public interest from the strict liability rule established under section 1 thereof'if the risk of 
impediment or prejudice to particular legal proceedings is merely incidental to the 
discussion'. This development is well explained by Walker as follows: 
Under section 2(3) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 (UK) a publisher is not liable 
under the strict liability rule unless proceedings were 'active' at the time of the 
publication of the material. The First Schedule to the Act sets out when proceedings 
are 'active'. In the case of criminal proceedings, the starting point is similar to the 
starting point for when criminal proceedings arc 'pending' rather than ' imminent ' . 
The legislation does, however, give greater freedom to publishers than the common 
law as it is applied in Australia [and some other common law countries such as Cyprus]. 
For example, under the Act, criminal proceedings are active until there is an acquittal, 
sentence, verdict or discontinuance of the proceedings; appellate proceedings are active 
from the time they are commenced until they are disposed of or abandoned, 
discontinued or withdrawn. Unlike the common law position, the media are free to 
publish material without fear of contempt proceedings during the gap between the 
conclusion of proceedings at first instance and the initiation of an appeal. Furthermore, 
where a court remits criminal proceedings to the court below or orders a new trial, 
the further proceedings are active only from the conclusion of the appellate proceedings. 
It follows that a statement published before a retrial is ordered cannot constitute contempt 
on the ground only of its possible effect on a judge or jurors in any new trial.92 
89
 Burgess: op. cit. 
90
 See Fawehinmi v. A-G, Lagos State (No. 2) Nigerian Weekly Law Reports, 3 (1989) 740, Rex 
v. Duffy & ors. Ex-parte Nash. All England Law Reports, 2 (1960) 891. 
91
 See Constantinides v. Vi ma Ltd. This was an application in the Supreme Court of Cyprus for 
stay of appeal based on the contemptuous publications in newspapers made by the appellant before 
the appeal was heard. The court found that the impugned publications, 'however benevolently one 
may interpret them...contain a scurrilous attack on the Judges who tried the case and...the judiciary 
as well.' [At p. 357.] Accordingly, it ordered that the appeal be stayed until the appellant restores by 
appropriate action the authority of the court to do justice in the case. 
92
 Walker, S.: Freedom of Speech and Contempt of Court: The English and Australian Ap-
proaches Compared, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 40 (1991) 583, at 590. See also 
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It is equally important to note that in most common law jurisdictions it is settled law 
that mere criticism of the conduct of a judge or court, even if such criticism is strongly-
worded, is not contempt, as long as the criticism is fair, temperate and made in good 
faith.93 As the Nigerian Supreme Court has explained, 'the rationale for contempt is the 
need to vindicate the dignity of the court and thereby protect due administration of justice, 
rather than to bolster the power and dignity of the judge as an individual'.94 Lord Denning 
made the same point earlier in R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Ex parte Blackburn 
(No. 2).95 Yet, as argued above, such criticism may impinge on the independence of the 
judiciary. In Constantinides v. Vi ma Ltd"' the Supreme Court of Cyprus made this point as 
follows: 
On any view of the articles complained of, however benevolently one may interpret 
them, they contain a scurrilous attack on the Judges who tried the case and, the 
Judiciary as well. Mr. Constantinides, under the guise of criticism, in the first article 
published three days after the delivery of judgment, questioned the impartiality of the 
trial Court, as well as the Judiciary... Nothing said in this judgment is designed to li-
mit the right of the public to criticize judicial action. Not only the public-especially 
the press-has a right, but a duty as well to criticize judicial action whenever they 
think that criticism is merited in the public interest. Nobody is above the law. Least 
of all Judges. We are duty bound to administer justice according to law. The 
administration of justice is all important to the wcllbeing of society and concerns 
everyone. We are not here confronted...with a bona fide criticism of a judgment of 
the Court, but with a litigant attempting to vindicate his proclaimed rights through 
the press, by destroying the premises upon which justice is administered, that is, the 
impartiality of the Judiciary.97 
Contempt of Court Act 1981, schedule I (paras 4, 5, II , 15 and 16). To the like effect Parker L. J. said 
in Attorney-General v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. [1987] QB 1, 17: '[I]t is important to remember 
that the Act...provides that the strict liability rule does not apply until the proceedings concerned 
become active. Thus a publication will be wholly protected if it happens to be made the day before 
High Court proceedings, the course of justice in which it is alleged that it will seriously prejudice or 
impede, are set down. Thereafter it will not be completely protected...' The extant law on contempt 
of court in Cyprus may be modified along the current British law, since the recent amendment ef-
fected by Law 36(l)/2009 did not get to this extent. Note, however, that Walker maintains that the 
1981 British Act did not go as far as the Australian High Court has gone (in developing the common 
law) in Hinch v. Attorney-General (Victoria) Commonwealth Law Reports, (1987) 15 (High Court of 
Australia). See Walker, ibid, 585. For an overview of the English contempt of court law, see Bradley-
Ewing: op. cit. 395-404. 
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No doubt the public has a 'right to know' and the media/press has a constitutional/ 
statutory and/or traditional duty to inform the public, particularly with regard to 'issues of 
public interest' (including judicial matters).98 The 'right to know' is based on the 
fundamental right to ' freedom of expression' (also called 'freedom of speech'). The 
grievous assaults, inhuman and degrading treatments allegedly meted to the two hapless 
Cypriot students by the Cyprus Police was obviously a case of public interest and the media 
was generally right in reporting it, subject to what is said below. As has been seen above, 
most observers who commented on the decision of the Nicosia Assize Court argued that it 
was within their constitutional right to freedom of expression-which states that 'every 
person has the right to freedom of speech and expression in any form' 9 9- to criticize 
government institutions, including courts of law. Importantly, they also suggest that the 
media was entirely right in its coverage of the case from the time of the unfortunate 
incident. 
However, the point must be made that while the right to free speech is important it 
must not be forgotten that an accused person is equally entitled under Cypriot law and 
Constitution100 as well as under the Council of Europe human rights instruments'01 and 
international law102 to fair hearing.103 These opposing rights-right to freedom of speech/ 
expression and right to fair trial/hearing-can sometimes be in conflict. This is 'most likely 
to arise when a media organisation publishes material which may interfere with the course 
of particular legal proceedings'.104 As Burgess has rightly observed, 'by exercising one's 
right to freedom of speech one can conceivably threaten another person's right to be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law'.105 In Attorney-General v. MGN 
Ltd)06 Schiemann LJ put the problem in perspective when he stated: 
The present application focuses, as these applications usually do, on the tension 
between two desiderata-( 1 ) the desire that a person facing trial should face a tribunal 
which is not prejudiced against him by reason of matters which have not been proved 
98
 See R. v. West [1996] 2 Criminal Appeal Reports, 374, 385-386 per Lord Taylor CJ. The 
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(83/1996/702/894), Judgment of 29 August 1997, para 50. 
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in evidence, and (2) the desire that newspapers should be free to publish what they 
please. The tension is particularly strong in cases which are of widespread public inte-
rest because of the notoriety of the persons or deeds involved. The problems posed by 
this tension are real and recurring.107 
Hence, the critical question that arises is to what extent pre-trial reporting may be 
properly made without the risk of prejudicing the accused's 'right to fair trial' (also called 
'right to fair hearing').108 In Sheppard v. Maxwell,109 the US Supreme court considered this 
question and held that the massive, pervasive, and prejudicial publicity attending the 
petitioner's prosecution prevented him from receiving a fair trial; and that though freedom 
of discussion (freedom of speech) should be given the widest range compatible with the fair 
and orderly administration of justice, it must not be allowed to divert a trial from its purpose 
of adjudicating controversies according to legal procedures based on evidence received only 
in open court. Accordingly, the court ordered a new trial for the petitioner/accused because 
of the prejudicial impact of the media publicity on his murder trial 12 years earlier. 
More recently, the same approach has been sanctioned in English cases as can be seen 
in the case of Attorney-General v. MGN Ltd.uo In that case, there had been a period of 
'saturation coverage' over a number of years about the relationship between a well-known 
television personality and her boyfriend. The publications disclosed his violent behaviour 
and details of his previous convictions. He was later arrested and charged with serious 
assault. Various newspapers published stories about the alleged incident. The accused 
applied successfully for a stay of the criminal proceedings on the ground that the press 
coverage of the case made it impossible for him to have a fair and impartial/unprejudiced 
trial. Although the present application for committal of some newspapers for contempt of 
court failed on its facts, this did not affect the order of stay of criminal proceedings against 
the accused which was made by the trial judge. In fact, the Divisional Court which heard 
this case observed: 
The solicitor General has drawn our attention to no less than three cases in the last six 
months where ... a prosecution has been stayed indefinitely because of pre-trial 
publicity. Clearly that seriously prejudices the course of justice. There must be many 
others where a trial has had to be delayed or moved to a less convenient place and 
where it could be submitted that the course of justice has been seriously impeded.111 
In a nutshell, these and other relevant authorities appear to suggest that prejudicial 
publications relating to criminal suspects and accused persons should be avoided in order 
not to imperil the path of justice. For example, previous convictions and other criminal 
records should not be published and the names of suspects and accused persons should not 
107
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be mentioned when commenting on criminal issues of public interest which are the subject 
of imminent or pending judicial proceedings. Moreover, suggestions of guilt (or innocence) 
should be avoided: that is the job of the courts. 
Although a 'pro-free speech approach'-i.e. granting greater freedom of speech and 
sometimes privileging the same over the right to fair trial-can sometimes be seen in 
contemporary UK jurisprudence (based on interpretation of the 1981 English Contempt of 
Court Act and following European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence)"2 as 
well as in US cases (see below), the Sheppard case approach is still generally good law in 
most common-law/commonwealth countries, such as Nigeria and Kenya, and there is 
nothing to suggest that Cypriot law is different from the general common-law/common-
wealth position, except to the extent that it reflects the current position of the ECtHR ," 3 
Importantly, note that though the Sheppard case (as well as similar UK cases) relates 
to trial by jury, its principle applies with equal force to cases tried by a judge or judges 
alone (i.e. trial without jury). Yet, some commentators on the recent Nicosia Assize Court 
decision have suggested that since the case was decided by a panel of three legally qualified 
judges alone without a lay jury"4 there was no possibility of extraneous influence-such as 
newspaper publications-affecting their judgment."5 For example, this was the unequivocal 
view of Loucaides."6 However, it is contended that this view is wrong. Undoubtedly, 
a judge by his training is expected to avoid adverse media publicity affecting his judgment. 
Nevertheless, it must be remembered that he lives in the same society as others and does 
and feels very much like other members of the society; hence, he could be influenced by 
adverse/prejudicial publicity against an accused person standing trial before him. As Justice 
Cardozo of the US Supreme Court has pertinently reminded us in his seminal book The 
nature of the Judicial Process, 'the great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do 
not turn aside in their course and pass the judges by ' . " 7 Similarly, Justice Alabi made this 
point extra-judicially thus: 
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In the case of a trial by a judge alone, it is only in rare cases that a publication will 
be held to constitute a contempt... as it is acccptcd that judges arc capable of guarding 
against allowing any prejudicial matter to influence them in deciding a case; but a 
campaign of pressure might be so great that even a judge could not be safely assumed 
to be unaffected by it.118 (emphasis added) 
According to the Indian Supreme Court, publications which are prejudicial to a suspect 
or accused may also affect judges 'subconsciously', and this can be at the stage of granting 
or refusing bail or at the trial. In In re PC Senf9 the Supreme Court stated that 'no 
distinction is, in our judgment, warranted that comment on a pending case or abuse of a 
party may amount to contempt when the case is triable with the aid of a Jury and not when 
it is triable by a Judge or Judges'.120 Importantly, this reasoning and conclusion can be 
seen in the decision of the Supreme Court of Cyprus in Georgiades v. Republic.121  
Furthermore, the point was made even much clearer by the US Supreme Court in Pennekamp 
v. Florida]22 thus: 
No judge fit to be one is likely to be influenced consciously except by what he sees 
and hears in court and by what is judicially appropriate for his deliberations. 
However, judges are also human, and we know better than did our forbears how 
powerful is the pull of the unconscious and how treacherous the rational process. 
While the ramparts of reason have been found to be more fragile than the Age of 
Enlightenment had supposed, the means for arousing passion and confusing judgment 
have been reinforced. And since judges, however stalwart, are human, the delicate 
task of administering justice ought not to be made unduly difficult by irresponsible 
print... If men, including judges and journalists, were angels, there would be no 
problems of contempt of court. Angelic judges would be undisturbed by extraneous 
influences, and angelic journalists would not seek to influence them.123 (emphasis 
added) 
The same point was forcefully made in England by Lord Dilhorne in Attornev-General 
v. BBC:124 
It is sometimes asserted that no Judge will be influenced in his judgment by anything 
said by the media and consequently that the need to prevent the publication of matter 
prejudicial to the hearing of a case only exists where the decision rests with laymen. 
This claim to judicial superiority over human frailty is one that I find some difficulty 
in accepting. Every holder of a judicial office does his utmost not to let his mind be 
affected by what he has seen or heard or read outside the court and he will not 
knowingly let himself be influenced in any way by the media, nor in my view will 
any layman experienced in the discharge of judicial duties. Nevertheless, it should, I 
think, be recognized that a man may not be able to put that which he has seen, heard 
118
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or read entirely out of his mind and that he may be subconsciously affected by it. It 
is the law, and it remains the law until it is changed by Parliament, that the 
publications of matter likely to prejudice the hearing of a case before a court of law will 
constitute contempt of court punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.'25 
Note that in accordance with the common-law doctrine of judicial precedents, under 
the Cypriot legal system foreign judgments-particularly from common-law/commonwealth 
jurisdictions (UK, US, India, Nigeria, etc.)-are regarded as persuasive precedents whereas 
judgments of superior courts (particularly the Supreme Court of Cyprus) are binding on all 
lower courts in the country. Hence, based on the above binding and persuasive precedents, 
it is arguable that the Nicosia Assize Court judges were entitled to hold, as they did hold 
(assuming the publications, under Cypriot law, can properly be considered as tending to 
interfere with the outcome of the case before them126) that the impugned media publications 
'constituted serious interference in the course of justice and pre-empted the outcome of the 
trial', and that 'it constitutes a usurpation of the judicial authority and contempt of court' 
(see above). Moreover, they were right-based on the above authorities'27-to conclude 
that prejudicial media publications can be held to interfere with judicial proceedings 
pending before a judge or judges sitting with or without jurors.128 On the contrary, it is clear 
that the assertion of Loucaides that 'media influence is irrelevant to the proceedings, and in 
the cases of professional judges (with no jury), the issue of media influence does not arise' 
(see above) cannot be correct. In fact, there are several cases-for example Efimeris 
"O Filathlos" & Anor. v. The Police^29-where Cypriot judges (sitting without jury) had 
punished persons who published articles adjudged capable of prejudicing the fair trial of a 
pending judicial proceeding, for contempt of court. The position is the same under the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR, contrary to the assertion of Loucaides. Surely, the decision of 
the ECtHR in the Case of Worm v. Austria)30 mentioning the possibility of adverse pre-trial 
publication affecting 'lay judges' did not imply, and was clearly not intended to imply, that 
'legally learned judges' cannot be affected by adverse pre-trial publications. 
The same conclusions had been reached a long time ago in Nigeria and in other 
common law countrics-espccially Britain, which was the former colonial master of both 
Nigeria and Cyprus. The 1926 Nigerian case of Rex v. Ojukoko,131 decided by Tew, J (citing 
well-established English cases on the point) is a good case in point. In that case, some 
125
 Ibid. 335. 
126
 A guide can be found in several decisions of the Supreme Court of Cyprus. Under the 
English Contempt of Court Act 1981 (section 2(2)), two tests must be satisfied in order for publica-
tions to be held contemptuous-namely, that the publications created a 'substantial risk' and 'serious 
prejudice'. Moreover, the proximity of the publications to the trial is another important considera-
tion. See Attorney-General v. News Group Newspapers Ltd., 15-16; Attorney-General v. Independ-
ent Television News Ltd. & Others, Criminal Appeal Reports, 1 (1995) 204, at 208. 
127
 Especially the binding authority of Georgiades v. Republic. 
128
 A UK criminal court recently frowned against unfair media coverage of a pending crimi-
nal case. See 'lbori's London case: Judge condemns unfair media coverage' (Vanguard, 23 Septem-
ber 2009); available at: <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/09/23/iboris-london-case-judge-con-
demns-unfair-media-coverage/> (accessed 23 September 2009). 
129
 Efimeris "О Filathlos" & Anor. v. The Police, Cyprus Law Reports, 2 (1967) 249. See also 
Georgiades v. Republic. 
130
 Case of Worm v. Austria. 
>31 Rex v. Ojukoko (1926) 7 NLR 60. 
22 K.ANIYE S. A. EBEKU 
newspapers had published articles alluding to a theft of various articles from Government 
House, Lagos, and stated that the crime had been traced to an ex-convict who had only 
recently been discharged from prison. Following this, the Attorney-General of Nigeria made 
applications to the Divisional Court in Lagos for the editors of three named newspapers 
involved in the publications to be committed to prison for contempt of court. The editors 
were found guilty of contempt of court."2 In his judgment, the judge pertinently said: 
It cannot be too widely made known that the publication of such statements were 
calculated, in the language of Lord Hardwicke in Roach v. Garvan... "to prejudice the 
minds of the public against persons concerned as parties in causes before the cause is 
finally heard", constitutes a serious contempt of court and will not be allowed to pass 
unnoticed or unpunished... In Rex v. Tihbits... Lord Alverstone, CJ said: ... It would, 
indeed, be far-fetched to infer that the articles would in fact have any effect upon the 
mind of either magistrate or judge, but the essence of the offence is conduct calculated 
to produce, so to speak, an atmosphere of prejudice in the midst of which the 
proceedings must go on. Publications of that character have been punished over and 
over again as contempts of court, where the legal proceedings pending did not involve 
trial by jury, and where no one would imagine that the mind of the magistrates or 
judges charged with the case would or could be induced thereby to swerve from the 
straight course. The offence is much worse where trial by jury is about to take place... 
[It] is not desirable that fair and proper comment on matters of public interest should 
be restrained; at the same time, the public and the press should be given clearly to 
understand that ... [the] court will not tolerate any interference with the right of any 
person who may be charged with an offence to a fair and impartial trial, (emphasis 
added) 
More importantly, under Cypriot constitutional law the right to freedom of expression 
is not absolute."3 The Constitution provides that the exercise of this right 'may be subject 
to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary only in the interests of the security of the Republic...or for the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others or ... for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary'}34 This is consistent with Article 10(2) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights which provides, inter alia, that the right to freedom of expression may be 
restricted in order to maintain the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.135 Clearly, 
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therefore, the exercise of the right to free speech is subject, inter alia, to the law of contempt 
of court: it cannot be used, for instance, to publish any writing or make any speech that is 
capable of prejudicing the fair trial of an accused person in a judicial proceeding,136 or to 
publish any speech containing scandalous matter respecting any court which has adjudicated/ 
decided any case.137 In Constantinides v. Vi m a Ltdns the Supreme Court of Cyprus categori-
cally stated that 'Section 44 [of the Courts of Justice Law 14/60 (as amended)] limits 
freedom of expression safeguarded by Article 19 [of the Constitution of Cyprus 1960] for 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the Judiciary,' and this is in accordance with 
Article 19(3) of the Constitution.139 Based on this, it is possible that some of the pre- and 
during as well as post- trial comments on the Efstathiou case were contemptuous of the 
Nicosia Assize Court specifically (as already noted, the court itself had also described the 
pre-trial media publicity of the case as contemptuous) and/or the Cypriot judiciary in 
general. 
Note that it could be contempt of court all the same even if the ten policemen had been 
convicted of the offences with which they were charged. As Lord Alverstone stated long 
ago in Rex v. Tihhits:140 
Though the accused be really guilty of the offence charged against him, the course of 
law and justice is nevertheless perverted and obstructed if those who have to try him 
are induced to approach the question of his guilt or innocence with minds into which 
prejudice has been instilled by published assertions of the guilt or imputations against 
his life and character to which the laws of the land refuse admissibility as evidence. 
More recently, Lord Diplock re-stated the same point thus: ' . . .That the risk that was 
created by publication when it was actually published does not ultimately affect the outcome 
of the proceedings is... "neither here nor there". If there was a reasonable possibility that it 
might have done so if in the period subsequent to the publication the proceedings had not 
taken the course that in fact they did... the offence was complete. The true course of justice 
must not at any stage be put at risk'.141 In Rex v Parke,142 Wills J. explained that 'the reason 
why the publication of articles . . . is treated as a contempt of court is because their tendency 
and sometimes their object is to deprive the court of the power of doing that which is the end 
for which it exists-namely, to administer justice duly, impartially, and with reference solely 
to the facts judicially brought before it'.143 
Having considered prejudicial publications that tend to interfere with judicial 
proceedings, it is now proposed to briefly advert to scandalous publications-i.e. publications 
scandalizing a judge or court.144 There are reasonable grounds to suggest that some of the 
post-judgment media attacks on the judges who decided the Efstathiou case as well as on 
the Cypriot judiciary in general probably scandalized the judges and the entire Cypriot 
136
 Courts of Justice Law 14/60, Article 44(l)(c) (as amended). 
137
 Courts of Justice Law 14/60, Article 44( l)(e) (as amended). 
138
 Constantinides Vima Ltd. [1983]. 
I» Ibid. 354. 
140
 Rex v. Tibbits [1902] 1 King's Bench, 77. 
141
 See Attorney-General v. English. 
142
 Rex v. Parke. 
143
 Cf. Hinch v. Attorney-General (Victoria). 
144
 See generally, Fawehinmi, G.: Nigerian Law of the Press under the Constitution and the 
Criminal Law. Lagos, 1987, Chapter 1 (on the aspect of the Press and Criminal Law). 
24 K.ANIYE S. A. E B E K U 
judiciary, and were contemptuous in accordance with Article 44( 1 )(e) of the Courts of 
Justice Law 14/60 (as amended). For example, the statement of Loucaides that the judges 
who decided the case 'may be not sufficiently trained'-a suggestion that they were not 
qualified to sit as judges. (Another example is the Cypriot Attorney-General's statement 
that Cypriots 'can't always trust court decisions': see above.) The point is that this kind of 
statement is not a legitimate public criticism of a judge; rather it is a 'scurrilous personal 
abuse of a judge with reference to his conduct as a judge in a judicial proceeding which 
had terminated'145-and this is what makes it a contempt of court, according to well-
established and long-standing legal authorities.146 There are several instances in the case-
law of common-law/commonwealth countries when contemnors of this species of 
contempt of court have been punished by the court. The same position can also be found 
in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).147 For present 
purposes, it is sufficient to refer only to the facts and outcome of two such cases from 
national courts and one decision of the ECtHR. 
Firstly, in the Nigerian case of Obiekwe Aniweta v. The State,148 an Advocate of the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria swore to two affidavits accusing a trial judge of corruption, and 
expressing his opinion that the judge is 'not fit to hold any judicial office' . By swearing 
them before a commissioner for oaths in a court registry, the lawyer had published the 
contents thereof. The trial judge considered the affidavits to be 'scandalous publications' and 
summarily convicted the lawyer for contempt of court after giving him an opportunity to 
enter his defence. Dissatisfied, the lawyer appealed to the Court of Appeal, but his appeal 
was dismissed for lacking merit.149 In its judgment, the Court of Appeal stated: 
See Rex v. Horatius (1925) 6 N LR 49 per Combe C.J. See also Article 44(1 )(e) of the Courts 
of Justice Law 14/60 (as amended). 
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person of the presiding judge he cannot personally hear it. 
147
 Case of Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria. 
>48 Obiekwe Aniweta v. The State, Appeal No. FCA/E/47/78 decided on 16 June 1978. (Re-
ported in Fawehinmi: op. cit. 98.) 
149
 The trial judge committed the lawyer to prison for 200 days, but this was reduced to 120 
days by the Court of Appeal after upholding the conviction of the appellant, on the ground that 
the sentence of 200 days was 'severe' . More recently (precisely on 25 September 2009), a senior 
Nigerian lawyer was sentenced to three months imprisonment for contempt of court (the charge 
was scurrilous personal abuse of a judge with reference to her conduct as a judge in a judicial 
proceeding which had terminated. Briefly, the lawyer, having suffered a default judgment from 
the judge, filed an application to set aside the judgment and supported it with a 28-paragraph af-
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Can anyone reading the two affidavits in the present case before us say that they were 
genuine criticism of the learned trial judge's judgment? Our answer is No. Those 
affidavits had nothing to do with any criticism. They were a brutal attack on the person 
of the judge as a most corrupt person unfit to hold his high office. We hold the view, 
and we are supported by the authorities, that in the circumstances of the case, as 
described by the learned trial judge, it was a matter that he could try summarily on 
his motion, because it was a contempt committed in the cognizance of the court... [In] 
the words of Holroyd, J in R. v. Davison (1821) 106 ER 958... no judge would "suffer 
those things to pass which will make him despicable in the eyes of others. It is his duty 
to support the dignity of his station and uphold the law, so that in his presence, at least 
it shall not be infringed."150 
Among others, the Nigerian Court of Appeal relied on the English Court of Appeal 
decision in Balogh v. Crown Court,151 where it was said, inter alia, that in cases of 
scandalous publications against a judge or court it mattered not whether it was 'a case that 
was being tried, or about to be tried, or just over - no matter whether the judge saw it with 
his own eyes or it was reported to him by the officers of the court, or by others... ' 
The second and more recent case was a decision of the High Court of Singapore in 
Attorney-General v. Tan Liang Joo and Others}52 In that case, the Attorney-General of 
Singapore had applied to the High Court for an order committing three respondents to 
prison for contempt of court in that they scandalized the Singapore judiciary, inter alia, by 
publicly wearing a white T-shirt, imprinted with a palm-sized picture of a kangaroo dressed 
in a judge's gown within and in the vicinity of the Supreme Court on 26 May 2008 when a 
hearing was being held before Justice Belinda Ang. The applicant argued that by stigmatizing 
the Singapore judiciary as a 'kangaroo court' the respondents implied, inter alia, that the 
court was self-appointed or a mock court in which the principles of law and justice are 
disregarded, perverted, or parodied. In their defence, the respondents contended, inter alia, 
that wearing the T-shirt was an act of 'fair criticism and self-expression in the hope that the 
Singapore judiciary would improve from strength to strength'. They denied that they had 
committed any contempt and refused to apologize to the court. In her well-considered 
judgment, which went on excursus into the case-law of several commonwealth countries, 
including Britain, Australia and New Zealand, the judge rejected the defence of fair criticism 
and found the respondents guilty of contempt of court. In her words: 
It was clear to me that this case was about much more than merely wearing a T-shirt. 
The conduct of the respondents communicated to an average member of the public the 
fidavit wherein he deposed, inter alia, that the judge is 'a complete failure in her capacity as a 
judge ' ) . Note that the contempt charge was brought against the lawyer by the Attorney-General of 
Lagos state in order to protect the integrity, honour and independence of the judiciary. See 'Judge 
Jails Lawyer For Three Months Over Contempt' (Guardian, 26 September 2009); <http://nspace. 
nigeria.com/main/news/judge-jails-lawyer-three-months-over-contempt-guardian-nigeria> (access-
ed 27 September 2009). 
150
 See also Rex v. Horatius', In re Ekpu (decision of a Special Military Tribunal in Lagos on 
4 February 1986, convicting a journalist on a charge of contempt of court for calling the tribunal a 
'Kangaroo court' in a magazine article; reported in Fawehinmi: op. cit. 573. 
isi Balogh v. Crown Court. 3 All England Law Reports, (1974) 283 CA. 
152
 Attorney-General v. Tan Liang Joo and Others [2009] SGHC 41 (decided 18 February 
2009). 
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respondents' conviction that the Singapore courts arc "kangaroo courts" as defined 
... above...153 The respondents' conduct amounted to contumacious contempt aimed 
at the integrity of the courts and was designed to degrade the administration of justice. 
Having considered all the circumstances, I came to the conclusion that a custodial 
sentence was appropriate.154 
With regard to the ECtHR jurisprudence, in the Case of Prager and Oberschlick v. 
Austria155 the applicants had been convicted by Austrian courts for unjustified personal 
attacks on some Austrian judges (especially Judge J.) published in a periodical called 
Forum. Among others, the publication alleged that the named Austrian judges 'treat each 
accuscd at the outset as if he had already been convicted'. In this application, the applicants 
claimcd that their conviction for contcmpt of court156 was a violation of their right to 
freedom of expression. However, after considering the circumstances of the case, the 
ECtHR concluded that the applicants' right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights was not breached by their conviction by the 
Austrian courts. In an important passage of its judgment, the court stated: 
Of the accusations levelled by those allegations, some were extremely serious. It is 
therefore hardly surprising that their author should be expected to explain himself. 
By maintaining that the Viennese judges "treat each accused at the outset as if he had 
already been convicted", or in attributing to Judge J. an "arrogant" and "bullying" 
attitude in the performance of his duties, the applicant had, by implication, accused 
the persons concerned of having, as judges, broken the law or, at the very least, of 
having breached their professional obligations. He had thus not only damaged their 
reputation, but also undermined public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary as 
a whole, (para. 36). 
To sum up, it can be seen that courts of law have awesome powers to punish for 
contcmpt of court in order, primarily, to maintain the dignity, integrity and authority of 
the courts. This position remains the same today, although within the Council of Europe the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) dictates that, in order to 
ensure fair trial, contempt proceedings-particularly ex facie-sho\i\â be heard by a judge 
other than the one against whom (and probably against whose court) it was allegedly 
committed.157 
On the other hand, it must be noted that the courts are slow to invoke their powers of 
contempt to abridge the right to freedom of expression.158 The US, British and other 
commonwealth courts, for instance, adopt a careful balancing of the conflicting rights of 
free spcech and fair hearing. As Lord Rcid has stated in Attorney-General v. Times 
1« ibid.. para. 28. 
I34 Ibid., para. 45. 
155
 Case of Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria. 
156
 The ECHR agreed with the government of Austria that the conviction of the accused was 
intended, inter alia, to maintain the authority of the judiciary. See ibid, para. 31 of the judgment. 
157
 See Kyprianou v Cyprus. See also Emilianides: op. cit. 
158
 Courts usually exercise their powers of contempt of court sparingly. In R. v. Metropolitan 
Police Commissioner, Ex parte Blackburn (No. 2), at p. 320 Lord Denning observed: ' . . . [Tjhis court 
has been called on to consider an allegation of contempt against itself. It is a jurisdiction which un-
doubtedly belongs to us, but which we will most sparingly exercise: more particularly as we ourselves 
have an interest in the matter.' See also R. v. Moran, 81 Criminal Appeal Reports, (1985) 51. 
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Newspapers,159 'public policy generally requires a balancing of interests which may conflict. 
Freedom of speech should not be limited to any greater extent than is necessary but it cannot 
be allowed where there would be real prejudice to the administration of justice'.160 This 
approach was followed in the US in Bridges v. California.'61 In that case, a litigant who had 
been found guilty of contempt of court for publishing a telegram wherein he had described 
a judge 's decision as 'outrageous', while a motion for a new trial was pending, had his 
conviction set aside on the ground that the publication did not present 'a clear and present 
danger'. Mr. Justice Hugo Black, writing for the US Supreme Court, stated: 
The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding judges from 
published criticism wrongly appraises the character of American public opinion... An 
enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the 
bench, would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more than 
it would enhance respect. 
It is important to emphasize that this is a reasonable approach, which can also be found 
in a long line of cases decided by the ECtHR. In the end, it can be surmised that courts in 
common law jurisdictions as well as the ECtHR strive (to a greater or lesser extent in 
practical terms) to achieve a proper balance between freedom of expression and the need to 
maintain the authority and independence of the judiciary.162 The critical question remains 
how the balancing exercise may be conducted. A number of cases decided by the courts of 
common-law/commonwealth countries163 as well as the jurisprudence of the ECtHR provide 
some guidelines to this complex act. For present purposes, it is sufficient to briefly explain 
the approach of the ECtHR. Within the Council of Europe, the question is, essentially and 
quite often, whether an adjudged interference with the right to freedom of expression under 
Article 10(1 ) of the European Convention on Human Rights'64 can be justified under any of 
the exceptions stated under Article 10(2) thereof.165 In which case, there would be no 
159
 Attorney-General v. Times Newspapers (1974) AC 273. 
160
 The Indian Supreme Court follows the same approach: see AK Gopalan v. Noordeen. 
161
 Bridges v. California, 314 US 252 (1941). This case has been followed by a long line of 
cases in the U.S., including Pennekamp v. Florida. 
162
 On the need for balance, see ECHR decision in Case of Amihalachioaie v. Moldova (Appli-
cation no. 60115/00), Judgment of 20 April 2004, para. 28. 
163
 See, for example, H inch v. Attorney-General (Victoria)', Attorney-General v. English', Attor-
ney-General v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. See also Walker: op. cit. 594-595. 
164
 The 1950 European Convention on Human Rights greatly influenced the Bill of Rights found 
in the Constitution of most commonwealth countries. In fact, the Convention provisions are in most 
cases reproduced verbatim. 
165
 Article 10 provides in full as follows: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, this right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and 
regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcast-
ing, television or cinema enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are neces-
sary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the 
reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, 
or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
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violation of Article 10(1). Importantly, to reach a conclusion one way or the other involves 
examining the interference to determine whether it is prescribed by an existing law; 
whether the aim pursued by the interference was legitimate; and whether it is necessary in a 
democratic society, inter alia, for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
If any of these considerations fail, then the interference would be held to violate the right to 
freedom of expression. In the Case of Amihalachioaie v. Moldova166 the ECtHR explained 
as follows: 
In performing its supervisory role, the Court [ECtHR] has to look at the interference 
complained of in the light of the case as a whole, including the tenor of the applicant's 
remarks and the context in which they were made, and determine whether it 
"corresponded] to a pressing social need", was "proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued" and whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are 
"relevant and sufficient" (see The Sunday Times (no. 2). . . , and Nikula v. Finland, no. 
31611/96, § 44, ECHR 2002-11). (para. 30).167 
Note that within the Council of Europe the assessment of these factors falls in the first 
place to the national authorities (including an independent court), which enjoys a certain 
margin of appreciation in determining the existence and extent of the necessity of an 
interference with the freedom of expression.168 
Nevertheless, while the balancing approach remains generally true in most common-
law/commonwealth countries, a pro-freedom of the press/freedom of speech approach can 
be observed in several decisions of the ECtHR169 as well as decisions of US courts (e.g. 
Bridges case) and English courts (particularly since the 1981 English Contempt of Court 
Act was made and following ECtHR jurisprudence). As Lloyd L.J. observed in Attorney-
General v. Newspaper Publishing Pic:1711 
[T]he statutory purpose behind the 1981 Act was to effect a permanent shift in the 
balance of public interest away from the protection of the administration of justice and 
in favour of freedom of speech. Such a shift was forced on the United Kingdom by the 
decision of the European Court [of Human Rights] in The Sunday Times v. U.K...n] 
166
 Case of Amihalachioaie v. Moldova. See also Jersild v. Denmark, Judgment of 23 September 
1994 (Series A no. 298); Case of Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, para. 35; Case of Kobenter and 
Standard Verlags GMBH v. Austria (Application no. 60899/00), Judgment of 2 November 2006. 
167
 The ECHR found in this case that even though the impugned critical remarks may be 
regarded as showing a certain lack of regard for the Constitutional Court of Moldova following 
its decision on the constitutionality of legislation regulating the legal profession, they cannot be 
described as grave or as insulting to the judges of the court. Accordingly, it was held that restrict-
ing the applicant's right to freedom of expression (he was ordered to pay administrative fine for 
his remarks) was a violation of his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
168
 See Case of Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, para. 35. 
169
 See, by example, The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (Series A No 30), European Court of 
Human Rights (1979-1980) 2 European Human Rights Reports, 245, Judgment of 26 April 1979; 
The Times (No. 2) v. The United Kingdom (Application no. 13166/87), Judgment of 26 November 
1990; Case of Amihalachioaie v. Moldova. 
170
 Attorney-General v Newspaper Publishing Pic, 3 All England Law Reports, (1987) 276. 
171
 Ibid. 310; Attorney-General v. Newspaper Publishing Pic [1988] Ch. 333, at 382. 
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A similar statement, albeit not quite extremist as the above, can also be found in the 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Cyprus in Cosmos Press Ltd & Anor. v. The Police}11 
In the light of the modern trend in interpreting and applying provisions relating to 
human rights, such as Article 19 of our Constitution and corresponding Article 10 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, which forms part of our own law as well, 
[see European Convention on Human Rights (Ratification) Law 1962-Law 39/62] 
and in the light, also, of weighty dicta such as those of the European Court of Human 
Rights in the judgment of "The Sunday Times case,".. . section 122(b) of Cap. 154, 
which is a restriction of the right of expression, must be applied in each particular 
case in a manner as favourable as possible for the freedom of the press. 
Even so, this does not spell the end of criminal contempt of court; it only means 
that the courts are slow to abridge the right to freedom of speech but in clear cases it will 
still find certain publications, for instance, as contemptuous.173 This is arguably the current 
position in Cyprus, given that it is a reflection of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.174 
4. Concluding Remarks 
The recent Efstathiou case decision in Cyprus has provided an opportunity to re-appraise 
the issues of independence of the judiciary, trial by media and fair trial in the country as 
well as the closely linked issue of contempt of court. While there is no suggestion that the 
Cypriot judiciary has no independence, the case has raised issues which threaten the 
independence - for example, whether the right to freedom of speech can be used to interfere 
with judicial proceedings or engage in scurrilous abuse of a judge because of his judicial 
opinion in a case. 
As could be observed from various cases cited here from various common-law 
jurisdictions, in criminal contempt of court cases-particularly with regard to prejudicial and 
scandalous publications-the application to commit the accused to prison for contempt of 
court is normally brought by the Attorney-General of the State.175 This is also true in the 
Republic of Cyprus, as suggested by the Supreme Court in Constantinides v. Vima Ltd,176 
Note that this position is based on constitutional and/or statutory provisions that invest the 
Attorney-General with the power to commence and/or discontinue all criminal prosecutions 
(including the criminal offence of contempt of court). More importantly, this is a pre-
eminent way by which the Attorney-General ensures the maintenance of respect, honour 
and dignity for the judiciary or, to put it differently, the protection and defence of the 
independence of the judiciary.177 In the Republic of Cyprus, the prosecutory power of the 
172
 Cosmos Press Ltd. & Anor v. The Police, Cyprus Law Reports, (1985) 73, at 81. 
173
 See, by example, Attorney-General v. Express Newspapers England and Wales High Court, 
(2004) 2859 (Admin); Attorney-General v. SIGN Ltd:, Scottish Daily Record, Sunday Mail Ltd. v. 
Procurator Fiscal, Edinburgh. See generally Attorney-General of the Republic v. Efstathiou. 
174
 See, by example, Case of Worm v. Austria; Case of Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria. See 
generally Attorney-General of the Republic v. Efstathiou. 
175
 In Australia it is possible for any person to bring an action alleging contempt of court by 
publication. See R. v. Dunbabin, 53 Commonwealth Law Reports, (1935) 434 (High Court of Aus-
tralia), at 445 (per Rich J.). See also Walker: op. cit. 588. 
176
 Constantinides v. Vima Ltd., at 353. 
177
 It is also the case that the Attorney-General of a State normally responds to public criti-
cisms of judges. See, by example, C. Dyer, 'Plea for end to attacks on Woolf' (Guardian, 13 Novem-
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Attorney-General is provided in Article 113(2) of the Constitution of Cyprus 1960 which 
states that: 
The Attorney-General of the Republic shall have power, exercisable at his discretion in 
the public interest, to institute, conduct, take over and continue or discontinue any 
proceedings for an offence against any person in the Republic. Such power may be 
exercised by him in person or by officers subordinate to him acting under and in 
accordance with his instructions.178 
The recent sad development in Cyprus, where the Attorney-General was himself 
probably liable for contempt of court, has revealed the limitation of this position and raised 
the question 'who prosecutes the prosecutor?'179 This is particularly serious having regard 
to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Kyprianou case.180 In 
that case, a Cypriot trial court had convicted a lawyer for alleged contempt in the face of 
the court (the lawyer suggested that a male and female member of a 3-member panel of 
judges were sending iove notes' to each other while he was conducting his case for his 
client before them instead of listening to him) and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment.181 
However, the conviction and sentence were set aside on the application of the lawyer to the 
ECtHR on the ground that it breached his right to a fair trial guaranteed under Article 6 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. According to the court (ECtHR), the proper 
thing to do is to 'refer the question to the competent prosecuting authorities for investigation 
and, if warranted, prosecution, and to have the matter determined by a different bench from 
the one before which the problem arose'.182 
Importantly, the Cypriot government has recently amended the Cypriot contempt of 
court law in order to bring it in line with the Kyprianou case decision of the ECtHR.183 
Essentially, Article 44(3) of the Courts of Justice (Amendment) Law 36(l)/2009 forbids a 
Cypriot judge from trying an ex facie contempt of court case where the act constituting the 
contempt affects the judge personally.184 Moreover, under Article 44(9) of Law 36(1 )/2009 
lawyers conducting cases before a court are immune from the offence of contempt of court 
in the face of the court.185 The reason for this is said to be 'the need to safeguard freedom of 
ber 2004); <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2004/nov/13/ukcrime.media> (accessed 12 May 2009). 
The Plea was made by Lord Goldsmith, Attorney-General of the UK, in defence of Lord Chief Justice 
Lord Woolf who was suffering persistent press attack. 
178
 See. Loizu, A. N.-Pikis, G. M.: Criminal Procedure in Cyprus. Nicosia, 1975. 
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 The difficulties of this situation can be gleaned from the recent Ruling of the Supreme Court 
of Cyprus in Attorney-General of the Republic v. Efstathiou (Supreme Court Ruling of 8 October 
2009). 
180
 See Kyprianou v. Cyprus. For a useful comment on this decision, see Emilianides: op. cit. 
181
 The lawyer's appeal to the Supreme Court of Cyprus was unsuccessful. 
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 Kyprianou v. Cyprus, para. 37. 
183
 See Courts of Justice (Amendment) Law 36(l)/2009. 
184
 Query: Did the amendment effected by the Courts of Justice (Amendment) Law 36( I )/2009) 
fully comply with the ECHR decision in the Kyprianou case? A Cypriot Advocate and scholar, Dr 
Achilles Emilianides, answers this query in the affirmative (email communication, 21/09/09). 
185
 On grounds of public policy, they are also immune from an action for negligence at the suit 
of a client in respect of their conduct or management of a cause in court. See Rondel v. ÍVorsley, 1 Ap-
peal Cases, (1969) 191, at 227. This is no longer the case in England. See Arthur J.S. Hall and Co. v. 
Simons, 1 Appeal Cases, (2002) 615. 
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expression and speech of advocates and the right to a fair trial of parties represented by the 
advocates'.186 (Further amendment in line with the English Contempt of Court Act 1981 
may be considered in order to further enlarge the right to freedom of expression). However, 
acts which hitherto would have constituted contempt of court ex facie within the meaning 
of Article 44(1) of Law 14/60 (as amended by Law 36(l)/2009) - for example showing 
disrespect to a court by word or conduct - are now regarded as a 'disciplinary offence'187 
triable by the Disciplinary Board188 established by the Advocates Law,184 and headed by the 
Attorney-General.190 This position may have been brought about by the suggestion of the 
ECtHR in the Kyprianou case that punishing lawyers for contempt committed during their 
conduct of a client 's case in court could have a 'chilling effect' on the performance of 
lawyers in court. However, it is contended that the court was not advocating immunity for 
lawyers from ex facie contempt of court; rather, it was urging judicial restraint when 
considering a contempt case affecting a lawyer and in sentencing a contemnor lawyer in 
order to strike a fair balance between the need to protect the authority of the judiciary on 
the one hand and on the other hand the protection of the lawyer's freedom of expression in 
his professional capacity. 
From the foregoing, one can deduce two implications. First, the Nicosia Assize Court 
(and, indeed, other courts in Cyprus) is effectively powerless against anyone who commits 
contempt in the face of the court {ex facie contempt of court)-specifically, where the act 
constituting the contempt 'turns against the person of the judge of the said court'.191 
Although an affected court/judge has power under Article 44(3) of the Courts of Justice 
(Amendment) Law 36(1) 2009 to 'refer the case and the relative proceedings to the President 
of the Supreme Court, in order for the latter to appoint another court to adjudicate the 
offence', in the case of an Attorney-General it seems that such a reference is potentially 
ineffective as he could invoke his constitutional power to discontinue the case. Secondly, 
a deliberate act of disrespect by a lawyer (including the Attorney-General) who is conducting 
a case before a court does not constitute the offence of contempt of court but merely a 
disciplinary offence, which may be tried by a Board headed by the Attorney-General. All of 
this probably explains why Attorney-General Petros Clerides interfered with impunity with 
the reading of the judgment in the recent Efstathiou case.192 
IM Courts of Justice (Amendment) Law 36(l)/2009, Article 44(9). 
it" Ibid 
I»8 Ibid 
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 Advocates Law, Cap 2 (as amended). The court before which the disrespect occurred may 
refer the matter to the Disciplinary Board, which is required to examine the conduct 'as a matter of 
urgency'. See Courts of Justice (Amendment) Law 36(l)/2009, Article 44(9). 
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 There are six other members of the Board, apart from the Attorney-General. See Cyprus Bar 
Association, 'The Board Members' <http://www.cyprusbarassociation.org/ 
thebodymembers en.php> (accessed 21 October 2009). 
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 See Courts of Justice (Amendment) Law 36(l)/2009), Article 44(3). See also generally Article 
44 (2)—(10). 
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 It must be mentioned that though the Courts of Justice (Amendment) Law 36 (1) 2009) was 
passed shortly after the Efstathiou case was decided, it was never in doubt in Cyprus that the EC1IR 
decision in the Kyprianou case effectively precluded the Nicosia Assize Court from taking any ac-
tion against the Attorney-General when he interfered with the reading of the judgment in the case. 
Furthermore, the conduct of the Attorney-General and other justice officials following the acquittal 
of the ten policemen charged with offences in the Efstathiou case has been condemned in an article 
in the CyprusMail. After recounting their various reactions and public statements, it was concluded: 
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Regrettably, while Law 36(l)/2009 may have been well-intentioned, it seems it has 
unwittingly added to the power of the Cypriot Attorney-General in a manner that may well 
be contrary to the rule of law and democracy. Prior to the amendment, a Cypriot Attorney-
General was an established powerful State officer193-thc Attorney-General's office is an 
independent office194 and the occupant enjoys security of tenure195 and salary196 (he cannot 
easily be removed from office nor can his salary be reduced) unlike the case in some 
commonwealth countries (such as Nigeria) where the Attomey-Gcneral's office is at the 
pleasure of the Head of Government. In the interests of justice, the rule of law and 
democracy, it is strongly recommended that the Cypriot government should consider 
amending the prosecutory and other laws appropriately to ensure that the prosecutor is not 
above the law nor have the semblance of being above the law in any way, although it must 
be acknowledged that this may not be easily achieved within the complex Cypriot 
constitutional context. 
The Cypriot judiciary has truly helped the country, even as recognized by the President 
of the Cyprus Bar Association Doros Ioannides. The celebrated Supreme Court of Cyprus 
decision in Attorney-General of Cyprus v. Mustapha Ibrahim)91 eloquently illustrates this 
point. That was the case where both Greek and Turkish Cypriot judges cooperated to render 
a decision which has helped to hold the fabric of the Cypriot society together on the doctrine 
of 'state necessity' since the 1964 inter-communal clashes led to the enduring problem of 
the country.198 More recently, the contribution of the Cypriot judiciary to the general 
interests of the citizenry can be seen in the landmark decision in the Orams case, which the 
European of Justice (ECJ) recently ruled to be binding and legally enforceable throughout 
We have an Attorney-general [AG] who does not completely trust the justice system, a deputy 
AG who feels that judges get things wrong and a senior counsel who insists that many police officers 
are corrupt crooks. And these officials are supposed to work together with the allegedly corrupt police 
in order to prosecute suspected law-breakers? They are also supposed to cultivate respect for the law, 
the justice system and the state, but they are doing the exact opposite. How can they serve the very 
state in which they have so little faith and have gone out of their way to discredit? Only they could 
answer. See 'What sort of example are our justice officials setting?'. 
193
 It is perhaps a measure of the degree of contempt with which the Attorney-General holds 
the Cypriot judiciary that lie chose to reward a possible contemnor, Loukis Loucaides, with a fat 
brief-counsel for the State-Appellant in the Efstathiou case-instead of prosecuting him for con-
tempt of court as would have happened elsewhere. A commentator also thinks that the choice of 
Loucaides (former ECHR judge now in private legal practice) was wrong for other reasons. See 
Charalambous, L.: Of all the lawyers to appeal the beatings ruling, why Loucaides? [CyprusMai l 
(Internet Edition), 10 May 2009]. 
194 Constitution of Cyprus 1960, Article 112(2). 
>93 Constitution of Cyprus 1960, Article 112(4). 
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 Constitution of Cyprus I960, Article 166(l)(b). See further Article 153 (7)-(12). 
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 Attorney-General of Cyprus v. Mustapha Ibrahim, Cyprus Law Reports, (1964) 195. 
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 Following inter-communal clashes (Greek versus Turkish Cypriots) in 1963 and the at-
tempted military coup in 1974, Turkey had invaded and occupied the northern part of Cyprus since 
1974; thus effectively partitioning the small Island country (it is estimated that Turkey is occupying 
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the European Union.199 In that case, a Cypriot court had decided in favour of a Greek 
Cypriot who claimed title to land located in the Turkish occupied northern Cyprus on which 
a British couple had built a villa. 
The point must be made that without independence, no judiciary can satisfactorily 
play its important role in the society, not least the Cypriot judiciary. Yet, it was the case 
that the reactions and comments which followed the Efstathiou case decision greatly 
impinged on the independence of the judiciary as explained above. Among others, the 
reactions and comments grossly violated the prescriptions of Article 2 of the Universal 
Charter of the Judge 1999, which states that ' the Judge, as a holder of judicial office, must 
be able to exercise judicial powers free from social, economic and political pressure', and 
Principle 1(d) of Recommendation No. R (94) 12 of 1994 (on the independence, efficiency 
and role of Judges) of the Council of Europe, which states, inter alia, that 'judges should be 
independent and be able to act without any restriction, improper influence, inducements, 
pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason'. In 
the end, given the importance of the judiciary in any democratic society as shown above 
and having regard to the fact that it cannot properly function without independence and 
public confidence in it, nothing should be done that may destroy the independence of the 
Cypriot judiciary in any way. 
Furthermore, lawyers must remember that their special status in the society gives them 
a central position in the administration of justice 'as intermediaries between the public and 
the courts', and that this position leads to restrictions on their conduct. So, while they, like 
other members of the society, can comment in public on the administration of justice, their 
criticism must not overstep certain bounds: it must not degrade the courts.200 In the Case of 
Schöpfer v. Switzerland,201 the ECtHR reiterated that 'the courts-the guarantors of justice, 
whose role is fundamental in a State based on the rule of law-must enjoy public 
confidence...202 Regard being had to the key role of lawyers in this field, it is legitimate to 
expect them to contribute to the proper administration of justice, and thus to maintain public 
confidence therein'. Undoubtedly, the comments of most Cypriot lawyers (including the 
Attorney-General of Cyprus) regarding the decision in Efstathiou case undermined the 
public confidence in the judiciary instead of contributing thereto.203 In fact, as already 
suggested above, the statements of Loucaides and Attorney-General Petros Clerides 
199
 See B. Waterfield, 'Landmark court ruling means Britons could be forced to re-
turn homes in Northern Cyprus' (Telegraph, 29 April 2009); available at: <http://www.telegraph. 
co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/cyprus/5242294/Landmark-cour t - rul ing-means-Bri tons-could-
be-forced-to-retum-homes-in-Northem-Cypms.html> (accessed 9 May 2009). See also S. Bahceli, 
'Orams lose at Court of Justice' [CyprusMail (Internet Edition), 29 April 2009], Although some, 
particularly Turkish Cypriots, contend that the Orams decision will complicate the ongoing re-
unification talks, Greek Cypriots are generally exhilarated by the decision. As at 20 October 2009, 
there is no evidence that that decision has caused any significant obstacle to the progress of the 
talks. 
200
 See Case of Amihalachioaie v. Moldova, paras. 27 and 28. 
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amounted to scurr i lous at tack on the trial judges and the Cypriot j ud ic i a ry 'under the g u i s e 
of cri t icism'.2 0 4 
The med ia is equally impor tant to the Cypr io t society, as e l sewhere in the wor ld . In 
fact, neither the judic iary nor the media is more impor tant than the other in a d e m o c r a t i c 
society. Hence , wha t is needed is a thorough recogni t ion of the l imits of all insti tutions o f 
government . Moreover , it mus t be noted that w h i l e f r e e d o m of s p e e c h is impor tan t in a 
democra t ic soc ie ty , it is not an abso lu t e right. It c a n n o t be u sed , f o r instance, to p e d d l e 
dirt in t e rms o f de famato ry s ta tements or in terms o f scurri lous abuse of the judicial s y s t e m 
or to interfere wi th judicial proceedings . In the end, a fitting conclus ion to this article is the 
fol lowing immor ta l words of Jus t ice Frankfurter in the U S Supreme Cour t in 1946: 
Without a f ree press there can be no f ree society. F reedom of the press, h o w e v e r , is 
not an end , in itself, but a m e a n s to the end o f a f r ee society. T h e scope and n a t u r e of 
the cons t i tu t ional p ro tec t ion o f f r eedom of speech must be v i e w e d in that l ight, a n d 
in that l ight appl ied. T h e independence of the jud ic i a ry is no less a means to t he e n d 
of a f ree society, and the p rope r func t ion ing of an i ndependen t judiciary pu t s t he 
f r eedom of the press in its proper perspec t ive . For the j u d i c i a r y cannot f u n c t i o n 
properly if wha t the p ress does is r easonab ly calculated to disturb the j u d i c i a l 
j u d g m e n t in its duty and capac i ty to act so le ly on the basis o f what is b e f o r e t he 
court. A jud ic ia ry is not independent unless cour t s of jus t ice are enabled to admin i s t e r 
law by a b s e n c e of p re s su re f r o m without , w h e t h e r exer ted t h r o u g h the b l a n d i s h m e n t s 
of r eward or the m e n a c e o f disfavour.2 0 5 
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 This was an expression of the Supreme Court of Cyprus in Constantinides v. Vima Ltd., 
at p. 357. See generally Attorney-General of the Republic v. Efstathiou (Supreme Court Ruling of 8 
October 2009). 
205 Pennekamp v. Florida, at 354-357. The Judge said more: In the noble words, penned by 
John Adams, of the First Constitution of Massachusetts: "It is essential to the preservation of the 
rights of every individual, his life, liberty, property, and character, that there be an impartial interpre-
tation of the laws, and administration of justice. It is the right of every citizen to be tried by judges as 
free, impartial, and independent as the lot of humanity will admit." A free press is not to be preferred 
to an independent judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over 
the other; both are indispensable to a free society. The freedom of the press, in itself, presupposes an 
independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of the 
potent means for assuring judges their independence is a free press. A free press is vital to a demo-
cratic society because its freedom gives it power. Power in a democracy implies responsibility in its 
exercise. No institution in a democracy, either governmental or private, can have absolute power. Nor 
can the limits of power which enforce responsibility be finally determined by the limited power it-
self... In plain English, freedom carries with it responsibility even for the press; freedom of the press 
is not a freedom from responsibility for its exercise...These are generalities. But they are generalities 
of the most practical importance in achieving a proper adjustment between a free press and an inde-
pendent judiciary. Especially in the administration of the criminal law-that most awesome aspect of 
government-society needs independent courts of justice. This means judges free from control by the 
executive, free from all ties with political interests, free from all fears of reprisal or hopes of reward. 
The safety of society and the security of the innocent alike depend upon wise and impartial criminal 
justice. Misuse of its machinery may undermine the safety of the State; its misuse may deprive the 
individual of all that makes a free man's life dear. Ibid. 
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T A M Á S N Ó T Á R I * 
On Quintus Tullius Cicero's Commentariolum petitionis 
Abstract . T h e Commentar io lum peti t ionis written in 6 4 B.C. is the oldest c a m p a i g n strategy d o c u m e n t that has 
been p rese rved for us. In this h a n d b o o k Quintus Tul l ius Cicero , younger brother o f the most excel lent ora tor of the 
Antiquity, M a r c u s Tullius Cicero, g ives advice to his e lde r brother on how M a r c u s can win consu l ' s e lec t ions , that 
is, how he c a n rise to the highest posi t ion of the R o m a n Republic. In the presen t paper C o m m e n t a r i o l u m will be 
analysed in detai l examining the fo l lowing aspects: the Ant ique genre c o m m e n t a r y (I.); the issue o f au thorsh ip of 
C o m m e n t a r i o l u m (II.); the character isat ion of the compe t i t o r s , Antonius and Cat i l ina , provided in C o m m e n t a r i o l u m 
(III.); the s y s t e m of elections in Ancie t Rome and the c r i m e of election fraud/br ibery, i.e. the c r imen ambi tus (IV.) 
and the ro le o f associations and c l ients in Roman e l ec t ions (V.). 
K e y w o r d s : Elect ions in Ancient R o m e , Cicero, C o m m e n t a r i o l u m petitionis 
I. The Latin genre commentary (commentarius) comes from the Greek hypomnema. 
Hypomnemata were meant to support memory (mimneskesthai), either in form of lists and 
invoices on business transactions, or private notes not intended for publication.1 Given a 
wide scope of meaning, the genre of hypomnema was suitable for being extended in several 
directions; so for denoting descriptions of noteworthy events as autobiographical notes or 
practical guidelines.2 From the age of Hellenism, hypomnema served more and more to 
denote exegetic comments on literary texts; the locus quoted was followed by 
explanation and various interpretations. Later, especially in the last century of the Roman 
Republic, plain presentations confined to sheer description of facts were called commen-
tarius, which could be elaborated into annals (libri annales) or historical works (história) 
by historians. At the same time, the notion of commentarius used in the sense of notes 
meant for private use, or at least not for being made public in the given form, did not vanish 
completely.3 
The question arises which literary genre Commentariolum petitionis is the closest to. 
The form with diminutive suffix in the title (commentariolum) gives the impression that the 
author intended to sum up his views on applying for office merely in minor notes rather 
than in an exhaustive writing. At the beginning of the work one can read the greetings 
addressed to Marcus Tullius Cicero,4 on the other hand, it implies that he wanted to send 
this writing as a letter.5 Both in the opening lines and in the last paragraph of the work 
Quintus Tullius Cicero speaks to his brother Marcus in a fairly direct, fraternal tone, and at 
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the end of the letter he asks him to share his comments on, supplementing, correcting the 
writing with him so that it could be published as a genuine commentctrius.6 By that the 
author made it clear that his writing in the form sent by him was not to be considered real 
commentary, but the improved text he wanted to publish as such. Furthermore, most of the 
manuscripts of Commentariolum petitionis bequeath this work as Quintus Tullius Cicero's 
work included in books 9-16 of Marcus Tullius Cicero's correspondence with his kin and 
friends (adfamiliares). On the other hand, the text cannot be considered a letter in the strict 
sense for the structure, introduction and closure of the writing as well as its attention to 
detail imply that the author considered the work to be made public later completed in most 
of its parts. Except for its private aspects and greetings, the text, or a significant part thereof 
that can be published as commentarius, is fully presented to us.7 
It is rather dubious if Quintus publishcd-could have published-this work after it had 
been revised by Marcus, in which he outlines the organisation and management of the 
election campaign since he explored the details of the fight for votes with relentless honesty. 
Günter Laser sums up the core of Quintus's writing as follows: in order to obtain the 
consul's office the applicant should not shrink back from any tricks, false promises, lies, 
pretence and approaching/flattering any group that fits the purpose.8 
Even more important than discrediting opponents is to win as many friends as possible.4 
It is important to appear in the company of popular people, even if they do not support the 
candidate since those who can see them together will not necessarily know that.10 Quintus 
lists three kinds of ways of how to arouse sympathy: when one does good to somebody; 
when people hope that we will do good to them, or when people likes us ." One should send 
the message to the friends of our friends that one will not be ungrateful if they support us. 
One should promise them offices since the worst that could happen is that we might possibly 
not keep our promise once having won the consul's office.12 The most important thing, 
however, is that when one appears in a village, everybody who counts must be called by 
their name.13 Quintus asserts that a candidate should keep the map of entire Italy in his 
mind so that there should be no village where he has no sufficient support.14 Each electoral 
district should be covered by a web of friendly relations.15 The most important thing, 
however, is that when one appears in a village, everybody who counts must be called by 
their name. However, so many names to keep in mind is an impossible task for anybody. To 
this end, nomeclatores (name reminders) were used, who whispered who was who into 
one 's ears.16 In Quintus Cicero's view, to contact those who are hesitating between political 
6
 Commentariolum petitionis 1. 58. 
7
 Laser: Quintus Tullius Cicero. ... op. cit. 4 sq. 
8
 Ibid. 5; Németh Gy.-Nótári T: Hogyan nyerjük meg a választásokat? Quintus Tullius Cicero: 
A hivatalra pályázók kézikönyve. (How to Win Elections? Quintus Tullius Cicero: Handbook for Ap-
plicants for Offices.) Szeged 2006. 149 sqq.; Takács, A.: Election Campaign in the Antiquity. Acta 
Juridica Hungarica 50. 2009/1. 111 sqq. 
4
 Commentariolum petitionis 16 sqq. 
10 Ibid. 24. 
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 Ibid. 21. 
Ibid. 20. 
и Ibid. 31. 
I" Ibid. 30. 
is Ibid. 29. 
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sides three things are needed: generosity, attention and, occasionally, some pretension and 
flattery.17 One should let everybody to have access to him day and night; everybody should 
be helped; or at least one's help should be promised but all this in such manner that one 
does not hurt self-esteem of those whom one helps.18 
II. The issue of authorship of the Commentariolum petitionis has many times divided 
researchers. At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, G. L. Henderson questioned the 
originality of Commentariolum but his assertion drew no significant responses, either for 
or against, in the literature;19 and in his entry on Quintus Cicero Fr. Münzer took the position 
that the work was original.20 In the middle of the 20th century, W. S. Watt, the publisher of 
Commentariolum expressed his amazement that this work could have ever been considered 
by anybody Quintus Cicero's letter written to his brother, Marcus;21 and refusing the 
standpoint of hypercriticism. The recent publisher, G. Laser alleged the text was Q. Cicero's 
work.22 Against Quintus's authorship the following arguments have been put forward. They 
deem it exaggerated naivety that the younger brother, Quintus would have made notes for 
his elder brother, Marcus on what strategy he should follow while applying for the consul's 
office, and in these notes-as he himself confessed-hc would not have made known anything 
to his brother that he had not already known, or could have known. Also, it might definitely 
give rise to suspicion that the arguments against the competitors, Antonius and Catilina put 
forth in the Commentariolum return almost word for word in Marcus's oration registered 
under the tile In toga Candida handed down to us by Asconius in fragments. On the grounds 
of the above, they qualify the Commentariolum forgery compiled from In toga Candida and 
Pro Murena and Marcus's letter written on the public administration of the provinces 
addressed to Quintus.23 
These arguments have been denied by several experts, including R. Till, with the 
following reasons. The inherited manuscripts of Cicero's works can hardly give an answer 
to the question of originality. Quintus's four letters preserved for us, three of them addressed 
to Tiro and one to Marcus, cannot support any linguistic or stylistic conclusions drawn with 
regard to his author profile. On the other hand, it is highly improbable that his style would 
have been greatly different from the language of his brother's letters who was almost the 
same age as him and had the same education. The assumption claiming that 
Commentariolum can be dated as well to the late period of the Age of Augustus can be 
refused by putting the question whether who could have been the person in the last years of 
the reign of Augustus that deemed it was in his interest to give a detailed description on the 
election and campaign secrets of the year 64 B.C. And even if somebody had decided to do 
that why would he have chosen Quintus Cicero, a rather grey figure both in literary and 
political terms, as the authority of what he wanted to expound. What benefit could he have 
gained from using Quintus's name after Marcus's death for revealing his brother's policy of 
opportunism? Who could have been the author who had such exact knowledge of the 
>7 Ibid. 42. 
1» Ibid. 44 sqq. 
19
 See Schanz, M.-Hosius, C.: Geschichte der römischen Literatur I. München 1927. 551. 
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 Münzer, F.: Q. Tullius Cicero. In: Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Alterthums-
wissenschaft Vila. Stuttgart-München 1943. 1288. 
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' Watt, S. W.: M. Tulli Ciceronis epistulae III. Oxford 1958. 179. 
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conditions and events of the given year that no errors whatsoever were made in his writing? 
Why would he have chosen just the period as the subject of his description when Catilina 
had not been swept off the scene of public life? Finally, what forger would have been so 
modest to emphasise right at the beginning of his writing that the fictitious addressee could 
not learn anything new from his summary?24 
The author hardly wanted to win rhetor's laurel since his style is dry, his sentences 
have an unpleasant ring.25 The Commentariolum provides formidable knowledge of the 
events of the years discussed in it, so its author must have by all means been a contemporary 
who experienced these events from quite close. References made to Marcus's situation and 
background26 give account of such knowledge that it can be bravely assumed that from 
words let drop or sentences left unfinished the addressee exactly understood what the author 
meant. As a matter of fact, Marcus was not lacking knowledge of the process of applying 
for offices either, however, it can justify Quintus's effort to sum up relevant experience that 
he had also applied for minor offices (magistratus minores), and so he could add his 
personal observations to his brother's strategy.27 The plural used in sentences with more 
personal tone28 also indicates that the writer of the letter might have had a direct relation 
with the addressee. The fact that certain sentences from Commentariolum return almost 
word for word in In toga Candida cannot be an argument against originality. Quintus sent 
his notes to his brother with a view to have them supplemented and corrected,29 from which 
one can draw the conclusion that later on he wanted to make his writing public-at a later 
point of time, in May 59, he forwarded his work entitled Annales to Marcus also for 
correction with the intention to publish it.30 As a matter of fact, the Commentariolum was 
not published by Marcus either in 64 or later since by doing that he would have allowed to 
have an insight into his own political intentions and opportunism, but the charges against 
Antonius and Catilina gathered in these notes he could use with clear conscience and 
comfortably in his later oration, In toga Candida f The publication of the work later was just 
as against Marcus's purposes as the publication of several of his letters addressed to Atticus. 
Taking all the above into consideration, albeit for lack of direct evidence we are forced to 
dismiss the standpoint of hypercriticism and until the contrary is proved unambiguously we 
need to allege that Quintus Tullius Cicero is the author of Commentariolum petitionis?2 
Quite openly, Quintus explores his brother's far from favourable situation in applying 
for the consul's office. In the eye of the nobility he is considered 'a new man' (homo 
no vus) f who is not backed either by a proper group of clientes, or sufficient financial 
support; while his competitors, Antonius and Catilina are abounding in all these.34 Although 
the term homo novus was never defined exactly, it was used in a dual sense: as a narrower 
24
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25
 Till, R.: Ciceros Bewerbung ums Konsulat. (Ein Beitrag zum commentariolum petitionis.) 
História 11. 1962. 316. 
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31
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denotation it meant all of those who did not have any consul among their ancestors; in a 
wider sense it denoted those whose forefathers, even if not having obtained the highest 
rank, did obtain some office or were allowed to be the members of the senatus. The 
optimates used this term properly since for them it meant only the parvenu; however, Cicero 
declared about himself quite proudly that he had obtained all possible offices at the youngest 
age permitted by law (in suo anno), although he did not come from the aristocracy of the 
senatus. A similar thought can be read in Pro Murena too.35 
For Marcus his own character and view of life must have meant a disadvantage too 
since being a Platonist it was alien to him to apply pretence (simulatio) indispensably 
necessary for application36 and the ability to make friends with people in order to adjust to 
voters.37 His key weapon was his oratory skills that helped him to make himself popular 
among the people (popularis).n On the other hand, he had to beware of appearing a populist 
politician since it was not the urban masses (urbana multitude) that would decide the 
outcome of the election.39 Interestingly, Quintus did not attribute any special significance to 
the help Marcus had recently given to populists (C. Fundanius, Q. Gallus, С. Cornelius and 
C. Orchivius), regarding the election he considered it simply a useful step to win the relevant 
associations (sodalitates).40 From first to last, Marcus attempted to avoid appearing a 
populist but in his efforts he got several times in unpleasant situations; so, for example, 
when he undertook C. Manilius's case.41 What happened was that the urban masses forced 
Marcus to live up his word to undertake the defense of C. Manilius;42 the proceedings were 
not held in early 65 due to the political situation, and so Cicero escaped from being forced 
to make an unambiguously clear political statement in public.43 Although Quintus does not 
consider the aforesaid statements of defense a standpoint of especially great weight, he 
deems the action taken for the benefit of Pompeius in 67 even after such a long time an act 
that could cast shadow on his brother's career.44 The reason for that can be most probably 
looked for in the fact that while statements of defense made in court of justice were 
considered events soon forgotten in the turmoil of everyday life, Marcus himself protested 
against being confronted with his standpoints formulated in statements of defense later on 
as his own opinion.45 This oration made in the popular assembly for the first time as praetor 
entering office represented an unambiguous confrontation with the senatus since it was the 
popular assembly and not the senatus that was competent to decide the superior commander's 
authority (impérium) to be granted to Pompeius. To promote his popularity, Cicero gave 
free rein to diminuting the authority of the senatus, and subsequently many were very much 
offended by his act-so he had to manoeuvre quite skilfully during the process of application 
35
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36
 Commentariolum petitionis 1. 45. 
37
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38
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not to alienate Pompeius and his adherents, on the one hand, and not to worsen his chances 
in the circles of senatores by asserting his commitment to Pompeius, on the other.46 
How does Quintus in early 64 evaluate his brother's chances in the election, and what 
opinions does he formulate on the competitors? He considers it a fortunate circumstance 
that his brother does not have any respectful competitors who come from the nobility 
(nobilitas), and he points out that C. Coelius Caldus, the consul of the year 94-the last homo 
novus who fulfilled the consul's office before Cicero-must have had quite a difficult job 
since he had to overcome outstanding figures of the nobility.47 The nobility of the age 
considered the consulatus their own monopoly;48 they believed that electing Cicero consul 
would defile and desecrate this office.49 After that, Quintus enumerates the four possible 
opponents, of whom Galba and Cassius albeit coming from high-born families had no 
chances because they do not have enough persistence and drive.50 The criminal procedure 
against Catilina turned out favourably in spite of anticipations,51 although somewhat earlier, 
in July 65 Marcus did not think it was possible, and was pondering over possibly undertaking 
Catilina's defense as by that he wanted to win Crassus and Caesar standing behind Catilina 
for his later election campaign.52 Eventually, Marcus did not undertake to defend Catilina, 
and after the verdict of acquittal Catilina entered into an election alliance with Antonius, 
which was approved by the aforesaid influential political factors too. All this unambiguously 
shows that political alliances of the period were formed accidentally based on current 
interests, and that in order to increase his chances Cicero would have been willing to enter 
into alliance even with Catilina, and after their election most probably he would have 
applied the same tactic against him as against Antonius-these assumptions, however, are on 
the verge of unhistorical speculations.53 
III . The characterisation of the competitors, Antonius and Catilina54 is perhaps the most 
remarkable part of the Commentariolum both in terms of language and the palpable 
description. Quintus considers both persons unpleasant for his brother; at the same time, he 
is compelled to see them as factors that must be reckoned with-regarding both of them he 
states that their past is obscure and sinful, both of them live to fulfil his desires, and none of 
them has the necessary financial means to be able to conduct the election campaign 
successfully55 (with this last remark he opposes them to the wealthy upper and middle 
classes who want to protect their wealth).56 At the end of the presentation he underlines as 
their common feature that it is not so much their origin from high-born families but their 
sins that make them well-known, and those casting their votes on them would stab two 
daggers at the same time into the state.57 The use of the term dagger (sica) is not by chance, 
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by that Quintus lets Marcus associate it with Antonius's and Catilina's aforesaid 
characterisation, in particular, that both of them are assassins (sicarii). 
C. Antonius, son of M. Antonius, the orator, who taught Cicero too,58 bore the sobriquet 
Hybrida (bastard), and is kept in evidence among others as the uncle and father-in-law of 
the later triumvir M. Antonius. Quintus adduced against him that in 70 the censores excluded 
him from the senatus54 because he sold his plots and property in auction due to his debts.60 
As the next charge he mentions the lawsuit successfully brought against him by the 
inhabitants of Achaia in 76 before M. Licinius Lucullus praetor peregrinus as a competent 
forum having jurisdiction in the disputes of Roman citizens and aliens:61 they charged him 
with looting them as the commander of the cavalry during Sulla's rule of terror.62 The 
counsel for the prosecution was the then twenty-four year old Caesar,63 and although 
Antonius withdrew himself from the praetor's jurisdiction, six years later it was this act 
due to which the censores excluded him from the senatus. Nevertheless, he was admitted to 
the senatus again in 66 as praetor, and later in 42 he fulfilled the censor's office too.64 
When elected praetor he was not able to name friends in sufficient rank for counting and 
checking the ballots, only the ill-famed Sabidius and Panthera.65 His father's name was 
probably of great help to him in successfully applying both for the praetor's and later the 
consul's office; however, Quintus does not mention that in his election to be praetor 
Antonius got from the third place to the first with Cicero's help66—this fact also shows that 
election alliances were short-term partnerships based on interests of the moment.67 
Concubinage with a slave woman (concubinatus) itself was not considered a rare thing or an 
exceptionally scandalous act.68 What causcd dissatisfaction in the case of Antonius was that 
he bought the slave girl whom he kept beside him in an open auction (de machinis) as a 
praetor in office, and by doing so he injured the dignity of the office he fulfilled.69 
When the application procedure commenced Antonius did not stay in Rome but we 
do not know where his journey took him.70 On official missions (legatio libera) the 
traveller was entitled to reimbursement of travel expenses and accommodation and board; 
also he had the opportunity, in addition to compulsory benefits, to make the innkeepers 
hosting him pay tributes-the fleeced innkeeper (copo compilants) as a proverbial phrase was 
used by Petronius too.71 On official missions one could get enormously rich as it is proved by 
a locus from one of Cato maior's orations on his own costs and expenses (De sumptu suo).72 
In 59 Caesar made an attempt to eliminate the abuse of public funds by statutory instrument 
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(lex Iulia de repetundis)', and in Cilicia Cicero waived even the reimbursement of expenses he 
was entitled to.73 On his official journey mentioned by Quintus, Antonius substantially 
replenished his financial resources to accumulate proper funds for generous distribution of 
gifts during the election campaign (largitio)\ on the other hand, he injured the people of Rome 
too-points out the author-since he failed to fulfil his obligation to ask for the support of the 
people of Rome personally during the process of application (populo Romano supplicarej.74 
Later, Cicero was yet compelled to exercise his consul's office in concordance with 
(concordia) him75 since the popular assembly (comitia centuriata) electcd Antonius consul on 
the second place after Cicero-it praises Marcus's sense of tactic that by doing favours to him he 
was able to make the competitor attacked earlier stand by him as an associate in the office 
during the times when he had to cope with the dangers of the Catilina plot.76 
Expressing his indignation over Catilina's past and way of life Quintus took to more 
powerful means as in the characterisation of Antonius, which can be clearly identified in the 
series of pathetic poetic questions.77 At the same time, these questions and exclamations do 
not lack irony as he sharply questions the nobleness of Catilina's origin, on the one hand-
although in theory Catilina was more high-born than Antonius, his ancestors obtained only 
the praetor's office while Antonius's father was one of the leading personalities of the 
State-and the lack of nobleness of his character, on the other.78 Contrary to Antonius who 
was frightened even by his own shadow, Quintus characterises Catilina in general as an 
uninhibited scoundrel who despises and defames the law;79 then, he turns to the list of his 
outrageous deeds.80 He underlines his poor family conditions, also referred to by 
Sallustius,81 as it was only through Sulla's proscriptions that Catilina took possession of 
considerable wealth,82 and the fact that his rakish and violent sexual nature was 
reinforced by what he experienced at home, seeing his elder sister's conduct.83 The greatest 
part of the crimes in the presentation comprises the murders committed during Sulla's rule 
of terror against Roman citizens.84 Quintus enumerates the names of the murdered Roman 
knights, who supported Cinna and by doing so evoked Sulla's revenge, in a generalising 
plural even if Catilina's bloodlust demanded only one victim from the given clan.85 As one 
of the most outrages examples of these murders he recalls the murder of Q. Caecilius, 
Catilina's own brother-in-law, who played no political role at all, and considering his age 
the only thing he wanted was quiet old age;86 it is highly weird that to the best of our 
knowledge Marcus never mentions the murder of relatives committed by Catilina.87 
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Quintus gives a longer pathetic description not shrinking back from depicting 
naturalistic details of the brutal murder of Catilina's wife, Gratidia's sister, by M. Marius 
Gratidianus Catilina.88 This murder must have affected the brothers closely since 
through their grandmother they were relatives of Gratidianus.89 This man highly dear to 
the people of Rome (homo carissimus populo Romano) was very popular among others 
because during the two consecutive years, in 85 and 84 when he fulfilled the praetor's 
office he took several measures to prevent the people from being injured; so at several 
points of the city they erected statues of him, which were respected with cultic ceremonies.90 
On the other hand, both Quintus and Marcus conceals that in 87 Gratidianus as a popular 
tribune and as Cinna's adherent threatened Q. Lutatius Catulus with crucifixion, who escaped 
into suicide-the Commentariolum renders the merciless revenge of Catulus's son and 
especially Catilina perceptible.91 Quintus demonstrates Catilina's corruptness and dangerous 
nature when he does not fail to mention that Catilina lived together with actors and 
gladiators-both occupations were inflicted by loss of honour (infamia) in Roman law92-and 
while actors satisfied only his lust, gladiators meant grave threat to all the citizens.93 Since 
the Spartacus uprising, contacts with gladiators represented threat to the peace of the State-
Catilina obtained a troop of gladiators from Q. Gallus.94 The danger implied by it is 
indicated also by the resolution of the senatus (senatus consultum) dated 12 October 63, 
twelve days before Cicero's first oration against Catilina, claiming that Catilina's gladiators 
must be dispersed to Capua and other provincial towns.95 
Catilina committed sacrilege (sacrilegium) both when he washed his hands besmeared 
with blood in the holy water basin of the Apollo temple after murdering Gratidianus,96 
and later by other acts. However, Quintus puts it quite obliquely and speaks about defiling 
only one sacred place and some other persons who became the innocent victims of Catilina's 
crime.97 Quintus's vague description is understandable since the case is from 73 when 
Clodius charged Catilina with incest, incestum, committed with Fabia (Fabia was a Vesta 
priestess and half-sister of Cicero's wife, Terentia). Owing to Catulus's help, Catilina was 
acquitted but the case left the reputation of Fabia, and by that of Terentia's and Cicero's 
family in tatters. There are a few loci available on the case; e.g., Sallustius98 and Plutarch99 
asserts Catilina's outrageous deed as a fact, but Cicero, should he refer to the fact, never 
associated his sister-in-law's name with him. After that Quintus enumerates some persons 
by name who belonged to the circle of Catilina's close friends (amicissimij;100 this, 
however, cannot be interpreted to imply that Marcus or Quintus suspected as early as that 
88
 Commentariolum petitionis 10. 
89
 Cicero, De officiis 3, 67. 
99
 Ibid. 3, 80. 
91
 Cf. Asconius, Commentarius 84, 9 sqq.; Till: op. cit. 1962. 330. 
92
 Cf. Földi A.-Hamza G.: A római jog története és institúciói. (History and Institutions of Ro-
man Law.) Budapest 2009 A 223 sq. 
93
 Commentariolum petitionis 10. 
94
 Asconius, Commentarius 88, 2 sqq. 
95
 Sallustius, De coniuratione Catilinae 30, 7. 
m Plutarchus, Sulla 32. 
97
 Commentariolum petitionis 10; Asconius, Commentarius 91, 16 sqq. 
98
 Sallustius, De coniuratione Catilinae 15, 1. 
99
 Plutarchus, Cato minor 19, 3. 
100
 Commentariolum petitionis 10. 
44 TAMÁS N Ó T Á R I 
anything about the plot prepared by Catilina l0l-nevertheless, certain names (Q. Curius, L. 
Vettius) related later to the plot already appeared here.102 
To make the list of crimes complete, Quintus points out that Catilina seduced free-
born boys almost in their parents' lap-Sulla's legislation and the lex Sca(n)tinia imposed 
a fine of ten thousand sestertius on this state of facts 103-which was public knowledge all 
over the city,104 and was absolutely contrary to Cicero's relation to youth several times 
underlined by Quintus too.105 To cover Catilina's recent scandal, Quintus adduces to the 
case well-known to his brother: the acquittal from the charge brought against him for 
robbing goods from the province Africa (crimen repetundarumj.106 This lawsuit could 
have prevented Catilina from applying for the consul's office107 but in late 65 at 
Catilina's demand the purportedly biased jurors were recalled with the prosecutor's, P. 
Clodius Pulcher's consent, and the newly set up jury acquitted Catilina.108 Quintus, and 
later Marcus spoke about the corrupt jurors with contempt.104 On the other hand, Quintus 
docs not talk about Crassus and Caesar who supported Catilina from the background.110 
Most probably Quintus summed up the negative features of the two competitors 
well-known to his brother to help Marcus to make the citizcns aware of them in a concise 
form,1" or to make him able to properly threaten Catilina and Antonius with charging them 
with their outrageous deeds."2 Against Antonius he enumerates the following acts, in brief 
summary: his debts; selling his estates; his contempt of the court; his exclusion from the 
senatus; his suspicious acquaintance with Sabidius and Panthera; defiling the dignity of the 
office by buying the girl friend on the slave market; and, from the recent period, looting the 
innkeepers; and despising the people of Rome by not attending the application in person. 
Legally, it was only the abuse of the rights of official mission-or his participation in Sulla's 
proscriptions-that could give proper grounds for calling him to account for his deeds."3 
In the description of Catilina's past, when Quintus enumerated the names of the knights 
killed by him, and pathetically dcscribcd the murder of Gratidianus, he must have had kept 
current political issues in view and not just the requirements of historical authenticity as 
that was the time when those who committed murders during Sulla's reign of terror were 
called to account for their deeds"4 - i n spite of the fact that pursuant to the dictator's 
regulations the killers of proscribed persons should have enjoyed impunity."5 As part of 
this process, a short time before the election of the consoles, L. Liscius, Sulla's well-known 
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captain and Bellienus, Catilina's uncle were sentenced due to murdering proscribed 
persons during Sulla's rule, although both of them were quite ignorant persons and they 
could have said that they had committed all that on the orders of Sulla."6 At the end of 64, 
Catilina was also brought to the court of justice competent to pass judgment on homicide 
(quaestio inter sicarios), the investigator's office (quaesitor) was fulfilled by Caesar, the 
chairman's office by L. Lucceius, known as a historian, who was good friends with Cicero."7 
In spite of the fact that Catilina could not give an excuse for his deeds by saying that he 
acted on the orders of the dictator, he was acquitted because Caesar and Cassius backed 
him."8 Furthermore, he could have been charged with seducing boys and unlawfully 
keeping gladiators; and many people demanded retrial of the case of looting the province. 
Although the first lawsuit ended with acquittal, the public opinion of the period evaluated 
it as a scandalous outcome. So owing to Quintus's instructions, Marcus had sufficient 
material for being able to threaten both of his competitors, primarily Catilina with possibly 
charging them."9 
Marcus amply used the material compiled by his brother in his oration entitled In toga 
Candida handed down to us by Asconius in fragments: what happened was he claimed to 
make the law motioned by C. Calpumius Piso to sanction election fraud in 67 (lex 
Calpurnia de ambitu) stricter when the amount of the bribery monies distributed by 
Antonius and Catilina went far beyond any usual extent.120 Q. Maucius Orestinus exercised 
his right of veto (intercessio), and Marcus heavily attacked his competitors before the 
senatus enumerating the following deeds. Regarding Antonius: looting Achaia and 
despising the court; his own favour he did to Antonius in the election of the praetor, 
assigning his goods; and holding back the shepherds who worked on his estate in order to 
organise an army from them; Antonius's participation in Sulla's proscriptions and the role 
taken by him when driving a cart (quadrigarius) in Sulla's triumphal procession. 
In the rest of the speech, he attacked Catilina: he charged him with murdering Roman 
citizens; financial abuses and crimes; immorality and debauchery; despising the law; 
killing Marius Gratidianus; gathering gladiators and seducing the Vesta priestess-and called 
both of them a dagger pointed against the State.121 The two competitors made efforts to 
defend themselves; however, not being able to come up with anything against Cicero's 
personality and conduct of life, the only thing they cast on his eyes was that he was 'a new 
man' (homo novus)}22 The oration produced its impact: it seemed more prudent to elect an 
applicant who did not have noble descent from the old times but was eligible for each layer 
of society and the masses than Catilina.123 Antonius achieved the second place after Cicero, 
and his father's former authority was of great help to him.124 
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IV. The Republic of Rome recognised four kinds of popular assemblies; three of them 
played a part in the elections. The comitia centuriata based on property census electcd the 
prime leaders of the Empire, the consules and the praetores who carried out administration 
of justice as well as the censores who implemented property estimation. The point of the 
system was that based on their property status, income the population was ranked among 
military/political centuriae. The centuriae of the wealthier as a matter of fact did not amount 
to one hundred persons while the number of persons in a single centuria of the pauper was at 
least as large as the whole first class; that is, the total of the eighty centuriae of the aristocracy. 
Equités constituted eighteen centuriae. The wealthier the people recruited were, the higher 
the number of centuriae was; i.e., the number of citizens classified in each centuria was 
steadily increasing when the given centuria consisted of less and less wealthy people. 
Through that it was possible to attain that people without any property were represented only 
by five centuriae. Elections were held in a process per centuriae-and "from up to down". 
This means that first wealthier people cast their vote and after that the poorer, finally the 
pauper, who constituted the major part of the population. Although the ballots cast by 
each citizen were equal but their ballots were aggregated per centuria and their centuria 
eventually represented only a single 'yes' or 'no' vote, depending on which response the 
majority of the ballots was cast in the centuria. If a case had to be decided or an official had 
to be voted for, voting was carried out only up to the stage where the centuriae that had 
already cast their vote had reachcd fifty percent plus one ballot. As the eighty votes of the 
eighteen votes of the équités and the eighty votes of the first class of the patricians/thc 
aristocracy themselves were more than half of the one hundred and ninety-three centuriae in 
total, it can be clearly realised that even the twenty centuriae of the second property class 
had to cast their ballots only in the very rare case that the centuriae of the knights and the 
first class had not reached accord for some reason. As, however, the first ninety-eight 
centuriae actually represented merely a fraction of the whole of the citizens, the election was 
far from reflecting the will of the majority of the citizens.125 
The day of the election of the consuls always fell on the second half of July. The 
electors went out to the Mars field early morning and gathered by centuriae. The persons 
controlling the elections announced the names of the candidates; and, after that voting 
began. The identity of the voters appearing per centuriae was verified by the guards at the 
gateway to the voting bridge. Voters wrote the initials of the name of the candidate they 
supported on a wax covered piece of wooden board. At the other end of the voting bridge a 
ballot-box was set up where they cast their boards. Once one centuria has cast their votes, 
ballots were aggregated in the ballot counting chambcr, and the names of the candidates 
were written in a predetermined order, with the decisions of the centuriae added beside 
the names. When a candidate had reached fifty percent plus one vote of the ballots of the 
centuriae, voting was discontinued, and the result was proclaimed. The institution of 
campaign silence was unknown to the Romans since agents tried to convince voters to vote 
for specific candidates even at the gate of the bridge. I f i t was foreseen that the result would 
be unfavourable for patricians, then the voting bridge collapsed "accidentally", and the 
voting had to be interrupted-and be postponed for several days. Then, in some eases, 
augures showed up, who stated that they were seeing ill omina, and this allowed declaring 
the whole procedure null and void.126 
125
 Németh-Nótári: op. cit. 136 sqq. 
126
 Ibid. 144 sq.; Takács: op. cit. 111 sqq. 
ON Q U I N T U S TULLIUS C I C E R O ' S C O M M E N T A R I O L U M PETITIONIS 47 
Just as the election of magistrates was a necessary part of the order of the state of 
the Republic of Rome, in these elections election fraud/bribery (ambitus) played a part 
too. Very soon after the making of the Twelve Table Law, in 432, the first statutory provision 
was published, which prohibited for applicants to call their fellow citizens' attention to 
themselves with specially whitened clothes made shining.127 Initially, ambitus (walking 
around) indicated not more than the activity when the applicant for the office walked around 
among electors to secure their votes for him.128 It is linked with the name of C. Poetelius 
tribumis p/ebis that in 358 a plebiscitum prohibited for the applicants to walk around on 
markets and in villages among electors,129 which provision was obviously intended to 
prevent unethical practices to obtain votes outside Rome. In accordance with Roman 
terminology, it was always only ambitus that violated legal order, ambitio did not;130 the 
latter was often used in the sense of petitio, its meaning was sometimes undoubtedly 
pejorative but it never became a legal term.131 It should be noted, however, that the 
aforesaid two plébiscita cannot be considered punitive statutes.132 
From the second half of the second century we know of the existence of two acts that 
sanctioned ambitus-they are lex Cornelia Baebia from 181133 and an act from 159,134 but 
their content is not known. In the age between C. Gracchus and Sulla, the system of 
quaestiones perpetuae was already quite extended. The first news provided on a lawsuit 
specifically on the charge of ambitus is dated to this period: in 116 one of the consul's offices 
for the year of 115 was won by a homo novus Marcus Aemilius Scaurus, who was charged 
by his rival having lost the election, P. Rutilius Rufus with ambitus. In turn Scaurus did the 
same against Rufus; otherwise both of the accused-who were prosecutors at the same time-
were acquitted.135 The existence of lex Cornelia de ambitu made by Sulla is somewhat 
disputed;136 our understanding of leges Corneliae is not complete since there are two sources 
on these acts available. First, Cicero's speeches; secondly, the writings of the lawyers of late 
principate, which are known only in the form bequeathed in the Digest. Cicero refers to 
these acts only to the extent his interests manifested in the given speech, that is, the rhetoric 
situation makes it necessary; so in no way does he make an effort to be exhaustive as it is not 
his duty. The lawyers of the principatus dealt with only those acts of Sulla that remained in 
force after Augustus's reforms. The following reference, however, gives ground for 
considering the existence of lex Cornelia de ambitu possible. It asserts that in earlier ages 
the convicted were condemned to refrain from applying for magistrates for ten years. The 
aforesaid lex Cornelia can be hardly the lex Cornelia Baebia from 181 since between his 
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spcech delivered in defense of Publius Cornelius Sulla and lex Cornelia more than ten years 
had passed, and as in this period other laws sanctioning ambitus were also made, it cannot be 
supposed that the extent of punishment would have remained the same.137 
In the periods after Sulla, quaestio de ambitu was usually headed by a praetor, so 
for example in 66 C. Aquilius Gallus fulfilled the office of praetor ambitus,138 On the laws 
following this stage, information is supplied by Cicero in Pro Murena. At the request of C. 
Cornelius tribunus plebis, in 67, lex Calpurnia was born;139 what can be known about its 
sanctions is as follows. It contained expulsion from the senatus, banning from applying for 
offices for life (contrary to the ten years' term defined under lex Cornelia) and certain 
pecuniary punishments.140 A senatus consultum from 63 emphatically sanctioned a part of 
the acts regulated under lex Calpurnia; so for example, the act of recruiting party adherents 
for money upon the reception of the applicant in Rome; the act of distributing a great 
number of free tickets and seats for gladiators' games; and the act of hospitality to an 
excessive extent;141 this senatus consultum probably interpreted and specified the aforesaid 
law.142 The events of the year 64, however-primarily the increasing losses of Antonius and 
Catilina-made it necessary to make a new law. This law became lex Tullia enacted in 63, 
supported by all the candidates applying for the consulatus of the year 62,143 which 
threatened with ten years' exile as a new punishment, and took firmer action against 
distributing money, and punished absence from legislation due to alleged illness. 
Furthermore, it banned the arrangement of gladiators' games during two years before 
applying, with the only exemption from such ban being an obligation to do so as set forth in 
a last will and testament. That is how the law wanted to prevent paying money directly to 
voters, and intended to limit the number of the entourage of the applicants (as an increasingly 
great entourage almost appearing to be a triumphal procession might have suggested sure 
victory to voters). It is a fact however-as Joachim Adamietz's witty and quite to the point 
remark reveals-that the actual limits of ambitus were determined by nothing else than the 
confines of the financial possibilities of the candidates.144 
V. The associations founded by private persons, usually called collegium, held together the 
communities providing protection and assistance for persons living at the same settlement 
and belonging to the same religious cult but were primarily not meant to serve everyday 
political fights.145 To cover their expenses certain associations claimed admission fees 
(capitulare) or regular monthly membership fees (slips menstruaj,146 which of course 
limited the number of members; that is, most often the members of the collegia were from 
the wealthier layers of urban common people (plebs urbana), traders, craftsmen, ship 
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owners and not from simple labourers.147 If an association, which did not claim any 
membership fees, was not able to finance its expenses from its own resources, it could rely 
on the generosity of its leaders, or a patrónus but if it engaged a conduct which was contrary 
to the maintainor's intentions, then it could lose the support.148 The political significance of 
collegia increased during periods of applications for magistrates; however, even then it was 
enough for the applicant to win over the leading personalities of the collegium to his goals, 
the rest of the members obediently followed the opinion leaders.149 Clodius's activity added 
a peculiar element to the political operation of certain associations. Clodius definitely 
raised the number of collegia that did not claim any membership fees and brought together 
the scum of the city, which highly shocked Cicero.150 The maintenance and "representation" 
expenses of these associations were most probably covered by Clodius himself, and in 
return the members could express their gratitude to their patrónus in several ways and 
forms; consequently, in theory Clodius could easily mobilise masses.151 These collegia lead 
by Clodius were actually gangs operated by keeping the appearance of legality but used as 
tools to raise riots; and it was not in the interest of decent citizens to risk their reputation, 
proceeds and life-by closing their shops and leaving their daily jobs-for the sake of 
Clodius.152 Later, Clodius made efforts to use the collegia maintained by him as a kind of 
private army,153 which were, looking at their "results", sufficient for Clodius achieving his 
short-term plans and disturbing the privacy of the public for a short while, but for seizing 
power for a longer period (which was perhaps not included in Clodius's intentions) both 
financial resources and proper motivation were missing. After Clodius's death, the collegia 
lost their impact produced on political events; nevertheless, later on the leaders of the State 
were very careful in their ways with associations.154 
The question arises what proportion of the population the institution of the clientela 
covered-Gelzer believes it was the common people of the city (plebs urbana) who belonged 
to the clientela155-and as part of that what services the clientes were obliged to provide for 
their patrónus; and to what extent the wider masses could be manipulated and mobilised 
through the clientela. Since the early period of the Republic the relation between the 
patrónus and the cliens had been based on mutual trust (fides), under which patricians 
having outstanding authority (auctoritas), dignity (dignitas) and wealth (vires), and later 
plebeians undertook to protect citizens in need of and asking for protection156 as well as 
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travelling aliens (hospites) in the form of various benefits and favours (bénéficia, mérita) 
both financially and before the law.157 In spite of their dependant relation to their patrónus 
the clientes preserved their personal freedom, and were not compelled to waive their right 
to political activity or participation in public life; what is more, their patrons promoted 
them to do so.158 In addition to expressing esteem (reverentia) and gratitude (gratia) the 
clientes were obliged to provide several services for their patrónus}59 So, for example, they 
arranged for accommodation for their patron or his friends,160 shared the payment of 
penalties,161 supported their patrónus in court proceedings,162 during the period of applying 
for or fulfilling offices they provided spiritual and financial support for their patron,163 
in danger they undertook to protect him personally,164 as a foreign cliens they supplied 
goods to the patrónus}65 and preferably they informed as many people as possible about 
the generosity of their patron.166 On the grounds of all the above, the clientes were in many 
cases meant to articulate the patrónus's interests and views to the wider masses clearly and 
efficiently.167 Although the clientela provided an essential basis of support for the patrónus, 
the citizens fulfilling patronatus were far from relying only on clientes in search of tools 
that could be used for their political purposes since the attachment of the clientela was of 
ethical rather than legal nature, on the one hand-consequently, the patron was not able to 
enforce support given to him through legal means, or he could get this support only by 
holding out the prospect of appropriate considcration-and the clientes, pursuing their own 
occupation, could not always be available to the patrónus, on the other. 
The social significance of the clientela depended to a great extent on the social position 
of the cliens, and, therefore, the patronus-ingenuus (free-bom citizen) relation and the 
patronus-libertus (frecdman, liberated slave) relation must be clearly separated from each 
other. A part of free-born clientes belonged to a social and economic layer identical with or 
similar to that of the patrónus, and needed the patronus's support only for the sake of 
strengthening their own position, or for obtaining an office168-in this case the clientela 
meant friendship between persons of equal rank (amicitia)}69 These clientes belonged to 
the higher census class, and so at the comitia centuriata and in a provincial tribus they 
could articulate their opinion and advance their patrónus's interests as competent persons.170 
As a matter of fact, not all free-bom citizens belonged to the wealthier layers, and they 
turned to the patrónus primarily for urgent legal or financial help, but they could hardly 
return the favours did to them as due to the peculiar features of the Roman election system 
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they did not have the opportunity to cast their votes and these votes were not evaluated 
unless the elections were expected to produce a dubious outcome.171 Compared to the latter, 
the applicant for the office appreciated the support of men with greater prestige much more; 
so, for example, the support of the leaders of collegia (principes), who in the given case did 
not constitute a part of the clientela but produced major influence in their association, 
district and their entire place of living, and had considerable impact on changes in the 
morale of voters.172 
The representation of the institution of salutation (salutatio) casts interesting light on 
the applicant's social relations: saluters from lower layers of society (salutatores) visited 
several applicants on the same day (plures competitors), so the conduct engaged by them 
during the election could not be considered secure and stable (communes/fucosi 
suffragatores). Therefore, the patrónus applying for the office ought to have appeared 
grateful to them, and had to praise their activity both to their face and in front of their 
friends as by doing so he could expect them to leave their other patroni and become firm 
and committed voters (proprii/firmi suffragatores)-thc applicant was not supposed to bring 
up his suspicion arising or proved regarding their loyalty, and against his better conviction 
he had to assert his trust in them.173 The patrónus could never be absolutely sure of the 
support and gratitude of salutatores for they could compare the goods and benefits 
received from him to the allowances granted by other applicants they had also visited-i.e., 
economically independent citizens seemed more secure voter's base. The endeavour to 
recruit and hold inconstant salutatores and clientes becomes understandable when one 
considers that the patrónus applying for an office could produce the appearance of 
popularity and influence by having a lot of people crowding around him during 
salutation.174 
More important and more respectful salutatores were allowed to have a word directly 
with the patrónus; their presence made the masses aware that the applicant was worthy of 
more extensive support.175 The salutatio provided opportunities for the applicant for 
gathering information on the morale and desires of common people, which their close circle 
of friends (amici) did not provide insight into; consequently, the patronus-cliens relation 
served mostly exchange of information. The relation between the patrónus and the freedmen 
(liberti) developed somewhat differently: their relation remained closer even after 
liberation (manumissio) but this relation was based as much on the requirements of moral 
standards than on the requirements of legal norms: In 118 Rutilius Rufus's praetor edictum 
limited the range of services that could be demanded by the patrónus,176 but a freedman 
was not allowed to take legal action against the patrónus}11 and it was only Augustus's lex 
Aelia Sentia that formulated statutory sanctions against ungrateful freedmen.178 
Accordingly, the clientela made up of free-bom citizens and freedmen cannot be 
considered uniform in terms of the strength of their attachment to the patrónus since it was 
exactly due to the moral nature of the attachment that the patrónus did not have any 
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legal means to collect outstanding claims and unfulfilled obligations. Although a 
patrónus deceitfully acting against his clientes became the object of the contempt of 
society, this did not mean that he was deprived of his rights. Servius's commentary quoting 
the text of the Twelve Table Law attached to the relevant locus of Vergil's Aeneisl79-
which asserted that the patrónus deceiving his aliens should be damned (sacer)-implied 
ethical offence and not criminal law facts. In this case the term sacer presumably meant 
the person who engaged culpable, that is, despiseable conduct180 rather than a person 
who could be sacrificed to the gods or freely killed. 181 Most probably Servius followed 
the tendency of the late period of the Age of the Republic that idealised the Roman past.182 
Even if we presume close patronus-cliens relations regarding the archaic age, the 
significance of clientelae dramatically diminished by the 3rd c. B.C., and owing to the 
growth of the number of citizens we can no longer reckon with stable clientelae during 
Sulla's rule of terror, much rather ad hoc patronus-cliens relations organised for specific 
purposes should be presumed under which fulfilment of moral obligations was no longer of 
great account.183 If there had been no mobility of such a great extent within and between 
clientelae, then the patroni and applicants for offices would not have been compelled-even 
at the expense of ambitus (election fraud)-to recruit clients.184 Clientes from lower layers of 
society became important to the patrónus not so much for getting their votes-which 
sometimes they were not even allowed to cast in the elections-much rather for their capacity 
to mediate the opinion of the masses to him, which helped him to prepare for what opinion 
they would like to hear from him in public appearances.185 
With the loosening of the patronus-cliens relation, or owing to the fact that the aliens 
would seek a patrónus that represented his interests better, and the patrónus would seek 
clientes in his environment who had more considerable influence and so had greater capital 
of relations, this process reached the stage where the lower layers of society, which 
constituted a considerable part of clientes, were able to produce direct influence on political 
leaders. A grand entourage represented the acknowledgement of the politician and his 
legitimisation by the citizens,186 whereas a decreasing number of people forced him to 
revise his views entertained so far.187 On the other hand, it was just due to the unstable and 
unreliable nature of the clientela that in the last century of the Republic applicants for 
offices relied, in addition to their clientes, on their relatives, friends, neighbours in the 
district, their freedmcn and slaves when compiling the urban accompaniment-this 
diversity enriched not only the spectacular entourage but opened roads to each layer of 
society and created relations for the applicant.188 So the clientela was only one of the means 
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of political fight, and far from being the only or the most important one;189 all the more as 
Livius's description asserts that the purpose of the clientes taking action before the court of 
justice was not to raise sympathy with the defendant much rather to prevent a larger mass 
from getting together.190 
Conclusions 
The exploration of uninhibited opportunism and manoeuvring described in Commentariolum 
petitionis by Quintus Tullius Cicero was in no way in the interest of the ruling class of the 
late Republic, and it would have put especially Marcus Tullius Cicero in an unpleasant 
situation since he could not have shielded himself from the shadow of the suspicion that-
especially as homo novus-he was able to win consulatus because he used all these tools in 
practice. In the mirror of all the above, it can be ascertained that the Commentariolum 
petitionis was produced primarily as a personal writing addressed to Marcus, in which his 
brother, Quintus wanted to give him help by summing up the key aspects and tools of the 
election campaign to win the consul's office. 
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Contemporary Interpretation of the Conception 
of World Heritage in International Law and Practice 
Abstract. T h i s presentation e x a m i n e s s o m e of the c o m p l e x issues that pertain to the perspective of the concept ion 
of World Her i tage embodied in the U N E S C O Conven t ion concerning the Protect ion of the World Cultural and 
Natural Her i tage closely related to the currently observed changes in its conceptua l development . By today, it has 
become the m o s t widely accepted international instrument demonst ra t ing success fu l implementat ion on dif ferent 
levels. At the s a m e time, new i s sues regarding new ca tegor ies of objects , responsibil i ty etc. have emerged . 
Conclusions are drawn in favour o f an adequate re -examinat ion and re-adaptat ion of the conceptual f r a m e w o r k of 
cultural her i tage based on accep t ing its new functional d imens ion and integrat ing multiple perspect ives f rom a 
variety of a c a d e m i c fields. 
Keywords: wor ld cultural and na tura l heritage, c o m m o n heri tage of mank ind . World 1 leritage Commi t t ee , World 
Heritage Fund , World Heritage List o f UNESCO, responsibil i ty, erga omnes obl igat ion, international communi ty , 
cultural l andscapes 
The conception of "World Cultural Heritage" appeared in international law and practice in 
the late '60s of 20,h century. The main idea of the conception is that certain states arc 
credited with cultural assets and these states have the duty to maintain and protect them in 
the interest of the whole humankind1 for future generations. Thus, states are merely trustees 
of the treasures of importance for the whole humanity. As a result, the state in which the 
object is situated has the duty to protect it and prevent its destruction. If the state is not 
able to provide sufficient protection, it is obliged to request the international community of 
states for assistance. International instruments often regard cultural heritage as the common 
heritage of mankind. Thus, the Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural 
Cooperation (1966) confirms that "all cultures arc part of the common heritage of mankind, 
and accordingly, the tangible forms of such cultures are cultural monuments". The UNESCO 
Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001 ) recognises cultural diversity as a source 
of exchange, innovation and creativity and the common heritage of humanity.2 
The concept of cultural heritage has expanded considerably in recent years. This greatly 
increased popular attention is based on an ever-increasing public awareness of the richness 
of heritage as well as of its vulnerability. Today, information and communication 
technologies along with tourism facilitate a better response to this social demand. For 
heritage must be appropriated and made accessible in more imaginative ways, shared more 
widely within and among nations, used more creatively to re-invent a living culture (which 
will soon be valued as the heritage of the future) and last but not least, nurtured more wisely 
as an important source of income and employment. Yet today, the gap between ends and 
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means is even larger: wars, natural disasters, urbanization and industrialization continue to 
jeopardize cultural heritage and its relationship with development has become increasingly 
complex. In the modem world of global markets, national and international rides must be 
harmonized, thus, an effective system for the protection of cultural property should 
incorporate different branches of law. 
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
was bound to encourage the identification, protection and preservation of cultural and natural 
heritage around the world considered to be of outstanding value to humanity. Concrete 
action began in 1960 with an international campaign to save the temples of Nubia, 
a landmark operation that was notably followed by campaigns in Venice (1966), Carthage, 
Borobudur (1970) and Angkor (1991). The great scale and spectacular repercussions of 
these enterprises rallied unprecedented contributions in favour of threatened sites. 
The successful international campaigns furthered working out an international legal 
instrument regarding the international protection of cultural heritage. At the same time, the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (hereinafter: IUCN) 
paid great attention to deteriorating natural objects, scilicet, national parks, reservations, 
outstanding natural sights, the protection of which was obviously needed. An international 
conference in Stockholm (1972) approved of the proposal to adopt an international instrument 
of international cooperation in respect of cultural property and natural objects. 
The recognition of the need to establish a universally recognized ethical-legal foundation 
so as to safeguard world heritage along with the concurrent activity of the IUCN prompted 
the UNESCO to examine the subject further with the Convention pertaining to the 
Protection of Cultural and Natural World Heritage adopted in 1972. Today, there are 186 
State Parties to the Convention and its universal application makes the concept of World 
Heritage exceptional. 
According to Para. I of Art. 6 of the Convention, whilst it fully respects the sovereignty 
of the states on whose territories the cultural and natural heritage is situated and without 
prejudice to property rights provided by national legislation, each State Party to the Convention 
recognizes that the duty of ensuring conservation of the elements of world heritage situated 
on its territory lies primarily with it and undertakes to act to this end. This fundamental 
provision is the basis of international law concerning the protection of cultural values. 
For this purpose, each State Party to the Convention is required to compile an inventory 
of property forming part of cultural and natural heritage, which is situated on its territory 
and suitable for protection under the Convention. The duty of ensuring the identification, 
protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to future generations of cultural and 
natural heritage situated on their territories is also recognized by states as a measure of 
national protection. Thus, the state is responsible for the protection of values composing 
world heritage. Such state employs the utmost of its own resources. The core obligation of 
protection, conservation and transmission to future generations incumbent on a State Party 
according to the World Heritage Convention in respect of monuments, groups of buildings 
and sites of outstanding universal value situated on its territory constitutes an obligation 
recognized by general international law.3 Each State Party should endeavour to take the 
appropriate legal, scientific, technical, administrative and financial measures necessary for 
the identification, protection, conservation, presentation and rehabilitation of such heritage. 
3
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At the same time, State Parties undertake to contribute to the identification, protection, 
conservation and preservation of world cultural and natural heritage, if the state on whose 
territory it is situated is so requested and do not take any deliberate measures which might 
damage directly or indirectly the cultural and natural heritage situated on the territory of 
other State Parties to the Convention. It means the positive responsibility, that is, the 
duties of the Parties to the Convention. The provisions of the Convention instantiate a 
"delicate balance between national sovereignty and international intervention".4 
Apart from specific safeguarding actions, the most significant achievement has been the 
adoption of a permanent instrument of international cooperation, where there had not been 
one before. The result, in effect, is a commitment to solidarity, which is at the heart of 
the notion of world heritage.5 The Convention stipulates the duty "of the international 
community as a whole to cooperate" (Art. 6), which should be achieved via the 
establishment of a "system of international cooperation and assistance" (Art. 7). Such 
system is created by an Intergovernmental Committee for the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage of Outstanding Universal Value, the World Heritage Committee 
(hereinafter: the Committee), which was established via the Convention. Its Rules of 
Procedure were adopted by the Committee at its first session (Paris, 1977). Its members are 
elected by the General Assembly of the State Parties to the Convention ensuring "an 
equitable representation of the different regions and cultures of the world" (Art. 8). With its 
21 members, the Committee is the final decision-making body, the responsibilities of which 
include establishing, keeping up to date and publishing both the "World Heritage List" and 
the "List of World Heritage in Danger", furthermore, administering the World Heritage Fund 
(Art. 15) and deciding on granting financial assistance (Art. 13, 21). The World Heritage 
Centre appointed by the Director-General of the UNESCO assists the Committee to perform 
its task (Art. 14). Under Art. 29 of the Convention, the Committee submits a report on its 
activities at each General Assembly of State Parties and at each of the ordinary sessions of 
the General Conference of the UNESCO. 
The Convention refers only to the immovable and tangible heritage, whether "cultural" 
(Art. 1 - monuments, groups of buildings, sites) or "natural" (Art. 2). On the basis of 
national inventories (an inventory of property forming part of the cultural and natural 
heritage situated on the state's territory), the World Heritage Committee has established the 
World Heritage List. The World Heritage List consists of cultural and natural sites. They 
include the Palace and Park of Versailles (France), Stonehenge, Avebury and associated 
sites, the Tower of London, (the United Kingdom of Great Britain), the Wet Tropics of 
Queensland, Shark Bay (Australia), the Vilnius Historic Centre, the Kernavé Archaeological 
Site (Lithuania), the Acropolis, Athens, the Archaeological Site of Delphi, the Medieval 
City of Rhodes (Greece), the Archaeological site of Troy (Turkey), the Saint-Sophia 
Cathedral and Kiev-Pechersk Lavra, the Ensemble of the Historic Centre of Lviv (Ukraine) 
and others." Today, the List of World Heritage consists of 890 sites, including 689 cultural, 
176 natural objects and 25 mixed properties in 148 State Parties. The Convention does not 
set a numerical limit for the List. 
4
 Cameron, C.: The Strengths and Weaknesses of the World Heritage Convention. Nature and 
Resources, 28 (1992) 3, 18-21. 
5
 Musitelli, J.: Opinion World Heritage, between Universalism and Globalization. International 
Journal of Cultural Property, 11 (2002) 326. 
6 Ibid. 
C O N T E M P O R A R Y INTERPRETATION OF THE C O N C E P T I O N OF W O R L D HERITAGE 57 
The nominations presented to the Committee shall entail the full commitment of the 
State Party to preserve the heritage concerncd within its means. Such commitment shall take 
the form of appropriate policy, legal, scientific, technical, administrative and financial 
measures proposed and adopted to protect the property and its outstanding universal value. 
The Convention is not intended to ensure the protection of all properties of great 
interest, importance or value, but only of a selection of the most outstanding of these 
from an international viewpoint. It cannot be assumed that a property of national and/or 
regional importance will be automatically included in the World Heritage List. 
Outstanding universal value means cultural and/or natural significance, which is so 
exceptional as to transcend national boundaries and to be of common importance for 
present and future generations of all humanity. As such, the permanent protection of 
this heritage is of the highest importance to the international community as a whole. 
The Committee defines the criteria for the inclusion of properties in the World Heritage 
List under the Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage 
Convention (January, 2008).7 The Operational Guidelines are periodically revised to 
reflect the decisions of the World Heritage Committee. 
The Convention does nor specify clear guidelines regarding the deletion of property 
from the List, whereas, it is Art. 11 (2) that refers to the task of the Committee to "establish, 
keep up to date and publish" the List. These tasks also include deletion as the Committee 
drafted it under extensive provisions in the Operational Guidelines. Some paragraphs of the 
Chapter of Operational Guidelines, that is, the "Procedure for the eventual deletion of 
properties from the World Heritage List" are devoted to that purpose. 
The Committee adopted a procedure for the deletion of properties from the World 
Heritage List in cases: 
a) where the property has deteriorated to the extent that it has lost those characteristics 
which determined its inclusion in the World Heritage List; and 
b) where the intrinsic qualities of a World Heritage Site were already threatened at 
the time of its nomination by action of man and where the necessary corrective measures 
as outlined by the State Party at the time have not been taken within the time proposed. 
The Committee will examine all the information available and will take a decision. 
Such a décision shall, in accordance with Art. 13 (8) of the Convention, be taken by a 
majority of two-thirds of its members present and voting. 
The Guidelines do not seem to require the consent of the State Party concerncd, 
only its consultation shall be achieved. The Committee shall not decide to delete any 
property, unless the State Party has been consulted on the question. The Committee 
shall not apply the deletion procedure as an alternative to the inscription of sites on the 
List in Danger. 
The State Party shall be informed of the Committee's decision and public notice of such 
a decision shall be immediately given by the Committee. If the Committee's decision entails 
any modification to the World Heritage List, this modification will be reflected in the next 
updated List that is published. 
For a long time, deletions have not been implemented, by reason of political 
and legal deliberations.8 The Committee has refrained from setting an example-a decision 
7
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8
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which may cause political repercussions and irritations. An example of the deletion 
procedure took place in 2007: The World Heritage Committee de-listed a property because 
of Oman's decision to reduce the size of the protected area by 90% in contravention of the 
Operational Guidelines of the Convention. This was seen by the Committee as destroying 
the outstanding universal value of the site, which was inscribed in 1994. In 1996, the 
number of the population of the Arabian Oryx on the site had been 450, but it dwindled 
to 65 with only about four breeding pairs, which makes its future viability uncertain. This 
decline was due to poaching and habitat degradation.9 
After extensive consultations with the State Party, the Committee held that the unilateral 
reduction of the size of the Sanctuary and plans to proceed with hydrocarbon prospecting 
would destroy the value and integrity of the property, which is also home to endangered 
species including the Arabian Gazelle and the houbara bustard. 
The second instance of deletion has taken place in 2009, when the World Heritage 
Committee decided to remove Germany's Dresden Elbe Valley from the UNESCO's World 
Heritage List due to the construction of a four-lane bridge in the heart of the cultural 
landscape, which meant that the property failed to keep its "outstanding universal value as 
inscribed".10 
Dresden was inscribed as a cultural landscape in 2004. The Committee held that 
Germany could present a new nomination related to Dresden in the future. In doing so, the 
Committee recognized that parts of the site might be considered to be of outstanding 
universal value, but that it would have to be presented under different criteria and 
boundaries. 
The Convention of 1972 foresees the establishment of the List of World Heritage in 
Danger. The World Heritage Committee includes property "appearing in the World Heritage 
List, for the conservation of which major operations are necessary and for which assistance 
has been requested under the Convention". Sites can be listed, if they are threatened by 
natural disasters such as floods and volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, serious fires, and they 
can be listed because of human-caused disasters such as urbanization, changing land 
ownership, tourism and armed conflicts. The List was criticized as not paying tribute to the 
real situation. Its inclusion of only about 35 inscribed sites does not reflect the dangers and 
threats with which World Heritage is faced or as described, for example, in the List of 100 
Most Endangered Sites compiled by the World Monument Fund." 
9
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One of the main functions of the World Heritage Committee is to administer the World 
Heritage Fund and to determine how financial resources are to be allocated to the countries 
and organizations which request assistance (according to Art. 15). Moneys accumulated in 
the Fund come from: 1) obligatory contributions from State Parties to the Convention, which 
are fixed at one percent of their contribution to the budget of the UNESCO; 2) from 
voluntary contributions from State Parties; 3) donations from institutions or private 
individuals or from promotional activities. The World Heritage Fund provides assistance 
on grounds of concrete provisions, as the international institute can't satisfy all requests for 
international financial assistance with regard to limited resources. The Convention of 1972 
foresees arrangements for international assistance such as studies concerning artistic, 
scientific and technical problems, training of staff and specialists, supply of equipment and 
so on. The benefit of the Fund consists in the allocation of finances to the mechanisms of 
assistance.12 
In 1997, the General Conference of the UNESCO adopted the Declaration on the 
Responsibilities of the Present Generations towards Future Generations, Art. 7 of which 
states in part that "the present generations have the responsibility to identify, protect and 
safeguard the tangible cultural heritage and to transmit this common heritage to future 
generations".13 Customary norms lay in the principle that the preservation of cultural 
heritage constitutes part of the general interest of the international community as a 
whole. This principle has its theoretical foundation in the concept of erga omnes obliga-
tions formulated by the International Court of Justice in the well-known Barcelona Traction 
case. In this case, the Court distinguished between norms that create bilateral obligations of 
reciprocal character binding upon individual states inter se and norms that create 
international obligations erga omnes or obligations owing to all states in the public interest. 
The prohibition of acts of wilful and systematic destruction of cultural heritage of great 
importance for humanity also falls under the category of erga omnes obligations.14 On the 
other hand, the "international community as a whole" is an abstraction. There is no legal 
entity or person by that name. As Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice put it in his trenchant dissenting 
opinion in the Namibia case in 1971, "the so-called organized world community is not a 
separate juridical entity with a personality over and above, and distinct from, the particular 
international organizations in which the idea of it may from time to time find actual 
expression".15 
According to the GA UN Res. 56\589 12 December 2001, the breach of an international 
obligation of the State constitutes an internationally wrongful act, which entails the 
international responsibility of that State. Under Art. 42 of the G A UN Res. 2001, a State 
as an injured state is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another state, if the obligation 
breached owes to a group of states including that state or the international community as a 
whole. This provision is a substantial step in the progressive development of international 
12
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law as Law of the International Community.16 Thus, the prescription of collective measures in 
the common interest of the states is the first task.17 
Art. 48 foresees the invocation of responsibility by a state other than an injured state: 
"any state other than an injured state is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another 
state, if the obligation breached owes to a group of states including that state and it is 
established for the protection of the collective interest of the group, or if the obligation 
breached owes to the international community as a whole." 
By virtue of its non-synallagmatic nature and of the Convention's express textual 
references to a universal interest in the preservation of the cultural heritage in question, the 
obligation laid down in Art. 4 is an obligation owing to all State Parties to the Convention 
and it is established for the protection of a collective interest of the group" according to the 
phrasing of Art. 48 (1) (a) of the International La Commission's Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. It is an erga omnes partes 
obligation, to use the traditional terminology.18 
Having established this, it becomes apparent which subjects of international law are 
injured by such violation. International norms related to cultural heritage consider the 
destruction of any nation's cultural property as a loss and an injury to the collective heritage 
of humankind's civilization. The duty not to destroy cultural heritage, therefore, is merely a 
manifestation of an erga omnes obligation. 
Few events have caused such a great shock and condemnation within the international 
community in recent years as the destruction of the great Buddhas of Bamiyan in 2001. 
Mullah Mohammed Omar issued the order for the destruction of all "statues", which were 
"un-Islamic". His main target was a 1,500-year-old statue of Buddha in the central Afghan 
province of Bamiyan. This 53-meter-high sculpture, carved into a cliff face, was the most 
famous landmark in Afghanistan and the most visible testimony to the country's Buddhist 
past before the arrival of Islam in the ninth century. It was one of the few historical treasures 
to have survived the country's turbulent and violent history.19 
It is important to point out that while at the relevant time there were no Afghan 
properties inscribed on the World Heritage List, Art. 12 of the Convention states expressly 
that the fact that a property belonging to the cultural or natural heritage has not been 
included in either the World Heritage List or in the List of World Heritage in Danger shall 
in no way be construed to mean that it does not have an outstanding universal value for 
purposes other than those resulting from inclusion in these lists. This provision must be 
read in connection with Art. 4, which points out: the duty of ensuring the protection, 
conservation, presentation and transmission to future generations of the cultural heritage 
situated on the territory of each State Party to this Convention belongs primarily to that 
state. 
The joint reading of these provisions makes it clear that membership in the World 
Heritage Convention obliges State Parties to conserve and protect their own cultural 
properties, even if these arc not inscribed in the World Heritage List. As for the Bamiyan 
16
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Buddhas, there is no doubt that they were included in the concept of cultural heritage 
relevant to the Convention. Regardless of whether they meet the standard of 'outstanding 
universal value' set forth in Art. 1, the Buddhas were certainly 'works of monumental 
sculpture' and of generally recognized historical importance. 
Individual states, international organizations, such as the United Nations and the 
UNESCO, religious authorities including some of the most influential Islamic authorities, 
NGOs and people all over the world have called for international mobilization against such 
acts of barbarity and religious intolerance. First of all, such destruction gives rise to a 
breach of duties falling to Afghanistan under its membership to the 1972 World Heritage 
Convention. According to the Preamble of this Convention, "deterioration or disappearance 
of any item of cultural heritage constitutes a harmful impoverishment of the heritage of 
all the nations of the world". 
Having established this, it becomes apparent which subjects of international law are 
thus injured by such violation. International norms related to cultural heritage consider the 
destruction of any nation's cultural property as a loss and an injury to the collective heritage 
of humankind's civilization. The duty not to destroy cultural heritage, therefore, is a 
manifestation of an erga omnes obligation. In the Afghan case, the erga omnes character 
of the obligation is confirmed by the fact that there is no directly and materially injured 
third state, since the act of violence is committed on the territory and against a value 
belonging to the transgressor state as such. In other words, faced with a customary 
obligation limiting the power that the territorial state has over assets that belong to its 
sovereignty, such an obligation may exist only with regard to the international community 
as a whole, and thus, with regard to all states. It follows that every state, unilaterally or in 
the context of an international organization, could have adopted appropriate measures as a 
reaction to the wrongful act committed by the Taliban against the cultural heritage located 
on its territory.20 
There is no doubt that the deliberate, wanton destruction of the great Buddhas is 
inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the 1972 Convention. The World Heritage 
Committee, in its aforementioned 1997 resolution, had considered the statues to be of 
'inestimable value' and 'not only part of the heritage of Afghanistan, but part of the 
heritage of humankind'. Therefore, there is sufficient legal basis for the adoption of 
countermeasures, such as the suspension of technical assistance, withdrawal of financial aid 
and similar measures by states party to the World Heritage Convention and by the 
UNESCO. 
The catalogue and inventory of national treasures are generally intended to limit such 
private rights in view of safeguarding the public interest in the conservation and 
transmission of the cultural heritage to future generations. In the case of the Buddhas of 
Bamiyan, the injury to the international public interest, which was to conserve these 
monuments and prevent their destruction, was all the more apparent because a) the 
destruction was motivated by invidious and discriminatory intent; b) it was systematic; 
and c) it was carried out in blatant defiance of appeals coming from the UNESCO, the UN, 
the ICOMOS and many individual states. 
Thus, the General Conference of the UNESCO 17 October 2003 proclaimed the 
Declaration concerning the International Destruction of Cultural Heritage, under Part 6 of 
which "a State that intentionally destroys or intentionally fails to take appropriate measures 
20
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to prohibit, prevent, stop and punish any intentional destruction of cultural heritage of great 
importance for humanity, whether or not it is inscribed on a list maintained by UNESCO or 
another international organization, bears the responsibility for such destruction to the extent 
provided for by international law". 
This analysis leads us to conclude that the wilful and discriminatory destruction of 
the great Buddhas of Bamiyan perpetrated by the Taliban in March 2001 constitutes a 
breach of international law forbidding the wanton destruction of cultural heritage. 
Additionally, such destruction is a specific breach of the commitment under the World 
Heritage Convention to ensure the protection of cultural heritage loeated on the territory of 
State Parties. 
The law of state responsibility is in practice an unlikely and ill-adapted mechanism for 
compelling a state to preserve cultural heritage situated on its territory. Jurisdictional hurdles 
make judicial proceedings notoriously difficult. As for countermcasures, it is unresolved 
whether they arc available at all to those states invoking responsibility solely under Art. 48 
of the Articles. Even if it were so, assessing proportionality might pose a bar, given that 
simple reciprocity in the form of damage by another state to cultural heritage found on their 
respective territories would be preposterous and possibly impermissible. State responsibility 
can only be invoked, once it has breached the relevant international obligation and by then, 
in most cases of damage to or destruction of cultural heritage, it is too late. Thus, in the 
great majority of cases, diplomatic pressure would be the only practicable option. As such, 
given that states not party to the world heritage convention arc permitted to intervene 
diplomatically, if another state fails to preserve elements of the world's cultural heritage 
situated on its territory, it scarcely matters in practice that they are not entitled to compcl 
preservation through the invocation of state responsibility. In practice, since diplomatic 
coercion is the only realistic course of action, it is perhaps immaterial that states which are 
parties to the World Heritage Convention may in principle invoke another's responsibility 
for failing to preserve this heritage.21 
The mechanisms put in place by the Convention resulted in a reinforcement, on a global 
and national level, of the politics of protection that until then had been very unequally 
developed and rarely coherent from one region to the next. The UNESCO has no power to 
police or to sanction. Its authority is purely moral. It exercises its authority in various ways: 
persuasion or political pressure on governments, the classification of a site of heritage in 
peril, the promise of technical and financial assistance. In this way, it can stop the projects 
whose realization would bring grave, possibly irreparable effects to registered goods now or 
in the future.22 On the long list of avoided catastrophes, we should mention the prevention 
of the placement of a bauxite treatment factory near an archaeological site in Delphi, of the 
flooding of sites of rock art in the valley of Coa in Portugal by the construction of a dam, 
of the disfigurement of the plateau of Giza by the creation of a highway near the pyramids 
and of the immense saline construction on the site of El Vizcaino in Mexico or of cablc car 
access for tourists in Machu Picchu. The UNESCO sometimes intervenes to support the 
action of small states in the face of powerful economic forces and sometimes to prevent 
governments from undertaking operations that could damage the integrity of protcctcd 
21
 O 'Kcefe : op. cit. 207. 
22
 Musitelli: op. cit. 325. 
C O N T E M P O R A R Y INTERPRETATION OF T H E C O N C E P T I O N OF W O R L D HERITAGE 63 
monuments.23 The UNESCO plays a decisive role in raising awareness of a collective 
responsibility with regard to world heritage.24 
Considering the high rate of ratifications of the World Heritage Convention as well as 
the authoritative character of UNESCO recommendations, which in effect represent nearly 
the totality of the nations of the world that participate in the General Conference, it is not 
possible to deny that a general opinio juris exists in the international community on the 
binding character of principles prohibiting the deliberate destruction of cultural heritage of 
significant importance for humanity. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the 
protection of cultural heritage as a matter of public interest, and not only as part of private 
property rights, is recognized in most of the advanced domestic legal systems in the world. 
The concept of identifying and conserving the values of heritage places has been at the 
heart of the UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and 
Natural Heritage 1972, and indeed, of all international heritage conservation policies. 
However, the application of the Convention in different countries with diverse cultural roots 
has been a key issue. Experience shows that only via the understanding of the influence of 
culture on an understanding of nature, with a complete assessment of the interrelationship 
of the two in theory and in practice, can world heritage be protected in a meaningful and 
holistic way.25 
It should be mentioned that at present the expression "World Heritage" no longer has 
the same meaning as it did in 1972. It may be queried whether the aim of universalism is still 
the goal, when economic and financial logic penetrates and remodels the cultural sphere 
and tends to impose a "global model" of heritage as an alternative.26 
Since 1994, as a result of the adoption of "Global Strategy", the World Heritage List 
has become more open to heritage that had not been presented on the List or had been 
rejected by the Committee some years before: cultural landscapes, modern architecture, 
railways, waterways and different kinds of industrial heritage. These new categories finding 
entry into World Heritage "reflect a significant change in our concept of heritage": by finally 
questioning the idea inherited from ancient times and firmly rooted in European culture of 
what a masterpiece is, "the World Heritage Committee opened the way to a more balanced 
view of humanity's heritage".27 
The doctrinal consistency of world heritage is compromised by the difficulty of clearly 
articulating the relationship between universality and cultural diversity.28 For some years, 
the controversy has focused on the theme of "imbalance" or even "lack of representativity" 
of the List. At the same time, a double imbalance, geographic and thematic, persists. From 
the geographic point of view, in one region alone, that is, in Europe half of the cultural sites 
are inscribed on the List. The absence of inscribed African sites, whether archaeological 
or urban, devalues the List and even the concept of world heritage. The typology established 
produces a clear preponderance of three categories of cultural items that essentially 
pertain to European civilization: archaeological sites, historical cities, Christian mo-
numents. 
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A broad consensus existed concerning the proposition that all reform steps must be 
achieved without changing the Convention. Amending the Convention would be a long and 
risky option and would result in the existence, for a period of undefined length, of two 
parallel conventions, a source of permanent and serious problems as to its implemen-
tation.29 
The Committee acknowledged that cultural landscapes represent the "combined works of 
nature and of man" as formulated under Art. 1 of the Convention. They are illustrative of 
the evolution of human society and settlement over time under the influence of physical 
constraints and/or opportunities presented by their natural environment and of successive 
social, economic and cultural forces, both external and internal. 
Certain sites reflect specific techniques of land use that guarantee and sustain biological 
diversity. Others associated in the minds of the communities with powerful beliefs, artistic 
and traditional customs embody an exceptional spiritual relationship of people with nature. 
So as to reveal and sustain the great diversity of the interactions between humans and their 
environment, to protect living traditional cultures and preserve the traces of those which 
have disappeared, these sites called cultural landscapes have been inscribed on the World 
Heritage List. Cultural landscapes (cultivated terraces on lofty mountains, gardens, sacred 
places) testify to the creative genius, social development, imaginative and spiritual 
vitality of humanity. They are part of our collective identity. 
To date, 55 properties have been included as cultural landscapes in the World 
Heritage List, such as: Australia — Uluru-K.ata Tjuta National Park (1987), Austria -
Hallstatt-Dachstein Salzkammergut Cultural Landscape (1997), Wachau Cultural Landscape 
(2000), Hungary - Hortobágy National Park the Puszta (1999), Tokaj Wine Region 
Historic Cultural Landscape (2002), Italy - Sacri Monti of Piedmont and Lombardy (2003), 
Cilento and Vallo di Diano National Park with the Archaeological Sites of Paestum and 
Velia and the Certosa di Padula (1998), Costiera Amalfitana (1997), Portovenere, Cinque 
Terre and the Islands (Palmaria, Tino and Tinetto) (1997), Val d'Orcia (2004), Philippines 
- Rice Terraces of the Philippine Cordilleras (1995), Poland - Kalwaria Zebrzydowska: 
the Mannerist Architectural and Park Landscape Complex and Pilgrimage Park (1999), 
Portugal - Alto Douro Wine Region (2001), Cultural Landscape ofSintra (1995), Landscape 
of the Pico Island Vineyard Culture (2004), South Africa - Mapungubwe Cultural Landscape 
(2003), Spain - Aranjuez Cultural Landscape (2001), Sweden - Agricultural Landscape of 
Southern Öland (2000), Togo - Koutammakou, the Land of the Batammariba (2004), 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland - Blaenavon Industrial Landscape 
(2000), Cornwall and West Devon Mining Landscape (2006), Austria, Hungary - Fertő/ 
Neusiedlersec Cultural Landscape (2001), Germany, Poland - Muskauer Park / Park 
Muzakowski 2004) and so on. 
In 1992, the World Heritage Convention became the first international legal instrument 
to recognize and protect cultural landscapes. The Committee at its 16th session adopted 
guidelines concerning their inclusion in the World Heritage List. 
Intentions to introduce reforms in the implementation of the Convention and to render 
its contemporary interpretation arc almost as old as the Convention itself and have 
transformed the World Heritage Programme into a forum of permanent discussion, 
evaluation and intervention. An increasing number of State Parties and sites will not only 
contribute to an enhanced and more global approach in identifying and addressing problems, 
29
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but will also turn the reform procedure into a more complex and time-consuming task. On 
the other hand, greater awareness of the specific problems of World Heritage and increasing 
demands for changes might accelerate the reform procedure. The elaboration and 
implementation of the globally important and recognized World Heritage program can 
continue to be successful only as long as the different entities concerned by the Convention, 
scilicet, the State Parties, the Committee, its Bureau and the advisory bodies cooperate 
closely by applying clear legal provisions, concepts and strategies.30 
In particular, the concept of World Heritage lacks the support of an encompassing 
conception of culture that takes into account the facts of anthropology. This results in the 
crystallization of the artificial distinctions between natural and cultural goods, material 
remains and spiritual values, history and authenticity. The rigidity of these categories, which 
lack pertinence in most non-European civilizations, has privileged the classic architectural 
heritage-grand monuments and urban areas that are charged with history-to the detriment 
of forms of heritage that integrate intangible values, such as sacred sites, traditional habitats, 
religious or merchant routes.31 
There are civilizations for which the notion of heritage is not the same as the notion of 
monuments. The efforts made by world heritage organs to integrate this dimension of the 
problem, which exposes representations and a symbolic system unfamiliar to Western 
paradigms, remain too timid to adsorb the contradiction between universality and diversity. 
Even if the trend has evolved favourably since 1972, there still remains resistance to surpass 
pure monuments and an elitist conception to avoid an approach that would integrate the 
heritage within its environment.32 
At the same time, experiences at international level can influence national practices. In 
this variegated landscape, it becomes cmcial to verify whether there is a conflict or 
coherence between different treaty regimes protecting cultural heritage on the one hand and 
investors' rights on the other hand.33 
The scientific relevance of representativity in relation to heritage can always be 
contested. The reality of imbalance and the ethnocentric grievance it encourages has given 
rise in recent years to the supposition of north-south tensions. This evolution would be very 
harmful if, in the name of a "politically correct" concept of world heritage, each state or 
each cultural community believed in its right to claim a quota of sites in the enforcement of 
a presumed right of the representativity of its heritage or even its powers of negotiation. If it 
were not based on scientific premises, the representativity of World Heritage would risk 
being reduced to questionable political arithmetic.34 
The corpus of norms largely elaborated by the UNESCO itself does not appear to need 
radical renewal. What is needed is its radical application. In particular, basic guidelines 
concerning taking stock of the cultural heritage, training qualified personnel and the holistic 
management of heritage resources are still not adequately respected. 
It will be necessary to integrate research from social sciences and humanities, in 
particular from the area of history by bringing universities, research institutes and religious 
authorities into the picture and into constructive dialogue with classical studies departments 
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and other 'guardian' institutions as well as with the media and educational authorities. Each 
socicty will need to assess the nature and precariousness of its cultural as well as natural 
heritage in its own terms and determine the uses it wishes to make of both and the links it 
might build between them. Within nations, therefore, it is particularly important that this 
sort of heritage is recognised by and for all groups (women, children, cultural minorities 
including Indigenous Peoples). Equally, the means to do this work needs to be specified not 
just by the central organs of the state, but also, perhaps above all by municipalities and 
regions. The method employed should draw on current experience and new knowledge not 
just to conserve, but also to establish meaningful connections between past and present, 
East and West, North and South, tangible and intangible values, culture and nature. 
Summary 
The presentation is devoted to legal issues related to the conception of World Cultural and 
Natural Heritage and the tendency of its development within the frameworks of international 
law. We've provided the analysis of international legal relations among the Parties to the 
Convention Regarding the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage of 1972, 
the Intergovernmental Committee for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage and the Fund for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 
regarding protection, conservation, presentation, and transmission to future generations of 
cultural and natural objccts included in the World Heritage List. The items protected by the 
Convention are those pertaining to the cultural or natural heritage, which are of outstanding 
universal value from the point of view of history, art, science or aesthetics. 
The Convention lays down two basic principles, which are at the same time the basis of 
the World Heritage Conception. First, each State Party to the Convention recognizes that 
the duty of ensuring conservation of the elements of World Heritage situated on its territory 
lies primarily with it and undertakes to act to this end to the utmost of its own resources. 
World Heritage sites belong to all the peoples of the world, irrespective of the territory on 
which they arc located. Secondly, all the Contracting States recognize that it is the duty of 
the international community as a whole to cooperate in ensuring the conservation of a 
heritage, which is of universal character. 
At the moment, the expression "World Heritage" no longer has the same meaning as it 
did back in 1972 because of globalization and commercialization. We argue that the 
conceptual focus has shifted alongside interrelated and complementary directions: from 
monuments to people; from objccts to functions; from preservation per se to purposeful 
preservation, sustainable use and development. Reappearing functional heritage is 
discussed as opposed to the objectif ied heritage of the past by referring to both practical 
and theoretical heritage domains. 
If today's collective memory is to be shared more widely and more creatively to form 
that of future generations, broader participation appears essential. But this will be possible 
only if people themselves have a better understanding of their heritage. Hcnce the paramount 
need for inventories of heritage which are not only more complete, but also more meaningful. 
As it was pointed out by the World Heritage Committee, the knowledge basis for the 
elaboration of integrated conservation policy remains scarce in many countries. Governments 
need to examine more comprehensively what society defines as heritage and raise awareness 
of its value. 
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I. General features of the Hungarian legal education 
1. Historical introduction and some general information 
1. A key feature of the Hungarian legal educational system is its strong historical 
traditions. The first law school of the country was founded in 1667 as the third faculty of 
the Jesuit University of Nagyszombat, in the northern part of medieval Hungary. The town 
of Nagyszombat was also the centre of the Hungarian countcr-reformation movement at 
this time. This university was established by Péter Pázmány, the archbishop of Esztergom 
in 1635 and it already had two faculties: humanities and theology. Domestic customary 
law, canon law and Roman law were the main forms taught at the law faculty of 
Nagyszombat, in harmony with the general trends of legal education in the 17th century.1 
Hungarian legal education therefore has an almost 350 year long history. 
Today eight faculties of law exist in a country with more than 10 million inhabitants 
with half of them being established following the political changes of 1989. The regional 
division of Hungarian law schools is relatively balanced as one can find at least one law 
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 For a deeper and more detailed discussion of the early centuries of Hungarian legal education, 
with special regard to the role of comparative law see Péteri, Z.: Teaching of Comparative Law and 
Comparative Law Teaching. Acta Juridica Hungarica 43 (2002) 255-257; for a general introduction 
into the history of Hungarian legal education see Nagy Zs.: A magyar jogi oktatás történeti vázlata 
[A Historical Draft on the Hungarian Legal Education]. Jogelméleti Szemle 2003/3. http://jesz.ajk. 
elte.hu/nagyl5.html; for the history of the oldest faculty of law see Horváth, P.: 300 Jahre Staats- und 
Rechtswissentschaftliche Fakultät der Budapester Eötvös-Loránd-Universitat. Annales Universitatis 
Scientiarum Budapestinensis De Rolando Eötvös Nominatae Sectio luridica 8 (1967) 3 -26 . 
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faculty in each regional centre except Central Transdanubia.2 There are three faculties of 
law in Budapest, the capital city of the country, and this fact appropriately indicates that the 
heart of Hungarian legal education can be found here. 
It is worth mentioning at this point that the institutional dynamics of the Hungarian 
legal education system went through a "golden age" or "blooming period" from the second 
half of the 1990's onwards. Four faculties of law was established between 1995 and 2002,3  
doubling the number when compared to the number of faculties that existed in the socialist 
era. An additional point of interest is that, of the four law faculties established during the 
"post-socialist or transitory" period, two of them were directly founded by two Hungarian 
Christian churchcs, the Catholic and the Protestant.4 Thus both traditional universities 
and churches anticipated many opportunities in the foundation and management of law 
schools in the period following the political changes. 
2. The number of students participating in legal education significantly increased in 
parallel to the establishment of new faculties. One can see from the data that in the academic 
year 1980/1981 law faculties had 4629 students and 4738 in the academic year 1990/1991.5 
Therefore less than 5000 law students were studying in some of the four law schools yearly 
during the last decade of socialism. However, in the next decade this number almost 
tripled as 15776 law students participated in various forms of legal education in the 
academic year of 1999/2000 increasing to 17935 in the academic year of 2002/2003.6 
Looking at the number of graduating law students one can point to a similar trend, 899 
students graduated in 1980, 741 in 1990, 1881 in 2000 and 3190 in 2003.7 The numbers of 
enrolling and graduating law students have remained more or less constant in the following 
years. One can conclude therefore from this data that legal education reflects a more 
broadened and democratic picture than it did during the socialist period. 
With reference to the costs of legal éducation it should firstly be mentioned that in the 
Hungarian higher education system students can study for free or on a tuition fee basis. A 
certain number of law students are assisted by the government in the form of a direct 
financial support every year. However, law schools, as in all the other faculties, are also 
2
 Faculties per regions, their seats, names and dates of foundation: Western Transdanubia: Győr, 
Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, [(1995) 2002]; Southern Transdanubia: Pécs, 
Faculty of Political and Legal Sciences of the University of Pécs (1923); Central Hungary: Buda-
pest, Eötvös Loránd University Faculty of Law and Political Sciences (1667), Pázmány Péter Cath-
olic University Faculty of Law and Political Sciences (1995), Károli Gáspár University Faculty of 
Law (1998); Southern Great Plain: Szeged, University of Szeged Faculty of Law (1872); Northern 
Great Plain: Debrecen, University of Debrecen Faculty of Law (1996); Northern Hungary: Miskolc, 
University of Miskolc Faculty of Law (1981). 
3
 Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political Sciences [(1995) 2002]; Pázmány Péter Catholic 
University Faculty of Law and Political Sciences (1995); University of Debrecen Faculty of Law 
(1996); Károli Gáspár University Faculty of Law (1998). 
4
 Pázmány Péter Catholic University Faculty of Law and Political Sciences (1995); Károli 
Gáspár University Faculty of Law (1998). 
5
 Szabó M.: A jogászképzés társadalmi funkciójáról - húsz év múlva [On the Social Function 
of Legal Education-Twenty Years Following], In: Szabadfalvi J. (ed.): Amablissimus-Loss Sándor 
emlékkönyv [Amablissimus-A Volume Dedicated to Sándor Loss]. Debrecen, 2005. 318. 
6
 Kissné Pap M.: Ajog i felsőoktatás néhány jellemzője [Some Features of the Legal Education], 
In: Takács P. (ed.): A jogászképzés múltja, jelene és jövője [The Past, Present and Future of Legal 
Education], Budapest, 2003. 327-328. 
7
 Szabó: op. cit. 325. 
PRACTICE E L E M E N T S IN THE H U N G A R I A N LEGAL EDUCATION S Y S T E M 69 
allowed to accept students on a tuition fee-paying basis. The tuition fees for a semester 
range between 130 000-200 000 HUF (715-1060 USD) this year.8 The ten semester long 
legal education therefore costs about 7150-10 600 USD (based on today's prices) in 
Hungary if a student can only enroll in a law school on a fee-paying basis. 
In the recent past there was a special written entrance exam consisting of history and 
Hungarian literature for law students, but the system has changed following the introduction 
of the so-called Bologna model9 in Hungary. Nowadays prospective students are accepted 
on the basis of the results of their high school graduation. The maximum result of high 
school graduation is 480 points including all the possible bonuses, and the acceptance points 
this year were between 426-405 for normal places and between 400-172 for the fee-paying 
places. As a result of this, students with lower results from high school could also be 
accepted to a law school if they are or their families are able to pay the tuition fee. 
3. It is also a characteristic feature of the Hungarian legal education that law school 
graduates cannot work as an independent practicing attorney or lawyer immediately after 
graduation. Having worked for three years in a legal position under the supervision of a 
senior lawyer-mainly an attorney, a judge, a prosecutor or other persons having responsibility 
in legal work-the trainee or assistant has the right to register for a spécial examination 
called the szakvizsga. The underlying idea of this examination is fairly similar to that of the 
examination for entry into the bar in common law countries, the sole exception is that it is 
open to candidates coming from other spheres of legal life and it is administered and 
coordinated by the Ministry of Justice, not by the Bar Associations. 
This examination consists of three modules: (i) civil law, family law, economic law 
and civil procedure; (ii) criminal law, criminal procedure and penitentiary law; iii.) 
labour law, social security law, constitutional law, administrative law, and the law of the 
European Community.10 A candidate has to choose one subject from which he or she 
intends to make both a written and an oral exam, while from the other modules the only 
requirement is a successful exam before a committee composed of professionals. These 
exams are explicitly to measure the practice skills of the candidates since they have to 
prepare a submission in the context of a hypothetical case in the written part," and the 
subsequent oral exams are also about the discussion of a fictitious case with the members of 
the committee.12 
2. The legal background 
4. There is no special act regulating the requirements for the licensing of law schools in 
Hungary, but the Higher Education Act of 2005 provides a general framework for their 
functioning. This act, as the basis of the entire system of Hungarian higher education, 
8
 It must be mentioned that the average gross monthly income was around 199 000 
HUF (1050 USD) in 2008. Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, http://portal.ksh. 
hu/pls/ksh/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_eves/tabl2 01 25 01 i.html 
9
 The main aim of the so-called Bologna Process is to create the European Higher Education 
Area by harmonizing academic degrees and quality assurance standards. It began in 1999 with sign-
ing of the Bologna Declaration by Ministers of Education of 29 European countries. Cf.: http://www. 
ond.vlaanderen.be/hogeronderwijs/bologna/ 
10
 Decree of the Ministry of Justice No. 5/1991 (IV. 4) § 5 (1). 
11
 Ibid. § 7(1) . 
12
 Ibid. § 9 (2). 
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clarifies general questions such as the establishment of higher education institutions,13 the 
principles of their functioning,14 the structure and organs of higher education institutions15 
and governmental competences in higher education.16 Moreover, it provides a detailed 
regulation on the position of students including their rights and obligations,17 it defines the 
main lines of the exam and grading system,18 and also regulates both the right of appeal 
against university or faculty decisions19 and the organization of student bodies and their 
representation.20 All in all, this act comprehensively rules the sphere of higher education 
and therefore sets forth a stable legal framework for it; so it could be regarded as the 
"constitution" of Hungarian higher education. 
The Act set up the so-called Hungarian Accreditation Committee to create a regulatory 
body for the management of the whole system of higher education. This Committee is an 
independent body and its main aim is the assessment and monitoring of the quality of the 
entire system of higher education. In doing so, the Accreditation Committee delivers 
opinions on the different bachelor, master and doctoral formations prior to their governmental 
recognition as well as regularly-every eight years-monitoring the functioning of every 
higher education institution from the aspect of the fulfillment of all necessary, mainly 
personal, physical and financial preconditions.21 
The Accreditation Committee has a very important position regarding the establishment 
of faculties since the act explicitly sets forth that prior to creating a new faculty in the 
framework of an existing higher education institution, a preliminary opinion shall be asked 
from the Committee.22 Therefore, from the aspect of accrediting a law faculty the decisive 
point is the preliminary opinion delivered by the Hungarian Accreditation Committee since 
according to the act a new faculty can be only established if the Committee supports it in its 
opinion.23 In the case of a negative or non-supportive opinion the given higher education 
institution can appeal to the so-called Registration Centre24 and then to the Minister of 
Education who may depart from the opinion of the Committee.25 
In the opinion of the Accreditation Committee the fulfillment of the so-called minimal 
conditions-as they are outlined in Appendix 5 of Governmental Decree No. 79/2006 (IV. 5) 
on the realization of certain articles of the Act of Higher Education-could play a 
preeminent role. According to this decree the most important conditions for the 
establishment of a new faculty are the following: firstly, the faculty shall at a minimum 
incorporate two different levels of formation (bachelor, master or doctoral), secondly, 
13
 Act CXXXIX of 2005 on the Higher Education § 12-18. 
14
 Ibid. § 19-22. 
13
 Ibid. § 23-30 . 
16
 Ibid. § 99-114. 
17
 Ibid. § 46-51 . 
18
 Ibid. § 57-61. 
I' Ibid. § 73-75. 
20
 Ibid. § 77-79. 
21
 Ibid. § 109 (1) g and § 110(1). 
22
 Ibid. § 30 (6). 
23
 Ibid. § 32 (10). 
24
 An agency set up by the Act in order to register higher education institutions. 
23
 Ibid. § 106 (2). 
PRACTICE E L E M E N T S IN T H E H U N G A R I A N L E G A L EDUCATION S Y S T E M 71 
a minimum of two hundred students must be enrolled to these formations in the year 
prior to the submission of the registration claim and lastly, the full tenure of forty 
teachers is also required.26 The first condition in the case of a law school practically 
means that the future faculty of law has to offer both graduate legal education and doctoral 
formation-due to the fact there are no LL.B. or LL.M degrees in Hungary but only a five 
year long, and therefore undivided, lawyer degree. 
5. One cannot find a standard course of study at law faculties since the general structure 
of legal education was regulated in relatively broad terms by the legislator. Law students 
have ten semesters for their studies and they must collect 300 credits during these five years. 
It is required to prepare and defend a master thesis at the end of the studies and the passing 
of four so-called state exams27 are also mandatory. In relation to the remaining nine 
semesters the relevant decree of the Ministry of Education28 only outlines the main lines for 
the curricula of law schools by diving them into three major parts. A legal curriculum must 
contain (i) basic studies29 (80-110 credits), (ii) professional studies30 (115-130 credits) and 
(iii) elective studies31 (30-50 credits). Besides these guiding principles and credit numbers, 
law schools are almost absolutely free to compose their curriculum, the only thing that they 
must respect is the earlier general structure. 
This decree also defines that law students must fulfill an obligatory period of 
apprenticeship of 6-12 weeks in order to facilitate the formation of their practical skills. 
This period could be spent in the judiciary, public administration or in other fields as is 
determined by the curriculum of the given law school. Law faculties therefore have broad 
opportunities to offer externships to their students. It should be stated that this is the sole 
point where the legislator mentions practice in the most general sense, in the other parts of 
the decree one cannot find any reference to it. Hence, one may conclude that the practical 
aspects of legal education were not the primary focus of the legislator when it created its 
basic principles. 
On the basis of this general introduction we can acknowledge that the current regime of 
governmental regulations barely deals with the role of practice in legal education, the sole 
exception is the mentioning of the obligatory period of apprenticeship as a requirement. 
The introduction of practice elements into the curriculum remains the responsibility of law 
schools, and therefore their diffusion depends mainly on the policies of a given faculty. 
26
 Governmental Decree No. 79/2006 (IV. 5) on the realization of certain articles of the Act on 
the Higher Education, Appendix 5. 
27
 The first three of these state exams are same at all the faculties: private law, public law and 
criminal law, but the last one could differ depending on the given faculty since it could be interna-
tional and European law or legal theory. 
28
 Decree of the Ministry of Education No. 15/2006 (IV. 3) on the requirements of bachelor and 
master degrees. 
29
 For instance: general social science, professional language, latin, basic jurisprudence, legal 
theory, legal sociology, legal history classes. 
30
 For instance: private law, constitutional law, administrative law, criminal law, international 
law, European law classes. 
31
 For instance: in-depth classes related a given legal institution, ethical studies and comparative 
law classes. 
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II. Practice elements in the Hungarian legal education 
6. The guidelines kindly provided by the general reporter suggest that practice elements 
could be conceived of in a relatively broad sense. As a first step it is worthwhile separating 
two fundamentally different dimensions: the aforementioned period of compulsory 
apprenticeship which is dedicated to gaining experience of professional life and the different 
ways and methods of offering "practical" education in the curriculum of a given faculty. 
This paper will firstly scrutinize certain characteristics of this externship period, then it will 
turn to the various forms of "in-house" practical training, that is to say to those courses in 
which some practice elements are included. 
At the outset, it must be mentioned that law schools are absolutely free in the 
determination of the detailed rules of this externship period. In these regulations law 
schools generally appoint a teacher or a professor-practically called a coordinator-who is 
responsible for the administration and coordination of the whole program. The crucial 
question of this period is the place of the apprenticeship i.e. which institutions arc willing 
to accept and integrate law students for 30 workdays or six weeks into their life. It is 
obvious that a prestigious international law firm can offer very different experience than, 
for instance, an administrative agency in a small town. Many faculties handle this 
problem with the help of different framework cooperation agreements concluded among 
the given law school and various administrative bodies, courts and other legal institutions. 
Of course, students can choose institutions as place of externship other than these official 
partners, but they must organize it on their own in this instance. Normally law schools are 
flexible in accepting various propositions coming from their students. The only thing that 
students must keep in mind is that all the necessary administrative requirements-an 
agreement to accept the student, a report about his or her work, signed by a responsible 
person-must be fulfilled. 
Accordingly, law students can fulfill this obligatory period by participating in the work 
of various institutions, e.g. courts, administrative agencies and national or international 
law firms. An example of this institutional agreemcnt-the Faculty of Political and Legal 
Sciences of the University of Pécs concluded cooperation framework agreements with the 
County Court of Pest, that of Baranya, the Parliamentary Commissioners' Office and the 
regional inspectorate for the environment, nature and water.32 Thus the law students of this 
faculty can choose from a relatively broad "menu", since the various offers of the law 
school comprise of judiciary, public administration as well as legal assistance experience, and 
they can even look for other options independently. 
7. The traditional setting for teaching certain dimensions of legal practice are the so-
called seminars or seminary classes in the general curriculum. In order to understand the 
peculiarities of the Hungarian system, we must firstly look at the two ways of law school 
teaching. Firstly, law schools offer to all students who fulfil each necessary precondition, 
general courses which arc normally managed by a professor or professors. These courses 
are accessible to all students and they are basically comprehensive lectures provided by a 
professor. They generally work as a one-way channel, since the main emphasis lies on the 
lecture of the professor and does not include the active participation of students. That is 
why these classes are usually referred to as "lectures" in the informal language of both 
students and professors. 
32
 Announcment of Dr. Cs. Herger, coordinator of the externship program (07. 03. 08). http:// 
www.law.pte.hu/tartalom/110 
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However, to provide a different kind or quality of education than that of passive listening 
and making notes, law schools also offer courses dedicated to small groups of students, 
maximum 20 or 25 students depending on the institution, and these kind of classes are 
generally called seminars. These seminars are always linked to the "lectures" and their main 
aim is to interactively discuss the subject in a detailed manner. It is also worthwhile 
mentioning that these seminars are often taught by younger teachcrs, mainly assistants or 
lecturers,33 which makes possible the creation of a more informal, open and cooperative 
atmosphere compared to the general features of "lectures". For instance, at the Pázmány 
Péter Catholic University Faculty of Law and Political Sciences the general course or the 
"lecture" entitled Private Law I.-this class is about the theory, history and general principles 
of private law as well as personal law-seminars of Private Law I. are always attached. 
Finally, it should also be mentioned that the attendance requirements of seminars are 
always more strict than those of the "lectures" and if someone has already chosen a general 
class it might also be compulsory to choose a seminar from the same subject at many 
faculties. 
In this regard seminars could be the ideal place for teaching practical legal knowledge 
due to the small number of students and their specialized nature. Ideally, these classes are 
about the interactive discussion of case-law related to the main subject.34 During these 
in-depth case analyses, students could be familiarized with the reasoning of courts as well 
as the general legal arguments. However, it must also be borne in mind that the success of 
the course is always dependent on the capacities of the given teacher; therefore it is 
impossible to generally assess this seminary education system. With a good and well-
prepared teacher these classes can substantially enrich the practical, case-law oriented 
knowledge of the students. 
However, one of the manifest weaknesses of seminars is the fact that these classes are 
normally devoted to the national case-law and thus they usually miss the comparative 
approach. As a result, students cannot gain a broader view on a given legal problem by 
definition, which would help them to recognize that the general principles behind the 
various legal solutions could often be almost the same or very similar.35 Additionally, these 
classes are exclusively aimed to bring students closer to the case-law, thus they do not 
intend to improve the practical skills that they will require in their future professional life, 
e.g. writing memorials or pleading before the courts. Therefore, one can generalise that the 
seminary teaching method can overcome the manifest disadvantages of the "lecture" 
method as they include detailed case-law analyses and have a strong interactive element. 
But this way of teaching has usually nothing to do with the improvement of the practical 
skills. 
8. Clinical legal education is a relatively new element in the curricula of Hungarian 
faculties of law. The first of these courses started in 1996 at the Eötvös Loránd University 
Faculty of Law and Political Sciences,36 and other legal clinics have been founded in Győr, 
33
 A certain part of those who teach seminary courses even could come from the "practice", as 
for instance attorneys, prosecutors or even judges depending on the policy of the given law school. 
34
 For a detailed analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the so-called case-method 
see: Jakab, A.: Dilemmas of Legal Education-A Comparative Overview. Journal of Legat Education 
2007/2, 253-265. 
35
 Cf.: Schlesinger, R. В.: The Common Core of Legal Systems. In: Zweigert, K.-Puttfarken, H. 
J.: Rechtsvergleichung. Darmstadt, 1978. 249-269. 
36
 http://jogklinika.cjb.hu 
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Szeged, Debrecen and Miskolc. More than half of all law schools now offer some kind of 
clinical legal education to law students, and it can be regarded as a considerable achievement 
in the field of practical education. 
As an illustration of the work and effectiveness of the clinical legal education in Hungary 
it is worthwhile examining two of them in detail. The most comprehensive practical legal 
education is offered by the legal clinics hosted by the Eötvös Loránd University Faculty of 
Law and Political Sciences. These legal clinics arc administered by an independent 
foundation - the Jogklinka (legal clinic) and Street Law Foundation-and their financial 
background has been provided by external donors such as Open Society Foundation, Soros 
Foundation and Ford Foundation since their establishment.37 It is very important to 
emphasize that due to this financial independence the legal clinics provided all of their 
services-from education to legal assistancc-to the law faculty free of charge. 
According to the Foundation, legal clinics have various but closely interrelated goals. 
They are aimed at providing legal services for socially disadvantaged people, to improve 
the quality of legal education by organizing practice-oriented and skill-training focused 
courses and to prepare comparative and critical analyses about the normal functioning of 
the legal system.38 In addition to these major aims the founders also defined some 
supplementary goals: that these courses are dedicated to enhancing the social sensitivity of 
students and their social responsibility; that they also assist in the deepening of the values 
of democracy and those of the rule of law; and that they can help in the development of 
professional skills; moreover that these classes are also able to support equality before law 
by providing free legal assistance for those who need it.39 The improvements of the practical 
thinking and skills of law students as well as the promotion of values such as social 
responsibility and equality before law are viewed equally as the key focus of this program. 
Currently six different legal clinics operate at the Eötvös Loránd University Faculty of 
Law and Political Sciences, and each of them is an elective course of at least two or even 
more semesters. Each legal clinic is focused on a special segment of legal affairs and 
their programs could be divided into three consecutive parts: improvement of the 
theoretical knowledge, specific skill training such as conducting interviews with clients, 
fact investigation etc., and learning through the general practice. It must also be mentioned 
that the teaching team of these legal clinics is always a special composition of university 
teachers as well as practicing professionals. Depending on the area of the various legal 
clinics one can find attorneys, judges, or other professionals e.g. psychologists or aftercare 
experts within the teachers excluding professors or assistant professors. Obviously students 
would profit a lot from the personal meetings and supervision of such experts in the field of 
practical thinking and skills. 
The eldest is the Criminal Law legal clinic, which offers free legal assistance to 
disadvantaged and young people. According to the data this legal clinic deals with 
approximately 60 cases yearly, the majority of which arc related to young and roma people. 
The second legal clinic is called the Nonprofit Law legal clinic dealing mainly with cases 
related to civil organizations such as establishment, tax problems or legal assistance. The 
third legal clinic program is also related to criminal law since it is focused on the aftercare 
of former prisoners. In the framework of this Aftercare Law legal clinic students become 
37
 http://www.jogklinika.cjb.hu/alapitvanyunkrol.html 
38
 A jogklinikák bemutatása [Introduction to the various legal clinics], http://www. 
jogklinika.cjb.hu/jogklinikak.html 
39
 Ibid. 
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familiar with the difficulties of reintegration as well as the socio-cultural effects of 
imprisonment. The fourth legal clinic in this web of clinical legal éducation is the Labour 
Law legal clinic, its work is focused on a very special target group since this legal clinic 
helps people with epilepsy to integrate into the labour market. In this special assistance 
activity the legal clinic cooperates with a foundation (Foundation Umbrella) specializing in 
helping and assisting people with epilepsy. The "youngest" legal clinic, which was 
established in 2003, is the Rights of the Child legal clinic. As is obvious from its name, the 
main goal of this legal clinic is assistance in the protection of children, with special regard 
to their rights as they are expressed in Hungarian law. The last legal clinic could be regarded 
as the most peculiar one since its aim is teaching law in high schools and in various 
penitentiary institutions. Its name is the Street Law legal clinic and it offers a 
comprehensive education about the different methods of law teaching in secondary 
education.40 
As one can see this "web" of clinical legal education could be regarded as quite complex 
and sophisticated since it includes six specialized clinics and many really interesting issues 
from the teaching of law to labour law assistance. The varied specialization and appeal of 
this form of éducation as well as the choice of interesting and hot topics could be one of the 
main reasons that about 100 students enrolled to these legal clinics every year.41 
Compared to this system of legal clinics the Freedom of Information legal clinic-also 
included in the curriculum of the Eötvös Loránd University Faculty of Law and Political 
Sciences-might be regarded as a slightly more modest but also very interesting enterprise. 
This legal clinic is one of the newest legal clinics in the country since it was started in the 
first semester of 2008 as a two-semester long elective course. As one can clearly see from 
its name its aim is to familiarize students with the practical problems of the law with special 
regard to the access of public data and information.42 There is a broad institutional background 
behind this legal clinic since six civil associations dealing with a wide-range of affairs 
related to public data and information-Open Society Justice Initiative, Association for 
Public Data, Reflex Environmental Protection Association, Enviromcntal Management and 
Law Association, Eötvös Károly Institute and Hungarian civil Liberties Union-participate 
in its program mainly by offering internships for the enrolled students. 
One should state that the establishment of this system of legal clinics has only 
successfully begun in the last years. This process is properly illustrated by the fact that an 
Administrative and Constitutional Law legal clinic related to the University of Szeged 
Faculty of Law as well as an Anti-discrimination legal clinic hosted by both the 
University of Miskolc Faculty of Law and Eötvös Loránd University Faculty of Law and 
Political Sciences also started to work in 2007 and in 2009. This fast proliferation of legal 
clinics in various law schools proves that there is a constant demand for the enhancement of 
the practical side of legal education, and the Hungarian students are open to this qualitatively 
new and complex form of legal education. It is highly probable that newer legal clinics will 
be created in the future, if the dynamics of this process remain the same. 
9. In addition to the seminary education and the work of legal clinics there are some 
other opportunities, which could also include certain practical elements. First of all, the so-
40
 For the details see ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42
 http://tasz.hu/jogklinika 
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called pleading competitions43 should be mentioned. Both, law schools and governmental 
agencies organize competitions e.g. the Criminal Law Pleading Competition of University 
of Miskolc Faculty of Law could be regarded as a tradition, since it has been organized for 
many years.44 But one can find many other pleading competitions, too e.g. the pleading 
competitions organized by various Bar Associations,45 or the national Labour Law pleading 
competition. Additionally, the University of Miskolc has also been organizing a European 
law moot court competition in Hungarian since 2004, which might be regarded as a 
preparatory step toward the international moot court competitions. These competitions offer 
wide-ranging challenges for law students by which they can improve their speech making, 
public speaking and performance skills. 
III. Concluding thoughts 
10. Primarily one can easily recognize that the amount of practical education has 
considerably increased in the Hungarian legal education system during the last few years. 
Law schools are more and more willing to provide various courses focused on certain 
segments of practice. The most comprehensive practical education is undoubtedly granted 
by the numerous legal clinics which exist to provide a detailed knowledge based on theory, 
skills and supervised but independent partice. Compared to the clinical legal education 
method the system of seminars has somehow slightly more modest goals, concentrating on 
the presentation of the relevant national, or in case of International Law or "European Law", 
international case-law. By reading and discussing judicial decisions many skills of law 
students could be improved, for example reading and interpreting cases, distinguishing 
between legally relevant and irrelevant facts, understanding and following legal reasoning 
etc.. In addition, the mandatory externship period is also able to familiarize students with the 
everyday work of a given law firm or governmental agency so that they can broaden their 
view on real functioning law. 
However, this considerable expansion of practice in the legal education does need 
refining. Regarding the legal clinics, it must be emphasized that only half of the law schools 
use this innovative form of legal education and they are only accessible to a limited number 
of students, the others have not established legal clinics so far. It should be incumbent upon 
the other faculties to start these clinics in their curricula since the lack of clinical legal 
education could be a reason for serious student deficiencies. This lack may deprive a 
considerable number of students of the complex practical experience provided by this form 
of education, and it could even affect their chances in the labour market. The lack of legal 
clinics could also be a problem for the faculties themselves due to the very severe 
competition within the legal educational system. It is obvious that the work of legal clinics 
can offer a more advantageous position to a faculty since it can then argue that it provides a 
43
 It is worthwhile knowing that these pleading or orator competitions differ from the so-called 
moot-court competitions, as for instance, the Philip c. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competi-
tion, in certain points. In Hungary the pleading competitions are focused on individual pleading in 
front of a bench, that is to say, on the individual eloquence and skills in public speaking. Participants 
are required neither to form teams, nor prepare and submit memorials, they only have to plead before 
a bench consisting of professionals. 
44
 http://www.mertnet.net/cikkek/2008/aktualis/perbeszedverseny-2008 
45
 For instance by the Bar Association of the County of Bács-Kiskun, cf. http://www.bacs-
kiskunmegyeiugyvedikamara.hu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=63&Itemid=l 
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much more comprehensive education to students than the others, and it could even be the 
decisive point when someone chooses a law school. 
Another problem regarding the practical education could be the fact that law schools, 
even those who provide clinical legal education, do not put serious emphasis on skill-
training in a broad sense. Seminars concentrate on the discussion of case-law, the mandatory 
externship period and legal clinics intend to introduce students to the everyday practice of 
legal work, but nothing-or almost nothing-is devoted to improving the general skills of 
students. Take for example rhetoric, which should be regarded as one of the most important 
skills of a lawyer, due to the fact that argument has an eminent role in legal culture,46 is 
only included in the curriculum of two law schools as an elective course.47 Other faculties 
do not teach it at all. Professional ethics or ethics has a slightly broader role, but these 
courses are only introductory classes at the beginning of the legal education and they 
are usually parts of more comprehensive philosophy courses.48 Needless to say it is 
important for a lawyer to have a solid ethical education since his or her profession has to 
make difficult and complex decisions. Otherwise, studying professional or at least general 
ethics is important from the point of view of empathy since it facilitates the understanding 
of human motives and decisions. On the whole, the practical side of Hungarian legal 
éducation should be completed with such subjects, which can enable law students to 
master these basic skills of their future profession that are not explicitly related to case-
law or everyday legal work but extremely important in the ethos of lawyers such as logical 
thinking, public speaking or human understanding.49 
11. As an epilogue, the points outlined above are re-cnforced by an empirical survey 
taken among the students of the University of Szeged Faculty of Law in 2002.50 This 
research concentrated on the factors influencing legal éducation and its conclusions revealed 
certain interesting findings on the role of practice in legal education from the student's 
perspective. In this study the researchers asked fifty randomly chosen students from the 
third year to list and explain such things with which they were dissatisfied, concerning their 
education. This survey did not apply any questionnaire therefore enabling the students to 
46
 James Boyd White argues that the work of the rhetorician and the lawyer is very close to each 
other in many senses. Moreover, law or legal practice could also be conceived of a special branch of 
rhetoric. Thus rhetoric should play a primordial role in legal education with special regard to skill-
training. Cf. White, J. В.: Rhetoric and Law. The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life. In: James, B. 
W.: Heracles s Bow. Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of Law. Wisconsin, 1985. 32-35. 
47
 At the University of Szeged Faculty of Law and Kiroli Gáspár University Faculty of Law. 
48
 The volume of János Zlinszky-professor emeritus of Roman Law at the Pázmány Péter Cath-
olic University Faculty of Law and Political Sciences-could be regarded as a symbol of that approach 
which treats legal ethics as a separate subject. Cf. Zlinszky J.: Keresztény erkölcs és jogászi etika 
[Christian Morals and Legal Ethics], Budapest, 1998. 
49
 There is one very innovative initiative in this field. Miklós Szabó-Dean of University of 
Miskolc Faculty of Law and Head of Legal Theory and Sociology of Law Department-published 
a course-book entitled Trivium at the beginning of 2000. This book concentrates on the improve-
ment of such elementary skills which are related to language in the broadest sense, such as gram-
mar, logic and rhetoric. Cf. Szabó M.: Trivium. Grammatika, logika, retorika joghallgatók számára 
[Trivium. Grammar, Logic and Rhetoric for Law Students], Miskolc, 2001. 
50
 Nagy Zs.-Tóth J. Z.: A jogi oktatás helyzete (Felmérés a jogi oktatást befolyásoló tényezőkről) 
[The Situation of Legal Education (A Survey on those Factors which can Influence Legal Education)]. 
Jogelméleti Szemle 2002/4. http://jesz.ajk.elte.hu/nagyl2.html 
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formulate their own opinions without any external influence encodcd into the phrasing of 
questions.51 
The participants generally touched on six different problems in their replies. According 
to the researchers on the basis of these replies it is possible to classify seven factors which 
influence the effectiveness of legal education. The most important three factors are the 
number of students, the subjectivity of examinations, and the problems of teaching 
methods.52 With regard to the methodology of teaching, 54 percent of the students mentioned 
the lack of practical legal éducation as a serious deficiency. In their eyes the general legal 
education is excessively theory oriented, which means that professors and teachers are only 
concerned with the discussion of abstract concepts and do not concentrate on the practical 
dimension of law. Students were also highly critical of the system of seminary education; 
they unequivocally complaincd that many of these seminars cannot be regarded as more 
than "mini lectures" or they even miss the discussion of case-law because of the endless 
explanations of the teacher. Some students also pointed out that verbal communication has 
only a secondary place in legal education due to the fact that most of the exams arc written 
and seminars are also mostly about making notes on the basis of the explanation of the 
teacher.53 
Consequently, students are also aware of the many deficiencies of the practical legal 
education system, and this can be regarded as good news in itself. The explicit or implicit 
expectations of law students might also be a factor which may compel law schools to 
integrate more and more practical elements into their curricula in the long run. 
11. In conclusion, the field of practical education in the system of Hungarian legal 
education is in a transitory phase.54 Transitory since many new and inventive elements have 
already appeared e.g. legal clinics or the teaching of rhetoric, but they have not extended 
generally so far. Hopefully, this transition signals an unambiguous advance towards a much 
more modern form of legal education in which practice in the broadest sense will have a 
more balanced position compared to the theoretical oriented teaching. It should be borne in 
mind however that the roots of the Hungarian legal education are deeply interconnected to 
the continental, dogmatic approach, which does not intend to prepare law students for the 
challenges of practical life, but concentrates on providing lawyers with a broad intellectual 
background.55 It might be illusory to anticipate a complete reform of the Hungarian legal 
education on the basis of the "practicaf'-originally North-American-modcl, but the growth 
of different forms of practical education is certainly a positive step towards the formation of 
a system of legal education where the theoretical and practical dimensions could work in 
harmony. 
si Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54
 For a broader discussion of the relationship between socio-political transition and Hungarian 
legal thinking see: Meleg Cs.: Társadalmi változások és jogászi gondolkodásmód [The Impact of 
Social Changes on the Legal Way of Thinking], Jura 2001/2, 58-73. 
55
 René David, classic of modem comparative law literature, explicitly argues that the task of 
legal education is the teaching of general legal culture since law students in this system could acquire 
such a broad view of legal problems which protects them to become simple bureaucrats and compara-
tive law must play a preeminent role in it. Cf. David, R.: Le droit comparé enseignement de culture 
general. Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé 2 (1950) 682-685. 
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GARY CHARTIER* 
Natural Law and Non-Aggression 
Abs t r ac t . Natural law theory can render the so-called "non-aggress ion principle" (NAP), which prohib i t s the 
initiation of force against person or property, intelligible and can ground a robust, even if not exceptionless, version 
of the principle. Natural law and natural rights theories share c o m m o n roots, but arc of ten seen as divergent , if not 
antagonistic. But I believe it can plausibly be maintained that c la ims about natural rights find their h o m e wi th in the 
context of more comprehensive natural law theories. 1 seek to illustrate this claim by showing how a central claim 
about natural rights can be de fended using the resources provided by the best contemporary version o f natural law 
theory. I cons ider the significance of the NAP and its place in natural rights theory. I outline the contours o f one 
contemporary natural law posit ion, the new classical natural law ( N C N L ) theory. 1 go on to indicate wha t form I 
suspect a version of the NAP f ramed using the categories provided by the NCNL theory might take. 
K e y w o r d s : natural law, non-aggression principle, natural r ights, Finnis, John, Rothbard, Murray, property 
I. Introduction 
Natural law theory can render the so-called "non-aggression principle" (NAP), which 
prohibits the initiation of force against person or property, intelligible and can ground a 
robust, even if not exceptionless, version of the principle. 
Natural law and natural rights theories share common roots, but are often seen as 
divergent, if not antagonistic. But I believe it can plausibly be maintained that claims about 
natural rights find their home within the context of more comprehensive natural law theories. 
I seek to illustrate this claim by showing how a central claim about natural rights can be 
defended using the resources provided by the best contemporary version of natural law 
theory. In Part II, I consider the significance of the NAP and its place in natural rights 
theory. In Part III, I outline the contours of one contemporary natural law position, the new 
classical natural law (NCNL) theory. In Part IV, I indicate what form I suspect a version of 
the NAP framed using the categories provided by the NCNL theory might take. I suggest 
that NCNL theory provides a strong foundation for absolute prohibitions on purposeful or 
instrumental attacks on people's bodily and mental health, rooted in what is often called the 
Pauline Principle, and a sturdy but less-than-absolute basis for rights in tangible property, 
grounded in the Golden Rule. I conclude with a recap in Part V. 
II. The Place of the NAP in Natural Rights Theory 
An influential strand of natural rights thinking gives pride of place, as far as political ethics 
are concerned, to the non-aggression principle. One of its most influential advocates frames 
the principle this way: "no one may threaten or commit violence ( 'aggress') against another 
man's person or property. Violence may be employed only against the man who commits 
such violence; that is, only defensively against the aggressive violence of another. In short, 
* Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Law and Business Ethics, School of Business, La 
Sierra University Riverside, CA 92515-8247. 
E-mail: Gary.Chartier@GMail.Com 
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no violence may be employed against a nonaggressor".1 (For convenience, we can call the 
two aspects of the principle its person-aspect and its property-aspect.) 
The principle is sometimes described as an axiom, given its arguably crucial position 
as the foundation for civilized life. A range of justifications have been offered for it, 
however, including ones purporting to derive it from the notion of self-ownership and from 
the simple fact of the agent's status as a living being. 1 want to argue here that an important 
contemporary expositions of the natural law tradition in which much natural rights thinking 
is rooted can provide limited philosophical grounding for the NAP. 
Natural rights theory is characteristically concerned not with "personal morality" but 
only with "the proper sphere of 'polities', i.e. with violence and non-violence as modes of 
interpersonal relations.2 Talk about rights in this context is narrow: to say that a given interest 
is safeguarded by a right is to say that that interest may not be "interfered with by violence"; 
it is not at all to deny that there may be "immoral ways of exercising that right". Whether 
there are is a question for ethics, not for political philosophy-the subset of ethics concerned 
specifically with the just use of force.3 Natural rights theory is thus not a general theory of 
ethics: serious moral inquiry extends well beyond questions about when force might be 
appropriate. However, natural law theorists may be inclined to argue, it is most important to 
get clear on the moral limits of violence. As long as rejecting aggression is accepted as a 
ground-rule, people can get along satisfactorily even if their views on other moral questions 
differ. This does not, of course, imply that all moral stances compatible with a commitment 
to the NAP are, for natural rights theorists, equally appropriate.4 Talk about natural rights, 
rooted in the natural law tradition, is plausibly understood as a subset of natural law ethics 
more broadly construed. Natural law political ethics cannot reasonably be seen as free-
standing; rather, natural law convictions about proper limits on the use of force are intelligible 
to the extent that they flow from natural law ethics more generally. This way of thinking 
about the relationship between political ethics and general ethics does not follow strictly, of 
course; perhaps there are moral principles that are concerned exclusively with the use of 
force and don not depend on more general principles. But it seems more economical and 
elegant to suppose that, if there are more general natural law principles of ethics, principles 
of political ethics make sense in light of those more general principles. 
There are obviously multiple strands in the natural law tradition. The Spanish Scho-
lastics, for instance, have been seen as in many ways the precursors of contemporary natural 
rights theorists. But their thought, of course, was grounded in the earlier work of Aquinas 
and Aristotle. And subsequent descendants of Aquinas have reworked the Aristotelian 
tradition to which he was a major contributor in ways quite different from those of the 
Spanish (and other) Scholastics. 
The position of the contemporary "new classical natural law" (NCNL) theorists is an 
obvious example. It reflects the influence of the post-World War 11 analytic tradition in 
1
 Rothbard, M. N.: War, Peace, and the State. In: Hoppe, H.-H. (ed.): The Myth of National 
Defense: Essays on the Theoiy and History of Security Production. Auburn ( AL), 2003, 66. 
2
 Rothbard, M. N.: The Ethics of Liberty. Atlantic Heights (NJ), 1982, 25. 
3
 Ibid. 24. 
4
 Johnson, Ch. W.: Liberty, Equality, Solidarity: Toward a Dialectical Anarchism. In: Long, R. 
T.-Machan, T. (cds): Anarchism/Minarchism: Is a Government Part of a Free Country? Aldershot, 
2008, 155-188. 
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English-language philosophy, and is particularly dependent on the work of the late G. E. M. 
Anscombe. I believe a plausible version of NCNL theory can provide a version of the NAP 
with both intelligibility and justification. 
111. The Contours of the New Classical Natural Law Theory 
A. Introduction 
NCNL theory features two key components: basic aspects of well being and basic practical 
principles. I consider the first in Section В and the second in Section C. In Section D, 
I explain why NCNL theory can regard basic moral principles as absolute while treating 
others as relative. I sum up in Section E. 
B. Basic Aspects of Well Being 
Basic goods, or aspects of human welfare or well being, are central to the NCNL view. 
These goods include life, speculative knowledge, practical reasonableness, friendship, 
religion, self-integration, aesthetic experience, and play.5 What matters, in general, is not 
just what counts as a basic aspect or dimension of welfare or well being. What's significant, 
instead, is that these aspects of welfare are not reducible to anything else (either a substantive 
good like pleasure or felt satisfaction, or a fonnál good like preference-satisfaction) and 
that each category and each instance of each category is incommensurable and non-
fungible/' An aspect of well being may be identified as basic in multiple ways.7 Classifying 
it this way may be the result of a process of reasoning that leading to reflective equilibrium 
among convictions including the belief thai a given dimension of welfare is basic. It may 
simply be seen non-inferentially to be fundamental in nature. Denying its status as a basic 
good can be shown to be self-contradictory. A phenomenological analysis of reflection and 
choice can lead to the conclusion thai a given good provides a terminus for reasoning, so 
that no further justification is required to pursue it. And the experience of privation or loss 
may be seen, by implication, to point to the value of what has been lost. 
It is possible, the NCNL theorists emphasize, to choose among instances of various 
aspects of welfare in various combinations. And our choices are constrained by reason in 
two ways-to be reasonable, they must be for real goods rather than illusory ones (like 
emotional satisfaction untethered to objectively satisfactory states of affairs in the real 
world) and they must be consistent with the principles of practical reasonableness (about 
which more anon). But provided a choice is a choice for a real good and is otherwise 
consistent with the demands of practical reasonableness, there will be no objective way to 
rank one choice as "better" or "worse" than another (except in terms of the actor's own 
prior commitments). 
5
 Some heterodox NCNL thinkers have been inclined to include more subjective aspects of 
welfare, like sensory pleasure and peace of mind on the list see Murphy, M. C.: Natural Law and 
Practical Rationality. Cambridge, 1999; Chartier, G.: Economic Justice and Natural Law. Cambridge, 
2009; and there may be good reason not to include self-integration (Chartier 2007). The details are not 
crucial. 
6
 Finnis, J.: Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford, 1980; Finnis, J.: Fundamentals of Ethics. 
Oxford, 1986. 
7
 Chartier: op. cit. 
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This basic fact of incommensurability and non-fungibility renders consequentialism a 
non-starter. For standard consequentialism, at least, depends on the ability to rank-order 
states of affairs incorporating many different aspects of welfare. And if there is no rationally 
inescapable way to combine all of the goods realized in a given state of affairs-as one 
cannot if the assignment of weights to different instances of different goods must be a 
matter of choice rather than of rational necessity-then there will be, can be, no objectively 
required ranking of states of affairs in the standard consequentialism demands. (Classical 
utilitarianism offers the possibility of objective ranking by focusing on the amount of 
pleasure embodied each possibility to be ranked; but as early as Mill it was becoming 
apparent that this sort of Benthamite project was inattentive to crucial aspects of the human 
experiences of valuation and moral judgment.) 
C. Practical Principles 
NCNL theory maintains that reasonable participation in basic aspects of well being is 
participation governed by a set of practical principles. Two of these principles, the Golden 
Rule and the Pauline Principle, provide the basis for a version of the NAP grounded in 
NCNL theory. 
1. The Golden Rule 
The Golden Rule requires that one treat those affected by one's actions fairly. It can be 
variously formulated, of course. NCNL theory characteristically emphasizes two features. 
First, if one treats two moral subjects differently, one should do so only for the purpose of 
participating, or fostering someone else's participation, in a genuine aspect of well being. 
(Thus, one may reasonably pick capable players for a football team in order to foster the 
good of play; one may reasonably select good art over trash in order to foster the good of 
aesthetic experience; friendship requires distinctions between friends and non-friends.) 
Second, one should not treat another moral subject-even when in otherwise reasonable 
pursuit of an intelligible aspect of welfare-in a way such that one would be resentful if one 
were treated that way oneself. 
2. The Pauline Principle 
The Pauline Principle as understood by NCNL theorists is grounded in the incommensurability 
of basic aspects of well being. The expression "Pauline Principle" reflects St. Paul's 
exasperated rejection8 of the notion that we might reasonably do evil to bring about good. 
The twist in the NCNL version of this principle, though, is that the principle is not seen as 
dependent on previously specified deontic norms. 
The idea behind the principle is often cashed in something like this way: a set of rules 
(say, the Ten Commandments) is treated as given; and the Pauline Principle is understood 
as stipulating that the rules should be treated as exceptionless, so that they may not be 
violated even in pursuit of particularly good consequences. Framed this way, the principle 
appears unavoidably arbitrary. Why should I accept the relevant moral rules in the first 
place? And what reason, exactly, does the Pauline Principle give me to treat them as 
exceptionless? Thus, the strength of the NCNL version. The NCNL theorists do not offer a 
version of the Pauline Principle that begins with a set of specific moral rules treated as 
8
 Romans Chapter 3 Verse 8. 
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givens. Rather, they derive it in large part simply from the idea that there are objective 
aspects of human welfare. The NCNL version of the Principle can be framed like this: do 
not purposefully or instrumentally cause harm to any basic aspect of a moral subject's 
welfare. 
Now, consider someone contemplating an attack on someone else's welfare. If her 
action is to be reasonable, she will need to act in order to participate in some aspect of well 
being or in order to foster someone else's participation in some dimension of welfare. 
Presuming she correctly understands what she is doing as an attack on some aspect of 
someone else's good, then she needs to see her attack as justified in virtue of the good she 
seeks to realize or pursue. It can not, ex hypothesi, be because the good she's attacking is 
valueless. But the good she's attempting to realize does not, could not, outweigh the good 
she's attacking: it's not commensurable with it. So any purposeful attack on an acknowledged 
basic good in the service of another acknowledged basic good will be unreasonable, because 
it will involve treating a genuine good as if it were not a genuine good, or as if it could be 
rationally subordinated to another genuine good when it can not. (The same line of argument 
fairly clearly rules out acting with hostility toward any basic aspect of well being.) 
Another way the point is sometimes made by NCNL theorists is to say that attacking a 
basic good directly amounts to the choice to make being an attacker of basic goods part of 
one's identity. Thus, Grisez4 talks about treating oneself as giver of life and death when one 
chooses to attack someone's life. 
There's obviously more to be said about this argument, and my purpose here is not to 
spell out all of its ramifications or to defend it against all possible objections. The point of 
this post is to talk about the degree to which the NCNL approach to natural law theory 
might be able to justify something similar to the NAP. But I wanted to outline the basis an 
NCNL theorist might offer for the Pauline Principle so it would be clear how the NCNL 
version differs from other versions of "Don't do evil to bring about good." No detailed 
moral principles are presupposed: all the argument needs to get off the ground is the 
recognition that certain aspects of welfare are, indeed, aspects of welfare and that they're 
incommensurable and non-fungible. 
D. Practical Principles as Absolute 
The Golden Rule, the Pauline Principle, and other relevant practical principles are all, on 
the NCNL view, absolute and exceptionless. That is, there is never a time when it is 
reasonable to ignore the Golden Rule or the Pauline Principle. But there's one fairly obvious 
difference between the two. The Pauline Principle rules out certain generically specifiable 
action-types absolutely. For example: any instance of targeting non-combatants in war-time 
is fairly clearly going to be an instance of purposefully causing harm to one or more basic 
aspects of well being. So it is possible to be quite clear in general tenus about various sorts 
of conduct that will always be inconsistent with the Pauline Principle. And this means, in 
turn, that someone potentially on the receiving end of such conduct will have an absolute 
right not to be subjected to the ill effects of that conduct. By contrast, while everyone has 
an absolute right not to be treated in a manner inconsistent with the Golden Rule, just what 
conduct will prove inconsistent with this prohibition on arbitrariness will vary significantly 
from situation to situation. (For instance: supposing that promissory obligation is rooted in 
9
 Grisez, G.: Toward a Consistent Natural-Law Ethics of Killing. American Journal of 
Jurisprudence. 15 (1970), 64 96. 
84 G A R Y C H A R T I E R 
the Golden Rule, there will likely be no way to specify whether someone may be exempted 
from the requirement to keep a promise without a good deal of quite situation-specific 
information.) 
The Pauline Principle is quite compatible with causing unintended but foreseen harm, 
harm as an anticipated but unsought by-product or side-effect of action intended to realize 
or pursue a genuine good. (Thus, it can allow for the use of force to defend oneself or 
others: one's purpose in this case need not be to cause harm, but simply to repel or resist an 
attack.) But the fact that the harm is not purposeful or instrumental does not mean it's 
automatically permissible. There will be multiple constraints on bringing about unintended 
harms. But the most important will be the Golden Rule: one may not impose a risk of 
unintended but anticipated harm on someone else if one would resent the imposition of a 
similar risk, in comparable circumstances, on oneself or one's loved ones. 
E. Conclusion 
Practical reasonableness, as understood by NCNL theorists, calls for consistent acknow-
ledgement of the value of all of the varied aspects of well being and of those who 
participate in them. Discerned in diverse ways, the basic aspects of welfare are objective, 
incommensurable, and non-fungible. Regard for the welfare of real people requires 
acknowledgement of the irreducible significance of these aspects of well being. The Pauline 
Principle precludes acting purposefully or instrumentally to harm any of these aspects of 
welfare, or out of hostility toward it; the Golden Rule requires that we treat the moral 
subjects with whom we interact fairly. Moral rules derived from the Pauline Principle are 
exceptionless; the Golden Rule itself is exceptionless, but rules derived from it will of 
necessity be more flexible and responsive to particular circumstances. 
IV. Natural Law and the Property-Aspect of the NAP 
A. Alternative Natural Law Grounds for Property Rights 
It is clear that the Pauline Principle provides very solid grounding for the person-aspect of 
the NAP. Any putposeful or instrumental violence against a person's body, mental health, or 
peace of mind will clearly be ruled out by the Pauline Principle; using force to defend oneself 
or others will be permissible, but imposing unreasonable risks of harm on others will not. 
The NAP as standardly formulated implies that a person's property in material realities 
external to her person should be treated as equivalent to her person, as an extension of her 
body. Just as it would be wrong to attack a person's body, on this view, it would be equally 
wrong, and wrong for the same basic reason, to attack her property. However, the NCNL 
theorists typically demarcate body and property quite clearly. They would be inclined, 
I think, to treat regarding one's property as an extension of oneself as an instance of 
fetishization. That does not mean, though, thai they could not come to endorse something 
similar to the property-aspect of the NAP. In the remainder of Part IV, I consider three ways 
in which they might be able to do so: they could seek to show that the Golden Rule could 
justify robust property rights (Section B); they could treat property as a basic good, view 
individual pieces of properly as aspects of the self, or resist interferences with property 
rights as exercises in retrospective enslavement (Section C); or while distinguishing property 
from the basic goods, they could argue that essentially any assault on property is 
simultaneously a purposeful or instrumental assault on a basic aspect of well being (Section 
D). I conclude in Section E. 
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B. Property Rights and the Golden Rule 
Standard NCNL theory grounds property rights primarily in the Golden Rule. It can provide 
strong support for property rights; it is not clear, though, that the Golden Rule can ground 
the full property-aspect of the NAR Just as there's an absolute right not to be treated in a 
manner inconsistent with the Pauline Principle, there's also an absolute right not to be 
treated in a manner inconsistent with the Golden Rule. But what the Golden Rule requires 
will vary far more from situation to situation than what the Pauline Principle requires. Thus, 
mid-level general norms that flow from the Golden Rule-like Keep promises or Avoid 
rudeness-may admit of a variety of exceptions. In Subsection 1, I explain the basis for such 
rights in standard NCNL theory. In Subsection 2, I outline some proposed additions to the 
typical NCNL rationales for property rights. In Subsection 3, I consider the limitations on 
Golden Rule-based property rights that would seem to flow even from the sort of robust 
grounding for them I envision. 
1. Standard NCNL Rationales for Property Rights 
The NCNL theorists begin from what they see as essentially Aristotle's point of view: 
everything in principle belongs to everyone, but there are good reasons to give responsibility 
for each thing to someone or some group of people in particular, for the benefit of all.10 
Their view, in effect, is that property rights flow primarily from the Golden Rule. This basic 
principle of fairness, along with some contingent but persistent facts about human nature 
and the human situation, impose some limits on what might count as a just property regime. 
Finnis focuses primarily on three constraints, overlapping and mutually reinforcing 
rationales for property rights which may also be seen as justifications for particular property 
claims (the labels are mine): 
1. Incentivization: in general, a just property system will be one that facilitates people's 
contribution to the productivity of a community's economy through the use of 
incentives; someone can sometimes reasonably offer the fact that a property rule would 
incentivize people to engage in productive activity as a reason for others to support the 
rule and so in support of her claim to a piece of property that would be hers under the 
rule." 
2. Stewardship: in general, a just property system will facilitate stewardship-taking 
good care of property, cultivating and developing it responsibly, and preventing it from 
falling into disrepair; someone can sometimes reasonably offer the fact that a property 
rule would likely foster the effective stewardship of property as a reason for others to 
support the rule and so in support of her claim to a piece of property that would be 
hers under the rule.12 
3. Autonomy: in general, a just property system will be one that facilitates people's 
autonomy-their freedom to determine the contours of their own lives and major life 
choices without intrusion by others; someone can sometimes reasonably offer the fact 
that a property rule would help people to be autonomous as a reason for others to 
10
 Aristotle: Politics. (Trans. Benjamin Jowett), Oxford, 1905, II. 5. 
11
 Finnis, J.: Natural Law and... op. cit. 170, 173; Grisez, G.: The Way of the Lord Jesus 2: 
Living a Christian Life. Steubenville, 1994, 794. 
12 Ibid. 170. 
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support the rule and so in support of her claim to a piece of property that would be 
hers under the rule.13 
3. Additional Considerations Supportive of Property Rights 
Each of the standard NCNL rationales is plausible and persuasive, but I suggest that several 
others might also be relevant, too. Someone evaluating a given property rule in light of the 
Golden Rule could reasonably be expected to take all of these additional rationales into 
account along with those highlighted by the NCNL theorists. 
1. Generosity, in general, a just property system will be one that makes it possible for 
people to be generous; someone can sometimes reasonably offer the fact that a property 
rule would enable people to be generous as a reason for others to support the rule and 
so in support of her claim to a piece of property that would be hers under the rule.14 
2. Reliability, in general, a just property system will enable people to rely on their 
expectations that otherwise just property rules will continue in force, that decisions 
made about individual claims in light of such rules will be respected, and that otherwise 
just property titles will be respected; someone can sometimes reasonably offer the fact 
that a property rule would honor people's past expectations or enable them to depend 
on their expectations in the future as a reason for others to support the rule and so in 
support of her claim to a piece of property that would be hers under the rule.15 
3. Productivity: in general, a just property system will be one that ensures that property 
is put to its most productive use; someone can sometimes reasonably offer the fact that 
a property rule would ensure that property was put to its most productive use as a 
reason for others to support the rule and so in support of her claim to a piece of property 
that would be hers under the rule.16 
4. Compensation: in general, a just property system will be one that makes it possible 
for people to receive, and likely that they will receive, compensation for the goods and 
services they provide to others; someone can sometimes reasonably offer the fact that 
a property rule would enable people to be compensated for providing goods and 
services as a reason for others to support the rule, and so in support of her claim to a 
piece of property that would be hers under the rule.17 
5. Identity, in general, a just properly system will take reasonable account of people's 
identity-constitutive attachments to pieces of property; someone can sometimes 
reasonably offer the fact that a property rule would protect people's identity-constitutive 
attachment to pieces of property as a reason for others to support the rule, and so in 
support of her claim to a piece of property that would be hers under the rule.18 
6. Simplicity, in general, a just property system will be one that features rules that are 
simple-lhat are easy to formulate, articulate, leam, and apply; someone can sometimes 
reasonably offer the fact that a property rule is simple as a reason for others to support 
13
 Ibid. 172; 168 169, 192, Grisez: The Way of the Lord Jesus 2... op. cit. 794-795. 
14
 Aristotle: op. cit. II. 5. 
15
 Fried, Ch.: Modern Liberty and the Limits of Government. New York, 2006, 156-160; 
Munzer, S. R.: A Theory of Property. Cambridge, 1991, 191 226. 
16
 Cp. the discussion of utility and efficiency in Munzer: ibid. 191 226. 
17 Ibid. 254-291. 
18
 Radin, M.: Reinterpreting Property. Chicago, 1994, 35 71; Chartier: op. cit. 
N A T U R A L LAW A N D N O N - A G G R E S S I O N 87 
the rule, and so in support of her claim to a piece of property that would be hers under 
the rule.19 
7. Peacemaking: in general, a just property system will be one that features rules that 
minimize conflict-notably by clearly allocating responsibility for particular things to 
particular people; someone can sometimes reasonably offer the fact that a property rule 
would be conflict-minimizing as a reason for others to support the rule, and so in 
support of her claim to a piece of property that would be hers under the rule.20 
8. Coordination: in general, a just property system will be one that coordinates 
people's interactions by making possible the aggregation of information about their 
interests and needs and the determination of appropriate production patterns and 
distribution levels for goods and services; someone can sometimes reasonably offer 
the fact that a property rule would foster this kind of coordination as a reason for 
others to support the rule, and so in support of her claim to a piece of property that 
would be hers under the rule.21 
These additional concerns (1) add to the support for a system of private property 
provided by the considerations adduced by the NCNL theorists and (2) further constrain the 
kinds of systems that could reasonably count as just. 
4. Limited Implications of Golden Rule-Based Support for Property Rights 
The standard natural law approach to property, grounded in the Golden Rule, can justify 
a system of private ownership safeguarded by reliable rights. The stability and 
determinateness of the system is, in general, enhanced when the multiple additional 
considerations 1 have identified as relevant are also taken into account. But the Golden 
Rule does not require that people endorse the Lockean property rules many natural rights 
proponents read into the NAP. 
The Golden Rule does not leave reasonable people with a single option as regards 
property rules as regards (i) acquisition, (ii) abandonment, or (Hi) the extent of control. 
(Thus, for instance, it does not seem to provide one for a definitive basis for deciding 
between Lockean and occupancy-and-use views, and they certainly leave open, say, the 
length of time property might need to be abandoned before title might pass to a homesteader.) 
It constrains and highlights the range of considerations relevant to the deliberations of 
reasonable people seek to determine which property rules their legal system should enforce, 
but they leave open the question just what option is finally chosen.22 
19
 Epstein, R.: Simple Rides for a Complex World. Cambridge (MA), 1995. 
20
 Hasnas, J.: Toward a Theory of Empirical Natural Rights. Social Philosophy and Policy, 22 
(2005) 1,111 147; Shaffer, В.: Boundaries of Order. Auburn (AL), 2009; Friedman, D.: A Positive 
Account of Property Rights. Soc ial Philosophy and Policy, 11(1994) 2, 1 16. 
21
 Bamett, R.: The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law. Oxford, 1998; Friedman: 
ibid. 
22
 To be clear, I do not regard this as a criticism: variability in property rules seems perfectly 
reasonable to me. (/) Some empirical facts and some implications of particular ideas are unclear and 
need still to be discovered or understood more fully, and experimentation among different property 
rules, within the constraints of justice, will facilitate greater understanding, (ii) Different people's 
personalities will obviously vary, and some people will simply be more comfortable with some rules 
than other people will be and there seems no reason why they should not be able to proceed 
accordingly. 
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In addition, whatever general rules are compatible with the Golden Rule in light of 
these considerations, these rules will not be exceptionless. To take an obvious example: 
both Aquinas and Locke explicitly acknowledged that emergencies justified violating 
otherwise stable, reliable property rights. Aquinas maintains that when a need is "so 
manifest and urgent, that it is evident that the present need must be remedied by whatever 
means be at hand (for instance when a person is in some imminent danger, and there is no 
other possible remedy), then it is lawful for a man to succor his own need by means of 
another's property, by taking it either openly or secretly: nor is this properly speaking theft 
or robbery".23 
Aquinas seems primarily to be thinking of emergency cases. But Locke, so far from 
being the exemplar of "possessive individualism" Macpherson and others claimed him to 
be, is if anything more expansive in this regard. He writes: "charity gives every man a title 
to so much out of another's plenty, as will keep him from extreme want, where he has no 
means to subsist otherwise".24 Locke and Aquinas both seem to see property rules as fuzzy 
in just the way one might expect them to be if they were rooted in a general principle of 
fairness like the Golden Rule. 
C. Property as a Basic Good 
An alternative approach to generating a version of the property-aspect of the NAP using 
natural law theory would be to argue that justly acquired property, or controlling the 
disposition of such property-we can use ownership as a useful short-hand for this 
possibility-is itself a basic aspect of well being. 
This is not, of course, an approach the NCNL theorists take themselves. They clearly 
view the value of property as instrumental. They argue that "anything human persons make, 
or have, considered as distinct from persons ... cannot be basic. It is always for ... reasons 
which culminate within persons ... that individuals and communities are concerned with 
such goods".25 But of course they might be mistaken about this. And, of course, even if 
individual items of properly are sought and held for instrumental reasons, it does not follow 
that ownership itself is instrumental. Perhaps one or more pathway to the identification of 
other aspects of human well being as basic might also justify characterizing ownership of 
and control over justly acquired property in this way (Subsection 1 ). It might also be 
possible to treat, not ownership, but actual goods made or acquired by persons as aspects of 
those persons' selves, deserving the same sort of immunity from purposeful or instrumental 
assault as their bodies because directly or indirectly acquired through labor (Subsection 2). 
A similarly labor-related approach might frame justify absolute property rights by 
framing interference with someone's property as a kind of retrospective enslavement 
(Subsection 3). 
1. Ownership as a Basic Good 
i) Reflective Equilibrium. One might simply seek to ascertain whether affirming the good of 
ownership can be grounded in the attempt to achieve reflective equilibrium among one's 
23
 Aquinas, St. Th.: Summa Theologica. (Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province), 
London, 1920, II II q. 94 a. 7c. 
24
 Locke, J.: Two Treatises of Government. London, 1689. ch. IV, § 42. 
25
 Finnis, J. Boyle, J.-Grisez, G.: Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism. Oxford, 
1987, 178. 
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considered judgments about basic aspects of well being.26 It seems to me that recognition of 
ownership rights of some sort will form part of a system of beliefs in reflective equilibrium, 
but it is unclear to me that a reflective equilibrium-based approach would be sufficient to 
justify the claim that ownership was a basic good. 
ii) Non-Inferential Discernment. Perhaps we might directly, non-inferentially see that 
ownership was a basic good.27 I suspect that many people have, indeed, understood 
themselves to see this: but note that they have not seen the same thing. While cross-cultural 
support for the identification of something as a basic good is a pointer to-not a demonstration 
of-its status,28 cultural variation in this area is enormous. Some control over resources has 
been seen as crucial, but whether that control has been individual or collective, how far it 
has extended, and how it has been established have been viewed quite differently. It does 
not seem, then, that this sort of non-inferential discernment would yield and understanding 
of ownership as a basic aspect of well being that would undergird property rights any more 
robust than those grounded in the Golden Rule. 
Hi) Undeniahility or Self-Evidence. We might attempt to determine whether the good 
of ownership is undeniable or self-evident.24 However, even if it really were undeniable that 
assuming some kind of control over the natural environment was reasonable, it would not 
follow that Lockean rules were. And there is really no plausible claim that denying the 
value of ownership, much less Lockean ownership, is self-refuting. 1 suspect that a 
sufficiently clever dialectician30 could produce an argument designed to show that assertion 
presupposes the value of autonomy and that this value cannot be affirmed or preserved 
without property rights of some kind, but I am not clear that any very specific theory could 
be generated in this way.31 
iv) Reflection on the Deliberative Process. Alternatively, we might seek to determine 
whether we in fact treat ownership as a reason-terminator, whether we regard acquiring or 
maintaining ownership as itself an exhaustive explanation of or justification for an action.32 
But there is little reason to think that we do reason this way. We acquire property because it 
is beautiful, because it will provide space for a family to flourish-because it will enable us 
to achieve other goals. Even if we do not know just what we will want to do with money we 
acquire, we understand that we acquire it to achieve other ends. We can and do explain our 
acquisition of particular items of property in terms of the value of intrinsically valuable 
dimensions of fulfillment in which we will or might participate. 
But though owning particular items is instrumentally valuable, it may be that we value 
ownership itself-control over aspects of the non-sentient world that have come legitimately 
to be ours. That is because we extend ourselves into the physical world when we own 
things: property rights would seem to be constitutive components of personal autonomy. 
25 Raw Is, J.: A Theory of Justice. Rev. ed. Cambridge (MA), 1999, 18-19, 42 46; Larmore, Ch.: 
The Morals of Modernity. Cambridge, 1996, 55 64; McNaughton, D.: Moral Vision: An Introduction 
to Ethics. Oxford, 1988, 102 103. 
27
 See Gomez-Lobo, A.: Morality and the Human Goods: An Introduction to Natural Law 
Ethics. Washington (DC), 2002, 9 10; Finnis: Fundamentals of Ethics, op. cit. 51. 
28
 Finnis: Natural Law and... op. cit. 83 85, 97. 
29
 Chappell, T.: Understanding Human Goods. Edinburgh, 1998, 36. 
30
 Hoppe, H.-H.: The Economics and Ethics of Private Property. Auburn (AL), 2006. 
31
 Friedman n.d. 
32
 Finnis: Fundamentals of Ethics, op. cit. 51 52; Finnis: Natural Law and... op. cit. 51 99; 
Chappell: op. cit. 35. 
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It remains an open question, however, whether recognizing that they are is sufficient to 
generate a scheme of property rights any sturdier than those supported by the Golden Rule. 
v) Privation. Perhaps it is. We can see why it might be by means of an approach to the 
status of ownership as a basic good by way of privation.33 The general idea, for natural law 
theorists, is that a basic good is what has been damaged any time we can agree that someone 
has suffered a genuine harm or loss. Certainly, when something has been stolen from me, 
1 am inclined to see the wrong done not only as instrumental-so that theft, say, is 
objectionable just because it keeps me from enjoying some future benefit-but also as a 
violation of a protected sphere of my existence. Taking something that is mine is, apart 
from its obvious instrumental undesirability, itself a violation. And it is easy to characterize 
what has been harmed as something like the good of ownership. 
We ordinarily pursue the ownership of particular things as an instrumental rather than 
as an intrinsic good, and I think we would be inclined to regard the pursuit individual 
objects, or of material wealth more broadly, as fetishistic unless undertaken for some ulterior 
purpose (we might be inclined to regard the attempt to obtain or retain ownership of 
a specific identity-constitutive piece of property, understood as inherently valuable, as a 
different matter). This is clearly the way the NCNL theorists view political liberty: they 
argue that "[pjeople want liberty in order to pursue the truth, to worship as they think right, 
to participate in the responsible play of political decision-making, to live in friendship, and 
so on".34 If property only mattered instrumentally, as the NCNL theorists believe liberty 
matters, then, of course, it could not reasonably be regarded as a basic aspect of well 
being. 
I suspect, in fact, that people often seek liberty because they do not wish to be 
dominated, subordinated, pushed around-that they value liberty for its own sake. Similarly, 
we do seem sometimes to regard an attack on ownership as a harm in its own right, apart 
from any particular property loss resulting from the attack. Our concern in these cases may 
be seen as with the attacker's attitude-her disrespect for our ownership-as well as with her 
violation of our autonomy and our related right to control our property. 
It is important not to let the approach from privation prove too much. After all, thieves 
with no claim at all to property they have stolen may be angrily resentful when it is 
reclaimed-even by the rightful owners. While the recognition of harm in the case of theft 
does highlight something of moral importance, it is crucial to build into any account of 
ownership as a basic good the requirement that the ownership that is a basic good be 
ownership of justly acquired property. That this is so highlights the dependence of any 
credible account of ownership as a basic good on independently specified rules governing 
the acquisition, retention, and extent of property rights. 
vi) The Limited Implications of Conceiving of Ownership as a Basic Good. Reflective 
equilibrium might provide some general support for the value of ownership, but certainly 
quite little support for treating it as an intrinsic good. There is little reason to think that 
Lockean property rights can be seen to be self-evident or undeniable-or even just non-
inferentially evident. Asking whether ownership of some particular thing serves as the 
terminus in a plausible chain of practical reasoning seems to lead to a negative answer; but 
ownership itself seems a more likely candidate for status as a basic good. And the approach 
33
 Grisez, G.: The Way of the Lord Jesus 1: Christian MoraI Principles. Chicago, 1983, 123; 
Murphy: op. cit. 40. 
34
 Finnis Boyle-Griscz: op. cit. 278. 
N A T U R A L LAW AND N O N - A G G R E S S I O N 91 
by way of privation also suggests that we may see, at least, control over what is already 
legitimately ours as a basic value. 
But even if there might be some limited reason to think of ownership as a basic good, 
many infringements on someone's property cannot plausibly be understood as purposeful or 
instrumental attacks on that person's right to own. Theft will be, since the thief's project 
can succeed only if she is the owner of a piece of property and the prior owner is not. There 
is no way to understand theft except as an attack on the ownership of the existing owner. 
But other actions which cause harm to property and may impede the owner's control over 
her property may be incidental rather than purposeful or instrumental, and so will potentially 
be justifiable in terms of the more permissive Golden Rule. 
The fundamental problem, in any case, is that acknowledging the intrinsic value of 
ownership would not answer the question of what scheme or schemes of ownership rights 
are just. Treating ownership as intrinsically valuable does provide a strong moral argument 
against theft, once property rights are defined. But it provides no particular basis for defining 
just what rights ought to be secure against theft and how these rights ought to be acquired. 
If the definition of property rights-including both their acquisition and their extent-is 
primarily dependent on the Golden Rule, the case, the actual contours of property rights 
will be little different from what they would be if they had been defined in light of the 
Golden Rule without any reference to a basic good of ownership. If the Golden Rule, for 
instance, were understood to underwrite Aquinas/Locke-style exceptions to general property 
rules in the context of a system defined exclusively by the Golden Rule, it is not clear why 
it would not similarly be understood to do so if a good of ownership were acknowledged. 
It's just that, in this latter case, while theft would clearly be out of moral bounds, Ihe Golden 
Rule would ground a prior definition of the boundaries theft would be seen as trespassing in 
such a way that those boundaries would not be understood to be violated by someone taking 
another's property in an Aquinas/Locke-style case. 
2. Property as an Aspect of Identity 
Alternatively, a natural rights theorists working within the constraints of NCNL theory 
might argue, not that ownership was a basic good, but rather that individual items of justly 
acquired property should be treated as aspects of the self, so that an attack on a person's 
justly acquired property was morally objectionable for the same reasons as an attack on her 
body. On this sort of view, property might be acquired justly either in virtue of the labor of 
the person acquiring it (who has either directly created it using unowned materials, claimed 
it from among unowned resources, or acquired it using resources gained in exchange for her 
labor or other justly acquired property) or, if it is a gift, in virtue of the labor of the person 
giving it to her. In virtue of this labor, the property would be understood to be incorporated 
into the identity of the person acquiring it. 
On this view, the things people make or have really are aspects of those who make or 
have them. The labor involved in making or acquiring property would be what justified 
treating the property as an aspect of the self. And it would simultaneously provide a non-
arbitrary basis for defining the limits of property distinct from general considerations rooted 
in the Golden Rule. 
The NCNL theorists argue, recall, that "anything human persons make, or have, 
considered as distinct from persons ... cannot be basic. It is always for ... reasons which 
culminate within persons ... that individuals and communities are concerned with such 
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goods".35 But this cannot be entirely correct, even from the standpoint of the NCNL theorists 
themselves. Consider a prosthesis, for instance-made by persons and attached to a person's 
body. While the prosthesis is an artifact, an attack on it seems to be invasive, an assault on 
well being, for the same reasons as an attack on a healthy leg. It does not seem reasonable 
to regard the prosthesis "as distinct from" the person who employs it. 
The NCNL theorists might argue, in response, that the prosthesis was no longer distinct 
from the person employing it once it was attached to her body. But what kind of attachment 
is required? Does an artificial leg that is attached by straps count as distinct from its owner, 
while one that is attached surgically does not? A focus on the mode of attachment seems 
arbitraiy. It is easy enough to imagine an entirely artificial body that is physically distant 
from a human brain but which is fully controlled by the brain, say, via radio transmission, 
and which provides a full range of sensory inputs to the brain in the same way. Despite the 
lack of direct physical connection, it could certainly be argued that body was not distinct 
from the person controlling it. It seems, in short, as if the extent of control over an item, 
rather than the precise physical relationship between the item and the person's brain, might 
be decisive for the question whether the item was or was not distinct from its owner. 
Even this cannot be quite right, of course, because a person whose body was completely 
paralyzed, and who thus had no control over it at all, might well regard it, almost certainly 
would regard it, as an integral aspect of herself. Perhaps, then, whether something counts as 
distinct from a person or not might be understood to be in part of a function of how she 
understood it. 
It is clear that this criterion cannot reasonably be employed by the law or by a general 
system of social norms or rules, however, since how people regard things will vary quite 
dramatically from person to person. The law could certainly establish a limited number of 
presumptions concerned with familiar, predictable cases-so that, for instance, a person's 
paralyzed body might be expected to be identity-constitutive for the person, and a home 
that had been owned by successive members of a given family for generations might be 
expected to be identity-constitutive for members of the family. In general, however, the 
identity-constitutive character of a piece of property can only be introduced into a legal 
dispute at the cost of considerable confusion. The extent of a person's control over something 
is, by contrast, relatively easy to ascertain. 
If the extent of control is used, however, to determine whether the property control is 
distinct from the owner, it is clear that very few items of property-essentially only the 
person possesses and controls bodily on a consistent basis-might have any reasonable 
chance of being seen as not distinct from their owners. The labor involved in the production 
and acquisition of the property would not seem to be sufficient on its own to justify treating 
the property as incorporated into the owner's identity: the property can be distinguished 
from the owner. 
3. Interference with Property as Retrospective Enslavement 
A related approach might seek to bridge the gap between person and property by arguing 
that interfering with someone's justly acquired property was tantamount to enslaving her. 
This view would begin, again, with the claim that justly acquired property was property 
acquired directly or indirectly or indirectly through labor. To use force to compel someone to 
labor is to enslave her. But to use force to acquire what she has already labored to produce or 
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acquire seems morally similar to using force to make her labor to produce or acquire it in the 
first place. But if the former is enslavement, then the latter arguably is as well. If enslavement 
is unjust, then using force to acquire someone's property is unjust. Slavery is generally 
regarded as a paradigmatic instance of injustice. So it seems to follow that partially or 
completing depriving someone of her justly acquired property by force is unjust. 
Whether this intuitively plausible argument can be persuasively defended using NCNL 
theory depends, of course, on how NCNL theory understands the wrongness of slavery. 
NCNL theory begins with a conviction that persons are morally equal, and that there is thus 
no "natural right to rule".36 There cannot, therefore, be any permanent classes of slaves or 
slave-owners. Similarly, one cannot reasonably attack another's physical or mental health in 
order to realize the goods achievable through her labor as a slave: to do so would be to 
violate the Pauline Principle by causing harm instrumentally. And even if retributive 
punishment is justified (as 1 maintain that it is not), punishing someone for failing to labor 
as a slave will obviously be justified only if one may justly enslave her. 
For the NCNL theorists, then, using bodily force to keep someone as a slave or to 
punish her for not laboring as a slave will be wrong in principle. But it will be wrong because 
it involves actual or threatened purposeful or instrumental attacks on bodily health or other 
basic aspects of well being. The aspect of enslavement that is inconsistent with the Pauline 
Principle is not, per se, the control of someone's labor without her consent but rather the use 
of force against someone's bodily well being in order to compel her to serve the enslaver's 
purposes. To be sure, other techniques used to influence slaves' behavior will also be 
objectionable, from the standpoint of NCNL theory, because they are inconsistent with the 
Golden Rule. But interference with property after labor has already been used to acquire it, 
by contrast, will not involve attacks on basic goods. It may involve conduct inconsistent 
with the Golden Rule, of course; but whether it does will depend on just what kinds of 
properly rights the Golden Rule requires people to acknowledge or support. It does not seem, 
then, that the right not to be enslaved entails a right to possess labor-based property without 
interference. The argument from slavery does not provide a route within NCNL theory to an 
account of property rights rooted in something other than the Golden Rule. 
4. Conclusion 
If the goods of ownership were understood as involving a full array of Lockean constraints 
on the acquisition, retention, and extent of property rights, the Pauline Principle might 
generate something quite like the NAP. But it is difficult to see how the panoply of 
procedures natural law theorists employ to identify fundamental aspects of well being would 
lead to the identification not just of ownership, but of this sort of Lockean ownership, as a 
basic good. Labor-based approaches might be thought to provide non-arbitrary limits on the 
kind of ownership that could be seen as a basic good. But there do not seem to be good 
arguments either for treating labor-based property as incorporated into the self or forjudging 
interference with rights to such property as retrospective enslavement.37 
» Finnis, J.: Aquinas. Oxford, 1998, 184-185. 
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D. Property Interests as Coincident with Basic Goods 
Whether or not ownership is a basic aspect of well being, claims on specific items of 
property clearly function instrumenlally to foster participation in various basic goods. 
Another alternative grounding for a natural-law version of the NAP might build on this 
recognition. Someone might argue, that is, that because of this instrumental relationship, 
any attempt to damage a person's property or deprive her of it will also, at the same time, 
be an attack on one or more basic aspects of well being and so be precluded by the Pauline 
Principle. 
Clearly, people sometimes seek to participate in unreal goods using their property, or 
to participate unjustly in genuine goods. But this possibility need pose no serious threat to 
the argument linking property instrumentally with basic goods. The legal system cannot 
meaningfully distinguish between property used in pursuit of unreal goods from property 
used in pursuit of real ones. In the interests of simplicity, in recognition of the value of 
autonomous decision-making, and in full view of the legal system's frequent and unavoidable 
ignorance of people's purposes, it will characteristically be most reasonable for the legal 
system to operate as if people are pursuing real goods whether they are or not. The legal 
system, then, should, if this argument were correct, incorporate a straightforward prohibition 
on attacks on property, even though not all property actually functioned to facilitate 
participation in one or more basic aspects of well being. 
A property right need not be entitled to full protection to the extent that it is being 
employed in pursuit even of a genuine aspect of well being but in the course of an unjust 
attack on person or property. 1 have no particular right to use a weapon I legitimately own 
to engage in aggression against someone else, and others may rightly interfere with my 
control over my property to stop me from doing so (as well as to require restitution, etc.).38 
The use of my property to rob another can (ordinarily) be clearly distinguished from uses of 
my property that are consistent with just property rules. So the possibility that there might 
be unjust uses of property need not make a moral or legal principle precluding all direct 
attacks on property being used justly unduly difficult to operationalize. It does, however, 
make the Golden Rule decisive, again, since without the Golden Rule (or some similar 
principle) it will be difficult to know just what uses will count as just or unjust. The 
argument does not feature any independent specification of just uses. Perhaps, for instance, 
any use that precludes someone else's access in an Aquinas/Locke-style cases will count as 
an unjust use. 
Suppose, however, that we could provide a reasonable independent specification of 
just uses which was not simply a specification of the Golden Rule, so that the second 
argument 1 have envisioned could, in principle, do some further work in addition to the 
Golden Rule in safeguarding properly rights if it succeeded. We would still need to 
determine whether the argument's premise, that purposeful or instrumental assaults on 
property rights are, at the same time, purposeful or instrumental assaults on basic goods, 
was correct. (Obviously, if they are not purposeful or instrumental, they would not fall foul 
of the Pauline Principle whether they affected basic goods or not.) 
While there are many cases in which assaults on property will be assaults on basic 
goods (an attack on a painting may be both an attack on someone's property and an attack 
38
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on the basic good of aesthetic experience) it is hard to see that this will be true in every case. 
Using a computer to embezzle money from someone's bank account could be an attack on 
some basic good if its purpose was to keep someone from participating in that good (the 
thief might want the victim not to be able to pay medical bills and so to die; this would 
surely count as an attack on the good of life and bodily well being), but harm to a basic 
good might well be neither the thief's purpose nor an accepted means to some other end 
embraced by the thief. And it would be easy to identify a range of other cases in which an 
attack on someone's property did not count as an attack on any basic aspect of well being. 
E. Conclusion 
A set of mutually reinforcing, overlapping rationales rooted in the Golden Rule can ground 
robust individual property rights that deserve acknowledgement within legal systems and 
respect by individual moral actors. Such rationales will not, however, be absolute in 
character. Property rights rooted in the Golden Rule will almost certainly not be as 
sacrosanct as rights against purposeful or instrumental attacks on basic aspects of one's 
well being. Assaults on the latter are ruled out absolutely by the Pauline Principle; 
interference with the former will often be unjust, but need not always be. 
Alternate approaches to grounding property rights that are as robust as rights against, 
say, purposeful bodily harm are hard to defend within the tenus of NCNL theory. Ownership 
might qualify as a basic good, but its boundaries are relatively undefined. A limited number 
of items of property distinct from persons might be viewed as aspects of those persons' 
identities comparable to their bodies, and so subject to the same protections, but most items 
of property, even if clearly rooted in labor, are clearly distinct from their owners. Interfering 
with labor-based property after it is acquired is importantly different from compelling 
people to labor to acquire it, and so does not seem to fall foul of the moral prohibitions that 
preclude enslavement. And assaults on property need not involve purposeful or instrumental 
attacks on basic aspects of well being recognized as such by the NCNL theorists. An account 
of property rights consistent with NCNL theory will likely be rooted in the Golden Rule. 
V. Conclusion 
The NCNL theory gives pride of place to an account of human flourishing and a set of basic 
practical principles. It provides a straightforward grounding for the person-aspect of the 
NAP and, through a more tortuous path, strong support for a robust but non-absolute version 
of the property-aspect of the NAP. 
1. The basic fairness considerations embodied in the Golden Rule will count against 
the cost shifting represented by many of the property regulations the NAP is rightly 
seen as attacking. Most people will resent being asked to pay for the realization of 
other people's aesthetic, religious, or cultural preferences or to pay for services they 
could obtain more inexpensively on the market; and, if they do, they will act 
unreasonably if they ask other people to do so. More generally, whatever judgments 
people tend to make about their own property rights will be judgments fairness will 
demand that they accept when reaching conclusions about others'. 
2. Our participation in basic goods will characteristically involve the use of property. 
Attacks on someone's property will sometimes be ruled out precisely because they are 
also purposeful or instrumental attacks on basic goods. 
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3. Similarly, people often protect their property using their bodies, and attacks on their 
property will thus sometimes be inappropriate precisely because it involves using force 
purposefully or instrumentally in ways that harm people's bodies. 
4. Acting out of hostility toward someone by harming her or his property will always 
be consistent with the Pauline Principle. 
5. The overlapping considerations I have adduced in support of a property rights 
regime tend to provide mutually reinforcing, and so quite robust, justification for 
largely undisturbed property rights. 
6. The NCNL theorists offer a set of rock-solid arguments against classical 
utilitarianism and its various consequential ist cousins: global consequentialism is, they 
show persuasively, incoherent.39 That does not mean, of course, that expected con-
sequences are never relevant to deliberation about reasonable action; but their 
reasonableness is to be gauged in light of the Golden Rule rather than in terms of 
a putatively objective metric that allows a "best overall state of affairs" to be identified. 
Multiple options are consistent with the demands of reason. So, while pragmatic 
considerations can certainly enter into moral deliberation, global consequentialism can 
not justify any sort of attack on someone's person, and can not be invoked in support 
of any infringement of someone's property rights. 
A version of the NAP that can be defended on natural-law grounds-with the person-aspect 
rooted in the Pauline Principle and the property-aspect rooted in the Golden Rule-may not 
feature all of the elements preferred by some natural rights theorists, but it can provide 
moral grounding for the security of both persons and property. Instead of proceeding from a 
simple, free-standing, substantive value-self-ownership or life, for instance-a natural-law 
approach to the NAP renders this principle intelligible and defensible in light of a 
comprehensive moral theory. In so doing, it can make a modest contribution to justifying 
a norm that is basic to all civilized interaction and so, perhaps, to fostering the creation of 
a society in which that norm is more consistently observed. 
39
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Abs t r ac t . Af t e r the classical her i tage of both Civil Law and Common Law is characterised, their juristische 
Weltanschauung as professional deonto logy is reconstructed in parallel with their respective assumpt ions in theory 
formation. A s to the nature of legal process, the m o m e n t of concealment is identified in both types with the final 
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ideology is imbued with analogies as if cognition were at stake, in contrast to Common Law openly undertaking 
fiction to explain in what manner the judicial del iberat ion on facts whilst rcconstruing the whys and hows of past 
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I. Classical Heritage 
1. The rich legal heritage of the Romans, with its changing internal emphases, assured a 
basis for the development of two differing traditions during the European Middle Ages and 
Modern Times. In the course of this formative process, starting in the 16lh and 17th centuries 
the approaches to law characteristic of our Continent and of the Anglo-Saxon archipelago 
were gradually separated as they were strengthened by the failure of attempts to codify the 
law in England.1 
1. Continental Law 
2. As soon as this separation has been perfected, in continental law nothing remains from 
the ins except that which has been posited as a lex. In terms of this transformation process, 
the regola-once serving as a didactic exercise and summation-becomes the sole bearer of 
any legal quality as a set of linguistic signs that is destined to embody the law. 
From that time on, anyone who is eager to know what the law is (in terms of its sense, 
message or significance) must tum to its embodiment in and by rules. 
3. By this act and starting from the Roman imperial epoch, such a form becomes the 
exclusive source of any contents hidden in and by it. Of course, this form may easily prove 
to be casual, random and/or fallible; nevertheless, nothing else can be taken as law other 
than precisely that which has been edicted. This form is no longer an external gown veiling 
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the legislator's idea but the sole embodiment. With such a solution principally strengthened 
(but still as a correction mechanism building around the original idea), it will be accepted 
only later that whatever interpretation of the law's provisions may nevertheless draw from 
the law-maker's intent-as an auxiliary source (that is, among other additional sources)-
anything that can be read from (a) the conditions understood by the legislator, (b) the whole 
texture of regulation, (c) the actual knowledge as to the historical circumstances of 
legislation or (d) the intentions expressed during the bureaucratic procedure of legislation. 
4. Law is, therefore, a text with a meaning that can be ascertained through textual 
analysis, that is, by the help of linguistic and logical devices used lo look for connections 
and their disclosure. As interpretation theories would also formulate it, in case of necessity 
the interpreter might also have recourse to a search for proper meaning through the law's 
context as drawn from either (a) the intent of the legislator or (b) the historical conditions or 
(c) the systematic setting of the given piece of legislation. 
5. The very fact that the law is embodied by enacted texts and, therefore, it is treated 
textually in practice makes it possible for jurisprudential interpretation to forge concepts 
out of mere words used in the legal texture, in the course of classifications. It is no longer 
simple words but conceptualisations that stand for-as a representation of-diverse aspects of 
reality, conceptualisations that are developed into a complex and hierarchically organised 
notional system, which is defined in its components' mutual relations by boundaries with 
edged contours. These concepts are positioned as loci of a taxonomic systemicity, erected in 
place of mere words. 
6. Such conceptuality is, however, not imbued directly by the law's texture itself; the 
words used in the gesetztes Recht do not simply contain it. Lor legis latio is a practical act 
throughout. It is the volitional product of the agent authorised to issue normative texts. This 
is the mere result of some volitio: contingent in principle, plainly arbitrary in a philosophical 
sense, since, optionally, it could be something else as well. 
7. What pulls law as such to the conceptual world is the jurisprudents' conceptual 
analysis: classification and system-building, through which the jurisprudential reasoning 
over the internal connections of the law-stuff will create concepts by drawing analogies 
amongst individual words or by breaking down and/or splitting already established concepts 
into others. As an obvious denominational analogy-supported by the memory of the strict 
conceptuality disassembled from Biblical texts-this is what we call Rechtsdogmatik. Such a 
doctrine is the production of legal scholars having analysed law texts with the intent of 
forging an internal systemic connection in view of reaching this availably perfect conceptual 
systemic network from that resource of processing. Once established-and only provided 
that such a demand for conceptual systemic building is grounded on the common ethos of 
the given legal profession (not as an unnoticed pioneering attempt but expressing the 
mainstream of the age as, for instance, in Leibniz' epoch)-, such a doctrinal net (with the 
actual shape it has acquired) will form a weh of understanding around the law, i.e. a weakly 
(though informal) normative environment that already serves as a kind of pre-understanding 
[Vorverständnis] for all kinds of juristic activity when those professionals (making, applying 
or just studying law) start dealing with normative or other legal texts. 
Accordingly, and as a point of principle, legal texts themselves have ever been and 
will remain incidental and fallible. Their human understanding in this very culture (with the 
law already taken at a conceptual meta-level) will become imbued with such a doctrinal 
knowledge, slowly to be entirely presupposed by it. 
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(This is why in such cultures law, legal practice and their doctrinal representation may 
stand as relatively separate but mutually preconditioned and interactive entities, albeit in the 
social division of labour specialists are accustomed to cultivate one or the other as their 
specific fields.) 
8. As soon as the legal text is seen as ordered by conceptual limitations and additional 
adjustments (e.g. by making exceptions through further internal splitting)-with any element 
or partial field treated as the product of the breakdown of the overall total regulation, 
considered (in given time segments) as a closed unit, logically coherent and settled in 
details-well, then whatever idea we can form about law will from the outset be marked by a 
systemic place or locus, the basic features and definitions of which will already derive from 
its systemic definition. 
9. As a pattern of thought, thereby, the mos geometricus is given a shape. This is a 
concept deriving from the movement characteristic of the 16th century, when the European 
continental manner of studying law was set for centuries, that is, a methodological ideal 
that laid the constant foundation of our approach to law, prevalent even now. Beginning 
from classical times in Bologna, this idea penneated the reception of Roman law all over 
Latinic and Germanic Europe; despite all kinds of shaking, rectification, challenge and 
enrichment with new trends, this is the model that grants commonality in our respective 
understanding of law, while defining our identity and membership in one definite legal 
culture. 
Within this intellectuality, the cultivation of law is seen in the composition of a series 
of operations similar to those in mathematics, upon the basis of which the ideal has ever 
been to build up a perfect system both closed and exclusive, which, if challenged, can only 
be replaced by another, completely new in principle, according to EUCLID 'S axiomatism. 
10. The ideal of law represented by such an idea of normative systemicity will at the 
same time produce its pair and completion reflected in the world of factual reality, referenced 
in and by the law. This is the Tatbestand-laken as the aggregate of those facts that constitute 
a case in law-, which can only be thought of within the frame of a doctrinally organised 
approach to law (as a representation of Sein in counterpart to Sollen, with the former 
featuring the marks qualified by the latter). The notion of Tatbestand is a product of the 
mid-19th century continental culture, of the idea that legal scholarship reduced to 
Begriffsjurisprudenz [conceptual jurisprudencej-while approaching law-related (law-
referenced) factual reality in a conceptual way-can be developed. It is not by chance that 
the term Tatbestand has no proper equivalent in English, where-without any polarisation 
between Rechtssetzung [law-making] and Rechtsanwendung [law-applying], administration 
of justice is practiced (instead of the law's 'application')2-it can only be circumscribed (as 
translated from Max Weber, for instance) by "operative facts", "actual circumstances" or 
"facts that constitute a case in law". 
11. Well, according to its theoretical model, law-application projects the world of 
norms onto that of facts, ascribing the former's normative requirements to the latter. Or, 
what is modelled here is the set of reality aspects of those actual events, actions and 
situations thai, matched separately one by one, will in their entirety add to define a particular 
Tatbestand, taken as a case of the rule, representing those reality aspects defined through 
2
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the abstract formulations of a rule, to which the rule ascribes some legal conclusion (or 
sanction). 
12. This model is based on logical inclusion. What is at stake here is a particular 
actualisation on the plane of individuality, of what the norm has defined on the plane of 
generality. Starting from the norm, this will ground the logical necessity of judicial 
syllogism [subsumptio] that will lead to the judgment, based on the given norm, concluded 
from its generality. (For instance, providing the norm sanctions humans killing humans, and 
our case is about homicide, then the sanction imputed to anyone having performed the deed 
must be meted out.)3 
2. Anglo-Saxon Law 
13. The Anglo-Saxon mentality has adapted quite a differing pattern of legal regulation and 
judicial settlement of conflicts from the same Roman legacy. It continued its patterner's 
earlier attempts towards methodicalness, not departing too much further from the ancient 
Jewish and Islamic traditions. 
It did not look for safety in either conceptualising generalisation or the systemicity it 
had achieved; it did not dedicate its exclusive trust to the force of central edicts, believed to 
be suitable to settle everything. It was satisfied to build up law through examples following 
other examples, progressing casually by concrete situations answered by justices, who drew 
their pattern from their comparisons with earlier patterns, with the final outcome being that 
the judges themselves, proceeding in individual cases, could became the agents to declare 
what the legal tradition (reflected in their case) had always been. In order to master the very 
process of such a continual actualisation of the law, discipline and rational safety had to be 
assured to the extent feasible. This way, the Anglo-Saxon law's casual and inductive 
processing and its respect for the unique in the genuine representation of the fullness of life 
(and, thereby, also its openness towards any novelty in a given situation) could preserve a 
bit of sensitivity toward practical reason and daily moral deliberations, notwithstanding the 
fact that it could also successfully separate itself from the heterogeneity of everyday life 
through the artificial reason it erected. On the one hand, in the case of adjudication it alleges 
it has based its judgment on unstated rules but, on the other, it refrains from declaring what 
regolas have indeed been serving it. In consequence, almost until today it has not cultivated 
the kind of doctrinal culture that may build on general abstract norms exclusively. 
The Anglo-Saxon law cannot be taken as thoroughly conceptualised into an overall 
taxonomic system, independent of whether an enormous amount of rationalising literature 
has for centuries edified rather considerable meta-intellectuality above it. Instead of 
employing conceptual systemic consistency and completeness to build a replacement of the 
given chaotic accumulation, this literature responds mostly to practical challenges in terms 
of functionality and practicality.4 
3
 Cf., in first formulation, by Varga, Cs.: Moderne Staatlichkeit und modernes formales Rechts. 
Acta Juridica Hungarica, 26 ( 1984) 1 2,235 241. 
4
 Cf., by Varga, Cs.: Differing Mentalities of Civil Law and Common Law? The Issue of Logic 
in Law. Ada Juridica Hungarica, 48 (2007) 4, 401 410 {and <http://akademiai.om.hu/content/ 
b0m8x67227572219/fulltext.pdf>, abridged as Rule and/or Norm, or the Conceptualisibility and 
Logifiability of Law. In: Schweighofen, E. Liebwald, D. Angeneder, S. Menzel, T. (hrsg.): Effizienz 
von e-Lösungen in Staat und Gesellschaft. Aktuelle Fragen der Rechtsinformatik. Tagungsband der 8. 
Internationalen Rechtsinformatik Symposions, IRIS 2005. Stuttgart München Hannover Berlin 
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II. Reality in our Approach to Law 
14. The question arises whether or not our view formed on law in Civil Law cultures 
comports with institutional reality. The answer can only be ambivalent, that is, duplicate as 
formulated at different levels. 
1. As Professional Deontology 
15. Our previous characterisation is true in a descriptive sense in so far as it gives an 
account of the ideal pattern of our legal thought. For ideology as a kind of professional 
deontology, a manner of thinking specific to the legal profession, and in this sense a 
juristische Weltanschauung, has been and continues to be undoubtedly present in the 
approach to law rooted in our continental culture. In the above sense as well, ideology is 
consciousness that exerts impacts onto practice; consequently, it is a decisive component of 
the social ontological description of humans in action. This is part of a culture that assigns 
frames, within the boundaries of which we appropriate the world intellectually. Within 
them, we form key categories for understanding the world, while we also sense and/or 
attribute definite value-contexts of/to the same world. In its turn Juristische Weltanschauung 
is the foundation stone of legal cultures that shapes human abilities (skills and sensitivities) 
by which we may sense law at all and search for paths and spheres of action with reference 
to it. As a consequence, independent of its epistemological status (namely, of the issue of 
whether or not our specific law does indeed function this way, under its conditions and 
fulfilling its criteria), the lawyers' professional deontology is part of the genuine ontology 
of legal arrangements. Accordingly, it is part of the operation we can describe starting from 
the accumulated experience of (a) human practice making use of law, (b) the overall societal 
praxis and (c) jurisprudentia as the total sum of legal praxis.5 
2. In its Theoretical Explanation 
16. At the same time, theoretical reconstruction raises reasonable questions as to what 
indeed the existence of law does consist of, what are the consequences of its being carried 
by a linguistic medium, what are the chances of humans as socially exclusive acting agents 
and, at last but not least, in what exactly does their responsibility lie? Therefore, the inquiry 
goes on further: are we perhaps ourselves passive observers (perhaps mere reference points) 
in a structure operating like clockwork (possibly without our personal presence as well), 
since the law works as thoroughly logified within its pure formalism in a quasi-automatic 
way, broken down into a homogenised network that is empowered to produce its output, 
and which can reproduce itself continually-on the basis of its own presuppositions as 
equipped with its own laws and consequences, built in by some next-to-mechanical safety? 
Weimar Dresden, 2005, 58-65}, as well as Varga, Cs.: Law and its Doctrinal Study (On Legal 
Dogmatics). Acta Juridica Hungarica, 49 (2008) 3, 253 274 {and <http://akademiai.om.hu/content/ 
g352w44h21258427/fulltext.pdf>} and Varga, Cs.: Legal Traditions? in Search for Families and 
Cultures of Law. In: Moreso, J. J. (eds): Legal Theory / Teória del derecho. Legal Positivism and 
Conceptual Analysis / Postivismo juridico y análisis conceptual: Proceedings of the 22nd IVR World 
Congress Granada 2005,1. Stuttgart, 2007, 181 193 {and [as a national report presented at the World 
Congress of the Académie internationale de Droit comparé] in <http://www2.law.uu.nl/priv/AIDC/ 
PDF%20files/IA/IA%20-%20Hungary.pdf> and Acta Juridica Hungarica, 46 (2005) 3 4, 177 197 
and <http://www.akademiai.com/content/f4q29175h0174rl l/fulltext.pdf>}. 
5
 Cf., by Varga, Cs.: The Place of Law in Lukács' World Concept. Budapest, 1985, 193. 
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The answer can only be formulated in terms of the suitability of human practice for self-
reproduction through its own traditions as characterised by today's social theories, on the 
one hand, and of the irrevocable human responsibility as cultivated by the known theologies 
of morals, on the other. 
17. Well, the ideological stand implied by our juristische Weltanschauung approaches 
both language and law as if they were simple objects of the world's reality; as if it was 
going to suggest exactly whal metaphysically inspired logic wanted to inspire actual belief 
in (particularly in Germanic philosophies6)-namely, that relations (of logic and dialectic 
especially) are hidden in, or implied by, things and objects (their moves, coincidences or 
configurations) themselves. Nonetheless, it is exclusively statements that we can make as to 
objects and as to whatever kind of virtuality, that is, practically as to anything that can be 
specified by human ingenuity in the course of our mental appropriation of any imaginable 
world (involving the Golden Fleece or a unicorn, or hypothesising such limiting units of 
reference as the absolute cold or the arithmetic zero point, or abstracting the philosophical 
conclusion of "Das Nicht nichtet", as developed by Martin Heidegger1). If and insofar as 
we treat such statements within one single coherently comprehensive perspective, then once 
the truth/falsity of any of them, grounding our argumentation, is acknowledged, we may 
deduce true/false conclusions from them. 
18. At the same time, law is thoroughly disantropomorphised, and it is we who have 
done this. By abstracting from our subject's substance and genuine nature (dependent 
directly on human volition, practice, consideration or pure interest), we are used to investing 
our trust (which we have not undertaken, because it is not relegated to our rational common 
sense) in something else-notably, in some virtually reified entity or safety, projected from 
ourselves into a kind of substitute authority. Accordingly, we began to treat law as a reified 
construction alienated from ourselves, as if it could operate without us, like the Delphi 
oracle or a God-judgment set in motion as a specific slot-machine to settle our case, into 
which (as we are made to believe under the constraints of our professional socialisation) we 
might feed the parameters of the given case so that it would then dispense from its "black 
box" the single conclusive decision. 
19. As to the device of our communication, we have to be aware of the fact that law 
as linguistic practice also can only be intelligible for those who are skilled enough to use it 
properly. The case is by no means one of mute signs that catch or address us. It is we who 
make the language sounded in sending and receiving signs as markers. Of course, we do 
not act as isolated Robinsons. We are equipped with general societal (and added 
professional) education, socialisation and practice of common understanding. This is 
strengthened by daily use, suitable to re-conventionalise language practice. Thereby, we 
aclualise the language thai may make both our procedures and life in society liveable and 
reasonable. 
20. Language is certainly not exact, on the one hand. This continues to be so 
notwithstanding the fact that, as the most available mediator in societal contact and 
commerce, only such an ambivalent medium can fulfil language's ontological role, on the 
6
 See, e.g. the discussion on the ontology of nature between Eugen Dühring and Friedrich 
Engels. 
7
 What has already been (reminding this above form of "7Уге nothingnoths") raised as a problem 
in English-American analytics (by Rudolf Сamap, John Austin, etc.) as well. 
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other hand. Moreover, not even in principle could language be reduced into a less 
unambiguous mediator or conveyor of meanings. At the most, we may try to be more 
precise in our handling and resolution (dedicated to given relationships or limiting issues, 
when we draw limits or weigh individual situations), by asserting in a socially valid way 
what we want to express then and there. When we proceed by defining an actualised 
meaning (instead of the physical act or linguistic symbolism pointing directly at what we 
actually mean), a step forward is taken indeed, but without ameliorating the language itself, 
its state of being fuzzy from the beginning. Our innovation or rectification generated at one 
moment will inevitably become like mist when problematising at another moment and this 
goes on infinitely. For the next moment we have language as it has ever been: silenl-and 
defective in counselling. This is to say that the next moment is faced with a new situation, 
with novel expectations toward language, or mediation through language. 
21. That which may catch and bind us in fact is neither language nor law expressed 
lingually, but our conventionality. In societal cooperation we do rely on law, among other 
things. We call upon it, refer to and interpret it, trying to settle affairs according to patterns 
it has forwarded. For law offers orientation in settling disputable practical issues. It offers 
guidance and proposes a normative model. It serves us by being wedged amongst us, 
separating the partners in dispute, by being independent of each of us and disposing of 
relative consistency. For it is suitable for mediation by offering a pattern to our action. 
That is, it can model dispute resolution so that the outcome will be not of mine or yours 
but that foreseen with respect to all such (essentially or substantially similar) situations, 
cognoscible by anyone in advance. So, what will be concluded will have already been 
patterned. 
22. It is facts that surround us in nature and social life. These are mostly facts simple 
and unmediated, "brute" and formless. What we are faced with in the law's Tatbestand are 
already institutional facts. For law is not to be found in our affairs themselves. We identify 
it mostly outside of and above, and subsequent to, the elementary formative components of 
our affairs, at a time when we, reinterpreting them in the law's normative context, try to 
project the law's structured messages onto a factual or hypothetic case. Life is going on 
incessantly, following heterogeneous tracks. And the law is-allegorically speaking-
withdrawn like a spider, expecting now and then to strike at any of its selected aspects. 
Once that happens, the law will assimilate this whole life event (by denaturing the latter's 
heterogeneous full complexity) to the former's homogenised-simplified-nonning [Nor-
mierung]. Literally expressed, no one can any longer identify what the law has made out of 
it, and perhaps not those who are targeted by it; since one given Tatbestand (predefined by 
the law) will have been distilled from its primitively unique full-of-life richness. And this is 
so because the Tatbestand cannot be anything other than the factual reflection of the 
corresponding normative ruling. The only features that can be included as imputed to the 
humans in question (to their casual drama or luck, taken as a personal, non-recurrently 
individual event) are those who have already been specified as relevant in the abstract 
regulation. 
23. All this is as if artificially erected nightmarish shades were looking for opportunities, 
with projective nets, in the density of life, with the aim of picking suitable relevance-sets 
from it. That is, an external logic is projected upon acts in life, according to different 
available considerations-for instance, to impute to a flighty irascibility (attributed, e.g. to 
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О. J. Simpson8) homicide, adultery, personal injury, perhaps breach of contract, or even 
failure to meet his obligations for maintenance, out of the caldron of the legal witches' 
kitchen. This is to say that as long as we have not decided at all what of this or that qualifies 
as having occurred according to the law, we may only ponder in silence. However, as soon 
as that is decided, we start banging on every gate: this is that, and only that, moreover, 
a master case of that-as if that had been invented from the beginning and only to sanction 
our client's case. 
Our game could appear to be funny as well i f i t were not both serious and indispensable. 
This structured and more-or-less homogenised thought is applied in all fields of socialisation 
and societal transmission, that is, within the bounds of our humanly created second nature. 
As a consequence, life itself will be arranged following such a logic, destitute of the values 
and intimacy of the heterogeneity of everyday life but equipped with the force of social 
ordering and engineering, and, therefore, desired as the sine qua non of civilised human 
existence. For the sake of generating law and order for ourselves, we raise fixed points that 
are extrapolated and alienated from ourselves as the standards addressing us. 
24. I may happen to carry only a potato to you. However, 1 cannot know in advance 
whether and when my or your lawyer will call it delivery, agency or necessity, supply or 
disturbance of possession, perhaps theft, or something else. In any case, the internal 
(primitive) logic of my action (with its process-like development and gradualness) may well 
differ considerably from that which will be ascribed to me in law. This is so because the 
action in question may have followed its own path alongside its ad hoc "logic" (chaotic in 
itself as having been formed from one moment to the next), with open alternatives in every 
movement forward here and there. And all this notwithstanding, the juridically constructed 
Tatbestand will reconstruct a cumulative development out of this, as a one-way process that 
may have pursued one preset end with features that involve nothing more than those facts 
that may make a case in law. And what is more, the way 1 shall bс judged will be seen as 
the outcome of cognition, as if I were tracked all the way through by the knowledge of a 
neutral outsider-inslead of treating me as the subject to whom the normative consequence 
of a system of norms is meted out. 
25. The declared result of normative imputation is ascriptive. It will conclude some 
normative consequences of my action by the force of someone's volilive act and discretion. 
The legal status as to which my action is being qualified or classified will be defined with 
the above intention of imposing those consequences, and not as issuing from mere cognition. 
The whole process is not cognition as a result of someone having (with a magnifier) 
searched in the law or examined the collective memory of my action in order to identify 
exactly what (and how) may have met in the two (normative and factual) components. In 
fact, my judge has tested variations to couple them-according to additional considerations 
such as the prevailing interests and, maybe, intuitive sym/anti-pathy towards me. By the 
very fact of having qualified the event as the case of the given legal category, my case has 
already been decided. This legal category being an institutional fact itself, it is not cognition 
but exclusively a volitional classification that will classify my action as a case of the law. In 
law, nothing is described: we only classify actual life situations here and there. Instead of 
cognising, we decide-with as much rationally as we can, and based on evidence as much as 
we can. Therefore, instead of converting the action into anything of logical necessity (that 
8
 Cf. <http://en.wikipedia.0rg/wiki/O. J. Simpson murder case>. 
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is, into subsumption or a logically obvious conclusion), we subordinate it to something else 
with the justices' volitional act's force. 
26. Let us pay attention to the change in emphasis here, from the logical model 
establishing necessary connections amongst our things in an impersonal way, to the social 
ontological nature of what in fact is stricken out and produced by our social action of fore-
planning, since all the connected steps are of such a type here that could have not ensued 
without their actual performance. Our human involvement is, therefore, creative and strictly 
constitutive, irreplaceably effectuating something. In other words, it is arbitrary in the sense 
of logical necessity, even if not otherwise senseless, indefensible or irrational. This is to say 
that it is mostly practical problem-solving that we are engaged in, whilst the motivation for 
our verdict-its justification-vt\\\ prove, from the texture of the law, to be the compelling 
demand, that is, the necessity (even in details) of such -and only such-a solution. 
27. All this takes the form of a decision. For the given solution never could be 
completed in another way without artificially cutting off all the further (and otherwise 
feasible) paths and ways of the endless series of doubts, including the temptation to consider 
crossroads with alternative solutions. Until we have manipulated (interpreted and arranged) 
the facts to an adequate depth, not even their legal classification is finalised. Nevertheless, 
disputing what this was, actually how this happened and what grounds we have for 
qualifying this as the case of that, can only be cut as a Gordian knot. This is equal to saying 
that our certainty is by no means absolute; therefore, the certainty concerned will be termed 
as "judicial" (i.e. artificial), "rational" (i.e. limited) and/or "procedural" (i.e. with exclusive 
validity for the judgment) at most.9 
9
 We should consider how much we are used to ignore, when approaching law-application in a 
purely juristic manner (breaking it down into a syllogistic form), its fallible and contingent nature 
only justifiable through the long-term reliability of human praxis in the last resort (which reproduces 
itself incessantly) in general, and the underlying character of the qualification offacts-for the story 
itself is to be reconstructed from the witnesses' narrations expressed in different object-languages, 
which has to be transformed (transcribed) into a fact in the law, that is, "qualified" as the case, or 
subordinated to be a case, of an abstract definition and of the gaining of judicial certainty- with 
compiling the story in the course of evidence anyhow: from bare fragments, probability conclusions 
at different levels that may result mostly from additional circumstances, all them serving as the 
sufficient base to declare categorically sometime that that happened in fact in particular. For all these 
components with their most elementary constituents are creative with a constructive force, irreducible 
to formal certainty in a scientific sense, and as such, unsuitable to total rational reconstruction; the 
fact notwithstanding that these are the most substantive moments-serving as the turning points 
[Eckdaten]-of each and every judgement injustice. 
Methodologically speaking, it could only be compared to theology in explanation of the 
transcendence of human life, which, since the age of Saint Thomas Aquinas, was explicated in masses 
of volumes of great systemic corpuses, expressed in incessant discussions (in lines of competing 
directions) for centuries. Behind the whole undertaking, however, it is the humanity's fullness of 
being their total existential and practical consideration and decision, their extraordinary complex 
(psychological and other) attitude-that stands, which, in their finite life and personal options, express 
an act of volition that, beyond a certain limit, cannot be stressed further by the mere means of ratio. 
This is the moment of credo (specified as the realisation of credo quia absurdum). Such realisation 
will be socialised by us as a Ding für uns, as something given to us, that we have to develop in our 
earthly life by the intervention o f f a i t h , that is, by recognising our created nature with the whole chain 
of ensuing conclusions. Once this recognition is achieved as wedged in our socialisation, every 
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28. This is why adjudication is eventually finalised with legal force. Whatever decision 
is reached, it cannot tempt any longer. It must be finally accomplished, placed in the 
archives' oblivion, as a past instance of accomplishment of the then-prevalent law and 
order. 
29. Musing on the ordering role of law in society, we may ponder on how many 
thousands of thousandths of our daily transactions are selected in order to provoke law-
sensitive deliberation at all, how many thousandths of them are made controversial in order 
to await judicial deliberation. A great volume, the overwhelming majority, of both deviances 
and actions that are hardly defensible in law will remain free from legal reaction. What 
percentage of the other part will gain final force without any appeal against its first 
adjudication? Perhaps this will be a majority of the cases whose juridical solution would 
presumably never reach reconfirmation in legal reconsideration, while convenience, 
triviality or other petty conditions may have been in play in promoting their first conclusion 
with legal force. I0 ;" 
III. The Complexity of the Lawyers' World Concept 
30. The unification in institutional operation of conceptual patterning, on the one hand, with 
linguistic formulations, on the other, presumes complex constructions, together with the 
formation of human skills (mentalities and procedures) matched to these. 
1. The Complexity of Civil Law Mentality 
31. Within the range of utmost possibilities, the continental legal game builds up law-
application processes as an analogy of the cognitive ones common to the sciences: firm 
platforms (as indubitable stepping stones), logified steps (inspired by mathematics), strictly 
methodical interpretation (of rules) and verification (of facts), all concluded to a certainty. 
Behind such an analogy, the lawyers' ideology assists. It suggests logical force as a necessity 
with no alternative. As the entire construct is humanly operated, only a role of the police 
officer who directs traffic at turnouts seems to have been assigned to the lawyer. And behind 
component of the reconstructions from such theologies (with their mission's vocation) turns at once to 
be intelligible for us, raising the awareness of its conclusions as well. But when this is missing, in the 
given field-and in regards of the actor in question the object itself (together with the complex net of 
relevancies) will be lost: it will cancel itself out of their well-developed potential. 
10
 Cf., by Varga, Cs.: Theoiy of the Judicial Process. The Establishment of Facts. Budapest, 
1995; and Varga, Cs.: Lectures on the Paradigms of Legal Thinking. Budapest, 1999. 
11
 The historical explanation by Shapiro, M.: Islam and Appeal. California Law Review, 68 
(1980) 2, 350-381. In: Varga, Cs. (ed.): Comparative Legal Cultures. Aldershot Hong Kong-
Singapore Sydney: Dartmouth New York, 1992, 299 330, is inspired by such recognition. According 
to it, the state power that controls the course of "law and order" implementation has to tolerate up 
to a certain level, grade and depth, having in view the practical considerations of practical 
operationability the variety of jurisprudence effected in the name of law (with the competition of 
divergences involved), as inseparable from the total function. However, as a practical test of the 
legally relevant qualities of jurisprudence (such as unity, security, justice, and expediency) it will 
subject a randomly selected part of jurisprudential issues to sample-taking, in order to filter their 
quality. So, historically speaking, this is the origin and the mental root appeal. 
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the scenes no th ing but our wel l -educated profess ional socialisation stands, requiring that 
the sole right dec is ion will be reached from all avai lable alternatives, the one which can be 
identified within the polarity o f e i ther truth or falsity. 
2. The Complexity of Common Law Mentality 
32. From a European continental perspective, we are used to cons ider ing the Anglo-Saxon 
approach as f r eed f rom ideology, because it abounds in marks of unsophist icated natura lness 
without artificial mediatedness . N o considerat ion is usually given to the fact that even its 
myth-coloured basic definition is formed ideological ly f rom the outset . For, as is well 
known, that approach generates a judicial declarat ion of what the law is f rom the a l leged 
positivity of the immemorial custom of the Realm. Moreover, it is expressedly al ienat ing by 
tripping the ent i re jus t ice-game into lawyerly technical subtleties and tricks, in opposi t ion 
to the logical clarity and t ransparent foreseeabil i ty of the cont inental Professorenrecht.'2 
And, last but not least (and unless it creates its o w n subject of analys is as the result of 
today ' s analyt ics) its demands are strikingly a- theoret ical , with no receptivi ty to conceptua l 
issues.13 
IV. With H u m a n s in the Legal Machinery 
33. In turn, "humans are hidden in the machinery" as the law cannot function wi thout an 
active human component . This is obvious, since there are n o "correc t" answers in 
themselves, as n o exemplar of t hem can be found. 1 4 We may e n d e a v o u r to reach a rat ional 
12
 It is no chance that legal theories of alienation were mainly formulated in the domain of 
Common Law. Cf., e.g. Conklin, W. E.: The Phenomenology of Modern Legal Discourse. The 
Juridical Production and the Disclosure of Suffering. Aldershot and Brookfield (USA), 1998. 
Moreover, the exclusive purpose of the modem mainstream trend of Critical Legal Studies-cf., e.g. 
Bauman, R. W.: Ideology and Community in the First Wave of Critical Legal Studies. Toronto, 2002 
is to unseal the relations of dominance (as its fighters claim: the capitalistic, male-chauvinistic, or 
European regimes, or the ones ruled by the centres of the world economy or by the Christian faith, 
and so on) from the artificial ideological (defensive) linguistic cover of the law (provided with codes 
of mere technicality). 
13
 Almost the only exception I have taken cognisance about is Samuel, G.: Epistemology and 
Method in Law. Aldershot and Burlington (VA), 2003. 
It is an alarming instance to learn from a dispute Ratio Juris, 20 (2007) 2, 302 334 launched 
by Italian and Polish scholars about a volume Shiner, R. A.: Legal Institutions and the Sources of 
Law. Dordrecht, 2005 of a representative international series Pattaro, E. (ed.): A Treatise of Legal 
Philosophy and General Jurisprudence 3 the doubts expressed on the sense of such a universalising 
bosh, which is destitute of the lowest theoretical sensitivity in the author's exclusive dealings with 
American daily topics under the aegis of global legal theorising, stuffed with the want of genuine 
academic knowledge, as if the author never heard, for instance, of the doctrine on the sources of law, 
legal institutionalism, or Hans Kelsens foundational doctrine. Rounding this specimen of intellectual 
poverty by not even understanding the stake, in his rebutter the author calls its European critics to the 
respect of liberal tolerance and academic freedom, perhaps for lack of anything better. 
14
 In theoretical reconstruction, my concern is certainly not the validity of propositions that 
natural law doctrines (aiming at ontological foundations inspired by theological presuppositions) or 
practical philosophies (in their rebirth today) may advance in search for connections, but exclusively 
the specific issue of the ways in which prevalent trends (or their comparable analogons) may exert 
fermentative effect on the daily administration of justice. 
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justification at the most, and through benevolent discourses in human communities, an 
optimum solution has to be targeted somehow. We are fallible humans, as fallible as are our 
endeavours to make the world better. We may try to find salvation exclusively with skills 
and instruments we have developed, and, of course, through unceasingly adapting and 
correcting them. 
34. Irrevocably and unavoidably, all that remains is to draw on the recognition that, 
notwithstanding our different societal roles, somehow we all are parts of the practice of 
reproducing this understanding with full personal responsibility—whether as citizens, or as 
educators and socialisers (who form the public understanding professionally as teachers, 
priests, journalists and other social workers), or as intellectuals or politicians (who shape 
the fonner's frameworks), or having been specifically initiated as actors in the law's 
workings. 
35. In the final analysis, our law as actually practiced will hardly be anything other 
than that which we have formed out of it through our social co-operation and the fights we 
have undertaken.15 
36. In the end, law is a mode of speaking. It is practiced as a specific field of 
communication with a game of open scenes, which is actualised if played by humans 
through actual referencing. Accordingly-and instead of "what it is?"—"all that notwith-
standing: how it can be achieved" will be the final question that serves as a criterion 
as well. 
This also involves a call for axiology, in order to set some standard as a foundational 
stepping stone. This is to be done even if in the absence of a claim that we have made it 
suitable to conclude anything from it or subordinate anything to it (as the past antagonistic-
rivalry between the doctrines of natural law and legal positivism stressed). And this may 
presume to arrive finally at a development from thesis via anti-thesis to syn-thesis related to 
the correlation among humanity's natural, societal and spiritually founded intellectual 
world, perhaps strengthened as well by the re-/dis-solution of the law's positivistic self-
definition. Thereby, a genuine re-foundation may also be achieved in order to master 
humanity's response to the global challenges that are at our door. 
15
 For an outlook, cf., by Varga, Cs.: Doctrine and Technique in Law. lustum Aequum Saiutare, 
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Bódog Somló. Nevertheless, it is peculiar that apart from the laconic mentioning of factual 
statements, this period has not aroused the attention of technical literature. At the same 
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Science. A Sketch of the Career of Bódog Somló as a Thinker). Világosság, 12 (1981), 765. The 
writing on Bódog Somló in the volume Hell, J. Lendvai, L. F Perecz, L. (eds): Hungarian Philosophy 
in the 20th Century. ("His outward life-course is uneventful, whereas his inward life is extraordinarily 
exuberant as his memoranda in manuscript justify.") Budapest, 2000, 107. A similar opinion is 
formulated in the unpublished Ph.D. dissertation of László Seres, in which the chapter "Career 
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For decades, the most abundant information on the studies in Germany was provided 
by a contemporaneous biography-résumé published by Csaba Varga. In the biography, 
which was retained in the compilation of the prodirector of the legal academy from the 
period of the unsuccessful job application to the episcopal legal academy of Pécs in 1898 
by Bódog Somló, we can read the following concerning the peregrination: "Following his 
graduation, the Hungarian government sent him to Germany with a view to his further 
training in specialised branches of science, namely, in the philosophy of law and Roman 
law with a state grant of 800 Frs. for the academic year of 1896/97 and he spent the first 
semester at the university of Leipzig and the second one in Heidelberg.2 In the meantime, 
Bódog Somló's "humble appeal" of 10th July, 1898 to bishop Sámuel Hetyey has come to 
light, in which he wrote the following about his studies in Germany: "At the university of 
Leipzig 1 studied humanities, the history of economics, constitutional law and social history, 
while at the university of Heidelberg I dealt with positive law."3 
Plans and Preparations 
The thought of the study trip abroad emerged in Bódog Somló at the end of his studies at 
university. It turns out from the letters of Iván Herepei, his classmate and friend in Cluj that 
they submitted their application for state grant jointly, or at least in agreement in 1895. 
During the summer, Herepei inquired about the status of the applications in the Ministry of 
Culture, where he was informed that "nothing had arrived there yet", that is, the university 
may have not furthered the applications to the Ministry. As he wrote to Somló, he had little 
prospect for winning the competition and travelling, "although 1 would like it very much. 
( . . . ) We would at least spend a year together."4 During the autumn, even these faint hopes 
were ruined. Again, we are quoting the letter of Herepei. "I daresay it grieves me that I 
should give up our nice plan to spend a year together abroad. What an illuminating year it 
would have been. Believe me, my boy, I considered going with You as important as whether 
1 go or not. (. . .) I am thinking about not waiting for the reply of the Minister, but looking 
for a job." If, however, they received "the vicious grant", Somló can find a way for the 
postponement of the impending joining up the army.5 The expectations of Herepei were 
fulfilled, namely they did not receive the grant. By reason of the cancellation of the study 
trip abroad, Bódog Somló put on the battledress to do his term of voluntary military service. 
During his service, he got around to finish his studies. Namely, in this period he acquired 
the doctoral degree in political science-he had been initiated to a doctor of law already in 
September, 1895-and simultaneously, the issue of the study trip abroad was settled, at that 
time without Iván Herepei. About all this, we learn from the letter of Ferenc Knörr, another 
2
 Varga, Cs.: Somló Bódog esete a pécsi jogakadémiával (The Case of Bódog Somló with the 
Legal Academy of Pécs). Jogtudományi Közlöny, 35 (1980) 8, 544. See further Ződi, Zs.: Erény és 
tudomány. Somló Bódog állam- és jogbölcseleti munkássága (Virtue and Science. Bódog Somló's 
Work in Political Science and The Philosophy of Law). In: Loss, S. Szabadfalvi, J. et al.: 
Portrévázlatok a magyar jogbölcseleti gondolkodás történetéből (Portrait Sketches from the History 
of Hungarian Thinking in the Philosophy of Law). Miskolc, 1995, 65. 
3
 The Episcopal Archive of Pécs. I/l/k. Acta Lycei. 2575/1898. (Budapest, 10th July, 1898). 
4
 The letter of Iván Herepei to Bódog Somló. Zernest, 20"1 June, 1895. National Széchenyi 
Library, Manuscript Archive (hereinafter NSzL, MA). 
5
 The letter of Iván Herepei to Bódog Somló. Zernest, 14th September, 1895. NSzL, MA. 
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classmate and close friend in Cluj doing military service in Brasov, who must have been 
informed about the favourable developments by Somló. "You are doing splendidly. How 
did the military react to your new doctoral degree? (...) I wish you all the best to the grant 
and your new degree."6 About the developments concerning the grant abroad we are 
informed from a letter of Gusztáv, Bódog Somló's younger brother studying in Vienna, 
according to which his brother's application was cordially supported by Mór Kiss, his 
professor in Cluj.7 In a further letter, Gusztáv interpreted the joy of aunt Nelly, a relative in 
Vienna to his brother concerning his fine prospects "to travel to Berlin the next year".8 
As an objective of the study trip abroad the biographical summary stemming from the 
period of the application to Pécs in 1898 designated studying two areas of law, scilicet, 
Roman law and the philosophy of law, however, as it turns out from his autobiography, 
Somló dealt with more disciplines during the years of the peregrination. His orientation 
towards Roman law was probably down to the influence of Lajos Farkas, his professor in 
Cluj,9 the support and advice of whom Somló referred to several times in his letters written 
from Germany to his parents. Concerning his plans related to the philosophy of law, he 
requested the advice of Gyula Pikler.10 We do not know exactly, when and under what 
circumstances they met each other. Howewer, it is certain that Somló's attention was attracted 
to Gyula Pikler years before, in the spring of 1893 by a former classmate in Timisoara, 
Aladár Bartl, a student at the Faculty of Law in Budapest. "I missed you again very much at 
Gyula Pickler's (sic) lecture, he speaks fully to our taste, therefore, when I have obtained his 
book, I will send it to you after the exam in line with my notes." During his lectures. Pikier 
talks about "the justification of the regularities of nature, he refutes natural law and the 
justifiability of a final goal". "The day before yesterday he explained Darwinism and 
generally, his knowledge is a prolific and his habit of mind is interesting."11 Maybe this 
enthusiastic account aroused the interest of Somló in the person and work of Pikier. At any 
rate, during the months before the trip to Germany Bódog Somló turned to Gyula Pikler for 
advice in a letter. Although, this letter has not been retained, the question of Somló can be 
inferred from the reply. "I am glad to fulfil your request," reads the letter of Pikler in the 
middle of August, 1896, "but its best method would be a discussion by word of mouth, all 
the more so, that I must get informed about your studies so far and generally your whole 
personality."12 Although, since they cannot meet before two and a half months (at the time of 
writing the letter Pikler was staying in Trsztena in Árva county), he suggested the following 
concerning Somló's objectives. First of all, he advised Somló "not to stick to Berlin", instead 
with regard to teachers, he suggested Leipzig or an English university, depending on Somló's 
"personality and views of life". "I suggest Berlin in the least." At the same time, he 
recommended reading some technical literature, first of all Herbert Spencer's "First Principles 
of a New System of Philosophy" and "Principles of Psychology", furthermore, his university 
textbooks to be published soon. And a further good advice: "Learn so much English that is 
necessary for reading scientific books." In view of that, Pikier considered reading Spencer 
The letter of Ferenc Knörr to Bódog Somló. Brasov, 12"' January, 1896. NSzL, МЛ. 
7
 The letter of Gusztáv Somló to Bódog Somló. Vienna, 19lh November, 1895. NSzL, MA. 
8
 The letter of Gusztáv Somló to Bódog Somló. Vienna, 26 ,h November, 1895. NSzL, MA. 
9
 Lajos Farkas ( 1841 1921 ) was a professor of Roman law at the university of Cluj after 1872. 
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 Gyula Pikler (1864 1937) taught philosophy of law after 1891 at the university of Budapest 
(from 1896 he was a visiting professor, from 1903 a university professor). 
в The letter of Aladár Bartl to Bódog Somló. Budapest, 20th March, 1893. NSzL, MA. 
12 The letter of Gyula Pikler to Bódog Somló. Trsztena, 15,h August, 1896. NSzL, MA. 
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the most expedient.13 Somló paid heed to Pikler 's advice. He chose Leipzig instead of Berlin 
and read the recommended literature one after the other. In his diary, under the title "Notes 
and extracts in the philosophy of law", he made notes on the works of Georg Simmel, Rudolf 
Stammler and Emst Grosse and on those recommended by Pikier.14 Before his trip, on 14lh 
September, 1896, he made notes on Spencer's work "Die Principien der Psychologie" and 
made an abstract of Pikler's "The Rules of the Origin and Development of Law and Their 
Reduction to Elementary Causes" at home, on Is' October, 1896. Nevertheless, he read 
Spencer's "Grundlagen der Philosophie" already in Leipzig on 8lh November, 1896.15 In the 
spirit of the more and more absorbing professional and human relationship. Pikier further 
provided Somló with his professional directions and advice for conduct. 
Thereby, Bódog Somló started his study trip in Germany with this spiritual send-off in 
the autumn of 1896. At the moment, we can inspect the story of the months spent abroad 
via the family correspondence conducted overwhelmingly in German and via the letters 
of friends and professional mentors. The correspondence outlines not only the course of 
university and the parallelly conducted private studies according to the guidelines of 
mentors, primarily of Pikier, but also the everyday life of the peregrination noteworthy from 
scientific and cultural historical aspects. The accounts written to the parents and his brother 
evoke even the trivial details of the campus and off-campus life with due precision: the 
participants, sites and habits of social life, his old and new friends, the stories of journeys 
and excursions, the relation to exercise and sports, the turns of lhe weather, the circumstances 
of accommodation and eating. 
"I usually attend the lectures of Wundt and Lamprecht, sometimes others, as well..." 
Somló in Leipzig 
Somló arrived in Leipzig at the end of October, 1896. He did not travel directly, since he 
stopped and spent days in Vienna, Prague and Dresden, partly to visit his relatives. At first 
he did not find Leipzig appealing, though after a while he changed his mind, because he did 
not like the buildings made mostly out of red brick with high pediment in Old German 
style.16 Nevertheless, he accustomed himself to the university from the beginning. The 
university, at least the part 1 visited, i.e. the Albertinum is a brand new, splendidly furnished 
building."17 Not much after his arrival, on 28lh October, 1896, he matriculated at the 
13
 Ibid. It seems that their earliest meeting took place directly before his trip to Germany. Cf. 
The letter of Bódog Somló to his parents. Leipzig, 30"' October, 1896. National Széchenyi Library, 
Manuscript Archive. 
14
 Bódog Somló s diary (1896). NSzL, MA. Quart. Hung. 3038/1. 
15
 See ibid. It is probable that he also made abstracts of the monographies of Spencer's 
"Einleitung in das Studium der Sociologie" and Pikler's "Bevezetés a jogbölcseletbe" (Introduction 
into the Philosophy of Law) before his trip. 
16
 It is interesting that a later scholarship holder. Károly Szladits did not consider Leipzig a 
sightly town, either. As he put it in one of his letters exactly to Somló: "Leipzig totally lacks the 
concept of Beauty: neither the city, nor the landscape or the women are beautiful. What wouldn't I 
give for a Danube bank?" The letter of Károly Szladits to Bódog Somló. Leipzig, 19"' April, 1902. 
NSzL, MA. 
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Humanities Faculty of the University of Leipzig, which was founded in the 15"1 century and 
reorganised in Lutheran spirit in 1542 by the Saxon duke, Maurice.18 In the letter informing 
about his matriculation he related at length about his decision to apply to the history seminar 
of Karl Lamprecht.19 As a professor highly respected also in Hungary he was one of those 
whom Pikier not only recommended, but to whom he also wrote a letter of reference.20 
As Somló informed his parents, the advantages of the seminar included that admitted 
students had an access to the premises of the seminar including the library form 9 a.m. to 9 
p.m., furthermore, a separate writing-desk was due to everyone, and last but not least, 
signing up was also favourable, because thereby a great deal of the heating costs at home 
could be saved.21 
Days had passed before the final time-table was composed. Against the payment of 
60 Marks, Somló signed up for the following courses: Wilhelm Wundt-Philosophical 
encyclopaedia (4 classes per week); Lamprecht-German economic, social and constitutional 
history (3 classes per week); Introduction to the apprehension of contemporary politics and 
society (2 classes per week, one of which was held on Sunday afternoon). As it was 
expectable, besides the lectures, he also enrolled in the economic and constitutional history 
practice of the history seminar of Lamprecht (two classes on Sunday morning). Out of the 
total tuition fee, Lamprecht's seminar cost 10 Marks in itself. Somló explained this with the 
fact that only 12 students were admitted to the seminar, which set very high requirements 
and facilitated the establishment of personal connections with the professor and the students, 
who had access to the premises of the seminar the whole day, as he referred to that in an 
earlier letter.22 At the same time, he also met Lamprecht personally. The professor, as he 
wrote to his parents, "welcomed him very friendly", informed him about his seminar and 
encouraged Somló to turn to him safely, if he needed anything. Furthermore, he offered to 
introduce him to the History Society, where he may find proper company mostly consisting 
of young people with PhDs.23 Besides the lectures at the Humanities Faculty, he also 
attended the lectures of "famous" law professors, whose names he did not mention either at 
that time or later. He found that the lectures were generally of high standard, although it 
disturbed him that the professors laid much stress upon the approval of their audience.24 
Already from this early period, a shift of emphasis is discernible from university 
classes towards private studies. During the second week of his stay in Leipzig, he reported 
that concerning his studies, he was following the instructions of Pikier and Farkas professors 
in every respect. He wrote accordingly, "I much more need private studies than attending 
lectures."25 At the same time, he considered the chosen lectures multiply motivating. 
"Wundt is the most prominent German philosopher of our days, who is completely worthy 
of his fame. His broad-minded lectures on the philosophical encyclopaedia create good 
basis for studies in the philosophy of law."26 Whereas, the lectures of Lamprecht are useful 
18
 Szögi, L.: Magyarországi diákok németországi egyetemeken és főiskolákon 1789- 1919 
(Hungarian Students at German Universities and Colleges). Budapest, 2001, 405. 
19
 Karl Gotthard Lamprecht (1856-1915) was professor of comparative world and cultural 
history at the University of Leipzig. 
20
 The letter of Bódog Somló to his parents. Leipzig, 28th October, 1896. NSzL, MA. 
21 Ibid. 
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 The letter of Bódog Somló to his parents. Leipzig, Is" November, 1896. NSzL, MA. 
23
 Ibid. 
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only indirectly for him. "Namely, Lamprecht points out several discerning coherences and 
the interaction among economic, political and social facts provide very precious knowledge 
from the viewpoint of studies in the philosophy of law." 
The emphasis, however, shifted to studying at home and in the library. As he put it, 
this is the situation in case of all professions. If somebody wants to achieve results, he 
argued, after a time independent research and thinking must come to the fore. In view of 
that, he studied the literature of the philosophy of law according to the guidance of Pikier. 
He recorded his notes in his diary of 1896. Besides, in this period he was also interested in 
theoretical problems related to criminal law, such as the meaning of the sense of justice and 
its impact on criminal law.27 
Apparently, Somló shared his doubts concerning the university studies in Leipzig with 
Pikier, who wrote surely by reason of this in November, 1896 that if "you had appeared 
earlier, 1 would have suggested Graz instead of Leipzig."28 Months later, in the first months 
of 1897, when it was still not decided, where Somló would continue his studies, Pikier 
repeatedly came up with the University of Graz. "Graz is the place of modern spirit. You 
will learn from Gumplovitz29 and primarily from Hildebrand.3" The town is healthy, lovely, 
its surroundings is beautiful, besides, living is cheap.31 
Via Britannia! - Via Britannia? 
Somló started learning English during his stay in Leipzig. This was due not only to Pikler's 
advice, but it was obviously related to Somló's intention to continue his German study trip 
in England. As early as at the beginning of his stay in Leipzig, on 9"' November, 1896, he 
informed his parents that for the sake of familiarisation with special literature, he was 
learning English, which he would soon acquire according to his hopes. Nevertheless, he 
could not decide, whether to start leaning alone or in Berlitz school within the framework 
of a language course.32 Finally, he enrolled in a language course. 
Apart from Somló, a "Fraulein" and a young "Hungarian doctor" belonged to the 
group, who pursued his studies in Leipzig like him.33 We can fist read in Somló's letter to 
his brother about "the Hungarian doctor", Béla Kreutzer (later Kenéz 1874-1946), his 
future fellow professor in Cluj. "Yesterday at noon a young doctor juris arrived here in 
Leipzig, who graduated in Budapest and deals with scientific issues like me and seems to be 
quite a sensible man. Maybe I will meet him frequently."34 The Kenéz letters included in 
the Somló bequest refer to the fact that after returning to Hungary, they maintained a close 
relationship for years. 
27
 The letter of Bódog Somló to his parents. Leipzig, 9"' November, 1896 and 14th January, 
1897. NSzL, MA. 
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 The letter of Gyula Pikier to Bódog Somló. Budapest, 19lh November, 1896. NSzL, MA. 
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Somló raised the idea of travelling to England in his letter of 20lh November, 1896. 
"1 haven't inquired about the English relations. I would prefer spending the second semester 
there than in Germany."35 Besides learning the language, he naturally tried to find English 
relations. His letters manifest that he turned to British universities for information. During 
the weeks before his travel home for the holidays he wrote to his parents that he had 
received merely one answer letter from a professor in Edinburgh. He wrote that they would 
discuss the details at home by word of mouth. Of course, Somló searched for English 
relations in other directions, as well. Namely, the letter of Gyula Mandello, the Chief 
Secretary of the Hungarian Economic Society manifests that Somló requested Mandello's 
and obviously others' support for his prospective trip to England. "I've received your letter 
and as I stated verbally, 1 will be at your disposal, when you prepare to travel to England", 
Mandello wrote on 30"' March, 1897.36 By that time, however, Somló had given up, or at 
least had postponed his plans concerning England. Nevertheless, Pikier must have known 
about his decision, since he acknowledged the negative announcement with the following 
remarks in his letter of 24lh March, 1897: "I highly approve of your decision not to travel to 
England also with regard to your sickness."37 This letter is puzzling because of two reasons. 
What kind of sickness could Pikier refer to and what could the word "also" imply? Somló 
did not mention his contingent health problems in his extant letters, obviously, he did not 
wish to worry his parents, conversely, we can infer from the lines of Pikier that Somló had 
confidence in him in this respect, as well. The conclusion can be drawn from the word 
"also" that disregarding the sickness, Pikier did not approve of the trip to England, which 
he raised in an earlier letter half a year before, the realisation of which he made dependent 
on Somló's personality and views of life. 
"The lectures of Karlowa .. . (Pandects) and Bekker ... (Institutions and the History 
of Roman law) are the most important for me" - Somló in Heidelberg 
After he had provisionally abandoned his plans concerning England, after the autumn 
semester he travelled home to Cluj via Dresden, Prague, Vienna and Budapest in February, 
1897.38 During the holiday at home the next semester was settled. Although, as we referred 
to that earlier, Gyula Pikler called Somló's attention to the university of Graz, he finally 
decided in favour of Heidelberg. Pikler 's letter also informs us about Somló's increasing 
interest in international law. "You have made a right choice for international law from both 
a scientific and a practical point of view. (. . .) I hope you remember in what direction I 
suggested its study."39 
Subsequently to the long winter holiday, Somló set off at the end of April so as to 
arrive in Heidelberg via Vienna and Munich. During the days following his arrival, on 5lh of 
35
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36
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May, 1897 he matriculated at the Faculty of Law of Ruprecht-Karls University founded in 
1386 and reorganised in 1652.40 The town impressed him as "tiny", but "smart". When 
wandering about the town, one feels as if a magical hand threw one back from the 19lh 
century into the distant past, he informed his parents. Nevertheless, he found the building of 
the university "gloomy", but this did not influence his favourable opinion of Heidelberg.41 
"I have the time of my life here", he wrote to his parents after a week and this did not 
change further on, either.42 Later on, he also wrote that he was very satisfied with the major 
goal of his trip (the university) and with all the accessory circumstances (food, 
accommodation, town and company).43 
In one of his early letters from Heidelberg he informed his parents about his "firm" 
intention to study private law further on. He gave an explanation for his novel interest in 
private law in a further letter. Private law is "more concrete", which explains a greater 
interest in it in the world of law, than in the philosophy of law.44 At that time it also occurred 
to him that he would habilitate in private law at the university of Cluj.45 
Since he wrote this to his parents, we surely know that out of his university 
commitments at Heidelberg, he attended the lectures of Karlowa Privy Councillor46 
(Pandects) and of Bekker Privy Councillor47 (Institutions and the History of Roman Law), 
as ones that were the most important for him. Both of them are very famous and sagacious 
lawyers, Somló wrote to his parents.48 Apart from the lectures, with which he was all the 
time satisfied as opposed to those attended in Leipzig, he also signed up for the private law 
seminars of Karlowa and von Buhl.44 After the university commitments, he pursued his 
studies at home, in the boarding house. 
About his provisionally intensifying interest in Roman law and consequently, in private 
law, he infonned his earlier professor, Lajos Farkas, who accepted this decision favourably. 
"I am very pleased that my guidance turned out to your satisfaction. 1 am convinced that 
you will not regret it later, either. ( . . . ) It is not harmful that you have changed the object of 
your studies, I also find it more expedient if you devote yourself to the study of private law, 
since that will be the most topical before long. You can establish from the curriculum of 
German universities that the new civil code overshadows everything else. (. . .) This is surely 
a decisive turning point as to the German civilistic science and I cannot predict what the 
new trend will be like without the 'Quellen'."50 
Somló's orientation towards private law could be in connection with his seeking ways 
and means, at least we can infer this from one of the letters of professor Pikier written in a 
resigned lone. "1 am very sorry that I didn't have the time earlier to inform you that despite 
40
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the news you wrote to me I am fully congenial and concerned about your ambitions further 
on, about the seriousness and eagerness of which I am firmly convinced. Of course, 1 am 
interested in what you are going to devote yourself to: philosophy or constitutional policy 
or comparative constitutional law. Because I think you intend to go in for either of them. As 
for me, it would be instructive if next time you pointed out what 'the wavering of your 
scientific belief' consists in, I wish you infonned me about that, maybe I am slightly entitled 
to know that."51 The phrase "the news you wrote to me" may have referred to the news 
about the provisional loss of importance of the general direction of the philosophy of law. 
At the same time, Somló does not seem to have fully confessed his inclination to private 
law, otherwise Pikier would have obviously disregarded guessing what the scientific 
direction Somló took this time was. Beyond that Pikier made Somló openly avow "the 
wavering of his scientific belief'. We can find the possible causes of the vacillation in one 
of Pikler's next letters. "The doubts concerning whether there are laws and if yes, of what 
nature, and whether there is a science we deal with are the most inessential from the 
viewpoint of pursuing a science. The objective cannot be a firm entity systematically and 
ultimately posited within the completed system of knowledge, but it can be to know more 
than we knew before. Let me repeat that international law is theoretically the treasury of the 
rules of the philosophy of law and practically the legal science of the future."52 
Nevertheless, Somló was maximally satisfied with Heidelberg, as he put it in one of 
his last letters, "I will always remember staying here with pleasure."53 
(Blighted) Career Prospects 
The literature reviewing the life-course has highlighted the failures of Bódog Somló related 
to job search. It is widely known that he did not get a job that fulfilled his abilities and 
ambitions throughout years. His early attempts at the episcopal legal academy in Pécs and 
at the royal legal academy in Bratislava ended in failure.54 It is not accidental that one of 
the main topics of the letters written during the study trip abroad concerned the job search. 
However, it is less widely known that before the study trip in Germany he had applied for a 
job to the Calvinist legal academy in Sighet. As soon as he arrived in Leipzig, he infonned 
his parents in his letter of 30"' October, 1896 about the developments. He had consulted 
Pikier about the possible finding a job in Sighet before his study trip. According to his 
mentor, the position in Sighet would not be useless at all until he acquired the qualification 
of honorary lecturer. After two weeks, he could still write that he had not received an answer 
from Sighet.55 After another week, he received a note from the curator of the legal academy, 
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which made it clear that he could take up the position if he was Protestant. But not in 
another case.56 Soon he received a further letter from the curator of the legal academy, the 
details of which he transplanted word for word into the letter sent to his parents in 
Hungarian. This made it unambiguous that since he was a Roman Catholic, according to the 
rules of the Calvinist convent, he could not take up the position disregarding the intentions 
of the legal academy. " . . . despite being enlightened, tolerant and broad-minded, we need to 
adapt to the rules of our convent...", wrote the curator.57 It might have occurred to Somló 
for the first time that in case he does not have another choice, he will take up a position in 
the capital, at the legal department of Hungarian Railways, the employer of his father.58 
The issue of religion rose to the surface in other context, as well. Upon the submission 
of his application to the legal academy in Pécs, Bódog Somló paid a ceremonial visit to the 
church principal of the legal academy, bishop Sámuel Hetyey. According to his diary, we 
know that the bishop was rather bewildered when he heard that Somló had pursued studies 
in the Protestant Heidelberg. "1 visited Sámuel Hettyey (sic) in Nádas. He is a right-minded 
Hungarian man. He expressed his horror at hearing that 1 had studied in Heidelberg, where 
I must have been saturated with Protestant spirit."59 It could well be the case that such 
bewilderment by the bishop had a role in the failure of the application. 
During the months in Heidelberg, his new friend, Viktor Jászi also suggested a position 
to Somló. He suggested the Calvinist legal academy in Kecskemét to his friend, where there 
was a vacancy after the retirement of Benő Csilléry. "Recently, 1 received a letter from 
Tegze. He wrote that Csilléry had retired on 1st July and the vacancy may be advertised 
these days. Call an acquaintance at home and ask him to observe the Gazette with attention 
and to send you the advertisement. As I've heard, the selection will be effected by the 
church, but this should not refrain you from the submission of an application, in the worst 
case you will not be selected, but you can never know what kind of conjectures turn up...", 
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as Professor Jászi wrote.60 We do not know whether Somló took action to apply to 
Kecskemét after his failure in Sighet, but after he had committed himself to Hungarian 
Railways by that time, this seems improbable. 
The Preparations towards Habilitation 
Besides his studies and his job search, Somló had to pay attention to the preparation for his 
future qualification for the office of a lecturer at a university by enriching his literary 
workmanship. The period of his peregrination secured adequate circumstances for the work. 
In 1899, when he submitted his application for the qualification of an honorary lecturer at 
the university of Cluj, he supported his expertise with three treatises and two book reviews.61 
His first treatise, "The Parliamentary System in Hungarian Law" was published before his 
trip, in 1896, whereas, his second and third treatises, scilicet, "Regularity in Sociology" and 
"The Basic Principles of the Philosophy of International Law" were published in 1898. He 
published the book reviews about the monographies of Ernst Neukamp and Gyula Pikler in 
Jogtudományi Közlöny in 1897.62 Upon the express request of Pikier, he wrote the book 
review about Neukamp's "Einleitung in die Entwicklungsgeschichte der Rechts" at the end 
of his stay in Leipzig.63 He undertook the critique of the work of Pikier, "The Origin and 
Development of Law" during the Heidelberg period.64 It is very likely that he collected 
material in Germany for his work "The Basic Principles of the Philosophy of International 
Law"65 published on 71 printed pages in July, 1898. His treatise with more modest range, 
"Regularity in Sociology" was published on 23 pages after the lecture before the Hungarian 
Economist Society on 7"1 December, 1898.66 Judging from these, it seems that his studies 
abroad and staying abroad in itself encouraged the scientific work of Somló, despite the 
momentary professional vacillation. It was also during his study trip in Germany that he 
signed on to be a consultant for the Hungarian Encyclopaedia of Law edited by Dezső 
Márkus. He was commissioned to write various entries primarily related to the philosophy 
of law (e.g. "philosophical science", "human rights", "marriage", "natural law").67 Of 
course, these entries were completed and published after his return to Hungary. Later, 
apparently Gyula Mandello requested Somló to contribute to the "Encyclopaedia of 
Economics: a Repository of Economic Knowledge" edited by Gyula Mandello and Sándor 
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Halász to be published in three volumes between 1898 and 1901. Somló prepared two 
entries ("Society" and "Property") for the encyclopaedia. 
VII. 
The Scenes and Participants of Social Life 
Of course, Somló did not spend the months in Germany exclusively with the examination 
of scientific problems. He made friends and acquaintances, he went out, took part in 
excursions and usually did exercises. However, the beginning turned out to be wearisome 
for Somló. Namely, the early letters from Leipzig introduce a lonely, unsociable young man 
devoted to his studies, who does not socialise with anyone: neither at university, nor 
anywhere else. The reason for this, he wrote to his parents, "naturally hides in myself ' . And 
he continued: "I live an unsociable life like a solitary man of means."68 
Later, as 1 referred to that, in Leipzig he made friends with Béla Kreutzer (Kenéz), the 
future professor of the science of statistics and he hosted his friends from Cluj, Ferenc 
Kmörr and Bálint Kolosváry, the future professor of private law. It was rather in Heidelberg 
that he made acquaintance with foreign scholarship holders. "The company is quite good 
and interesting, the representatives of the most varied nations are present", he informed his 
parents during the first week.69 At the same lime, he made friends with Viktor Jászi, the 
professor of public law of the Calvinist legal academy in Kecskemét (1868-1915), the 
brother of Oszkár Jászi, who later had an important role in the life of Somló.70 "1 enjoy the 
company of the young professor of the legal academy in Kecskemét, who also undertook 
the study trip as the beneficiary of a state grant. His name is Viktor Jászi and he is a kind 
and educated man."71 Nevertheless, it turns out from the schedule of Somló that he socialised 
mostly with his flatmates in the boarding house in the evening. The company in the boarding 
house was made up by varied, American, English, Bulgarian, Japanese, Russian and 
Hungarian students. The chief, as Somló put it, the "Capo" of their friendly circle was a 
German general, who had travelled widely and was commissioned by the government to 
lead the archeological work in the region of Heidelberg. He raved about the "Capo", who 
had travelled widely and visited Hungary, as well, since he had seen more parts of Hungary, 
than Somló himself had.72 Ladies also belonged to the company. Two determined ladies 
arrived at the University of Heidelberg from Eastern-Siberia: one of them studied national 
economy, the other one literary history. The friendly circle also included an amusing 
member, Mr. Browne, "a typical and extremely comical English" philologist, who often 
made his flatmates laugh.73 
The study trip in Germany was first and foremost important for Bódog Somló from the 
viewpoint of scientific orientation. Although, he endeavoured to follow the directions of his 
mentors, primarily of Gyula Pikler, he was in search of the disciplines close to his interest 
with open spirituality. Though he was not completely satisfied with his studies at least in 
the case of Leipzig, he could spend precious months in the vicinity of noted professors of 
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famous universities. Nevertheless, it seems that he adequately made the best of the 
infrastructure, that is, the seminars and the libraries, of the universities he visited. The 
period spent in Germany was of crucial importance from the viewpoint of the preparations 
for habilitation as his publications justify. Furthermore, the peregrination was of high 
significance from the viewpoint of personal returns as to the life-course, since besides 
making foreign acquaintances, he owed the friendship of Béla Kenéz and Viktor Jászi to 
this study trip. 
Finally, we hope that becoming acquainted with the detailed history of the German 
study trip promotes the more complete knowledge of "the outward life-course" of Bódog 
Somló considered uneventful. 
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Introduction 
Hungary has been a constitutional democracy for twenty years. The republic created by the 
constitutional amendments of 1989 is based upon the acknowledgment of fundamental 
rights and the rule of law. Hungarian democracy is characterized by the main institutions of 
constitutionalism: a parliamentary system, a President of the Republic with constrained 
powers, ombudsmen who guard fundamental rights and the HCC, which reviews the laws 
for their constitutionality. 
Like in other Eastern European countries, the Hungarian fonn of the judicial protection 
of the constitution is closer the centralized German model than to the diffuse U. S. judicial 
review. By that I mean that the HCC is institutionally separated from the ordinary court 
system and has unique, erga omnes constitutional interpretative authority. At the same time, 
the HCC is more separated from the ordinary judiciary than the German Federal 
Constitutional Court. The latter may review any governmental action, including judicial 
decision, administrative decree and legislative act in a constitutional complaint proceeding.1 
The former may only review those individual complaints that state the judicial application 
of an unconstitutional law in the course of the proceeding. Thus, in Hungary, in a concrete 
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controversy ending in a judicial decision, only the law applied can be reviewed, not the 
decision itself. If the HCC concludes that an unconstitutional law has been applied then the 
procedure may be re-opened. If only the application of the law was unconstitutional in the 
concrete case then the HCC is powerless. Consequently, Hungarian constitutional review is 
incomplete. There is no legal remedy in cases where fundamental rights are violated as a 
result of judicial application and interpretation of the law.2 
The deficiency of constitutional complaint is not counterbalanced by the abstract nature 
of constitutional review. Anyone is entitled to bring an action without limitation; there are 
no deadlines to be observed, nor is the applicant required to show any impact or other 
legally protected interest (actio populáris)? The adverse effect of this procedure is that it 
seems as if Constitutional Court judges appear to be confronting norms with norms. If the 
lower norm (statute or other law) contradicts the higher norm (the Constitution), the HCC 
annuls the former. It is up to the discretion of the judges to what extent they present the 
encroachments of rights and social problems in the course of any constitutional review that 
is separated from concrete controversies.4 
But can judges hide behind the articles of law? Law is not exhausted by any catalogue 
of rules and principles, but an interpretive concept influencing the everyday life of the 
members of the political community.5 Law and, especially, constitutional law is a practice 
of the political community in which the HCC is merely a co-actor, not the only one. Legal 
authorities vested with interpretive authority (the President of the Republic, ordinary courts, 
ombudsmen etc.), the petitioners and other legal subjects' not authoritative legal inter-
pretation also form a part of the constitutional interpretation practice. 
Thus, the interpreters of the Constitution are participants in a communal practice. The 
way they examine the text of the Constitution is not independent from space and time, but 
they possess culturally and historically predetermined pieces of knowledge and premises 
("pre-judice").6 In the course of deciding cases these preconceptions enter into dialogue 
with the text of the norms. We can say that interpretation is embedded in the everyday life 
of the political community. On the one hand, it is so because the social environment provides 
the preconditions of interpretation. On the other hand, interpretation shapes the communal 
practice. Therefore, the appropriateness of constitutional interpretation depends whether it 
is in accord with the facts of the political community. And it also depends on what practical 
2
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consequences the interpretation have, i.e. how it forms the relations of the political 
community. 
In this analysis I show that experiences drawn from social reality inevitably emerge in 
the course of the abstract interpretation of the Constitution. The words of Constitution are 
inseparable from those societal phenomena to which the words refer. Symbolically speaking, 
the understanding of constitutional rules does not take place in an interpretation laboratory 
of a scientific institute, but departs from communal practice and in the end contributes to 
the formation of that communal practice. 
I show through the example of two groups how the social environment and 
constitutional interpretation interacts. One of them is the societal and constitutional 
perception of various religious groups; the other is that of the Roma as an ethnic minority 
group. My thesis is that the Hungarian constitutional jurisprudence treats these two social 
categories differently. It refers to historical and cultural facts in order to safeguard the 
privileges of churches, especially, historical churches. However, the social problems of 
Roma that also have historical and cultural roots are disregarded. This double standard in 
the twenty-year Hungarian practice has resulted in providing preferential treatment for 
historical churches. Conversely, the HCC's jurisprudence does not react to racial 
discrimination against Roma people. 
Constitutional Principles 
The Hungarian Constitution lays down the fundamental tenets relating to churches, ethnic 
minorities and the principles of equality in general. Since the text comes from 1989 and its 
models were international human rights instruments and the more recent Western 
constitutions, it was written in the language of modern constitutionalism. 
The Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution reads: 'In the Republic of Hungary 
everybody has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.' (Article 60 para. 
I.) According to the Separation Principle of the Constitution: 'the church shall operate in 
separation from the state'. (Article 60 para. 3.) 
The Constitution forbids discrimination based upon specific trails. 'The Republic of 
Hungary shall ensure the human rights and civil rights for all persons on its territory without 
any kind of discrimination, such as on the basis of race, color, gender, language, religion, 
political and other opinion, national or social origins, financial situation, birth or on any 
other grounds whatsoever.' (Article 70/A para 1.) Besides the antidiscrimination principle, 
the Constitution also provides for the principle of preferential treatment: 'The Republic of 
Hungary shall promote equality of rights for everyone through measures aimed at eliminating 
the inequality of opportunity.' (Article 70/A para 3.) Moreover, the Constitution explicitly 
protects minorities: 'The national and ethnic minorities living in the Republic of Hungary 
participate in the sovereign power of the people' and 'The Republic of Hungary shall 
provide for the protection of national and ethnic minorities.' (Article 68 paras 1 and 3.) 
So, according to the written text of the Constitution, the state is separated from the 
church; national and ethnic minorities enjoy special protection and it is forbidden to 
discriminate on the basis of suspect classification such as religion, race, color and ethnic 
origin. Since the Constitution was written in the language of abstract principles it does not 
refer explicitly to individual churches7 or minorities, among them the most populous, the 
Roma. 
7
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The HCC in its first landmark decisions established that liberty rights, including the 
right to free exercise of religion and equality emanate from the notion of human dignity. In 
1993 the HCC clarified all the relevant notions concerning personal freedom of religion.8 
'The individual freedom of conscience and religion acknowledges that the person's 
conviction, and, within this, in a given case, religion, is a part of human dignity, so their 
freedom is a pre-condition for the free development of personality.'9 
The requirement of the separation of state and churches and of religious neutrality of 
the state was also declared in that decision. 'From the principle of separation it follows that 
the state must not be institutionally attached to churches or any one church; that the state 
must not identify itself with the teachings of any church; and that the state must not interfere 
with the internal working of any church, and especially must not take a stance in matters of 
religious truths. From this (as well as from Article 70/A of the Constitution) it follows that 
the state must treat churches equally.'10 
The general principle of equality also reflects the idea of human dignity. 'The 
prohibition of discrimination means all people must be treated as equal (as persons with 
equal dignity) by law - i.e. the fundamental right to human dignity may not be impaired, 
and the criteria for the distribution of the entitlements and benefits shall be determined with 
the same respect and prudence, and with the same degree of consideration of individual 
interests.'" 
The HCC connected the requirement of preferential treatment, the so-called 'positive 
discrimination' to this principle. 'The right to equal personal dignity may occasionally result 
in entitlements according to which goods and opportunities must be distributed (even 
qualitatively) equally to everyone. If, however, a social purpose (...) may only be achieved 
if equality in the narrower sense cannot be realized, then such a positive discrimination 
shall not be declared unconstitutional. The limitation upon positive discrimination is either 
the prohibition of discrimination in its broader meaning, i.e. concerning equal dignity, or the 
protection of the fundamental rights which are positively expressed in the Constitution.'12 
With a bit of exaggeration we could say that the HCC reads the Hungarian 
Constitution with the help of the theories of Rawls and Dworkin. The principles of justice 
are echoed in giving priority to each person's equal right to basic liberties, including 
liberty of conscience compatible with the similar liberty of others. The relationship 
between basic liberties and equality of opportunity has been also read through the lens of 
Rawls.13 In addition, the HCC's concept concerning the neutrality of the state originates 
from the notion of equal liberty of conscience.14 Similarly, the Hungarian constitutional 
8
 Decision 4/1993. (II. 12.), ЛВН 1993, 48. The original versions of the decisions are available 
at http://www.mkab.hu/hu/frisshat.htm. Some important decisions are in English at http://www.mkab. 
hu/en/enpage3. htm. 
9
 Decision 4/1993. (II. 12.),ABH 1993,48,52. 
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и Decision 9/1990. (IV. 25.), ЛВН 1990,46,48. 
12 Decision 9/1990. (IV. 25.), ЛВН 1990, 48 4 9 . 
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concept of equal human dignity and the treatment as an equal are derived from the 
Dworkinian egalitarian point of view." 
Below 1 briefly show how the HCC applies these abstract constitutional principles in 
cases affecting religious groups and Roma people. 
Historical Privileges 
In the above-mentioned landmark freedom of religion decision, the petitioners simply 
challenged the constitutionality of an act that provided for returning real estates to certain 
churches that had been their owners before the communist nationalization. 
Besides the neutrality principle, the HCC also emphasized that a number of tasks 
formerly carried out by the churches (e.g. school education, taking care of the sick, or 
charity) have become the duties of the state while the churches have also maintained their 
activity in these domains. This is why 'from the separation principle it does not follow that 
the state should endorse the negative right to freedom of religion, let alone religious 
indifference. Nor does the separation of church and state mean that the state must disregard 
the special characteristics of religion and church in its legislation.' And, also, 'treating the 
churches equally does not exclude taking the actual social roles of the individual churches 
into account.'16 
Hence, according to the interpretation of the HCC, on the one hand fonnál equality 
followed from fundamental principles of the Constitution; on the other hand it became 
possible to treat those churches preferably that had been operating for a long period of time. 
In the concrete case this resulted in the fact that within the scheme of reprivatization only 
historical churches were returned their church-related real estates in the course of property 
compensation. Other institutions were given only partial compensation for their nationalized 
real estates. 
Based upon this precedent the HCC handed down two important decisions in 1993 that 
pointed in different directions. In one of the decisions the HCC dealt with the conflict 
between legal rules mirroring religious obligations and alternative social customs. The 
leaders of the Jewish religious community complained that under the Labor Code one could 
not work on Sunday in exchange for a different day off. The petitioners requested that 
Saturday should also count as a work free day. They also considered it discriminatory that 
only Christian holidays (Easter and Christmas) were recognized by the state as non-working 
days.17 
Although the decision anachronistically distinguishes between countries within the 
'Jewish-Christian tradition' and 'Islamic countries', the reasoning was not centered on 
religious grounds. First, the F1CC declared that the Slate 'may not favor any of the religions 
in an exceptionally exclusive treatment' and 'may not hinder any [...] members of religion 
in their free exercise of their faith'. Second, the HCC based its decision on die assumption 
that the greatest holidays of the Christian religions have a secularized and general social 
character. They are 'red-letter' days not because of their religious content but because of 
15
 Dworkin, R.: Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge (Mass.), 1977, 227. László Sólyom, the 
first president of the HCC acknowledged that Dworkin's conception was imported. Sólyom, L.: The 
Hungarian Constitutional Court and the Social Change. Yale Journal of International Law, 19 (1994) 
1,222, 229. 
16
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economic considerations and compliance with the expectations of society. 'The religious 
and secular elements are strongly mixed in these holidays. (...) Most of the citizens like to 
spend these days-without identifying themselves with their religious content-with their 
families, following tradition or with resting. No similar societal traditions are attached to 
the two biggest Jewish feasts (Ros Hasana and Yom Kippur). In the course of determining 
holidays as non-working days the legislator was led by traditions and expectations and not 
by securing preferential treatment for one of the churches.'18 Based on these considerations, 
the HCC upheld the validity of the law. Declaring Easter Monday, Christmas Day and 
Sunday non-working days were declared constitutional.19 
So this decision did not provide preferential treatment to religions and churches. The 
constitutional reasoning was tailored to profane traditions, popular customs and to the 
majority conception of holidays that form the communal practice. Thus, here customs 
appear in a weak sense. The traditional regulation can be upheld since no evidence appeared 
that would point towards changing the practice. A legislative and social practice that has 
religious origins but can be justified on a secular ground does not violate the principle of 
equal dignity.20 
The decision on the statutory preconditions of founding churches pointed in a different 
direction. A petitioner challenged the statute that required a church to have at least one 
hundred members in order to be registered with and recognized by the state as discriminatory. 
The HCC, in rejecting the claim, emphasized that this objective distinction had no influence 
on the most important functions of the religious communities - worship, education, and 
social services. According to the decision, communal exercise of religion can be carried out 
without church status. Moreover, the HCC's reasoning distinguished not only between 
churches and religious organizations without church status, but also among churches 
themselves. 'It is not a constitutional problem that historical churches with large membership 
through their organization and their co-operation with the State in many areas facilitate the 
exercise of religion for their members where the assistance of other (often state) institutions 
is required, such as in health-care or penitentiaries.'21 
There is a fundamental difference between the two cases' practical perspective. 
Specifically, the judgment on Saturday and holiday work avoided discriminating between 
religions, since it attributes secular reason for the law. At the same time, the judgment on 
church status explicitly and purposively provided preferential treatment for historical 
churches vis-à-vis other churches, religious groups and communities.22 
IS
 Decision 10/1993. (II. 27.), ABH 1993, 105, 106 107. 
19
 For more on the early freedom of religion case-law in Hungary see Paczolay, P.: The Role of 
Religion in Reconstructing Politics in Hungary. Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative 
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This latter decision became the precedent in the Hungarian case-law. In 1995 the HCC 
examined the constitutionality of the governmental decree concerning army chaplain 
service. The decree provides for the free exercise of religion and spiritual care only for 
members of the four 'historical churches' (Catholic, Calvinist, Lutheran, Jewish). The army 
chaplain service is operated with the participation of only these churches upon the 
governmental agreement concluded with them. The HCC came to the conclusion that the 
privileges of historical churches in the governmental decree are not unconstitutional, but 
'refer to the real historical role and social significance of such churches.' Proving their real 
social significance, the decision's reasoning applied statistical argument. A survey conducted 
in the Armed Forces showed that only 'the believers of the four churches could be measured 
at a percental rate'. (The statistics did not show the degree of exercise of religion, but only 
the formal affiliation with churches.) Besides the data, the HCC tried to give other reasons 
in order justify unequal treatment among churches. According to the reasoning, believers of 
other religions may individually exercise their faith in the Army; moreover, if the law in 
question were changed, other churches could be included in the anny chaplain service. 
1 think with such reasoning one could justify the establishment of a state-church.23 
There was no empirical examination conducted in other cases relating to the significant 
social role of historical churches. It was sufficient to refer to the 1993 and 1995 precedents 
in order to justify and extend privileges. Thus, numerous cases shutting up the communist 
past and laying the foundations for the future ended with an exceptionally (mostly from a 
financial perspective) favorable outcome for historic churches. As 1 have already mentioned, 
within the scheme of reprivatization only historical churches were returned their church-
related real estates in the course of property compensation. Following this, the HCC 
declared it constitutional that churches are exempted from the general statutory ban on 
acquiring soil.24 The HCC upheld that obligatory lustration extends, besides state leaders 
and professional politicians, to persons who carry out 'public opinion forming tasks'. 
However, contrary to journalists, for example, a decision exempted church leaders from 
lustration.25 Practicing clergymen did not have to serve mandatory military service because 
this so-called 'positive discrimination' ensured the believers' free exercise of religion.26 
Since 1997, in order to fulfill their role emanating from the free exercise of religion, 
'positive discrimination' has to be secured for church-run schools and kindergartens as 
compared with public education institutions run by foundations or associations. According 
to the decision, only church-run schools have the right to the auxiliary subsidy above the 
normative state allowance.27 In 2007 this preferential financial treatment extended to the 
social, child-protective and welfare activities of the churches in contrast with those humanist 
23
 Decision 970/B/I994, ABH 1995, 739, 743. Many criticized this decision. According to János 
Kis, this judgment would hardly survive the test either of the separation principle or that of the 
religious neutrality of the state and of the abolition of religious discrimination. Kis, J.: Constitutional 
Democracy. Central European University Press, 2003, 282. 
24
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institutions that are not affiliated with churches.28 As a result, for example, church-run 
schools receive more extended state subsidies than not-for-profit schools operated by the 
Waldorf Foundation. In 2008 the judges, by referring to the Concordat concluded between 
the Republic of Hungary and the Vatican, demanded that Catholic schools and public 
education institutions run by the state or municipalities be financed to exactly the same 
degree.29 
This inventory shows how far the principle of state neutrality as it appears in the text 
of the Constitution got in cases interpreting the role of churches. As a matter of fact, we can 
see an argumentative procedure that shares a common starting- and ending point: the 
practice of the political community. From the perspective of constitutional interpretation the 
judges accepted the premise that historical churches have notable social weight, and that 
they have an outstanding role in the field of spiritual care and, also socially and culturally. 
At the same time, with their decisions they influenced the communal practice in a way that 
churches, and especially historical churches, were granted exceptionally favorable conditions 
for their spiritual and other activities. 
The principles of the Constitution demand the separation of church and state and the 
equal treatment of religious communities. At the same time, the interpretative practice 
strengthened the old privileges of historical churches. According to the above reasoning 
these favors do not violate the principle of equal dignity and equal treatment. Moreover, the 
exceptional treatment of practicing clergymen and financing church-run public education 
institutions falls within the ambit of constitutionally justifiable preferential treatment.30 
The Hidden Roma Reality 
Now 1 turn from the category of religious groups to the Roma as an ethnic group. It is well 
known that in Hungary many hundred thousands of Roma live who have to face social 
difficulties, prejudice and segregation.31 Similarly to the historic and social role of churches, 
this could not be seen in the text of the Constitution. However, if one wants to be informed 
by the constitutional case-law, it is easy to overlook the fact that a part of the citizens is 
Roma. This is so since the HCC has not openly addressed the problems affecting Roma. 
From the first decade of constitutional review it can be reconstructed from one of the 
decisions regarding compensation that, during the Second World War, similarly to Jews, 
Roma were also deported.32 Apart from this there are two procedural orders that can be 
found in the case-law. 
In one of the cases the petitioner argued that in the course of employment she found 
herself in an unfavorable situation due to the fact that her name refers to her mother's Roma 
origin. The President of the HCC dismissed her petition on procedural grounds since she 
did not question a specific legal rule, but only the application of a legal provision in a 
2s Decision 225/B/2000, ABH 2007, 1241. 
2" Decision 99/2008. (VII. 3.), ABH 2008, 844. 
30
 Kriszta Kovács argues that the HCC uses the concept of preferential treatment in the wrong 
way and for the wrong purpose. Kovács, К.: Think Positive, Preferential Treatment in Hungary. 
Fundamentum (2008) 5, 46. 
31
 See, for example, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance's latest report on 
Hungary. http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-by-Country/Hungary/HUN-CbC-IV-
2009-003-ENG.pdf 
33
 Decision 1/1995. (II. 8.), ABH 1995,31,35. 
130 G Á B O R A T T I L A TÓTH 
concrete case. According to the procedural order that dismissed the claim, the law on 
changing the names 'has no relevant constitutional relationship with the right to work non-
discrimination clauses' of the Constitution.33 Thus, the discriminative nature behind the 
facially neutral and generally applicable law could not be unveiled. 
In the other case, a non-governmental organization protecting minorities, the Otherness 
Foundation challenged a local government resolution. Its first point provided: the local 
representative body 'with respect to the future decides that it declares those people persona 
non grata who do not fit in the life of the community, violating and endangering the public 
security and in the future, with all legal instruments it will make every effort to make these 
persons to leave the town.' The second point of the contested resolution empowered the 
notary to examine whether 'there are legal means to prevent' people who behave as outlined 
earlier 'from moving into the town'. The third point was a similar request also addressed to 
the notary. According to the HCC, the last two points of the resolution were not normative 
but individual decisions that 'did not refer to an unconstitutional procedure' and thus the 
judges had no competence to review them. As to the first point of the local governmental 
resolution, the judges concluded that it had neither individual, nor normative nature: 'it 
expresses intent' and 'general will' to solve local social problems and it counts as 'the 
autonomous and democratic administration of local public affairs'.34 This decision is similar 
to the former in declining to decide on the merit of the case based on the fact that challenged 
provisions do not function as norms. At the same time, the HCC's decision indirectly 
legitimizes local governmental aspirations with hidden or indirect racism. 
In the second decade of constitutional review the number of petitions relating to the 
discrimination of Roma has risen. At the beginning of the year 2000, two decisions were 
rendered in significant cases. Mainly non-governmental organizations protecting the human 
rights of Roma objected that laws did not provide adequate guaranties and did not secure 
proper procedures 'to cope with discrimination in the Hungarian society and in state 
institutions.' At that time Hungarian statute law did not demand equal treatment from 
private organizations acting in the public sphere. There was no efficient legal protection 
against indirect discrimination, and the conditions for proving discrimination were very 
difficult to meet. It was therefore almost hopeless to act against racial discrimination in the 
everyday life. 
The decision of the HCC gives a long list of enacted laws against discrimination and 
concludes that it is not unconstitutional that 'there is no a comprehensive Act dealing with 
antidiscrimination issues'. Although 'it is conceivable that the fragmented legislation does 
not provide for certain types of discrimination', the judges had failed to examine these 
cases.35 Thus the Parliament finally acknowledged Hungary's obligations concerning the 
approximation of Hungarian to European law and passed the Act on Equal Treatment and 
Promotion of Equal Opportunities. 
The other case was the overture of the housing decisions. The Parliamentary 
Ombudsmen for Civil Rights and for the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities jointly 
initiated a constitutional interpretation regarding to social problems. To put it simply, as a 
result of an inadequate institutional system, the homeless freeze to death on the streets of 
big cities in winter; the so-called 'arbitrary squatters' who are Roma families are moved out 
33
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by municipalities so that they become hopelessly homeless.36 According to the judges of the 
HCC, concrete rights, among them, the right to housing, cannot be derived from Article 
70/E of the Constitution that provides for the right to social security. However, the state, in 
order to protect human life and dignity, 'is obliged to take care of the fundamental conditions 
of human existence-in the case of homelessness the state is liable lo provide for housing if 
the situation directly endangers human life'.37 Notwithstanding the petitions, the judges did 
not deal with the conflict between local governments and arbitrary squatters, who are mainly 
Roma. 
Almost at the same time Parliament declared arbitrary squatting a misdemeanor and 
facilitated the vacation of arbitrarily squatted flats. The statutory amendments triggered 
many constitutional petitions, in which non-governmental organizations formulated the 
view that the new situation 'raises the danger of discrimination on ethnic grounds'. The 
decision of the HCC replied to this argument by pointing out that 'the situation of all 
arbitrary squatters is considered equally, independently of his or her ethnic origin'. By 
referring to their earlier decision, the judges declared: 'the state is obliged to secure the 
housing of evicted arbitrary squatters if their lives are directly endangered'.38 The judges, 
however, refrained from examining the actual situation of Roma. So, based on this reasoning, 
one could not tell us whether squatting problems are caused by alternative squatters known 
from Western metropolitan environments or whether they can be attributed to the fact that, 
similarly to South American favela, the number of slums in the country has increased. 
The Act and the assenting HCC decision encouraged many local governments. Local 
government decrees proliferated according to which those who had been formerly arbitrary, 
mala fide or squatters without legal title could not participate in the bid for social rental 
flats. Here it is important to note that according to former judicial precedents such local 
governmental decrees were unconstitutional on formal grounds since they contradicted the 
Act on Flat Rentals. For example, one of the Metropolitan's local governmental (Óbuda-
Békásmegyer) decrees was annulled for this reason in 2005.39 
Nevertheless, there was a radical shift in newer cases. By examining the rules of two 
big towns, Miskolc and Debrecen, the judges concluded that due to the amendment of 
statutory regulation the local governments may enact such decrees. That is to say, they may 
exclude arbitrary squatters and squatters without legal title from competition for social 
rental flats.40 At the same time, two important dissenting opinions were handed down. 
According to one of dissenting opinions, the regulation is discriminative since 'it excludes 
those people from taking part in the competition (mainly unemployed, unskilled people 
with their large families) who due to their financial and social situation are coerced to 
commit unlawful acts and who would otherwise mainly resort to social rental flats'.41 The 
other HCC judge also underlined that the only reason for exclusion is a misdemeanor 
motivated by hardship, while other unlawful acts (e.g. failure to pay local taxes) and even 
committing grave crimes do not pose an obstacle to bidding for social rental flats.42 I think 
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these two dissenting opinions came closest to the core of the problem, but the taboo was not 
broken. For two decades the problems relating to the exclusion and discrimination of Roma 
has remained hidden.43 
Playing with Time 
1 hope in the former two chapters I have managed to prove the role the facts of the political 
community play. The reasoning is supported by historical references and empirical data 
when a conclusion preferring traditional churches is required. In Roma cases, however, the 
reasoning of the judgments does not reflect social reality. At the same time, we can see that 
discriminative practice behind the nonns can be demonstrated. In order to ultimately support 
this thesis let me recall two cases that, due to their temporal coincidence, make it possible 
to compare the preferences of the judges. One of them is the constitutional review of the 
Act on Registered Partnership. The other is related to local government decrees regulating 
the social allowances of Roma living in deep poverty. 
In the last days of 2007 the Hungarian Parliament enacted the Act on Registered 
Partnership. The HCC formerly on many occasions declared homosexual marriage to be 
contrary to the Constitution. 'The Constitutional Court points out that both in our culture 
and law the institution of marriage is traditionally a union of a man and a woman. This 
union typically is aimed at giving birth to common children and bringing them up in the 
family, in addition to being the framework for the mutual taking of care and assistance of 
the partners. (. . .) The institution of marriage is constitutionally protected by the state also 
with respect to the fact that it promotes the establishment of families with common 
children.'44 
This conventionalist interpretation followed the conception of historical churches, 
namely, the text of the Constitution only provides that '[t]he Republic of Hungary shall 
protect the institutions of marriage and the family'. (Article 15.) Thus, the majority of the 
legislative branch took only very cautious steps towards the equal status of homosexuals. 
According to the new statute, property and personal rights were attached to registration, but 
there was no possibility to use the other's name nor for adoption. Besides this, the new 
rules also enabled heterosexuals to establish registered partnership status. In this way 
legislators aimed to create the legal framework for partnerships outside of marriage. In this 
manner they also tried to decrease the legal segregation of homosexuals. 
At the time of passing the Act on Registered Partnership, an anti-Roma local 
governmental movement was initiated. The essence of the Monok-model (named after the 
first municipality to introduce such measures) is that those receiving social allowances were 
obliged by local governmental decree to carry out public-interest work, or allowances were 
43
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directly revoked from those who were entitled to them. Via these regulations local 
governments who aimed to displace members of the Roma minority were even willing to 
violate the Social Act and the Act on Child Protection. In this way, the increasing ill will 
connected to the economic and political crisis was aimed at the most defenseless minority. 
They did not receive a proper job and pay-only an allowance. The fact that they performed 
work publicly (e.g. collecting garbage) did not improve their situation on the labor market; 
it rather increased prejudices towards them. 
Subsequently the Parliament passed the Act establishing the equal status of 
homosexuals, having considered the changing habits of young heterosexual couples. At the 
same time, many local governments passed decrees so as to deprive Roma of the material 
resources of the community and to displace them from settlements. Both legal changes 
stimulated serious debates and challenged before the HCC. The Act on Registered 
Partnership was primarily objected by historical churches in the public sphere and 
immediately several petitions were sent to the HCC. The decrees on the allowances were 
questioned at the HCC by the Roma Civil Rights Foundation and a Head of Public 
Administration Office (that supervise the legality of local government decrees). In the 
former case the regulation to be contrasted with the Constitution has not been declared 
unconstitutional in any comparable countries. The latter case included norms that were 
passed explicitly and knowingly with the intention of constitutional violation by local 
governments. 
Now the question is when the HCC rendered decisions and what the court said. The 
judgment on the Act on Registered Partnerships was passed before the given statute had 
come into force. The decision declared the whole regulation unconstitutional, and thus it 
did not come into effect.45 The statute promoting equality was found to be unconstitutional 
due to the conventional conception of marriage.46 In terms of heterosexuals the judges did 
not accept that the statute does not separate adequately the status of registered partnership 
from the institution of marriage. Adoption, the right to use the other's name, the waiting 
period before registration and other differences were proved to be unsatisfactory in 
protecting the so-called 'essential content' of marriage.47 
« Decision 154/2008. (XIL 17.), ABH 2008, 1203. 
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As to homosexual couples the judgment implicitly established the category of separate 
and unequal. Even though the decision theoretically acknowledged that the registered 
partnership of homosexuals is not unconstitutional, it did not approve the reviewed 
regulation.48 Apart from the fact that homosexual couples may not get married, when it 
comes to regulating their registered partnership 'the differences flowing from the nature' of 
such relationships and marriage must be maintained. This means that in the Hungarian 
constitutional practice the reasons for equal treatment must be shown, not that there is a 
compelling interest in unequal treatment.49 
In the meantime, no decision declaring unconstitutionality has been rendered in the 
local government cases that further dampened the prospects of Roma."1 Procrastination 
resulted in the fact that rather than the unconstitutional local government decrees being 
modified according to the statutes. Parliament had begun to modify the statutes at the 
expense of people living in deep poverty.51 1 think it can be inferred from these two cases 
that choosing the time of interpretation and decision-making also shows the preferences of 
a court. 
Conclusions 
The Constitution consists of abstract principles. It separates the state from churches (that 
have equal status) and it protects ethnic minorities. The judges interpret the abstract norms 
of the Constitution and laws. However, the words of the Constitution refer to a concrete 
political community. Adjudication is a form of decision-making on common, public issues. 
Therefore, constitutional review is closely connected to the practices of the political 
community. 
This is proven by Hungarian case-law relating to historical churches and Roma. The 
presented cases serve as an example that constitutional law is an interpretative concept. 
Authoritative constitutional interpretation is triggered by the interpretative initiatives of 
citizens, not-for-profit organizations, ombudsmen etc. The decisions of the HCC influence 
the operation of the legislation and other institutions and, accordingly, form the practices of 
the political community. 
48
 After the HCC's ruling, the Parliament passed an altered version of the Act on Registered 
Partnership. As a result registered same sex partnership has become a legal option in Hungary. 
44
 The ECtHR protects homosexual relationships according to Article 8 of the Convention. The 
state has to prove that the statutory regulation adversely affecting homosexual partners compared with 
heterosexuals serves a legitimate aim and is justifiable. For example Karner v. Austria, App. no. 
40016/08., Judgment of 24 July 2003. The family concept of the Convention does not only protect 
relationships based on marriages; thus the state may not regulate what type of relationship couples 
adopting a child choose. Emonet and Others v. Switzerland, App. no. 39051/03., Judgment of 13 
December 2007. 
50
 The HCC annulled two local government decrees in the summer of 2009. Both of them made 
it possible to revoke child-protection allowances if the child does not go to school. Decision 79/2009. 
(VII. 10.); Decision 80/2009. (VII. 10.). The reason of annulment was that the decrees were contrary 
to statutory regulation. There was no reference to the Roma minority in the decisions. 
51
 Parliament supported the government's 'Road to Work' program that tried to take the wind 
out of the sails of racist local governmental aspirations. However, by this time many local governments 
had moved ahead and introduced a so-called 'social card' that limited the utilization of financial 
allowances. 
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The choices of the interpreters determine to what extent social reality appears in 
judgments and to what conclusions it contributes. In the case of army chaplain service we 
can find the example that judges were oriented in social facts with the help of statistics. The 
constitutional privileges of historical churches were based on their conventional social role. 
When changing societal experiences were confronted with the conventions, like the 
frequency of going to church, the habits of getting married and family relations then the 
conventions were held to be stronger than reality. 
In the practice of other institutions, empirical surveys are an effective method of 
mapping indirect discrimination and racism.52 The Hungarian jurisprudence did not resort 
to such tools, however. Thus, while historical churches became constitutional categories, 
Roma do not even appear in the decisions. 
The different approach to churches and Roma can be traced back to a mistaken 
conception of equality. The concept "eliminating the inequality of opportunity" in Article 
70/A para. 3 of the Constitution explicitly refers to social situations. The text cannot be 
interpreted without their evaluative analysis. The HCC described the preferential treatment 
of historical churches as positive discrimination without shedding light on their adverse 
situation. At the same time, in Roma cases the features of indirect discrimination and 
preferential treatment were not put forward. 
There is a significant distance between the principles and the case-law.53 The reason is 
that there is a lack of adequate reflection on social reality. In the case of historical churches 
the judges apply the concept of preferential treatment, but it is not clear what type of 
inequality can be found at the starting point. In contrast, in the case of Roma all empirical 
analysis forewarns of the extraordinary social consequences arising from inequality. In 
relation to Roma, there is evidently a need for special legislation, since the root of the 
problems and the nature of hardship is different from other ethnic minorities. Moreover, the 
situation is becoming more serious. Verbal and physical assaults against Roma are increasing 
and certain public figures use anti-Roma speech. In line with these trends, indirect 
discrimination has not decreased, but rather increased in laws and in deciding individual 
cases. The Hungarian constitutional institutions not only remain color-blind, but simply 
blind and mute.54 
52
 For example in Strasbourg in relation to the school segregation of Roma. The ECtHR sums 
up the earlier practice of applying statistical evidence: D H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, App. 
no. 57325/00., Judgment of 13 November 2007. para 137, 188. See also Goldston, J. A.: Kelet-európai 
próbaperek a faji diszkrimináció ellen (Eastern European Test Cases against Racial Discrimination). 
Fundamentum ( 1997) 2, 130. 
53
 Kriszta Kovács shows that the HCC has never declared unconstitutionality based upon suspect 
classification. It found, for example, in the legal system gender-based discrimination affecting mostly 
men. Kovács, К.: Think Positive, Preferential Treatment in Hungary. Fundamentum (2008) 5, 46, 48. 
54
 Thomas Hammarberg, the Council of Europe's Commissioner for Human Rights, visited 
Hungary in October 2009, and 'expressed to the authorities his grave concern about the observed rise 
of extremism, intolerance and racist manifestations that have targeted, in particular, members of the 
Roma minority population. Of special concern have been the public use of anti-Roma hate speech by 
certain public figures and the lack of strong condemnation of and effective measures against a 
reoccurrence of such incidents.' [Press Release - 762(2009)]. 
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I. Brief History 
Although in (he 19th century there was no unified private international law (PIL) in Hungary, 
there existed rules regarding PIL in certain domestic statutes. Bilateral international 
agreements played an important role, such as the trade agreement concluded with the USA 
in 1929, and various other agreements on legal assistance. 
In the 20th century, up to the end of the Second World War, regulations regarding 
private international law continued to appear scattered in various different enactments. This 
accidental and rather chaotic method of legislation on Hungarian private international law 
made necessary a comprehensive codification of the law on this field. 
In 1948, István Szászy, professor of private international law, introduced a draft which 
regulated in great detail both the general and specific questions of PIL. The draft, which 
was prepared with excellent scientific erudition, reflected the theoretical achievements of 
the age as well as Hungarian judicial practice. The political changes taking place at the end 
of the 1940s in Hungary, namely the communist takeover of political power, had a negative 
impact on the future of the draft. It was declared anti-democratic, reflecting capitalist values, 
therefore unacceptable. Professor István Szászy was forced to stop teaching and had to 
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remain silent for a long lime. The question of the codification of Hungarian private 
international law did not arise for another two decades. 
Works of codification were started in 1966 under the conduct of the Legal Institute of 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and the second draft was completed in 1968. The 
Ministry of Justice took over the conduct of codification, and by 1970 another draft had 
been completed. The fourth draft was ready in 1978, accepted in 1979, and made public as 
Law Decree No. 13 of 1979 on Private International Law (hereinafter referred to as Code). 
Minor modifications have been made on the Hungarian PIL Code several times. More 
comprehensive modifications started to take place from the beginning of 2000, primarily 
with the aim of harmonization with European law. In 2000, sections IX and XI, dealing 
with jurisdiction and the recognition of foreign judgements, were re-regulated, and they 
were further modified in 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004. Hungary has ratified the Convention 
of 1980 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (hereinafter referred to as Rome 
Convention) in 2006.' The last modification took place in accordance with the results of EU 
unification of private international law. Act No. IX of 2009 is mainly a technical modification 
with the primary aim of drawing attention to the fact that beside EC Regulation on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations2 (hereinafter referred to as Rome IF) and EC 
Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations1 (hereinafter referred to as Rome 
Г) the Hungarian Code can only be applied to a limited extent. The amendments have also 
introduced a new provision in Section II concerning private individuals; it complemented 
previous provisions with a further rule regarding the use of name by natural persons. 
The structure of the Code is the following: it consists of three big parts and eleven 
sections. Altogether there are 75 articles dealing with the basic questions of private 
international law (General and Special Part) as well as with issues regarding jurisdiction 
and certain procedural questions. Section I, called General Rules, contains provisions 
concerning the purpose of the law-book and certain basic PIL legal institutions such as 
qualification, renvoi, determination of the content of foreign law, reciprocity, ordre public 
(public policy) clause, and fraudulent connection. The Special Part from Sections II to VIII 
determines the conflicts rules applicable to persons, law of intellectual property, property 
law and related rights, obligations, succession, family and labour law. Sections IX to XI 
contain regulations regarding jurisdiction, procedural law and the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgements. The Code itself is not too long; all the former drafts 
were longer. Therefore, the regulation of certain questions is rather brief and the definition 
of certain conflicts law institutions such as incidental question, the definition of international 
mandatory rules (lois d'application immédiate) is missing. These gaps have to be filled by 
judicial practice, which however does not apply unifonn solutions. 
The purpose and operation of the Hungarian Code is governed by the Articles 1 and 2. 
Article 1 states that the Code has a double purpose. First, in cases where elements of foreign 
private law are involved, it chooses from the conflicting legal systems the one whose 
substantive law should be applied (substantive law aim). Second, it determines what 
procedures the court should follow (procedural law aim). An element can be regarded as 
important foreign element only if it is relevant to the case. If the case contains foreign 
1
 Act No. XXVIII of 2006. 
2
 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 
on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations, OJ L 199, 31.7.2007, 40^19. 
3
 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 
on the law applicable to contractual obligations, OJ L 177, 4.7.2008, 6-16. 
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elements but they are not relevant to the judgement of the case, or if the case does not 
contain any foreign elements, the Hungarian Code cannot be applied.4 The Code emphasises 
its own subsidiarity when it declares in Article 2 that it "shall not apply to matters governed 
by international treaty". This provision is in hannony with Hungary's international 
obligations. 
Naturally, the law sources of the European Community enjoy priority to the application 
of the Code. The priority of community law applies, e.g. to contract and tort law,5 where the 
rules of Rome I and Rome II regulations prevail against the regulations of the Hungarian 
P1L Code. The scope of the Code extends only to cases which are not included in or 
regulated by these European instruments. 
II. General Methodology 
1. Legal Certainty and Flexibility 
European - and therefore Hungarian - private international law follows the traditional 
model based on the system developed by Savigny. However, certain important modifications 
and changes in approach make this system more flexible and less certain. Modem European 
choice-of-law doctrine introduces flexibility in a number of ways, including alternative 
references, "soft" connecting factors and escape clauses. As a result, legal certainty and 
flexibility appear together in recent private international law codifications. Professor Hay 
described the second half of the 20th century as one in which "the tension between 
predictability and flexibility is the hallmark of conflicts law".6 The resolution of this tension 
presents a dilemma in the development of private international law in the 21st century as 
well: How would it be possible to find a proper balance between the two principles? 
We should therefore raise the question concerning Hungarian codification as well. How 
and to what extent do legal certainty and flexibility work together in the Hungarian Code? 
Is there an appropriate balance between the two doctrines? Unfortunately, the negative 
answer has not changed in the past ten years. As Professor Burián staled earlier: "Despite 
the contrary wishes of Hungarian commentators, the Hungarian P1L codification has put the 
overwhelming weight on the guarantee of security and foreseeabilily, and has neglected 
flexibility."7 
9
 The foreign plaintiff is the sole proprietor of a Hungarian Ltd., who is defendant I. The plaintiff 
has turned to the court because in his/her opinion during the liquidation process the real-estate of the 
defendant was sold unlawfully to defendants 11 and III, who are also Hungarian. The Supreme Court 
stated that concerning the validity of the sales contract the fact that the plaintiff is of foreign nationality 
is irrelevant, for the sale was concluded between Hungarian parties. Therefore, the application of the 
Hungarian Code was omitted and the legal dispute was settled based on Hungarian substantive law. 
(Supreme Court Gf. II. 20. 176/2007/5) 
5
 The third regulation is concerned with matters relating to maintenance obligations. Council 
Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and 
enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, OJ L 7, 
10.1.2009, 1-79. 
6
 See Hay, P.: Flexibility versus predictability and uniformity in choice of law: reflections on 
current European and United States conflicts law. Recueil des cours, 226 (1992), 304. 
7
 For the reasons more details, see Burián, L.: Hungarian Private International Law at the End 
of the 20th Century; Progress or Regress? In: Symeonides, S. (ed.): Private International Law at the 
End of the 20th Century: Progress or Regress? The Hague, 2000, 268. 
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Regarding specific tools ensuring flexibility, the Hungarian legislator has not made any 
significant steps forward on the "flexibility scale"8. The Hungarian PIL Code does not allow 
the application of escape clauses in general or specific fields and it does not apply so called 
malleable approaches or similar formulae either. Divergence from the rigid rules is made 
possible mainly by the alternative reference rules (in more detail in V). As a result of the 
2009 modifications, the main connecting factor in contract law, in the case of questions not 
included in the scope of the Rome 1 Regulation, has become the "closest connection". 
Moreover, the modified Code allows the application of the choice of law in a limited form, 
concerning name bearing if the person is the citizen of more than one country (see XII1/1). 
These latter changes are undoubtedly the result of the activities of the European Community 
in the field of PIL. EU membership has given Hungarian PIL codification a new "impetus" 
to move towards flexibility: the developing nature of community law has become an 
important factor in the "quiet evolution"9. 
2. State-Selection and "Conflicts Justice" versus "Content-OrientedLaw-Selection" 
and " Material Justice" 
Demand for the enforcement of material justice (material justice deficit) has a central place 
in works of criticism regarding conflicts law. The line of reasoning goes that it is not 
permissible to limit private international law lo the selection of the applicable law; the 
material justice of the decision has to be taken into consideration as well. 
Instead of delving into the nature of the relationship between the categories listed in 
the title, we will refer to Professor Vischer, who stated that "[t]he aim of traditional bilateral 
conflict rules is "conflict justice" ["Kollisionsrechtliche Gerechtigkeit" (Kegel)] and not 
primarily the just substantive solution, [...] the substantive result is subjects to control by 
the ordre publicThus, conflicts justice requires no more than an allocation of legal 
relationship to those legal systems in which they have their "seat" (Savigny). Of necessity, 
this mechanism pays no attention to the quality of result it produces. Realizing the 
phenomenon and its negative consequences, in recent years there has been more and more 
emphasis on the corrective function of material justice in codified private international 
systems as well. Professor Symeonides has aptly described this process as "conflicts justice 
tempered by material justice"." 
The Hungarian PIL Code actually is viewed as "the bastion of the classical view",12 for 
it consists mainly of traditional conflict-of-law rules (or jurisdiction-selecting rules, as they 
were referred to by Cavers). The resulting blindfold application of conflict rules is 
traditionally corrected by the ordre public exception (ruled by Article 7).13 The Code 
8
 See Symeonides, S. C.: The American choice-of-law revolution in the courts: today and 
tomorrow. Recueil des cours, 298 (2003), 410. 
9
 See ibid. 407. 
10
 Vischer, F.: General course on private international law. Recueil des cours, 232 (1993), 93. 
11
 Symeonides: The American choice-of-law revolution... op. cit. 403 404. 
12
 See ibid. 400. 
13
 The rule that allows both parties in a contract (Hungarian PIL Code Article 24) to select in 
advance the applicable law is content-oriented rule, but not necessarily result-oriented, and the same 
can be said about another rule of the Code, which allows both parties to agree to the application of the 
lex fori after the events that gave rise to the dispute (Article 9). In more detail about the theoretical 
connections, see Symeonides, S. C.: Private International Law at the End of the 20th Century: Progress 
or Regress? General Report XVth International Congress of Comparative Law. In: Symeonides, S. 
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contains very few other exceptions mainly result-oriented rules - which consider the 
content of conflicting laws as well.14 The reason for that is that since its coming into force 
in 1979, there have been no comprehensive, modernizing modifications on the Hungarian 
PIL Code. As a result, modern approaches to conflicts law such as the application of 
alternative connecting factors, flexible connecting factors, escape clauses, choice of law etc. 
appear very seldom, or not at all in the Code. 
However a few above mentioned rules may be found in certain articles, such as those 
on the following subject:15 
(a) rules favouring the validity of certain juridical acts: 
(i) testaments: the article embodying the policy of favor testamenti provides that a testament 
shall be considered formally valid i f i t conforms to any one of the following five substantive 
law: the Hungarian law; the lex personae of the testator's at either the time of making or the 
time of death; the law of the testator's domicile or habitual residence at either the time of 
making or the time of death; the law of the place of making; in the case of immovables, the 
law of the situs [Article 36 (2)]. 
(ii) other juridical acts: the article embodying the policy of favor negotii provides an 
alternative-reference rule, a contract is formally valid if it conforms to lex contractus; lex 
fori, the law of the place of making or where the intended legal consequences are to take 
effect. [Article 29 (2)]. (We should note that this rule differs in some aspects from Article 
11 of the Rome I Regulation.) 
b) rules favouring a certain status: 
(i) based on the principle o f f a v o r divortii there is a unilateral rule in the Code, according to 
which a marriage can be dissolved under the lex fori even if the applicable foreign law does 
not allow dissolution [Article 41 (a)]. 
c) rules favouring one party: 
(i) choice of law by, or for the benefit of, one party 
Pre-dispute choice by one party> 
Until recently, choice of law was only possible within the field of contracts in Hungarian 
PIL. However, the 2009 modifications on the Code have changed the situation, for the 
option of pre-dispute choice by one party has been introduced. The modernization has been 
made with regard to the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Communities in 
ihe Garcia Avello case.16 The new provision concerning name bearing makes it possible that 
in the case of individuals with dual citizenship (Hungarian and foreign), not only the 
Hungarian substantive law,17 but the rules of the relevant foreign country may be applied 
upon the request of the person in question [Article 10(2)]. 
(ed.): Private International Law at the End of the 20th Century: Progress or Regress? The Hague, 
2000, 39. 
14
 See also Burián: op. cit. 271. 
15
 The aspeets of classification are in alignment with the division made by Symeonides. See 
Symeonides: Private International Law... In: Symeonides (ed.): Private International Law... op. cit. 
45 62. 
16
 C-148/02. Carlos Garcia Avello v. Belgian State [2003] ECR I-l 1613. 
17 See Article 11 
(2) If a person has multiple citizenships, and one of his citizenships is Hungarian, his personal 
law will be the Hungarian law. 
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Post-dispute choice by the court 
Regarding questions of delictual liability outside of the scope of the Rome II Regulation (in 
more detail in XII), the Hungarian PIL Code establishes the rule of lex loci delicti as the 
main rule: it is the law prevailing at the place and time of the tortuous act or omission. 
However paragraph 2, based on the principle of favor laesi, provides that "[i]f it is more 
favourable for the injured party, the law of that state shall apply, in the territory of which 
the damage occurred" [Article 33(2)]. This rule assigns the choice to the court to be made 
for the victim's benefit. Sometimes it happens in Hungarian judicial practice that this rule 
serves as a hidden device for the application of the lex fori,18 
There is a special provision in the Code with regard to the infringement of personal 
rights. This unilateral rule states that "if the Hungarian law is more favourable for the 
person suffering the injury in respect of the resultant compensation or indemnification, the 
claims shall be adjudged according to that law" [Article 10(3)]. 
In addition, a rule favouring the child appears. Regarding the status of the child and its 
family relationship Article 46 provides that "[t]he Hungarian law shall apply to the family 
legal status of a Hungarian citizen child or a child residing in Hungary, to the family law 
relationships between him and his parents, as well as to the obligation of maintenance 
provided for the child, if it is more favourable for the child". 
(ii) protecting consumers or employees from the consequences of an adverse choice of 
law clause: with regard to the fact that these type of contracts are governed by Articles 6 
and 8 of the Rome I Regulation, the former, partly different provisions of the Code were 
abolished with the 2009 modifications. 
Based on the above we can conclude that the rules of the Hungarian PIL Code "bind 
the hands" of the Hungarian judge regarding the question of allowing the court to consider 
the content of the conflicting laws and make the choice dependent on that content. These 
restrictions are presently eased by the law sources of the European Union in the field of PIL 
and by the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Communities. In the future, 
fundamental changes should be introduced by the comprehensive modification and 
modernization of the Code. 
3. Unilateral Rules and Rules of Immediate Application 
The unilateral conflict nonns, similarly to the concept of the statute theory, determine the 
extent of the application of one's own laws. In other words, a choice-of-law rule is deemed 
to be unilateral when it defines the scope of application of the domestic law with respect to 
foreign element cases only, namely it determines the situations in which a fact of private 
international law is to be governed by the domestic law. By contrast, the complete 
(multilateral) conflict norms explicitly determine the law applicable in a particular case, 
irrespective of whether the process of selection leads to the application of domestic or 
foreign law. The Hungarian PIL Code, accepting Savigny's approach, states that in private 
international law cases the complete (multilateral) conflict rules should be applied. 
In accordance with the basic concept of the Code, Hungarian jurisprudence holds that 
the complete conflict norms are more suitable to fulfil the function of PIL, since in a case of 
conflict judgement can be made on the basis of the law ensuring the fairest decision. The 
dominant view in the international legislative practice that the overwhelming majority of 
18
 S e e a l s o B u r i á n : op. cit. 2 6 5 . 
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choice-of-law rules are made up of multilateral conflict norms and therefore the use of 
unilateral rules is justified only in a limited area, where the State deems it important to give 
effect to its legal-political considerations, such as the protection of the weaker party in 
consumer contracts. 
We can seldom find unilateral conflict norms in the Hungarian Code, and the 
prerequisite for the application of these norms is the presence of a domestic interest. For 
example, Article 16(2) states: "Hungarian law shall apply in cases where, on behalf of a 
domestic legal interest, the Hungarian court declares a non-Hungarian national to be dead 
or missing, or determines the proof of death of such person." Domestic legal interest is 
involved in the procedure if the legal relations of the missing person in Hungary have to be 
resolved; for example, if the missing person owns a property in Hungary, and he/she has to 
be declared legally dead to start the legal process of succession. 
There is similar rationale behind Article 50 as well, which prescribes the application of 
Hungarian law if immediate measures have to be taken in the interest of the custody, support 
or care of a foreign citizen resident in Hungary. In such case the domestic interest is that the 
application of Hungarian law ensures fast procedure. 
The Code does not specifically deal with the problem of régies d'application immédiate 
and the Hungarian jurisprudence does not seem to be interested in the question either. In my 
opinion, the reason for that is that in Hungarian PIL the similarities and differences between 
règles d'application immédiate and mandatory rules have not yet been examined from a 
dogmatic point of view. In most cases, the legal institution is regarded as a sub-branch of 
ordre public. Due to the lack of adequate legal background and legal theory, the practice of 
its application does not exist either. 
4. International Uniformity and Protection of National Interests 
The theory of Savigny, developed in the middle of the 19th century, is still the cornerstone 
of the development of European conflicts law regarding its main elements. The equality 
among domestic laws and the "international uniformity of decisions" (internationaler 
Entscheidungseinklang), which he placed in the centre, still applies. However, the model 
created by Savigny has been further developed, and it is still developing. The differentiation 
of the connecting factors and the encouragement of efforts aimed at reaching fair decisions 
have appeared, and there is an increasing emphasis on the enforcement of national interests 
as well.14 International uniformity as a laudable and desired goal has remained, but since 
the second half of the 20th century there has been an increasing demand for the protection 
of state or national interests, especially in the case of the forum state. Some describe that 
this is the period when conflicts law has "lost its innocence".20 
With regard to instruments serving the protection of national interests, the Hungarian 
jurisprudence and the PIL Code do "not follow the position of promoting national interests 
directly by choice of law rules or methods".21 Consequently, such rules as the preference 
19
 See Burián, L. Kecskés, L. Vörös, I.: Magyar nemzetközi kollíziós magánjog (Hungarian 
Private International Law). Budapest, 2005, 74-75. 
20
 See Vrellis, S.: Le droit international privé grec à la fin du vingtième siècle: progrès ou recul? 
In: Symeonides (ed.): Private Internationa! Law... op. cit. 247. 
21
 See Burián: op. cit. 266. 
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given to the forum's or third state's international mandatory rules22 are not included in the 
Code. Besides the ordre public clause the Code also contains so-called unilateral rules 
specifically designed to protect forum interests indirectly ("special ordre public rules"), e.g. 
with regard to the dissolution of marriage.23 According to leading scholars of the subject, 
this provision of the Code "opens too wide the gate of defence in ordre public"The rule 
which allows the dissolution of marriage even if the conditions required by the applicable 
foreign law are not satisfied, but according to Hungarian family law they are met, is 
particularly unreasonable. In this respect, only the part declaring the theoretical possibility 
of the dissolution of the marriage may be justified, which however could also be concluded 
from the ordre public clause. 
Moreover, certain rules of the Hungarian P1L Code indirectly encourage the forum to 
apply the lex fori, thereby promoting the protection of national interests. In Hungarian PIL, 
the unilateral regulation of renvoi (see VIII) or the fact that fraudulent connection is only 
sanctioned by the Code if it resulted in the application of a foreign law (domestic law has to 
be applied in case of fraudulent behaviour as well) are regulations promoting a homeward 
trend, and while their purpose is not the protection of national interest, they can be used as 
instruments to achieve such a goal as well.25 
HI. Some General Rules 
1. Qualification 
Article 3 of the Hungarian PIL Code contains explicit provisions on qualification, which is 
basically subject to the lex fori. Accordingly where there is a dispute about the legal 
qualification of the facts or relationships to be judged is being disputed, the interpretation of 
the rules and notions of Hungarian law shall be used by the forum. Thus the law in 
accordance with most legal systems assumes the prevailing view. As a subsidiary rule the 
Code declares if a legal institution is not known to Hungarian law, or is known but carries a 
different meaning or different name, then the judge shall qualify it with regard to the foreign 
law regulating the legal institution [Article 3(2)]. It is not clearly stated by the above article 
which foreign law to use for qualification, and it is up to the judge to decide. From the 
aspect of the purpose of qualification however it can be stated that it can only be derived 
from legal systems in conflict with each other in relation to the facts of the case. According 
22
 In contrast with Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation. In Article 3(4) of the Rome I Regulation 
besides the protection of national or state interests the protection of Community interests appears 
as well. 
23
 Article 4L 
The foreign law applicable to the dissolution of marriage shall apply with regard to the 
following differences: 
a) A marriage may be dissolved also if the foreign law excludes the dissolution of marriage, 
or the conditions of dissolution arc not satisfied according to the foreign law but are satisfied according 
to the Hungarian law. 
b) The question of whether marital life has been completely and irreparably mined shall be 
considered even is cases where absolute grounds for divorce are present according to the foreign law. 
c) The dissolution of marriage may not be based upon culpability. 
24
 See Mádl, F. Vékás, L.: Nemzetközi magánjog és nemzetközi gazdasági kapcsolatok joga 
(The Law of Conflicts and Foreign Trade). Budapest, 2004, 421. 
25
 Burián: op. cit. 266. 
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to Professor Burián on the basis of text interpretation this can be the law of a third country 
with absolutely no reference to the facts of the case. 
According to Professor Lajos Vékás2b the solution based on lex fori is unilateral 
because it starts exclusively from the interpretation of the conflict norm hypothesis while 
the problem is far more complex than that. Qualification on lex fori starts from the principle 
that conflict norm hypothesis includes all those domestic and foreign legal institutions that 
are subjects to legal regulation within the substantive law of the forum. Professor Vékás 
suggests breaking with this unilateral and rigid view and instead he proposes to combine 
the comparative law approach of Rubel and the functional interpretation approach of 
Kegel. 
In the Hungarian judicial practice lex fori is usually applied for qualification.27  
2. Renvoi 
The Hungarian Code partly adopts the renvoi. Under Article 4 the scope of the reference 
must be interpreted in a narrow sense, thus except for reference back, the conflict rules of 
the applicable foreign law are not to be taken into account in general, but the rules of foreign 
law directly governing the matter must apply. Hence the Hungarian Code does not recognise 
a reference to third law because the foreign conflict rules to be applied can be ignored. The 
Hungarian forum therefore only accepts the renvoi on special occasions when it refers back 
to the Hungarian law. The general rule on renvoi is one of compromise, which does not 
always promote international harmonisation of decisions under the conflict-of-laws; 
however it vigorously serves the homeward trend. 
In the Special Part of the PIL Code Article 21/A embodied in Act No. XXVII of 2004 
which contains a provision of the EC directive on financial collateral arrangements28 
excludes reference back considering ownership and other rights in rem recorded on deposit 
accounts or based on dematerialized securities. 
Finally, the rules of Rome Convention, Rome I and Rome II also exclude the application 
of the renvoi, accordingly a Hungarian judge cannot apply this legal institution in case of 
26
 Mádl-Vékás: op. cit. 96. 
27
 There was a dispute between the parties over the terms of financial compensation of the 
management contract of a company. The plaintiff, a Slovak citizen and the defendant, a company 
domiciled in Hungary contracted for employment according to the German law on a tacit 
understanding, which should have required the application of the "Dienstvertrag" rules governed by 
BGB. This contract type is unknown to the Hungarian law, and above all it was misnamed as service 
relations. Service relations under Hungarian law mean service relations of professional members of 
the effective armed forces and services. The dispute in the given case however was between the 
managing director and the company. The Hungarian court had to take a stand on the issue of legal 
relationship between the parties. The personal law of the company is the Hungarian law, and under 
the Hungarian company law if the office-holder is in position without legal relations then the agency 
contract law of Civil Code must be applied. The parties concerned identically stated that between 
them a civil law relationship was regulated, therefore the court qualified the relationship between 
them as civil law relationship according to Hungarian law, and then judged the case according to 
German substantive law (Supreme Court Pkf. 5. 25.918/2008/2). 
28
 Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002, Official 
Journal L 168, 27/06/2002 43-50. 
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these legal relations. There have been no changes recently in the application of the renvoi in 
the Hungarian judicial practice, it invariably occurs very rarely.29 
3. Ordre Public and Mandatory Rules 
The rules of ordre public (public policy) have not changed in the Hungarian legal system in 
the past decade. The regulation of public policy, in a sense of P1L, can be found in Article 7 
of the Code, but Act No. LXXX1 of 1994 concerning commercial arbitration (hereinafter 
referred to as Arbitration Act) also contains public policy provisions. Even though the latter 
is not exactly identical with the concept of public policy as described by PIL, Hungarian 
judicial practice connects the two. Therefore, we will discuss it in what follows. 
The legislator has included in the system of the PIL Code the public policy rules of 
both private international and procedural law. The public policy clause can be found in the 
section concerning the disregard of foreign law. Article 7(1) gives a general definition of 
public policy. It is a general clause, according to which the application of foreign law shall 
be disregarded where it would violate Hungarian public policy. This definition aims at 
enforcing the defensive function of the public policy clause. Beyond that, it is the task of 
judicial practice to fill it with content. The ordre public functions as a "shield" against 
foreign laws, in case the application of which may have a negative impact on Hungarian 
economic, political or social values. The auxiliary rule of Article 7(2) makes the general 
clause more precise; the application of foreign law shall not be disregarded solely on the 
ground that the socio-economic system of a particular foreign state differs from that of 
Hungary. With that the legislator brings the attention of the forum to the fact that the legal 
institution cannot be applied with a discriminatory intent. 
The PIL Code contains so-called "special public policy rules" related to a given field, 
which make the elements of public policy more precise for judicial practice in a given field. 
Such rules are the rules regarding divorce in Article 41a), b), and c); or the consideration of 
the rules of substantive law, which are the mandatory prerequisites for child adoption based 
on Article 43(4).30 
29
 a) A Hungarian male citizen emigrated to France and there he deceased as a French citizen. 
He left behind some property back in Hungary on intestacy and without direct lineal descendants. His 
Hungarian citizen siblings lay claim for the estate. The Hungarian notary applied Article 36 of the 
Code which states that inheritance relations are subject to the personal law of the deceased person that 
is the citizenship of the devisor. This in our case is the French law but in case of inheritance of 
immovable the French private international law enacts according to the situs of the immovable (lex rei 
sitae). The Hungarian forum accepted the renvoi and applied the Hungarian substantive law of 
succession. See Burián Kecskés-Vörös: op. cit. 19-24. 
b) A Hungarian married couple emigrated from Hungary to Switzerland in 1956, where they 
acquired Swiss citizenship and later they moved back to Hungary. Under Article 39 of the Hungarian 
PIL Code: "The personal and property relations of the spouses [...] shall be governed by the common 
personal law of the spouses at the time of lawsuit." This could be the law of their common citizenship, 
the Swiss law, but the Swiss private international law rale in such a case determines the law of their 
common domicile (Art. 54 of IPRG), which could be found in Hungary. Therefore the judge accepted 
the reference back and applied the Hungarian substantive law. See Mádl-Vékás: op. cit. 107. 
30
 Former special ordre public rules in the area of torts, provided that Hungarian court "shall not 
establish liability for conduct that is not unlawful under Hungarian law", and "shall not impose legal 
consequences not known to Hungarian law", were repealed in 2009. This amendment of the Code 
is welcome because Hungarian scholars sharply criticized these strict and one-sided regulations. 
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According to Article 41, the law applicable in cases of divorce should be determined 
based on the following three criteria: 
a) A marriage may be dissolved even if its dissolution is excluded by the foreign law, 
or if the conditions of divorce are absent according to the foreign law but are present 
according to Hungarian law. 
b) The question of whether marital life has been completely and irreparably ruined31 
shall be considered even is cases where absolute grounds for divorce are present according 
to the foreign law. 
c) A marriage shall not be dissolved on the ground of fault. 
According to the general opinion of leading Hungarian scholars, with this rule the 
legislator gave too much room for public policy intervention, for, opposed to the general 
ordre public rule, in this case close domestic connection is not a prerequisite. Due to the 
flexible nature of the public policy clause, the connection of the case to the legal system to 
be protected is one of the prerequisites for its applicability. 
There is also a special ordre public rule related to adoption. According to Article 43(4), 
adoption may not be permitted or approved by the guardianship authority except when it 
satisfies the requirements of Hungarian law. For example, it is determined by Hungarian 
family law that only married couples are allowed to adopt in common a child. People living 
with their partner or in a registered partnership do not have the right to do so. The purpose 
behind this legal policy is to ensure that the child will be reared in a complete family as 
well as the creation of a family bond between the child and the adoptive parents. This 
imperative norm serves the interests of the child and embodies the social and moral values 
of Hungarian society. The PIL Code makes it more emphatic with a special public policy 
rule. 
The Hungarian international procedural law is characterized by a complex, multi-
channel law source, in which the source of law for the judge in a particular case is precisely 
determined.32 In Hungarian law, the procedural rules of ordre public may be found in 
Section 11 of the Code as the primary reason for the recognition of foreign judgements. The 
Hungarian judge always has to take into consideration whether the impact of the recognition 
and enforcement of the foreign judgement contravenes the fundamental values of the 
Hungarian legal system such as the basic constitutional principles. 
The Hungarian Arbitration Act regulates public policy problems in the field of setting 
aside of an arbitral award. According to the Hungarian rules this process, with reference to 
the violation of ordre public, may be initiated against a domestic arbitral award. This 
possibility and the fact that in the rigid system of setting aside of an award causes ordre 
public is a flexible and malleable legal institution had a significant impact on (he 
development of Hungarian judicial practice. The vast majority of the judgements related to 
As Ferenc Mádl and László Burián pointed out, the application of these rules are unreasonable in 
cases when both the party responsible for the damage and the injured party are foreigners from the 
same country and Hungary is only the place where the damage has occurred. In that case, according 
to Burián, the application of the law of his/her country would be more favourable for the injured 
party. See Mádl Vékás: op. cit. 368-370, and Burián Kecskés Vörös: op. cit. 239. 
31
 Namely this requirement is a cogent rule in Hungarian family law, thus the court always has 
to examine it in a divorce case. 
32
 The Brussels Agreement, the Brussels I and II rules give directives concerning procedural 
law in ordre public, and these rules enjoy priority to domestic law. 
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the application of public policy were born within the framework of a setting aside 
proceeding. While there is very little practice of the application of public policy rule in PIL, 
during setting aside proceedings references are most often made to the violation of public 
policy. The reason for that is to be found in the nature of the arbitration proceeding: it has 
only one instance. The indefinability of the content of the concept of ordre public further 
increases the chances for setting aside of an arbitration award, thereby offering the defeated 
party a last chance to escape the enforcement of the judgement. 
Several Hungarian decisions were made in the latter issue. With a few exceptions, 
references to the violation of ordre public were unfounded. All in all, during the examination 
of the violation of ordre public the starting point is always the same, i.e. the theoretical 
foundations of PIL. This approach has resulted in an interesting situation. Namely, that 
Hungarian judicial practice does not differentiate between the concepts of PIL and 
international commercial public policy. These judgements have contributed to a great extent 
to the development of the contextual outline of Hungarian public policy. They never define 
directly the contextual components of public policy. Rather, they start out from a negative 
approach and state which elements do not belong to the narrowly interpreted domain of 
ordre public 
The separation and interpretation of mandatory rules and public policy has not yet 
happened in Hungarian PIL. The Hungarian regulations do not contain specific reference to 
the field of mandatory rules. Jurisprudence usually regards mandatory rules as a positive 
component of public policy, but does not state specifically what requirements a given norm 
has to meet in order to gain an absolutely mandatory application. This is a question to 
which the answer will have to be found in the future. No judgement has been made 
concerning the application of imperative norms so far. 
33
 In the following, there is a brief summary about a controversial decision, in which the 
Supreme Court has declared for the first time that an arbitral award violates Hungarian public policy. 
The decision was based on an arbitral award of arbitration in which the court rejected the suit of the 
plaintiff and based on the 32 billion HUF in dispute forced him/her to pay 290 million HUF in legal 
costs. The arbitral tribunal arrived at this amount in accordance with the requirements of proportionality 
adjusted to the amount in dispute. The defeated party filed a suit of setting aside of this award at the 
court, in which he/she found injurious the high legal costs and stated that it violates the values of 
Hungarian society, therefore it violates the ordre public. At the first instance the court found this 
reference unfounded and stated that even though the amount is unusually high, the arbitral tribunal 
arrived at the amount in accordance with the laws in force; therefore it does not violate the foundations 
of economic and social order. Consequently, the award does not violate Hungarian public policy. The 
plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court against the final verdict, claiming that the exceedingly high 
legal costs placed a disproportional burden on the defeated party and violated the value system of 
society. The Supreme Court found that even though the stipulated amount was in accordance with the 
law, it could limit the party in his/her right to turn to the court and deprive him/her of essential 
financial resources. It might also violate the value system of society, and if it remained in force, it 
would have a negative impact on Hungarian judicial practice. (Supreme Court Gfv. VI. 30.450/2002.) 
The decision caused a lot of professional debate. Many people questioned whether the amount 
of legal costs constitutes part of ordre public. It was also in question whether it can restrict the party 
in his/her right to tum to the court, for it was a firm with considerable capital strength. The most 
heated debate was about the question of whether a judgement made in accordance with the laws in 
force can violate public policy. 
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IV. Law Governing Contracts 
The freedom of party autonomy in choosing the applicable law to international contracts 
had already been accepted in Hungarian judicial practice before the birth of the PIL Code. 
The Code adopts the choice of law possible as the primary connecting factor of the law 
governing contracts. The laconic provision constaicted in 197934 was supplemented with a 
few additions in 2009. According to the new provision: "A contract shall be governed by 
the law chosen by the parties at the time of contracting or later to the whole or a part only 
of the contract. The choice must be expressed or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by 
the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case." (Article 25). The Code, similarly 
to the Rome I Regulation, mentions primarily the express choice of law and defines the 
implied choice of law as well. In this last point, however, there is a difference from the 
definition in the Rome I Regulation. The second sentence in Article 3(1) of the Rome I 
Regulation is the following: "The choice shall be [...] clearly demonstrated by the terms of 
the contract or the circumstances of the case." In the Code it goes as follows: "[. . .] 
demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of 
the case."35 In this latter version implied and hypothetical choices of law can be hardly 
differentiated from each other, while only the former should be permitted.36 
Regarding the time of choosing a law, it provides the parties the choice of law at the 
time of contracting as well as after concluding the contract ("at later"). According to the 
Code, the first time for the choice of law is the time of contracting, but it is also possible for 
the parties to select the applicable law before concluding the contract, for example within 
the framework agreement. Regarding the closing time for the choice of law, the beginning 
of the legal dispute37 or the end of the evidentiary procedure at first instance38 are considered 
in Hungarian legal literature as the theoretical limits. Hungarian judicial practice, as opposed 
to theoretical positions, permits the choice of law any time until delivering the judgement, 
even in procedure at the second instance (we should add that in these cases it has always 
meant the selection of the Hungarian law).39 Similarly to Article 3(2) of the Rome I 
Regulation, it should have been settled in the Hungarian PIL Code that the subsequent 
choice of law, or the changing of the law originally selected shall not prejudice the fonnál 
validity of the contract or adversely affect the rights of third parties.40 
Depeçage: Even though the partitioning of a contract, or choosing several laws at the 
same time (depeçage) was possible based on the Hungarian PIL Code, it was the Rome 
Convention's entering force that finally clarified the situation. 
34
 Article 24. 
The law choscn by the parties at time of contracting or later shall be applied to their contract. 
35
 It should be noted that the text is the result of the inaccurate translation of the Rome I 
Regulation. 
36
 See Vékás, L.: A nemzetközi magánjogi törvény módosításáról (On the Modification of the 
Act on Private International Law). Magyar Jog, 6 (2009), 322. 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 See Burián Kecskés- Vörös: op. cit. 205. 
39
 Supreme Court of Hungary Pf.III.20 895/1992.; Supreme Court of Hungary Pf.VI.22 
046/1993.; Supreme Court of Hungary Pf.III.20 998/1995. See Mádl Vékás: op. cit. 348. 
40
 The legislator should have been made a provision concerning the question of the validity of 
the choice of law clause and the enforcement of the cogent rules of the law applicable in the absence 
of the choice of law against the rules of the chosen law (similarly to Article 3(5) and Article 3(3) of 
the Rome I Regulation). 
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The Rome Convention and Rome I Article 3(1) leave to the parties the complete or 
partial choice of law. The introduction of these rules removed the ambiguity that had been 
present before in the Hungarian regulation. Because the former rule of the Code regulated 
in one sentence the choice of law (Article 24), which, besides stating that the parties can 
choose a law either at the time of contracting or at a later time, contained no further 
provisions. From this regulation Hungarian jurispaidence41 concluded that if the Code does 
not prohibit the partition of the contract, then the parties are free to apply this practice. The 
same interpretation can be concluded through analogy from Article 30 as well. This Article 
states: "The governing law of contracts extends to all elements of the contractual relationship 
[. . .] and, unless otherwise agreed by the parties or otherwise mandated by this Law-Decree, 
to any agreement securing the contract (mortgage, suretyship, etc.) as well as to any setoff, 
assignment and assumption of claims related to the contract." Interpreting this rule, the 
parties have the right to agree to the application of several laws to their contract, but the 
same result can be reached by the simultaneous application of different articles of the Code 
as well. The latest modification of the Code affects this issue, because in the new Article 25 
the depeçage is expressed: "The law chosen to either the whole or the part of the contract 
by the parties [...] shall be applied." 
Limitations of party-autonomy: The Code has no specific provisions concerning the 
laws that may be chosen; therefore the choice of law is theoretically unlimited. It is even 
possible lo choose a law which has no relationship of any kind with either the contract or 
the parties. In this respect, however, the choice of law clauses are interpreted strictly in 
Hungarian judicial practice.42 Taking into consideration the further limitations of the choice 
of law, the Hungarian PIL Code does not specify any other devices besides the ordre public 
clause. In other words, it has no provisions concerning the enforcement of the imperative 
rules of the forum or a third state, and does not set any limitation similar to the Article 3(3) 
of the Rome I Regulation in case of contract where all other elements relevant to the 
situation at the time of the choice are located in a country other than the country whose law 
has been chosen. 
Priority of protective law: These restrictions usually refer to contracts in which one 
party is perceived to be systematically in a weaker position, most importantly consumer 
contracts, employment contracts and insurance contracts. In the member states of the 
European Union these limitations are expressly laid down in the Rome I Regulation, 
therefore the 2009 modification repealed the relevant rules of the Code. 
Finally, as we have mentioned above, it is the result of the decision made by the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities in the case of Garcia Avello43 that the Hungarian 
PIL allows the application of the choice of law rule not only in contract law, but on name 
Ibid. 203. 
42
 For example, it "generally" chooses the Austrian law in legal disputes resulting from loan 
contracts, it does not extend its scope to the collateral contract securing the loan. (Supreme Court of 
Hungary Pf.I.25.615/2002/11.) In another case the court stated that regarding the choice of law the 
Code allows "only the selection of the law (legal system) of an explicitly chosen country". 
(Metropolitan Court of Appeal Pf.6.20.577/2005/4.) (Thus the forum did not accept the clause "the 
ndes of the Hungarian Civil Code" as an appropriate choice of law on the grounds that it was the 
choice of a rule, not the choice of a country's law.) 
43
 C-148/02. Carlos Garcia Avello v. Belgian State [2003] ECR 1-11613. 
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bearing as well. According to Article 10(2), name bearing is governed by the lex personne 
of the individual, but in case of a request made by the individual involved, at the registration 
of the name of birth the law of that country shall be applied which the individual is a citizen 
of as well. 
In preliminary it can be stated that jurisdiction alone is not a connecting factor in 
conflicts law. The jurisdiction of the court of a stale does not necessarily mean that the 
substantive law of the given state should be applied. The function of PIL rules is overtly to 
make it possible for the forum not to use its own law. The rules of jurisdiction do not have 
a direct impact on the applicable substantive law, and it is true the other way round as well; 
the fact whether the applicable law is a domestic or a foreign one does not have any impact 
on the existence of jurisdiction. Consequently, the existence of jurisdiction and the choice 
of law are two separate issues. Although, the "qui eligit iudicem eligit ins" (if you choose a 
judge, you choose a law) is an old proposition in PIL, this principle does not generally 
apply in modern PIL. (We should note, however, that the picture is made more subtle by the 
preamble (recital 12) of the Rome I Regulation, according to which an exclusive choice of 
forum clause "should be one of the factors to be taken into account in considering whether 
a choice of law has been clearly demonstrated".) 
In the judgement of international contracts by a Hungarian court, there is a separation 
between jurisdiction and the selection of the applicable law. The freedom of party autonomy 
can extend to the choice of the forum as well as to the choice of law. In Hungarian judicial 
practice these clauses in general, either choice of law clauses or choice of forum clauses, 
are interpreted rather strictly,44 but the appropriately phrased or unambiguous clauses, 
including the arbitration clauses, are treated in the same way. 
In sum, we can say that with the EU Regulation coming into force the contract law 
rules of the Hungarian PIL Code play only a complementary role. Therefore, the demand of 
the modification of the "old" provisions of the Code was entirely justified. According to the 
new general rule of the Code, in the absence of the choice of law, the contract should be 
governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely connected (Article 28). 
Regarding questions which are not within the scope of the Rome 1 Regulation, for example 
the contract of inheritance, marriage settlement, or the scope of the rights of the 
representative, the trust, the Code contains no specific provisions (which can be a source of 
problems related to qualification). 
Some "old" rules of exception however have remained in the Code, which are the 
following: 
- The law of that stale shall apply to contracts concluded on exchanges, at tender 
negotiations or auctions, in the territory of which the exchange is or the lender negotiation 
or auction is conducted. [Article 26(1)]; 
- A contract of association shall be adjudged according to the law of the state, in the 
territory of which the company pursues its activities. The personal law of the legal entity 
shall apply to a contract of association founding a legal entity. [Article 26(2)]; 
- The law governing at the place of performance shall apply to the existence and 
extent of obligations based upon securities. [Article 27( 1 )]; 
44
 For example, the "jurisdiction of Brussels or courts of Brussels" clause was not acceptable, 
for only "the courts of a state or a certain court" should be selected. (Metropolitan Court of Appeal 
14.Gf.41.315/2003.) 
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- The emergence, devolution, termination and enforcement of contractual rights and 
obligations based upon bonds issued on the basis of a public loan shall be adjudged 
according the issuer's personal law. [Article 27(2)]; 
- If a security provides the right of disposal over goods, the provisions of this Law-
Decree relating to real rights shall apply to the real right effects. [Article 27(3)]; 
- If a security embodies membership rights, the emergence, devolution, termination 
and enforcement of the rights and obligations based upon the security shall be adjudged 
according to the personal law of the legal entity. [Article 27(4)].45 
To sum up, regarding the selection of the law applicable to contracts (similarly to the 
rules of delictual liability) it can be stated that at the modification of the Hungarian PIL 
Code the legislator failed to exploit the opportunity provided for the modernization of the 
old rules.46 Therefore, Hungarian courts will remain responsible for the task of harmonizing 
the Rome I Regulation with the Code until a comprehensive codification is finally made. 
V. Law Governing Torts 
In Volume 2 of his work Private International Law Ernst Rabel refers to the lex loci delicti 
commissi, developed by canonists and statutests, as a generally accepted principle in torts 
law. However, significant changes had taken place in the field by the end of the 20th century 
- beginning of the 21st century. There was a shift in emphasis from the tort-feasor to 
the injured party, and from injurious activity and personal liability the focus shifted to 
compensation.47 This "revolution" (or dethronement), as it was referred to by Ehrenzweig, 
led to the overthrow of the exclusiveness of the lex loci delicti commissi,48 Conflicts law 
reacted to the above process in various ways: with the application of general clauses, the 
development of connecting factors differentiated for special delictions and the "loosening 
up" of traditional connecting factors with rules of exception.49 
The 2009 modification of the Hungarian PIL Code has had an impact on the rules of 
the law applicable to questions of delictual liability. According to Act No. IX of 2009, with 
the modifications the legislator was aiming at the integration of the Rome II Regulation into 
Hungarian law and the harmonization of domestic regulation with the conflicts regulations 
of the EU. Therefore, Article 32 of the Code declares the priority of the Rome 11 Regulation. 
(Hungarian scholars do not think it should be explicitly stated due to the nature of the law 
source and to the fact that at the upcoming introduction of new private international law 
regulations the Code will have to be modified.50) 
45
 Judicial practice regarding the above mentioned remaining rules is unknown. 
46
 Vékás: op. cit. 322. 
47
 Mádl Vékás: op. cit. 363. 
48
 See Ehrenzweig, A. A.: A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers. 
Harvard Law Review, 80 (1966), 377. 
49
 Burián Kecskés Vörös: op. cit. 232 234. 
50
 This problem appears in contract law as well (Article 24). Hungarian scholars agree that 
Article 2 stating the subsidiary character of the Code (according to which "This Law-Decree shall not 
apply in matters which are regulated by international conventions.") should have been complemented, 
which as a result would have declared the priority of the regulation as well. This would have given a 
guidance regarding general questions governed both by the regulations and the Code, such as renvoi 
and ordre public. See Vékás: op. cit. 322. 
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The rules of Rome II Regulation and the preservation of the old provisions of the Code 
resulted in the creation of a two-channel system,51 which became a source of particular 
difficulties for the courts. At the determination of the law applicable to torts the Code, in spite 
of the criticism coming from leading scholars,52 retained the connecting factor of lex loci 
delicti commissi (Article 33(1),53 while the Rome II Regulation follows the connecting factor 
of lex loci damni. The law of the state on whose territory the damage occurred remained in 
the form of favor laesi in the Hungarian Code; in other words, if its application is more 
favourable for the injured party [Article 33(2)].54 Therefore, this provision gives the judge a 
chance to select the proper applicable law in the so called cross-border tort cases, i.e. torts in 
which the injurious conduct occurred in one country and the injury in another country. The 
rule of "more favourable law" referred to in the Code cannot be applied selectively, only to 
certain claims.55 For example, the application of one Hungarian provision of the non-material 
damages instead of the otherwise applicable German law on damages for pain and suffering 
(Schmerzensgeld) is not possible on grounds that it is more favourable for the injured party.56 
The Hungarian Supreme Court has rejected the application of dépaçage, in contrast with an 
earlier court decision at a lower forum.57 The other problem occurring in judicial practice is 
related to the localization of the place where the damage occurred. In the above-mentioned 
case the forum regarded the place of indirect consequences as the place of the injurious 
activity. According to the facts of the case, Hungarian citizens suffered a traffic accident in 
Germany as a result of a German citizen's breaking the law; therefore, both the lex loci delicti 
commissi, and the lex loci damni in a narrow sense lead to the application of the German law. 
However, the court interpreted the latter connecting factor in a broader sense and opted for 
the application of the law of the place of the financial consequences of the injurious activity 
(which in most cases leads to the habitual residence of the injured party); in other words, the 
court considered the "more favourable nature" of the application of the Flungarian law. 
Following these two general provisions, the Hungarian PIL Code declares two rules of 
exception. First, i f i t is justified by the identical social and legal environment the tort-feasor 
and the injured party domiciled in the same state, then the law of this slate should be 
applied.58 At this point there is a difference between the Code and the Rome II Regulation: 
51
 During the construction of Act No. IX of 2009 the legislator, instead of filling the gaps in the 
Decree and harmonizing the two (European and domestic) regimes, only followed the principle of lex 
minimae and repealed the provisions governed by the Decree or deemed unnecessary for other reasons. 
See ibid, at 324. 
52
 See e.g. ibid.', Burián, L.: A deliktuális felelősség a magyar nemzetközi magánjogban (Torts 
in Hungarian Private International Law). Jogtudományi Közlöny, 3 (1990), 143 168. 
53 Article 33. 
(1) Unless otherwise mandated by this Law-Decree, liability for non-contractual damage shall 
be subject to the law prevailing at the time and place of the tortuous act or omission. 
5" Article 33. 
(2) If it is more favourable for the injured party, the law of that state shall apply, in the territory 
of which the damage occurred. 
55
 Supreme Court of Hungary Pf.III.25.783/2002/5. 
56
 As the court states: "Certain concepts or legal institutions cannot be interpreted alone, taken 
out of context". Ibid. 
" Metropolitan Court 4. P. 87.230/1981. See Mádl-Vékás: op. cit. 391. 
s* Article 33. 
(3) If the tort-feasor and the injured party are domicile in the same state, the applicable law 
shall be of the state concerned. 
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while the former prescribes the connection of the common domicile, the latter prescribes 
the connection of the common habitual residence [Article 4(2)], which is more accepted 
today. Second, in case of tortuous act or omission occurred on a registered vessel or aircraft, 
lex bandi should be applied.59 
Finally, the Code contains two supplementary-interpretational rules. On one hand, if, 
under the law of the place of the tortuous act or omission, liability is subject to fault, the 
existence of culpability may be determined either by the lex personae of the tort-feasor, or 
by the lex loci delicti commissi.60 On the other hand, whether the tortuous conduct consisted 
in violation of traffic or other safety regulations, it shall be determined according to the law 
of the place of the tortuous conduct.61 (We should note that Article 17 of the Rome II 
Regulation says the same concerning the issue, therefore the provision of the Hungarian 
Code will not be applied in the future.) Finally, as opposed to the Rome II Regulation 
[Article 4(3)], the Code does not allow the application of escape clauses which would give 
place to judicial discretion and thereby ensure flexibility. 
A means of "loosening up" the lex loci delicti is the choice of law rule, a theory 
originating from Raupe and later further developed by Kropholler and Lorenz. The 
Hungarian PIL Code, contrary to the modem solution under the Rome II Regulation (Article 
14), does not adopt the choice of law rule, even though the party autonomy has been 
accepted by the Hungarian courts in the field of contractual relations since the beginning of 
the 20th century. The integration of the choice of law rule among the rules of conflict 
governing non-contractual relationships has not happened in spite of specific proposals 
made by scholars.62 As a sole possibility, Hungarian PIL allows in the general provisions 
for the parties to request, by mutual agreement, the disregard of the applicable foreign law 
(Article 9); then the lex fori becomes the law applicable to the private international law 
dispute. However, the meaning of the expression "by mutual agreement" is vague and its 
judicial interpretation is by no means clear. In the case of a traffic accident caused in 
Romania by a Hungarian to a Slovakian citizen, the Supreme Court applied the Hungarian 
law instead of the Romanian law (despite the lex loci delicti commissi, lex loci damni 
referred to by the plaintiff in his appeal), stating that with their implicit conduct the parties 
requested the disregard of the applicable foreign (Romanian) law, for both the complaint of 
the plaintiff and the pleading of the defendant were based on the Hungarian Civil Code.63 
There is an important difference between the Rome II Regulation and the Hungarian 
PIL Code. While the first contains a number of special rules, the latter does not provide 
separate choice-of-law rules for different types of torts, such as products liability, and 
environmental torts. We should note, however, that the Code does have provisions 
concerning the applicable law in case of the infringement of personal rights, although not in 
59
 Article 34 (2). This rule is in fact a variety of the lex loci delicti commissi. 
60
 Article 33 (4). 
"I Article 34 (1). 
62
 Burián, L.: Die Möglichkeiten der Rechtswahl im ungarischen IPR im Bereich des 
Deliktsrechts, des Erbrechts des Ehegüterrechts und des Arbeitsrechts. Budapest, 1987; Burián: A 
deliktuális felelősség... op. cit. 143-168. 
63
 Raffai sees the reasoning as the appearance of the homeward trend, and criticizes it saying 
that the disregard by mutual agreement can only be an explicit declaration. See Burián-Kecskés 
Vörös: op. cit. 353. The recognition of the disregard by mutual agreement based on implicit conduct 
(basically reference to Hungarian law in the procedure) appears in other legal relations (e.g. 
succession) as well. (Supreme Court of Hungary Pfv.I/a.20.879/2001/5.) 
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the field of delictual liability. The Hungarian PIL Code calls for the application of the law 
of the place and the time of the injury, but the principle of "more favourable law" appears 
here as well, meaning that if the Hungarian substantive law is more favourable for the 
injured party concerning compensation or indemnification, then that is the law which the 
judge should apply. We must add that the Rome II Regulation and the Hungarian PIL Code 
regulate the selection of the law applicable to the violation of intellectual property rights in 
the same way. 
In sum, the above-discussed dilemmas reveal that although the conflict rules of the 
Code on torts have only a subordinate role due to the Rome II Regulations in force, the 
Hungarian legislator should have already accomplished the harmonization and modernization 
of the conflict rules constructed in 1979, thereby avoiding the difficulties arising from the 
application of the two-channel conflicts law. 
VI. The Hungarian Judicial Application of PIL Rules 
In short, the answer to the question of how the Code is applied in the Hungarian judicial 
practice is the following: it is characterized by contradictions. First of all, as a starting point 
for our research, we have found that only a few number of verdicts in the field of PIL have 
been published in recent years. On the other hand, it is a fact that the number of PIL cases 
to be settled by the court tends to rise. The analysis of the Hungarian judicial practice can 
be approached from two different aspects: 
1. How are the provisions of the Code applied? 
In case of certain general PIL instruments, such as the application of the rules of qualification, 
no real problem arises because courts usually follow the principle of lex fori (see Chapter 
IX). On the other hand, in case of other instruments, for example, concerning the present 
eclectic practice of the ordre public, there is no real agreement even on the issue of what 
elements the Hungarian public policy should include. Another neuralgic point of the judicial 
practice is the determination of the content of foreign law, which is the overt responsibility 
of the court, but sometimes they fail to do it. It may result in the unnecessary lengthening of 
legal procedures,64 or it may lead to a situation when the parties according to Article 9 ask 
for the disregard of foreign law by mutual agreement, and consequently the Hungarian law 
is applied instead. In connection with the above-mentioned Article 9 courts sometimes do 
not make a difference between the choice of law and the disregard of foreign law, but place 
an equal sign between them.65 
2. How are the legal gaps filled? 
In order to present a typical example of filling gaps, let us mention the judicial practice in 
connection with the consideration of incidental question. Despite the fact that the issue of 
incidental question is not settled in the Code, there is agreement in the judicial practice in 
this matter. According to general practice, it is considered independently, i.e. based on the 
principle of lex fori)6 
64
 In 2004 in the Karalyos and Huber v. Hungary case (75116/01) the European Court of Human 
Rights dismissed Hungary in connection with it. 
"5 Supreme Court Pf. VI. 21323/1996. 
66
 Supreme Court Pf. II. 20.992/1992. 
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To sum up, the Hungarian judicial application represents a mixed scene in terms of 
practice. It is the task of jurisprudence to draw attention to the shortcomings as well as to 
provide adequate and appropriate theoretical solutions for the arising problems. In 2003 a 
professional discussion started between the representatives of jurisprudence and judicial 
practice. To serve the harmonization of legal theory and practice, every year a PIL 
conference is organized by Hungarian law faculties on different issues of Hungarian private 
international law. 
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European Round of Manfred Lachs Space Law Moot Court 
Competition, 29-30 April 2010, Győr 
The European Regional Round of Manfred Lachs Space Moot Court Competition was held 
at Széchenyi István University Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political Sciences in Győr, 
Hungary from 29 to 30 April 2010. The European Centre for Space Law (ECSL), together 
with the International Institute of Space Law (IISL), organises each year the European 
Regional Round of the Manfred Lachs Space Law Moot Court Competition. This year, the 
Széchenyi István University Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political Sciences hosted and 
the Hungarian Branch of International Law Association supported the organizing. The 
European Regional Round has been held annually since 1993, with teams participating from 
all parts of Europe. 
The Space Law Moot Court Competition began in 1992, when the U.S. members of 
the International Institute of Space Law invited the George Washington University and the 
American University each to send two teams to participate in a moot court competition in 
conjunction with the International Astronautical Congress. In 2003, the European Regional 
Round was created, and after the death of Judge Manfred Lachs,1 former President of the 
International Court of Justice (and former Judge of the competition) the competition was 
renamed in his honour and memory. In 2000, the Asia-Pacific Regional Round was created 
* Assistant lecturer, Széchenyi István University Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, H-9026 
Györ, Egyetem tér 1. 
E-mail: ganczermonika@yahoo.com 
1
 Manfred H. Lachs (April 21, 1914 Stanislawów, Austria-Hungary [now Ivano-Frankovsk, 
Ukraine] January 14, 1993, The Hague, Netherland) was a Polish lawyer and diplomat who pro-
foundly influenced the development of international law. He attended the Krakow Jagiellonian Uni-
versity where he earned a doctorate in Laws (1937). After his studies, he started working for the 
Consular Academy of Vienna and afterwards in the London School of Economics before the outbreak 
of World War II. Lachs was drafted in the army and throughout his military service he was advisor to 
the Polish government. Before his career turned toward international laws, he filled many judiciary 
posts in the Polish government such as Poland's Foreign Affairs director of the Department of treaties 
and legal jurisdiction between 1947 and I960 then prime minister 's special advisor between 1960 and 
1967. During the Paris Peace conference of 1946, Lachs stood for his country as a delegate. He be-
came a professor of international law at the University of Warsaw in 1952 and served as a member of 
the Polish delegation of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Afterwards, he became a judge 
on the International Court of Justice in 1967 and eventually became one of the longest-serving judges 
there, working until 1993. During his stay as a judge to the International Court, he presided the Court 
f rom 1973 to 1976. He wrote The Law of Outer Space: An Experience in Contemporary Law Making 
in 1972, which contributed to the development of the law of outer space. After his death, the Manfred 
Lachs Space Law Moot Court Competition was named in his honour. 
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and, by 2008, over 50 law schools now participate in the Manfred Lachs Space Law Moot 
Court Competition each year. 
In August 2009, as each year, selected scholars of space law had produced the moot 
problem that was released to universities and posted on the website of the Manfred Lachs 
Space Law Moot Court Competition. Law schools in each region then registered for the 
Regional Rounds. To participate in the competition, 2 to 3 committed law students interested 
in expanding their knowledge of international law and gain valuable international mooting 
experience were needed. Participating groups have submitted written memorials for both 
the Applicant and the Respondent on the moot problem in February. Regional Rounds are 
usually held between March and May, with the Asia-Pacific Regional Round usually held in 
Sydney, Australia, the North America Regional Round in Washington, D.C., and the 
European Regional Round hosted in various cities. 
Other Regional Rounds have already been organized at the beginning of April. The 
2010 North American Regional Round was held on 10 April 2010 at the Georgetown 
University Law Center, Washington, D.C. Each year, the American Association of 1ISL 
Members organises the North American Regional Round of the Manfred Lachs Space Law 
Moot Court Competition. Competitors were from the United States and Canada and the top 
two teams were George Washington University and Georgetown University. The George 
Washington University won the final round and was also awarded the Best Brief Award, 
although Georgetown won the F. Kenneth Schwetje Best Orálist Award. The Asia Pacific 
Regional Rounds have always been the largest region in the competition. The Indian Space 
Research Organisation (ISRO) funded the annual Indian National Funding Rounds in India 
to assist teams to compete in the Asia Pacific Regional Round each year. This year the 
Indian Domestic Funding Round was held in Bangalore, India on 19-21 February. The West 
Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences, Kolkata defeated the home team National 
Law School of India University, Bangalore in the finals, but National Law School of India 
University bagged the best memorial prize. The 2010 Asia Pacific Regional Rounds were 
held in Sydney, Australia between 13 and 17 April. Finalists were the teams of the National 
University of Singapore and the National Law School of India University, Bangalore, India. 
The National University of Singapore won the final round in close contest and obtained the 
Alexis Goh Memorial Trophy. 
The European Round was opened by Prof. Sergio Marchisio, Chairman of the European 
Space Agency European Centre for Space Law and Dr. Gábor Sulyok, Vice-dean for 
academic affairs of Széchenyi István University Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political 
Sciences. 
The 2010 moot problem is the case concerning Suborbital Tourism, Definition of Outer 
Space and Liability (Aspirantia v. Republica),2 revolving around the edge of space, liability 
and rescue commitment of states. The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice 
comprises by Special Agreement of the two states, jointly notified to the Court according to 
Article 36(1) of the Statute. In the Special Agreement the Parties agreed the following facts. 
The space tourism company Startours is incorporated in Aspirantia because of two 
reasons: the favourable tax climate for start-up companies, and the fact that it has no 
national space licensing regulations governing private or commercial space flights. Startours 
2
 The 2010 Moot Problem can be downloaded from <http://www.spacemoot.org/acrobat/ 
prob2010.pdf>. 
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has developed an experimental passenger spacecraft Starflight-1 that is designed to take of ï 
from a specially-adapted and refurbished carrier-aircraft flying high above the high seas. 
The private charter airline whose aircraft is used for this purpose is owned and controlled 
by private citizens of Zerbica. Startours offers suborbital flights to an altitude of 112 km. 
During the maiden flight of Starflight-1 after separation from the carrier aircraft, Starflight-1 
successfully blasted off and, after having reached an altitude of 93 km, returned to Earth 
using its wings for stabilisation. However, on its descent from that altitude it was struck by 
a piece of metal, loss of cabin pressure and the immediate death of the two of the three 
passengers and the co-pilot. All of the victims wore the pressurised suits, but they had taken 
off his headgear. The captain had insufficient authority to compel them to put their helmets 
back on, but him and the remaining female passenger did not remove their headgear. 
Consequently, the captain and the remaining passenger survived, though seriously injured, 
and landed in Aspiranlia. The Minister of Aspirantia announced his plans to draft national 
space legislation to regulate space activities, with particular attention to the problem of 
space debris. 
In the meantime, Starlours began an investigation and found a metal capsule with the 
inscription "father" and a serial number, came from a separate launch that took place on the 
same day by Stationride Corporation, a private company licensed by Kingdom of Republica. 
Stationride operates flights to a permanent national space station orbiting the Earth at 350 km 
above mean sea level. Stationride, which uses Stationferry to carry scientists and supplies to 
the Republican space station, obtained permission from the Government of Republica to offer 
rides to private individuals, even an extra-vehicular space walk can be arranged. Stationrider 
recently contracted with Ashes Corporation, a funeral services company incorporated in 
Republica, to carry a small container containing capsules each filled with 5 grams of human 
ashes, to be placed into low earth orbit. Although environmentalists, astronomers and space 
scientists in Republica have protested against this way of using and polluting orbital space, 
the Republican Space Agency saw no reason to forbid this launch and did not inform other 
nations about this payload and its destination. Its reasoning was that the low "graveyard orbit" 
used for this purpose guaranteed that the container with the capsules would not interfere with 
any active space objects in orbit and would, through atmospheric drag, fall back to earth 
within 15 years and disintegrate in the atmosphere, causing no harm to the Earth or pose a 
risk to orbital space activities. Timothy L. Ash was onboard Stationferry and he had made 
extra payments for an extra-vehicular spacewalk. With permission from the captain of the 
Stationferry, Alfons Linke to whom Mr. Ash paid a handsome amount of money, Mr. Ash hid 
one of the cremain capsules in his spacesuit that contained the ashes of his father-in-law that 
he intended to personally release into space, which impacted on Starflight-1. Startours began 
a lawsuit against Stationrider under the Space Activities Act and against the Republican 
Space Agency under administrative law in the Federal Court of Republica, claiming full 
compensation from both, jointly and severally, for the destruction of Staiflight-1 and the death 
and injuries to the crew and flight participants onboard. 
In the meantime, a return flight of the Stationferry from the Republican space station 
to the Earth suffered a malfunction during its descent through the atmosphere and the 
spacecraft was forced to declare an emergency and land the spacecraft at the nearest 
aerodrome with a long enough runway, which turned out to be an air force base in Aspirantia. 
As a safety precaution, the Stationferry released the fuel into a large lake that Captain Linke 
mistook for the ocean and landed safely. The fuel caused serious environmental damage to 
some protected natural habitats of rare animals, with cleanup costs. It was revealed that 
Captain Linke was piloting the spacecraft and Dr. François Vienet, the Director-General of 
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the Republican Space Agency, was onboard as a private space flight participant. As a result 
of the domestic and international media attention surrounding the accident of Starflight-1, 
the Government of Aspirantia arrested Dr. Vienet and Captain Linke on charges of 
manslaughter of the victims onboard Starflight-1 and breaches of the environmental laws of 
Aspirantia but released the Stationferry and all other crew and passengers onboard to the 
Government of Republica. Significant costs were incurred by the Aspirantian Government 
in relation to the care and repatriation of the remaining crew and passengers of Stationferry 
and the return of the spacecraft. 
Federal Court of Republica dismissed the claims against both defendants on the basis 
that: (i) the Republican Space Agency has fulfilled its obligations as the licensing authority 
for the Government of Republica and cannot be blamed for any subsequent behaviour on 
the part of Stationrider; and (ii) after hearing testimony from an independent aerospace 
engineer, the Court accepted his evidence that the technical specifications of Starflight-1 
and its carrier-aircraft showed that Starflight-1 was not sufficiently powerful or advanced to 
ever reach an altitude of 100 km. 
The two countries agreed to submit their dispute to the International Court of Justice to 
decide the following questions: (i) whether Republica is responsible for the acts and 
omissions of Stationrider and is liable for the loss and damage suffered by Aspirantia in 
relation to the loss of Starflight-1 or Aspirantia acted unlawfully in arresting and charging 
Captain Linke and Dr. Vienet and must withdraw the charges against them and return them 
immediately to Republica; (ii) whether Republica is liable to pay the cleanup, recovery and 
return costs incurred by Aspirantia as a result of the emergency landing by Stationferry; or 
Republica is not liable for the damage sustained by Staiflight-1; and (iii) whether Aspirantia 
acted lawfully in arresting and charging Captain Linke and Dr. Vienet or Republica is not 
liable to pay Aspirantia for cleanup, recovery and return costs of the Stationferry, its 
passengers and its crew. 
The nine competitor teams of the European oral pleadings arrived from the United 
Kingdom, Germany, Poland, Italy, The Netherlands, Russia representing the University of 
Silesia, Katowice; University of Cologne, Köln; The Honourable Society of Inner Temple, 
London; University of Genoa; Leiden University; University of Aberdeen Law School; 
University of Lueneburg; John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin and ihe Law Faculty 
of the Peoples' Friendship, Moscow. Teams contented in 9 preliminary rounds as agents of 
the Applicant and the Respondent state on 29 April. After totalizing the scores of memorials 
and oral pleading scores of the teams, Prof. Sergio Marchisio announced the finalists, and 
the coin toss decided that the University of Cologne (Ms. Lisa Kûpers, Mr. Erik Pellander 
and Mr. Martin Reynders) as Applicant and the Leiden University (Ms. Sotiria Tsoukala, 
Mr. Christopher Johnson and Ms. Ana Cristina Rosa) as Respondent should compete in 
final round. 
The Final Round was held on 30 April. The team of University of Cologne has won 
the European Round, defeating Leiden University. The team of University of Cologne was 
contest the World Finals to be held in October 2010 in Prague, Czech Republic. 
The winner of each region will gather for the 19th World Finals Finals of the Manfred 
Lachs Space Law Moot Court Competition between 27 September and 1 October, held in 
conjunction with the International Astronautical Congress and the International Institute of 
Space Law Colloquium on Ihe Law of Outer Space in Prague, Czech Republic. Participants 
of the competition are encouraged to attend the International Astronautical Congress, 
especially as there are several policy and law sessions each year that may be of interest. The 
world semi-final will be held on 28 September 2010, with the world final, to be judged by 
three sitting members of the International Court of Justice, lo be held on 30 September 
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2010. The two teams with lower-ranked memorial scores, as determined by an independent 
judging panel of scholars, will compete in a semi-final. The following prizes are awarded at 
the world finals each year: Manfred Lachs Trophy (awarded to the winning team in the 
world final); Eilene M. Galloway Award (awarded to the team with the best combined score 
for their memorials); Sterns and Tennen Award (awarded to the best individual oralist in the 
world final); Lee Love Award (awarded to the members of the winning team in the world 
final). 
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CHUN HUNG LIN* 
A Comparative Study of Investment Regimes 
in ASEAN Economies 
Abstract . For a long period, Southeast Asian economies have been export-oriented, most ly to Europe and North 
America . To earn foreign exchanges and speed their economic growth , ASEAN countr ies have moved to combine 
foreign and national capital to promote indigenous industrial deve lopment and nat ive economic growth. For this 
purpose, ASEAN countr ies have set up enormous foreign investment incentives to attract foreign capital and 
enacted related foreign investment regulations many times to catch more foreign investors ' eyes. However , the 
dissimilar economic developmental levels and the different political backgrounds. A S E A N countries have varied 
investment environment and regulations. Since both the formation of ASEAN and A S E A N members themselves 
are more focused on attracting foreign investment , one may ask wha t differences of foreign investment environment 
and regulations A S E A N member states have? The article hopes to analyze A S E A N member ' s investment 
environment and selected members ' investment regulations in o rder to examine the interactions between national 
developmental demands and foreign investment regulations through a comparat ive study of ASEAN m e m b e r 
s ta tes ' laws on foreign investment. 
Keywords: foreign direct investment, A S E A N , developing economies, investment incentives, investment 
guarantee 
I. Establishment and Goals of ASEAN-Attracting more Foreign Investment? 
Historically, Southeast Asia is a region rooted in cultural, ethnie, geographic and 
developmental diversity but generally transformed into a united bloc. Due to western 
imperialist invasions in the 19th century, regional conflicts such as territorial disputes and 
national unification aggravated distrust between neighbors and prolonged fragmentation of 
Southeast Asia.' The common experiences in this region were colonialism in 19th century 
and hegemonic encounter during the Cold War period. Because at that time the region was 
badly divided by ideological conflict and war, the cmcrgence of a shared sense of security 
was extremely slow and difficult. Internal insurgencies and economic hardship forced 
Southeast Asian countries to waste their resources on defense and to rely on external powers 
for security and aid. Those factors restricted the opportunity to create a regional identity 
throughout the region. Guided by the U.S., a number of security arrangements were 
S.J.D., LL.M., LL.B., Visiting Scholar, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary, 
University of London (United Kingdom); Associate Professor, Feng Chia University Graduate Institute 
of Financial and Economic Law (Taiwan); Member, Arizona Bar (USA). 
E-mail: jasonlin626@yahoo.com.tu 
1
 The Sabah dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines led to the early demise in 1962 of 
the Association of Southeast Asia, which these two countries formed with Thailand just one year 
earlier. Diplomatic ties between Kuala Lumpur and Manila were severed between 1962 and 1966. 
There was the Confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia; the separation of Singapore from 
Malaysia in August 1965; the escalating war in Vietnam and the Cultural Revolution in China where 
Chinese leaders openly espoused a policy to export revolutions to Southeast Asia. See Acharya, A.: 
Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order. 
London, 2001. 
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gradually formed during the Cold War period, and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) was also formed under such an atmosphere.2 Most of the organizations 
created during the 1950s and 1960s were subject to a number of limitations including 
geographic, temporal, functional, and ideological ones. Even so, currently there are several 
potential advantages for future cooperation in this region. Firstly, there are billions of hard-
working people constructing their nations after independence. It has also been fuelled by an 
"extraordinary growth in inputs like labor and capital rather than by gains in efficiency."3 
Furthermore, Southeast Asian economies have been export-oriented from the 1950s 
onwards.4 They exported mostly to Europe and the U.S. but intra-Asian trade has always 
been relatively less dynamic. 
The ASEAN was established with the signing of the "Bangkok Declaration" on 8 
August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand. The five original members were Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. Brunei joined ASEAN in January 1984. Following 
with Vietnam's admittance, Laos, Myanmer, and Cambodia have become the new members 
of ASEAN sooner or later. The Bangkok Declaration united ASEAN members in a joint 
effort to promote economic cooperation and the welfare of the people in the region. The 
Declaration set up guidelines for ASEAN's activities and defined the aims of the 
organization. Under the Declaration, the ASEAN countries came together with three main 
objectives. First, ASEAN plans to promote economic, social and cultural cooperation in this 
region. Second, it strives to safeguard the political and economic stability in this region. 
Third, it aims to serve as a forum for the resolution of inter-regional differences. Within 
ASEAN, internal affairs between member states have emphasized economic, social, cultural, 
and security cooperation,5 especially the progress in economic integration. 
Indeed, except the security reason, the ASEAN had intended to increase the 
organization's international leverage and the region's economic prosperity at the beginning. 
When the world's economic structure moves toward regional economic coopération such as 
the successful formations of the "European Union" (EU) and "North America Free Trade 
Area" (NAFTA), the future development of ASEAN had been deeply influenced by such a 
tend of regional economic integration. First, Southeast Asian countries feared becoming 
outsiders in a world increasingly divided into trading blocs and further sensed the need to 
create a fallback position, should the Uruguay Round collapse.6 In addition, the ASEAN 
nations whose legitimacy depended heavily upon the high economic growth rates delivered 
to their electorate created the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in the hope that it would 
bring in increased foreign investments to support the high growth rates.7 Lastly, the ASEAN 
2
 Romano, C. P. R.: Can You Hear Me Now? The Case For Extending The International Judicial 
Network. Symposium: Anti-Competitive Behavior and International Law. Chicago Journal of 
International Law, 10 (2009) 1,233-267. 
3
 Dale, R.: Debunking Myths of Modem Asia. InternationaI Herald Tribune, Nov. 4, 1994. 
4
 Tan, G.: ASEAN Economic Development and Cooperation. Singapore, 2000, 6, 7-34. 
5
 The ASEAN Declaration states that the aims and purposes of the Association are: (1) to 
accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region and (2) to promote 
regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship 
among countries in the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter. See 
ASEAN Declaration signed in Bangkok, 8 August 1967. 
6
 Tan, L. H.: Will ASEAN economic integration progress beyond a free trade area? International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, 53 (2004) 4, 935-967. 
7
 Ibid. 
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members worried that their markets might begin to look less attractive to foreign investors 
due to the rise of neighbours, P. R. China and India.8 This reasoning opened to the thinking 
that led of creation of AFTA by the leading members of ASEAN. Although ASEAN 
countries were hesitant at the beginning, they have since adopted the "Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation" (APEC) cause as their own and made major progress for 
liberalization and facilitation for many years.9 The most remarkable accomplishment in 
ASEAN economic cooperation was the creation of the AFTA scheme similar to NAFTA. 
AFTA is an agreement by the ASEAN member states concerning local manufacturing in the 
region and designed to lower intra-regional tariffs and put country-of-origin regulations 
in place.10 The main reason for formation of AFTA is not to promote internal trade 
and investment within its members; rather, to group a strong block for international 
competitiveness and attract foreign investors. 
Since the ASEAN leaders were keen on seeking economic gains from foreign investors, 
it seems that the future cooperation of ASEAN is more focused on attracting investment 
from within and from outside of ASEAN members, instead of internal trading. In October 
2003, the ASEAN leaders gave impetus to the original thought by signing the Bali Concord 
II to realize the vision of an ASEAN common market by 2020." These efforts are designed 
to facilitate the flow of goods within ASEAN so as to further AFTA's goals of deeper 
regional integration and attracting more investment from extra-regional sources. Although 
its position is one of the most successful examples of regional integration in the Asia-Pacific 
area, there is no doubt that ASEAN still has to deal with integration difficulties relating to 
developmental gaps between well-developed and less-developed members, in particular 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. Acknowledging the need to narrow the 
developmental divide among member states, ASEAN leaders had reached an agreement to 
create an ASEAN Community by 2020, known as the Bali Concorde II, made up of three 
components including the ASEAN Political-Security Community, the ASEAN Socio-
Cultural Community and the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) under ASEAN Sectoral 
Ministerial Bodies.12 It is believed that the Bali Concord II appears to map out a different 
course for ASEAN economic cooperation, namely deeper integration under regionalism. 
8
 Haas, D. A.: Out of Others Shadows: ASEAN Moves toward Greater Regional Cooperation in 
the Face of the EC and NAFTA. American University Journal of International Law and Policy, 9 
(1994) 3, 809. 
9
 Rennie, J.: Competition Provisions in Free Trade Agreements: Unique Responses to Bilateral 
Needs or Derivative Developments in International Competition Policy? International Trade Law and 
Regulation, 15 (2009) 2, 57-71. 
10
 See Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the ASEAN Free 
Trade Area, Singapore, 28 January 1992, available on http://www.aseansec.org/12375.htm (last visited 
on May 27, 2010) 
11
 Sucharitkul, S.: Report on the Second China-ASEAN Expo. 18-21 October 2005, Nanning, 
Guangxi, China. Chinese Journal of International Law, 5 (2006) 2, 397. 
12
 At the 11th ASEAN Leaders' Summit in December 2005, it was agreed to put forward the 
goal of realizing an ASEAN Economic Community by 2015. The establishment of ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) is spearheading ASEAN regional integration. The AEC is envisioned to create a 
single market and production base characterized by a free flow of goods, services, investment, capital 
and skilled labor by 2020. See Habito, C. F.-Aldaba, F. T.-Templo, O. M.: An Assessment Study on 
the Progress of ASEAN Regional Integration: The Ha-Noi Plan of Action toward ASEAN Vision 2020. 
REPSF Project No. 03/006b, by Ateneo Center for Economic Research and Development, Manila, the 
Philippines, Oct. 2004. 
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The ASEAN leaders arc also aware that failure to integrate the diverse markets of 
ASEAN will mean the group will lose investment and economic opportunities to regional 
competitors such as P. R. China and India. Not only forming a strong trading bloc, ASEAN 
member states have adopted a series of measures to catch more foreign investors' eyes. For 
example, most ASEAN countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Vietnam, and Thailand have enacted foreign investment laws or concluded investment 
guarantee agreements with main investor countries. These legislations provide legal 
protection for bilateral trade investments and ensure foreign investors' interests in those 
countries. Since both the formation of ASEAN and ASEAN members themselves are more 
focused on attracting foreign investment, strongly influenced by the establishments of the 
WTO, EU, and NAFTA, one may ask what differences of foreign investment environment 
and regulations ASEAN members have? In addition, ASEAN member states face different 
developmental situations, are their investment regulations similar with each other under a 
united structure of ASEAN? Or they have designed or adopted different investment 
measures to fit their national economic goals? This article hopes to analyze those questions 
from ASEAN member's investment environment and selected members' investment 
regulations and to examine the relationship between developmental demands and related 
regulations through a comparative study of ASEAN members' investment regulations. 
11. Economic and Investment Environment within ASEAN's Members 
For making the comparative study more efficiently, the author had divided the ten member 
states into three categories including developing economies, small economies and less 
developed economies depending on their economic developmental levels. Meanwhile, the 
small economies comprise Singapore and Brunei which are the richest and most advanced 
countries in this region. The less developed economies are so-called "CLMV" countries, 
named after the first letter in the following countries including Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, 
and Vietnam. Those four countries are the poorest and least developed countries in the 
region. The rest of the member states all belong to developing economies according to 
database of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and United Nations (UN).13 
I. Developing Economies—Four Original Members 
a) Kingdom of Thailand 
Thailand's economy has undergone dramatic changes over the last 25 years. The country 
has developed from an agricultural economy based on a narrow range of commodity-export 
into a newly industrialized country while agriculture still plays an extremely important role 
in Thailand's economy.14 More than half of the population depends on the cultivation of 
13
 The IMF uses a flexible classification system that considers "(1) per capita income level, (2) 
export diversification-so oil exporters that have high per capita GDP would not make the advanced 
classification because around 70% of its exports arc oil, and (3) degree of integration into the global 
financial system." See IMF: World Economic and Financial Surveys. World Economic Outlook, 
Databasc-WEO Groups and Aggregates Information. Oct. 2009. 
14
 Since the 1980s, Thailand's annual economic growth rate has averaged over 9% in real terms. 
See Central Intelligence Agency: CIA World Factbook: Thailand. Feb. 8, 2007, available on https:// 
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/th.html (last visited on May 28, 2010). 
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rice for their livelihood.15 Although the growth of the manufacturing and service sectors has 
reduced the dominance of agriculture, Thailand retains the leading position of rice exporters 
in the world. Textiles are the largest export item in Thailand. Thailand's major trading 
partners include Japan, the U.S., EU, Taiwan, and Singapore. Tourism is Thailand's single 
largest source of foreign exchange.16 Thailand joined the establishment of ASEAN and has 
developed increasingly close ties with other ASEAN members in economic, trade, political, 
and cultural coopération. The major foreign policy of Thailand is to support regional 
stability for ASEAN's interests and to stress a security relationship with the U.S. and other 
Western countries. Because manufacturing and related infrastructure have developed 
remarkably in recent years, Thailand attracts more foreign investments than other ASEAN 
countries. Besides, the Thai government always maintains favorable policies and a strong 
willingness to greet foreign investments. The major investors are Japan, the U.S., Taiwan, 
and Singapore. In order to reduce urban and rural citizens' income differentials, the 
government has tried to encourage the decentralization of economic activities out of 
Bangkok and also has provided more attractive investment incentives outside of Bangkok. 
b) Malaysia 
Since 1987, Malaysia has experienced remarkable economic growth averaging between 8% 
and 9% per year.17 Malaysia is the world's leading producer of rubber, palm oil, tropical 
timber, and tin. The major products of Malaysia includc electronic components, electronic 
goods, and textiles and apparel. Malaysia also is one of the largest exporters of semiconductor 
devices in the world.18 This country holds abundant natural resources, well-educated 
workforce, a well-developed infrastructure, and a stable political environment to attract 
foreign investors. However, because this country is heavily dependant on foreign capital, 
the cconomy remains vulnerable to external strikes.19 Therefore, industrial countries' 
economic depressions could cause severe repercussions to this country. Malaysia is a 
founding member of ASEAN and views regional cooperation, especially the relations with 
its Southeast Asia neighbors, as the most important foreign policy. The Former Prime 
Minister Mahathir had espoused the "Look East" policy, which emphasized the traditional 
Asian valuations and viewed Japan and Asia's Newly Industrialization Countries (NIC) as 
the economic developmental model. Malaysia still maintains traditionally close relations 
with the Western countries, especially with the British Commonwealth countries.20 
15
 Pupphavesa, W.: Globalization and social development in Thailand. CAS Discussion paper, 
(2002) 39, paper presented at the Conference on Globalisation and Social Development: Perspectives 
from Asia and Europe Antwerp, 15-16 April 2002. 
16
 ibid., the major tourists are from Japan, Taiwan and USA. 
17
 Manufacturing is the Malaysian economy's largest sector, accounting for an estimated over 
40% of GDP after 2000. See Mahbot, S.: The Malaysian Economy: Challenges and Prospects in 
Asian Strategy and Leadership Institute, Malaysia Today: Towards the New Millennium. London, 
1997. 
18
 ArifF, M.: The Malaysian Economic Experience and Its Relevance for the OIC Member 
Countries. Islamic Economic Studies, 6 (1998) 1, 2-40. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Mcndl, W.: Japan s Asia Policy: Regional Security and Global Interests. London, 1997. 
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c) Republic of Indonesia 
Indonesia is the world's largest archipelagic country, and has abundant natural resources, 
most of which remain undeveloped. The main exports of Indonesia arc timber, petroleum 
products, and rubber. The agriculture sector still plays the major role in the economy and 
also employs about half of the population. The economy of Indonesia has been transformed 
during the past thirty years.21 Before the 1960s, the economy suffered from serious inflation, 
and foreign exchange reserves were almost depleted. But changes in economic policies, 
rising foreign aids and investments, and the huge revenues from petroleum exports in 1970s 
till 1990s; all let Indonesia's economic growth become steady and brought the inflation 
under control.22 Indonesia's major trading partners include Japan, the U.S., and the Asian 
NIC. Japan is the largest foreign aid lender and the biggest direct investor of this country.22 
Indonesia has made vigorous efforts to deregulate its economy and to attract foreign 
investment. Because of Indonesian government deregulation and encouragement of the 
foreign investments to move Indonesia's economy forward, the government recognizes the 
importance of foreign investments and foreign capitals to sustain Indonesia's economic 
growth. Foreign investments in Indonesia tripled during the period between 1990s and 
2000s. The investments help this country's economy which has averaged growth of over 
7% per year for the last decade. Economic indicators also show foreign investments 
continuing to increase with a remarkable rate.24 
d) Republic of the Philippines 
The Philippines is an archipelago country and located along the southeastern rim of Asia 
forming a land chain between the Pacific Ocean in the east and the South China Sea in the 
west. The Philippines principal exports include textiles, minerals, farm products, and 
electrical equipment, and imports are commodities, capital goods and petroleum products.25 
Major partners of the Philippines are the U.S., Japan, Taiwan and ASEAN countries. 
However, drought and power supply problems hamper production, while inadequate 
revenues prevent government pump priming. After adopting a more liberal economic policy 
followed by a gradually stable regime, rapid economic growth of the Philippines is 
expected.26 Muslim separatists in the southern Philippines are still threatening to stall peace 
negotiations and abort a nascent economic recovery in the area.27 As to foreign investment, 
21
 Haseman, J. B.-Lachica, E.: The U.S.-Indonesia Security Relationship: The Next Steps. 
USA-Indonesia Society Publications, Jan. 2009, 55-87. 
22
 Iwan, J.-Azis, I. J.: Development and Sustainable Future: The Environmental Dimension of 
Indonesia's Socio-Economic Progress. Paper presented at the International Conference on Sustainable 
Future of the Global System, United Nations University, Tokyo, May 24-28, 2000. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 The Philippines is the world's largest producer and exporter of coconuts. Agriculture accounts 
for over 22% of the GDP and industrial production of goods account for over 28%. See Balisacan, 
A.-Hill, H.: The Philippine Economy: Development, Policies, and Challenges. New York, 2003, 402-
496. 
26
 The currency speculation that hit the Philippines peso during July 1997 could result in some 
slowdown in G DP growth. See Balisacan, A.—Hill, H.: The Dynamics of Regional Development: the 
Philippines in East Asia. Cheltenham, 2007, 13^47. 
27
 Ibid. 
A COMPARATIVE S T U D Y O F INVESTMENT R E G I M E S IN ASEAN E C O N O M I E S 169 
the Philippine government has taken different steps in recent years to attract foreign 
investment. These includc foreign exchange liberalization and foreign ownership's 
relaxation for enterprises which have no investment incentives. Besides, specific economic 
zone plans like the Subie Bay project have provided more favorable incentives than other 
areas to attract foreign investments. 
2. Small and Rich Economies-Singapore and Brunei 
a) Republic of Singapore-As One of "Four Asian Tigers" 
Singapore, as one of NICs, has the most advantage economic background over other 
ASEAN members including its abundant capital and advanced techniques. This small island 
become an independent country in 1965, and assumed full sovereignty over its territory.28 
Singapore does not have significant natural resources exccpt its deep water harbor. However, 
it has an excellent geographical location with a well-developed infrastructure and 
communications system, political stability as well as a well-disciplined manpower. 
Singapore is a major transshipment hub, a global warehousing and distribution center in the 
Asia-Pacific area. It poses the leading position of financial and commercial activities in 
Southeast Asia area. There arc many international companies including banks, insurance, 
shipping, transportation, communication, and services to set up operational headquarters or 
branches in Singapore. Traditionally, Singapore has adopted a free trade policy. The trade 
policies and regulations of Singapore are kept very liberal, with non-tariff barriers imposed 
to protect domestic industries.29 There are minimum trade restrictions and regulations. As to 
foreign investment, Singapore also remains high-level attraction to foreign investors with 
its liberal foreign investment policies and economic growth potential. The investment 
incentives in Singapore aim to develop this country into an international commercial ccnter, 
air and sea cargo center, as well as the regional operational headquarters for multinational 
enterprises and major exporter services. Foreign investors often use Singapore as their 
operational center to provide management services for their subsidiaries and associated 
companies or their branches in other Asia countries. 
b) Negara Brunei Darussalam-Small and Rich Petroleum-Export Center 
Brunei is located on the northern coast of Borneo Island, and is almost completely 
surrounded by Malaysia. The economy of Brunei is for the most part supported by exports 
of crude oil and natural gas, with revenues from the petroleum sector accounting for more 
than 50% of GDP.30 The major customers for Brunei's petroleum products are including 
Japan, S. Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and the U.S. The major suppliers of imports are 
Singapore, Japan, and the U.S.31 Most of Brunei's food had to be imported. Agriculture and 
fisheries arc among the industrial sectors which the government has selected for highest 
28
 Singapore's port is one of the busiest ports in the world. See McDougall, D.: Asia Pacific in 
World Politics. Boulder (CO), 2007, 201-230. 
29
 Over ninety percent of all imports enter into this country free from tariffs and other border 
measures. See Lin, Ch. H.: Critical Assessment of Taiwan's Trade and Investment Relationship with 
ASEAN Countries in the Past, Present & Future. Miskolc Journal of International Law, 7 (2010) 1, 
61-82. 
30
 Saunders, G.: A History of Brunei. London, 1994, 8-37. 
31
 See Lin: op. cit. 
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priority in its efforts to diversify the economy.32 Owning huge fortunes and the wealthy life, 
Brunei owns one of the finest social welfare policies in the world, providing all medical 
services and subsidizing food and housing to its civilians. The government of Brunei also 
actively encourages foreign investments. New enterprises which meet certain criteria can 
receive "pioneer" status, exempting profits from income tax for up to five years. There is no 
personal income tax or capital gains tax. Besides, there are no specific restrictions of foreign 
equity ownership, but local participation, both shared capital and management, is strongly 
encouraged. Owning companies in Brunei has to be incorporated locally or registered as a 
branch of a foreign company and must be registered with the Registrar of Companies. 
Brunei has joined ASEAN in 1984 and gives its ASEAN membership the highest priority in 
its foreign relations.33 
3. Less-Developed Econom ies—CL MV Countries 
a) Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
In 1975, North Vietnam and South Vietnam unified and established a new country, "Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam."34 Under prolonged wartime and huge military expenditures, Vietnam 
suffered a shortage of agricultural productions, and insufficient consumer goods. Badly 
deteriorated living conditions made the government attempt to start a new direction and 
trend into the international capitalistic system. Since the 1980s, the government adopted 
"New Economic Policy" and "Doi Moi" to restructure its society and economy.35 Vietnam 
has made significant progress in recent years moving away from the planned economic 
model and toward a more effective market-oriented economic system. In addition, the scopc 
for private sector activity has been expanded, primarily through dc-collectivization of the 
agricultural sector and introduction of laws giving legal recognition to private business. 
Despite such positive indicators, the country's economic turnaround remains tenuous. 
Nearly three-quarters of export earnings are generated by only two commodities, rice and 
crude oil. Vietnam is heavily dependent upon exports such as coffee, tea, and rubber for the 
success of its future economic development. Since 1986, Vietnam has attempted to open 
and run its economy by a more rational manner, and adjusted its international relations to 
reflect the evolving international economic and political situation in Southeast Asia.36 After 
withdrawal of its troops from Cambodia in 1989, Vietnam hopes to use the leverage for 
improved relations with ASEAN, the U.S., and Western countries.37 In 1995, Vietnam 
became the seventh member of ASEAN and has stepped up its speed to attract foreign 
investments from industrial countries and to regularize relations with the global economic 
32
 Statistics had showed that per capita of GDP in Brunei is $8,800 and is the highest among the 
third world countries. See Central Intelligence Agency: CIA World Factbook: Brunei (2009). Available 
on www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bx.html (last visited on May 28, 2010). 
33
 See Lin: op. cit. 
34
 McMahon, R.-Paterson, Th.: Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War: Documents 
and Essays. 4th ed., USA, 2007, 5-18. 
35
 Yamaoka, K.: The Feasibility of Cuban Market Economy: A Comparison with Vietnam. 
Institute of Developing Economies Discussion Papers, (2009) 189, 2-33. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 See McMahon-Paterson: op. cit. 
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system.38 Vietnam' resumption of diplomatic ties with the U.S. and getting its membership 
of ASEAN have reinforced Vietnam's economic development and made it become an ideal 
investment area. 
b) Lao People's Democratic Republic 
Laos is a landlocked country between Vietnam and Thailand. It is one of the poorest 
countries in the world with a grossly primitive economic infrastructure, and a largely 
uneducated workforce.39 It has very limited railroads, a rudimentary road system, poor 
external and internal telecommunications, and electricity available only in a few areas.40 
Laos has had a communist centrally planned economy. However, the Lao government began 
to realize that their economic policies were inappropriate, and started some economic 
reforms with decentralizing control, encouraging private enterprises, and privatizing public 
enterprises. Laos also had signed related agreements with the World Bank and IMF in 1989 
committing to turn itself into extending and deepening the economic reforms.41 Traditionally, 
Laos had maintained close ties with Vietnam formalized in friendship and cooperation 
treaties. In recent years, however, Laos has started to reduce its dependence on Vietnam and 
to improve its relations with other countries especially P. R. China, Thailand, France, Japan, 
and the U.S.42 Among those countries, Laos particularly has well-developed relations with 
Thailand, Laos' principal route of access to the sea and its primary trading partner. In July 
1997, Laos has been admitted by ASEAN and became a formal member.43 In recent years, 
the Lao government had enacted a more liberal foreign investment code to attract more 
foreign capital. However, the poor infrastructure and low-level technical skills still cannot 
attract foreign investors. In the foreseeable future, the economy of Laos will continue to 
depend on foreign aids as well as other international funds and sources. 
c) Kingdom of Cambodia 
The economy of Cambodia remains essentially rural, with the population largely living in 
the countryside and heavily dependent on subsistence agriculture. Economic recovery is 
still unexpected because of the continued political unrest and factional hostilities. Since 
1994, the government of Cambodia had been open for business with a liberal new investment 
law offering foreign enterprises some of the most attractive incentives within Southeast 
Asian countries, including tax holiday for up to eight years, exemption from withholding 
38
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tax on dividends, and no nationalization and price control, etc.44 With rich natural resources 
and abundant labor, Cambodia offers foreign investors many opportunities for producing or 
processing the wide variety of local products and consumer goods. Cambodia's low-cost 
labor, cheap land, and most advantageous investment incentives in Southeast Asia indeed 
attract many foreign investors' interests. However, Cambodia's political instability is a 
natural drawback for foreign investors.45 Due to its long internal armed conflicts, the United 
Nations was given a mandate to enforce a ceasefire, and deal with refugees and disarmament 
known as the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) for a 
comprehensive peace settlement in October 1991.46 However, another civil war between 
Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh broke out in July 1997, and ASEAN countries delayed the 
admittance of Cambodia.47 The civil war and delay of joining ASEAN in 1997 will seriously 
damage the fragile economy. In recent years, reconstruction efforts have progressed and led 
to some political stability under the form of a multiparty democracy under a constitutional 
monarchy. Since then, various international aid organizations had begun crop diversification 
programs to encourage farmers to grow other crops. Due to the support of foreign investment 
and tourism development, the recovery of Cambodia's economy has been steadily grown. 
d) Myanmar Union 
Burma had changcd its official name into Myanmar in 1989 after the State Law and Order 
Restoration Council (SLORC) dccidcd that the old name implied the dominance of Burmese, 
and the Burmese arc just one of the many ethnic groups in the country.48 Myanmar had 
suffered internal strife from a smorgasbord of dictators, rebels and guerrillas and most 
Western countries think it was synonymous with the suppression of democracy and the use 
of slave labor. Currently, the government of Myanmar is a military regime, led by the 
SLORC, which allowed a democratic election for a new government in 1990; however, the 
winner, National League for Democracy, was not permitted to take the reins of government.49  
Myanmar is a poor Asian country and the economy of this country is heavily dependent on 
the agricultural sector that generates about 40% of GDP and provides employment for 65% 
of the workforce.5" The country is also unable to achieve any substantial improvement in 
export earnings due to falling prices for many major commodity exports. Myanmar had 
been heavily isolated from international economic forces and had been trying to encourage 
foreign investment. Myanmar is now cementing economic bonds with ASEAN, which 
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believes constructive engagement is a better form of diplomacy than sanctions.51 Myanmar 's 
relations with ASEAN had steadily improved since 1995 and officially become a member 
state of ASEAN in 1997.52 ASEAN countries, especially Thailand and Singapore, had 
invested heavily in Myanmar. Myanmar and P. R. China have a traditionally intimate 
relationship. P. R. China also is the major arms and weapons supplier for the Myanmar 
regime.53 
III. Regulations of Investment in Selected ASEAN Countries 
As mentioned above, there are ten current member states within ASEAN. For making the 
comparative study more efficiently, the author had selected five member states into the 
comparative list. The selection criterion would be focus on the relationship between the 
economic developmental level and openness of foreign investment regulations, as well as 
the national demand and governmental attitude toward foreign investment, etc. Because the 
small economies, mainly Singapore and Brunei which are the richest and most advanced 
countries in this region, the author had deleted those two states from the comparative list. 
On the other hand, the less developed economies, especially Myanmar and Laos still adopt 
hostile measures against foreign investors and their developmental levels still far behind 
those developing economies in the region; therefore, the author only selected Vietnam from 
CLMV countries into the comparative list. There are five member states left on the 
comparative list including Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. 
1. Investment Promotion Laws of Thailand 
a) Board of Investment and Industrial Estate Authority 
The Investment Promotion Law of Thailand was amended in 1977 and follows the same 
general form of the first Investment Promotion Law enacted in 1963.54 Both foreign and 
domestic investors may apply for incentives under this law. Most investment incentives and 
measures are administrated by the Board of Investment. The Board of Investment imposes 
ceilings on alien ownership, on a case-by-case basis, for most projects awarded promotional 
privileges. Conditions may be imposed on promoted projects including minimum capital 
investment, minimum Thai share participation, requirements to use local raw materials, 
nationality and number of employees, training of labor, and distribution, designation and 
quality of products, etc. Except for the Board of Investment, the Industrial Estate Authority 
of Thailand is authorized by the Industrial Estate Authority Act 1979 to establish and operate 
industrial estates.55 It has authority to issue industrial operation permits as well as to provide 
other permits and facilities within its industrial estates. The Industrial Estate can be divided 
into four zones including general industrial estate, export processing zone, commercial 
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zone, and residential zone. Doing business in an export processing zone, there are incentives 
including exemption from import duty and VAT on imported machinery, equipment and 
materials under the Board of Investment Promotion Act.56 
b) Choice of Investment Vchicle and Licensing 
Foreign Investors can carry on business in Thailand through sole proprietorships, 
partnerships, private limited companies or public limited ones. In addition, joint ventures, 
branches of foreign corporations, representative offices and regional offices may be utilized. 
The most popular form of business organization is the private limited company. Foreign 
investors have to comply with the general business laws like domestic investors. In 
additional, there is no general licensing requirement for foreign investors in Thailand. The 
proper approach for foreign investors is to obtain a description of the proposed project and 
identify all applicable policies, laws and regulations. In some areas such as most 
manufacturing business, there are no restrictions for alien investments.57 
c) Investment Incentives 
To encourage alien companies investing in the remote provinces, the Board of Investment 
divided the whole Thailand into three zones. Those remote provinces that are far away from 
the capital-Bangkok enjoy special incentives. The three zones and related investment 
incentives are described as following.58 
Zone 1 (Bangkok and five surrounding provinces) 
Zone 2(10 adjacent provinces to Zone 1 ) 
- Exemption from payment of corporate income taxes for a period of from three to 
seven years. 
- Reduction of 50% or lip to exemption in import duties on imported machinery. 
Reduction of up to 90% of import duties on imported raw materials for a renewable 
one-year period. 
Exclusion of dividends from taxable income of shareholders. 
- The right to own land and bring alien technicians and managers on the business. 
Zone 3 (Other provinces as well as Laem Chabang and Map Ta Phud industrial estates) 
- Corporate income tax holiday is eight years; after eight years, it will still enjoy a 
reduction of 50% for five years. 
Import duty on machinery is exempted. 
Import duty on raw materials used for domestic sales is reduced by 75% for 5 years, 
renewable annually. 
- Import duty for priority activities is exempted. 
- Greater than 49% foreign ownership may be allowed for manufacturing projects for 
the domestic market. 
56
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Meanwhile, it does not mean that alien companies corresponding with the requirements 
can enjoy those investment incentives. The Board of Investment controls the final decision 
of providing the incentives on a case-by-case basis. 
d) Alien Business Law, Land Ownership and Foreign Exchange Controls 
The Alien Business Law controls three broad categories of business. Categories A and В are 
closed to aliens, while Category С businesses are open to aliens subject to conditions. It 
still remains some businesses which do not fall within any of the three categories and are 
open to alien investments. Besides, there are restrictions on the percentage of alien 
ownership of commercial banks, finance companies, commercial fishing craft, commercial 
transportation, commodity export, mining and other enterprises under various laws, 
government policies, and trade association regulations.59 In connection with seeking 
promotion by the Board of Investment, Thai participation will generally be recommended. 
Moreover, the Land Code of Thailand was amended to allow aliens to own up to 40% of the 
units in a condominium in 1992. For industrial purposes, a company promoted by the Board 
of Investment or Industrial Estate Authority may be granted the right to own land. Alien 
enterprises may lease immovable property and a registered lease of up to 30 years duration 
provides secure tenure.60 As to foreign exchange, the Bank of Thailand has announced a 
number of relaxations of exchange controls since June 1990. The repatriate capital and 
profits were discretionary and have been increased in recent years. Presently, commercial 
banks are authorized to process most applications to purchase foreign currency. Foreign 
currency accounts may be established abroad and in Thailand.61 
2. Promotion of Investments Act of Malaysia 
a) Foreign Equity Distribution 
Malaysian government emphasizes that indigenous Malaysians should be allotted a specified 
percentage of the equity. However, this requirement will be relaxed in favor of investments 
geared toward production of goods for export wholly or substantially.62 In general, foreign 
equity participation in manufacturing projects is subject to the following guidelines: 
Projects that export 80% or more of production are not subject to any equity 
conditions. 
- Projects not falling within the above category may have foreign equity participation 
of up to 79%, provided at least 51% of products are exported; and depending on 
59
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various factors such as size of the investment, technology involved value-added, 
utilization of local raw materials and spin-off effects. 
— Projects exporting between 20% and 50% of production will generally be allowed 
between 30% and 51% foreign equity participation, while those exporting less than 20% 
of production are allowed only a maximum of 30% foreign equity participation. 
b) Investment Incentives 
Under the Promotion of Investments Act of 1986 and the Income Tax Act of 1967, various 
incentives are given including: 
- Exemption from custom tax of raw materials and some machinery to the companies 
of which 100% production will be exported or whose production is principally for 
the domestic market. 
- Exemption from income tax to new industrial enterprises for five years. 
- Pioneer status, investment tax allowance and reinvestment allowance incentives. 
Double deduction for promotion of exports and incentive building allowance. 
- Research and development and training incentives. 
- Setting the operational headquarters incentives and the industrial adjustment 
incentives.63 
c) Licensing, Foreign Exchange Controls and Land Ownership 
A license is required of investors intending to engage in manufacturing activities.64 The 
license is to be issued by the Licensing Office, the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI). Malaysia's 1975 Industrial Coordination Act (ICA) governs manufacturing 
activities. Under the ICA, manufacturing companies with shareholders' funds of 2.5 million 
ringgit or more or engaging 75 or more full-time employees must apply for a license.65 For 
foreign exchange, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), Malaysia's governmental bank, is 
responsible for exchange controls and in charge of supervision of Malaysia's banking 
system. For foreign investors, the BNM is liberal in regard to foreign exchange inflows and 
outflows.66 Capital and profits can be freely repatriated when the remittances do not exceed 
a specified amount. Additionally, under the land code of Malaysia, foreign investors are not 
allowed to purchase lands that belong to Malaysian indigenous-reserved ones. However, 
most foreign investors own the lease rights to utilize lands. 
d) Double Taxation Relief and Investment Guarantees 
For attracting more foreign investment, the Malaysian government has signed double 
taxation relief agreements with many countries around Asia, Europe and the American. The 
government of Malaysia also has signed the Investment Guarantee Agreement with many 
63
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countries including Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Taiwan, United States, United 
Kingdom (UK), and most ASEAN members.67 Under the Investment Guarantee Agreement, 
foreign investors will be protected and provided with the following: 
- Protection against nationalization and expropriation. 
- Prompt and adequate compensation should the investment be nationalized or 
expropriated. 
- Free outflow of capital, profits and other fees. 
- Settlement of Investment disputes under the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, ratified by Malaysia in 1966. 
3. Foreign Investment Law of Indonesia 
a) Choice of Investment Vehicle and Foreign Equity 
The Foreign Investment Law of Indonesia was amended in 1970 and controls most foreign 
investment in this country. This Law had been supplemented by numerous government 
regulations, the most recent of which was issued in June 1994 and is known as the "June 
Package."68 The "June Package" fell in line with the government's promise to further 
deregulate foreign investment. There are two different ways for foreign investors to make 
equity investments in Indonesia's companies: 1. Establishment of an Indonesia limited 
liability company under the Foreign Investment Law. 2. Establishment of certain types of 
Indonesian limited liability financial companies under regulations issued by the Department 
of Finance.69 There are other types of investment that do not fall under the Foreign 
Investment Law and these investments are regulated by various government departments. 
As a general rule, all business sectors arc open for foreign investment unless specifically 
prohibited. The government publishes a Negative Investment List (DNI) to specify the 
business areas where foreign investment is prohibited, restricted or conditioned.70 The 
restricted sectors include ports, public electricity industries, public transportation, nuclear 
power generation, drinking water, and media. Under the "June Package," a foreign investor 
may now form a PMA company (the Indonesian acronym for foreign capital investment) 
with 100% foreign equity with no minimum capital investment requirements. However, 
there is the requirement that some divestment take place within 15 years.71 Although a 
foreign investor may own up to 100% in a PMA company, certain sectors of the economy 
exclusive of the DNI list are open only to PMA companies possessing at least 5% Indonesian 
equity. A PMA company may purchase shares in a domestic investment law company 
(PMDN) or a company which is neither a PMA nor PMDN company.72 However, to invest 
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directly in these types of companies, the PMA Company must have at least 5% total equity. 
Even though the status of the acquired companies does not change, these acquired companies 
still may not engage in activities on the DNI list. 
b) Investment Incentives 
According to the Foreign Investment Law, the government of Indonesia provides a series of 
investment incentives.73 These include that reductions or exemptions are granted from 
import duties and value added taxes for certain imports related to investment. 
- Exemption on import duties for the approved projects and businesses. 
- Reduction of 50% on import duties for support and auxiliary equipment. 
- Exemption on import duties for consumable materials around one year's operations 
and raw materials around two year's production. 
- Exemption on import duties in personal effects for expatriate personal, excluding 
liquor, tobacco and so on. 
c) Licensing, Foreign Exchange Controls and Land Ownership 
The foreign investment license granted by the Indonesia Capital Investment Coordinating 
Board (BKPM) is for a period of 30 years from the date of commencement of commercial 
production.74 This term may be extended at the discretion of the government. On the other 
hand, under the FIL, the government guarantees the foreign exchange for the free remittance 
includes: 
- Dividends proportional to foreign ownership 
- Proceeds from the sale of shares to Indonesia nationals 
- foreign loan payments including principal and interest 
- Compensation in the case of nationalization 
- Repatriation of invested capital in case of liquidation 
In Indonesia, aliens do not have the right to land ownership but have the lease right. 
However, the government approves alien joint-venture enterprises owning the construction 
rights of land in term of between 20 and 30 years.75 This term may be extended by 
government approval. 
4. Foreign Investment Act of the Philippines 
a) Foreign Equity Distribution 
Under the Omnibus Investment Code, enacted in 1987, foreign ownership of enterprises 
was generally limited to forty percent.76 However, in 1991, the Foreign Investment Act 
liberalized the entry of foreign investments into the Philippines. Under the 1991 investment 
code, there arc no restrictions on the extent of foreign ownership of export enterprises (sixty 
percent of the production of which will be exported), or domestic market enterprises 
73
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(enterprises whose production is intended principally for the domestic market).77 In addition, 
up to 100% foreign ownership was allowed in areas of activities determined to be "pioneer 
enterprises" under the Investment Priorities Plan, subject to constitutional or statutory 
limitations. A 100% foreign equity is generally allowed, unless the enterprise is included 
in the Foreign Investment Negative List.78 Moreover, foreign investors who invest in more 
than 40% of the equity of a Philippine corporation or a partnership must secure prior 
approval of the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
b) Investment Incentives 
Under the Investment Code, a wide range of benefits, fiscal, and non-fiscal, are granted to 
investors engaged in activities considered as "pioneer," or those which sixty percent of the 
production of which is exported.79 It includes: 
- Income tax holidays from four to six years. 
- Preferential customs duty of 3% on imported capital equipment. 
- Tax credit for taxes and duties on raw materials. 
- Double deduction for labor expense. 
Besides, the Export Development Act of 1994 entitles exporters to the following 
incentives: 
- Duty free importation of machinery and equipment and accompanying spare parts 
until 1997. 
- Exemption from deposit of duties at the time of the opening of the letter of credit 
covering imports. 
- Tax credits for increase in current year export revenue within 30 days from export. 
- Tax credits for imported ingredients and raw materials for five years. 
c) Foreign Exchange Controls and Land Ownership 
By the relaxation of the foreign exchange regulations, foreign exchange is freely sold and 
purchased outside the banking system. As to the capital repatriation and remittance of 
dividends and profits, foreign investors still have to show proof of inward remittance which 
must be registered with the Central Bank of the Philippines.80 Only the citizens of the 
Philippines or the corporations at least sixty percent of the capital stock of which is owned 
by the Philippines nationals can own land.81 The foreign investor is allowed to lease 
commercial lands up to seventy years, provided that the leased area will be used only for 
the purposes of the investment. 
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d) Double Taxation Relief and Investment Guarantee 
The Philippines has double taxation relief agreements with Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the U.K., the U.S., and so on.82 
These treaties generally allow the foreign investor to claim a credit for taxes paid to the 
Philippines government for income earned in the Philippines. The Philippines also has 
become a full member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agcncy wherein foreign 
investments entered through this agcncy are now insured against risk associated with host 
government restrictions on currency conversion and transfer, expropriation law, revolution 
or civil disturbance. 
5. Foreign Investment Law of Vietnam 
a) State Committee for Cooperation and Investment (SCCI) 
For most foreign businesses, the most important agency is the State Committee for 
Cooperation and Investment (SCCI), which has been established by the Vietnamese 
government to be a "one-stop shop" for investors.83 The SCCI approves all applications for 
foreign investment and supervises the administration of the Foreign Investment Law (FIL). 
The Vietnam government relaxed restrictions on foreign investment in 1994, allowing 
overseas investors to hold a 100% share in their companies. 
b) Choice of Investment Vehicle 
The FIL allows foreign investors to invest in any sector of the Vietnamese economy, but 
encourages foreign investment in areas which are labor-intensive; generate exports and 
which utilize Vietnam's raw materials.84 It also encourages infrastructural development and 
projects that can cam foreign exchange, like oil exploitation and tourism.85 Under FIL, it 
provides four most important forms of foreign investment including: 
- The "Joint Venture Company" 
- The "Business Cooperation Contract" 
- The "Enterprise with 100% Foreign - Owned Capital" 
- The "Build - Operate Transfer" Project 
Foreign investment projects arc now categorized into two groups. Projects that arc 
deemed strategic or vital to national interests are classified as "Group A" projects and are 
subject to the approval of the prime minister based on the recommendations of the SCCI 
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and various concerned ministries. All other projects that do not fall within "Group A" 
category are considered "Group B" projects and are subject to the approval of the chairman 
of the SCCI.86 
c) Taxation 
The FIL Implementing Regulations specify that foreign investment enterprises will be 
subject to profits tax at a rate of 25% unless they fall with in specific categories which 
allow for lower tax rates of 20%, 15%, and 10% for investments.87 Enterprises will also be 
eligible for consideration for tax holidays, with the length of the tax holiday depending on 
the tax rate which applies to the enterprise. Belonging to advanced technology, export-
oriented, natural resource exploitation, and heavy industries or infrastructure projects may 
be applied to lower tax rates and better tax incentives. The Ministry of Finance has issued 
guidelines to clarify the concessions and the period of time for which they will be available 
for different types of projects.88 Basically, investment in undeveloped areas and in priority 
industries will enjoy larger concessions for longer periods. 
d) Import, Export and Foreign Exchange Controls 
Foreign enterprises to business cooperation contracts are usually allowed to import 
equipment and materials related to the investment project. Foreign enterprises may also be 
exempted from import duties where the imported goods form part of the capital contribution 
to the enterprise or where raw materials, spare parts and accessories are imported for 
production of goods for export. Additionally, enterprises with foreign capital are required to 
deposit all foreign and Vietnamese funds with a government approved bank. All receipts 
and expenditure of the enterprises must be made through these accounts. The FIL provides 
that foreign investors have the right to transfer currency abroad when the currency belongs 
to the share of profit, the principal and interest on any loan, and any payment for provision 
of technology or services, etc.89 
e) Property Control and Export Processing Zones 
Under the revised Vietnamese Land Law, the land is state owned. Vietnamese organizations 
and citizens may be granted the right to use land, or may rent the right to use land. Foreigners 
are not permitted to hold the right to use land, but may rent the right to use land, the 
maximum duration of the lease being determined by the duration of their investment.90 
In most land use agreements, the rental fee for land use is revised every five years. With the 
86
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growth of the Vietnamese economy, land rental costs will rise sharply over the next decade. 
Moreover, the FIL Implementing Regulations make provision for the establishment of 
Export Processing Zones (EPZs) which are geared to export-oriented light industry or 
services.91 Enterprises established in these zones enjoyed lower profit tax rates (10% to 
15%) as well as other incentives, such as higher quality infrastructure and no import or 
export duties. All transactions in EPZs have to be carried out in foreign currency, ensuring 
that the majority of production is exported.92 
III. Comparative Investment Environment and Regulations 
among Selected ASEAN Countries 
Generally speaking, a country that had more foreign investments or enjoyed higher 
economic development often sets up more complicated investment regulations or higher-
standards to apply investment incentives. Those countries like Thailand and Malaysia have 
gradually amended related foreign investment regulations to heighten incentives standards 
or canceled foreign investment incentives. Those countries that need more foreign capitals 
such as Indonesia and the Philippines still provide favorable investment incentives to 
foreign investors. As to those countries that start to develop their economies like Vietnam 
and Cambodia, they often own the most liberal and favorable investment regulations to 
attract foreign investment. 
I. Favorable Investment Conditions of Intra-ASEAN 
Thailand possesses many excellent advantages including rich natural resources, well-
educated labor, stable social and political order, as well as excellent international relations 
with other countries. Thailand also has engaged in wide-range economic cooperation with 
its neighbors like Mekong developmental plan, the North and South growth triangle plan 
and so on. Thailand has an ideal investment environment for foreign investors and also 
attracts more foreign investments than other ASEAN countries. When foreign investments 
make Thai cconomy enjoy a high-level growth. Thai governmental departments has started 
to choose foreign investment projects that can benefit its national development and promote 
native technical level. Thus the Thai government gradually has cancelcd related investment 
incentives for labor-intensive industries. The Thai government has led its economic 
developmental direction to raise native industrial competitiveness and lower foreign 
investment's influence. In recent years, to balance the differences between urban and rural 
areas, the Thai government now provides more favorable investment incentives to foreign 
industries that are located out of Bangkok. However, the poor infrastructure, transportation, 
and communication in remote areas still can not raise foreign investors' interests. 
Since 1980s, Malaysia has transformed itself from a raw materials export-oriented 
economy into a manufacturing one. It is because Malaysia endeavors to attract foreign 
investments, liberalizing market restrictions, and privatizing national enterprises. Malaysian 
government stresses raising indigenous economic conditions and set up related measures to 
91
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Effect in Hanoi Vietnam. Research paper presented to Hitosubashi University, School of International 
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protect indigenous industries. From 1980 to 1990, most foreign investment in Malaysia 
concentrated on export-oriented and labor-intensive industries to earn foreign exchange. 
Following the positive economic development in the 1990s, Malaysia faces an insufficiency 
of labor and land as well as rising industrial capital. In addition, under rapid economic 
growth and enormous foreign investments, the Malaysian government gradually has 
canceled related investment incentives for labor-intensive industries and only provided 
investment incentives to high-tech industries. 
Because traditional historical experiences taught Indonesia to keep a suitable distance 
from foreign enterprises, the Indonesian government has adopted a changeable foreign 
investment policy. One hand they hope that foreign capital can assist indigenous industries 
and native economic development; but the other hand they are afraid that foreign enterprises 
will control most Indonesian economic sectors. Thus Indonesian government adopted a 
two-sided foreign investment policy that is to greet foreign capital on one side but to limit 
foreign equity and investment categories on the other side. Indonesia attempts to combine 
native and foreign capital to promote national economic development. Due to its huge 
domestic market, well-planned specific industrial zones, and gradually liberal investment 
regulations, Indonesia indeed draws many foreign investments. However, under strong 
competitiveness from P. R. China and Vietnam in recent years, the total foreign investment 
sum decreased in Indonesia. 
Among ASEAN countries, the Philippines had lower-priced labour than other countries. 
However, the political instability and deteriorating public order are fatal defects for its 
economic development. In addition, foreign investments mostly focus on basic infrastructure 
industries and these products still pour into the Philippines' domestic market. This kind of 
foreign investment neither promotes foreign exchange earnings nor raises native technical 
levels. Thus foreign industries in the Philippines form strong competitions for domestic 
industries and cannot provide any substantial assistance to the Philippines' economic 
development. Unlike Thailand and Malaysia, the government of the Philippines cannot 
utilize foreign investments to improve native economic development instead of seriously 
threat to indigenous industries. That is why the Philippines economy still remains on a low-
developed level and cannot grow remarkably. Under the worse economic order, the 
Philippine government now has started to design a series of more liberal and favorable 
economic plans and investment regulations to attract different kinds of foreign investments. 
The Subie Bay developmental plan particularly draws many foreign investors' interests. 
Although Vietnam still insists on a socialistic economic developmental model, it has 
adopted a more liberal policy to improve the worsening economy and approach a market-
oriented economic system in recent years. Meanwhile, due to the failure of socialistic 
economic plans and the lack of former Soviet Union's assistance, Vietnam is eager to gain 
more foreign capital to resolve its economic problems. To attract foreign investments, 
Vietnam has established the most favorable investment incentives and regulations to pull 
foreign capital. After joining ASEAN and normalization with the U.S., enormous foreign 
investments poured into Vietnam. Since 1992, Vietnam has enjoyed a high economic growth 
of 7%~8% per year. However, the poor infrastructure and transportation, as well as the 
wicked administrative efficiency are still Vietnam's defectives. 
2. Belief of Comparative Investment Regulations among Selected ASEAN Countries 
To maintain stable economic growth, ASEAN countries have amended related foreign 
investment regulations many times to conform to their industrial demands as well as attract 
more foreign investments. However, the dissimilar economic developmental levels and the 
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different political backgrounds, ASEAN countries also have varied investment regulations. 
Among those five selected ASEAN member states, Thailand and Malaysia have more 
complicated and strict investment regulations. It is because both of them have had numerous 
foreign investments, and they restrict those foreign investments that cannot bring any benefit 
or promote native technical levels. On the other hand, Indonesia and the Philippines still 
need more foreign capital and higher techniques, so they have willingness to provide more 
favorable investment incentives to foreign investors. As to Vietnam, it has planned to attract 
more and more foreign investments and to improve its economy in recent years; therefore, 
it owns the best preferential treatment for foreign investors. 
a) Foreign Equity Distribution 
Among those five selected ASEAN member states, only Vietnam does not set up any 
restrictions in the approval of 100% foreign ownership enterprises. Thailand and Malaysia 
regulate industries that export 80% or more of production and may not be subject to any 
equity conditions. Meanwhile, Malaysia requires indigenous Malaysian equity that should 
be 30% or more. In Indonesia, the approval of a 100% foreign equity enterprise must export 
100% of production and locate in specified economic zones or applied investment sum is 
over USS 50 million. In the Philippines, 100% foreign ownership is allowed in areas of 
activities determined to be "pioneer enterprises" approved by BOI or that is over 60% 
export-production. In Vietnam, the government allows 100% foreign equity and encourages 
aliens to invest in any sector of Vietnam's economy. 
b) Import Duty Incentives 
Basically, most ASEAN countries provide an exemption or reduction of import duties on 
imported raw materials or machinery. In Thailand, the government had emphasized the 
balance between rural and urban economic development and provides more favorable 
incentives to industries that are outside of Bangkok. In Malaysia, the incentives are 
dependent on whether this industry belongs to an export-oriented one or not. In Indonesia, 
the government can reduce or exempt from import duties approved investment projects or 
support and auxiliary equipment. In Vietnam, foreign enterprises are exempted from import 
duties where the imported goods form part of the capital contribution to enterprises or where 
raw materials, spare parts and accessories are imported for production of goods for export. 
c) Corporate Income Tax Incentives 
To attract more foreign investments, ASEAN countries all provide corporate income tax 
holiday between 2 and 8 years. In Thailand, the government emphasizes the balance between 
rural and urban areas and provides longer taxes holiday to industries that are outside of 
Bangkok. In Malaysia, in order to enjoy longer tax holiday must be enterprises that have to 
hire over 500 full-time employees or the capital expenditure is over US$ 25 million. The 
Philippines gives longer taxes holidays to "pioneer enterprises" approved by BOI. 
d) Foreign Exchange Controls 
In most ASEAN countries, capital and profits can freely be repatriated when the remittances 
do not violate related requirements and regulations. In Thailand and Malaysia, the 
governmental banks control but allow foreign currency remittances. In Indonesia, the 
government guarantees related foreign exchange for free remittances. In the Philippines, 
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aliens have to prove remittances registered by its governmental bank. In Vietnam, foreign 
investors have to pay five to ten percent income tax that is dependent on the total sum of 
remittances. 
e) Land and Immovable Property Ownership 
Most ASEAN countries generally provide aliens the lease rights to use land and immovable 
property; however, they restrict alien land and immovable property ownership. In Thailand, 
a company may be granted the ownership of land and immovable property by BOI or the 
Industrial Estate Authority for industrial purposes. In Malaysia, aliens generally have lease 
rights to use land but restrict their ownership. In Indonesia, the government approves alien 
joint-venture companies to own the lease rights. In the Philippines, a corporation, at least 
60% of the capital stock of which is owned by Philippine nationals can own land. Vietnam 
is a socialist country and all lands of Vietnam arc state-owned. 
As a whole, Thailand has attracted considerable foreign investments in recent years. 
Under this circumstance, its investment incentives gradually have been reduced and many 
restrictions had been added in contrast with other ASEAN countries. Due to remarkably 
economic growth and enormous foreign investments, Thailand has gradually canceled 
investment incentives for labor-intensive industries. However, because the Thai government 
hopes to balance rural and urban area's economic development, enterprises that are outside 
of Bangkok can still enjoy very favorable incentives. Malaysia hopes to transform itself 
into a developed country in 2020 and needs more direct foreign investments to achieve this 
goal. Therefore, the Malaysian government still plots a series of investment incentives 
especially providing the most preferential treatment for high-tech industries. In Indonesia, 
the government attempts to pull more foreign investment to assist indigenous industrial 
development. Indonesian government thus provides a lot of favorable incentives including 
relaxing foreign equity, lengthening lease terms to use immovable property, simplifying 
investment approval process, and improving related infrastructure. The government of the 
Philippines has already designed "Subie Bay" as an economic specific zone and a free port, 
as well as drafted related investment regulations to provide foreign investors with more 
incentives. Whether the Subie Bay transformational developmental plans succeed or not, it 
will directly impact on the economy in the Philippines. Vietnam furnishes foreign investors 
with more favorable investment incentives than other ASEAN countries. Besides, Vietnam's 
government encourages foreign investments in areas that are labor-intensive, generate 
exports and those utilize raw materials. Compared with Thailand and Malaysia, Vietnam is 
different from them and strongly encourages labor-intensive industries. If the foreign 
investor is under the category of labor-intensive, it is Vietnam that provides the most 
preferential treatments than the other selected countries and will be the best choice. 
However, if the foreign investor is under the category of capital-intensive or technical-
oriented industries, the poor infrastructure and the insufficient transportation and 
communication systems in Vietnam will decrease investors' interests. Reviewing these 
different foreign investment regulations, the author considered that there are definitely 
different economic developmental levels and demands among ASEAN countries. 
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IV. Conclusion 
ASEAN countries are moving combine foreign and national capital to promote indigenous 
industrial development and native economic growth. Those foreign economic policies are 
all guided by governmental departments to achieve "economic dependent development." 
ASEAN countries set up enormous foreign investment incentives to attract foreign capital. 
Most ASEAN countries also have learned Japan and Asian NICs' developmental experiences 
and economic models to establish their economic policies. ASEAN countries also encourage 
export-oriented industries to earn foreign exchanges and speed their economic growth. 
ASEAN countries offer different investment incentives based on investment projects and 
industrial categories. It is because ASEAN countries always exert their economic policies 
and regulations to direct their industrial development. ASEAN countries restrict aliens to 
invest in areas of public utilities or native security industries including drinking water, 
electricity, telecommunications, transportation, nuclear power, and media enterprises. Only 
investing in export-oriented industries, most ASEAN countries approve enterprises of 100% 
foreign ownership and provide the most favorable incentives. 
Generally speaking, one country's foreign investment regulations can express the 
degree of dependence on foreign investment. Thailand and Malaysia attract more foreign 
investment than other ASEAN countries. They gradually have canceled or reduced foreign 
investment incentives for labor-intensive industries. The governmental departments no 
longer encourage labor-intensive industries and try to attract high-tech industries to invest 
in their countries. It shows that Thailand and Malaysia own higher-level and self-appointed 
economic structures. On the contrary, Indonesia and the Philippines still demand more 
foreign capitals to promote their industrial growth. They have the willingness to provide 
more preferential policies to draw foreign investments than Thailand and Malaysia. In other 
words, Indonesia and the Philippines need foreign capital and investments deeper than 
Thailand and Malaysia. As to Vietnam, it had provided the best investment incentives to 
alien businesses. The Vietnamese government particularly encourages labor-intensive 
industries and those that utilize their raw materials. From those countries' investment 
regulations and related information, it could be found that lower-level developing countries 
demand more foreign capital to promote their industrial growth and provide more favorable 
investment incentives to attract foreign investments. On the other hand, higher-level 
developing countries want to retake their economic independent rights and have more 
restrictions in investment incentives. That is why many traditional industries have moved 
from Thailand to other countries and this is also why the Philippines and Vietnam tended to 
guarantee and give the most preferential incentives to foreign investors. 
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1. Introduction 
Public opinion regarding the presence of immigrants in the country has recently been fed 
with media reports on atrocious crimes committed by foreigners, exacerbating feelings of 
insecurity, fear, and even xenophobia among Italians.1 Recently, Italy registered several 
episodes of xenophobia and racism: in January 2010 a racist attack on African migrant 
workers in the Southern region of Calabria by local gangs brought to the surface the Italian 
society tensions that had been simmering for some time. It's an issue of strict actuality 
because Italy has one of the fastest growing immigrant populations in Europe, with 
immigrants now reaching about 7 percent of the population.2 
The EU Special Barometer of July 2009 reported that Italy scored some of the lowest 
results among the EU member States, as regards "the level of comfort with person from 
different ethnic origin as a neighbour and especially as regards the comfort with Roma 
neighbour". 
Another special country-based survey of the same EU institution reported a higher 
than the EU average (76% and 62% respectively) percentage of interviewees in Italy who 
thought that discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin was "very or fairly widespread". 
Apart the issue of racial discrimination and xenophobia against immigrants, there is 
the problem of Roma and Sinti in Italy.3 Usually known as Gypsies (a misnomer, derived 
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3
 In this paper we will use the term Roma and Sinti-instead of "nomads" as these people are 
often quoted in italian documents-in line with UN and OSCE language. The terms "Roma" and 
"Sinti" are authentic proper names meaning "person". Those of eastern European descent are called 
"Roma" and those of central European origin are referred to as "Sinti". On the other hand, the foreign 
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from an early legend about Egyptian origins) defy the conventional definition of a 
population: they have no nation-state, speak different languages, belong to many religions 
and comprise a mosaic of socially and culturally divergent groups separated by strict rules 
of endogamy. 
Their total amount is 150,000. They include (i) Italian citizens, as well as citizens of 
both (ii) EU and (iii) non-EU countries. Groups of Roma and Sinti migrated to Italy during 
different periods, beginning in the 14th century. In the 1980s and 1990s, the conflicts in the 
former Yugoslavia caused Roma to flee to other countries, including Italy. In the 1990s and 
the first decade of this century, a large number of Roma arrived from the States of Central 
and Eastern Europe. The most recent influx of Roma and Sinti communities has come 
mainly from Romania: these movements intensified since Romania joined the EU in 2007.4 
In the Italian legislation, nomads are not considered as a minority group and their legal 
status differs: after Romania's accession to the EU in January 2007, the Romanian Roma 
became EU citizens and gained the right to free movement within the European Union, 
while Roma from Western Balkans are non-EU nationals. Many of them have no documents 
providing their identity or places of origin rendering them de facto stateless (with particular 
negative consequences for children). They are technically subject to Italian immigration 
legislation.5 
Although they do not have a large presence in Italy, Romanian Roma migrants have 
attracted considerable public attention and negative media coverage, due to growing 
prejudice and the link between Roma and Sinti migrants, criminality and threats to public 
security. In November 2007, the murder of an Italian woman, by a Romanian Roma, was 
highly publicized on the Italian media and let to a series of attacks on Roma, culminating in 
a mob burning down a Roma settlement in Ponticelli (in the suburbs of Naples) in May 
2008 after a young Roma woman living in the settlement was accused of kidnapping a baby 
from a local couple. The Italian government responded to these events introducing a number 
of measures affecting specifically the Roma and Sinti population in Italy. 
2. The Italian response to violence committed by Roma 
Since May 2008, a number of government decisions have been issued concerning the Roma 
and Sinti communities, or "nomads", as they are commonly referred to in Italy. The Prime 
Minister issued a decree declaring a "state of emergency" in relation to settlements of 
A. M.: The Gypsies. Oxford, 1995; Hancock, I.: Gypsy History in Germany and Neighbouring Lands: 
A Chronology Leading to the Holocaust and Beyond. In Crowe, D. M.-Kolsti, J. (eds): The Gypsies 
of Eastern Europe. Armonk (NY), 1991; Kalaydjieva, L. et al.: A newly discovered founder population: 
the Roma/Gypsies. Bioessays. 27 (2005) 10, 1084-1094; Liegeois, J. P.: Roma/Gypsies: A European 
Minority. London, 1995. 
4
 See Ban, C.: Economic Transnationalism and its Ambiguities: The Case of Romanian 
Migration to Italy. International Migration, September 2009. 
5
 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), after examining the 
periodical report submitted by Italy according to Art. 9 of the UN Convention on the Elimination of 
all Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965, warned the Italian institutions that they must recognise 
the Roma as an official minority and adopt policies aimed at addressing their needs. The CERD 
"recalling its general recommendation № 27 on discrimination against Roma, recommends that the 
State Party adopt and implement a comprehensive national policy as well as legislation regarding 
Roma and Sinti with a view to recognizing them as a national minority and protecting and promoting 
their languages and culture" (para. 12). 
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"nomad" communities in some regions6 (measure based on Law n. 225/1992 which deals 
with emergency situations arising from severe natural disasters7) and three "ordinances" 
introducing special and exceptional measures concerning "nomad settlements" in the some 
regions. The state of emergency lasted until 31 May 2009. Following this decree, the prime 
minister issued on 30 May 2008 three 'ordinances' introducing special and exceptional 
measures concerning 'nomad settlements' in the regions of Campania, Lazio and Lombardia 
and which appointed the prefects of Rome, Milan and Naples as 'delegated commissioners' 
with powers to carry out 'all the interventions needed to overcome the state of emergency' 
in relation to Roma and Sinti settlements in those regions.8 Their specific powers include 
the monitoring of formal and informal camps, identification and census of the people, 
including minors, who are present there, the expulsion and removal of persons with irregular 
status, measures aimed at clearing "camps for nomads" and evicting their inhabitants; as 
well as the opening of new "camps for nomads". 
The government stated that the Ordinances were adopted in order to speed up the 
administrative procedures, including agreements to build new camps as well as to identify 
the due additional economic resources from within the State's Budget, in order to grant ad 
hoc reception measures, build new structures and improve those already existing. The 
Ordinances also entail specific support measures to promote the integration of people in the 
settlements through comprehensive projects having an integrated nature aimed at facilitating 
the school enrolment and the search for employment. 
Following the issuing of the ordinances, the authorities initiated a census including the 
collection and use of personal data of nomads (fingerprints of minors).4 These measures 
were justified as being necessary to provide support to individuals in camps and to prevent 
further degradation of their living conditions, as well as to identify people involved in 
criminal activities. With regard to minors involved in begging and stealing, the stated aim 
was to identify them and those forcing them into criminal activities. Once such data are 
collected, the plan was to dismantle criminal networks, put a stop to exploitation of children, 
assist children with their school registration, and provide them with adequate health care. 
Harsh criticisms to these policies adopted and implemented by the Italian Government have 
6
 Italy, Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers (21/05/2008). "Dichiarazione dello 
stato di emergenza in relazione agli insediamenti di comunità nomadi nel territorio delle regioni 
Campania, Lazio e Lombardia" [Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of 21 May 2008. 
Declaration of a state of emergency in relation to settlements of nomad communities in the territory of 
the regions of Campania, Lazio and Lombardia]. Published in the Official Gazette No 122 of 26 May 
2009. 
7
 Law no. 225 of 24 February 1992, "Institution of the National service of the civil protection". 
8
 'Disposizioni urgenti di protezione civile per fronteggiare lo stato di emergenza in relazione 
agli insediamenti di comunità nomadi nel territorio della regione Lazio, dclla regione Lombardia e 
della regione Campania' [Urgent provisions of civil protection in order to face the state of emergency 
in relation to settlements of nomad communities for the regions of Campania] (Ordinance No. 3678). 
9
 The special Commissioners are allowed to derogate from a number of laws concerning a wide 
spectrum of issues affecting constitutional prerogatives, for instance the right to be informed when 
subjected to administrative procedures such as photographing, fingerprinting or the gathering of 
anthropometric data. 
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been made at European level.10 In particular, some scholars argued a violation of Article 6 
paragraph 1 of the Council of Europe's Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data," which states: "Personal data revealing 
racial origin, political opinions or religious or other beliefs, as well as personal data concerning 
health or sexual life, may not be processed automatically unless domestic law provides 
appropriate safeguards. The same shall apply to personal data relating to criminal 
convictions." The Ordinances would not provide the "appropriate safeguards" requested by 
the Framework Convention. 
On 17 July 2008, the Ministry of Interior issued specific guidelines concerning the 
application of the orders on "emergency" concerning nomads'camps. The aim of these 
guidelines is to end the situation of degradation and make conditions liveable for those 
Roma and Sinti communities living in authorized or illegal settlements by providing 
humanitarian assistance, improving their access to health care, education and social 
assistance (with particular emphasis to children and schooling). 
The Police conducted forced evictions and dismantling of several illegal camps that 
caused high rates of criminality in the surrounding areas. The Major of Rome, in accordance 
with the Plan for Nomads issued in 2009 (relocation of many camps realized by settling the 
people concerned into "authorized villages"12) proceeded on 15 February 2010 to the 
definitive closure of the Nomad Camp Casilino 900. 
3. The Italian Legal Framework 
The principle of non-discrimination is one of the main pillars of the Italian Constitution 
(Art. 3) upon which the domestic legislative system is based and enforced, particularly by 
the domestic Courts.11 The presence of this article in the Constitution gives equality and 
10
 Office for Democratic Institution and Human Rights, High Commissioner on National 
Minorities, Assessment of the human rights situation of Roma and Sinti in Italy, Report of fact-finding 
mission to Milan, Naples and Rome on 20-26 July 2008, 7. 
11
 CETS No.: 108. The Convention was opened for signature in Strasbourg on 28 January 1981 
and entered into force on 1 October 1985. Italy ratified the Convention with Law 21 febbraio 1989, n. 
98, published in the Official Gazzette n. 066 SUPPLORD, of 20 March 1989. 
12
 Vitale, T.: Politique des évictions. Une approche pragmatique. In: Cantelli. F.-Pattaroni, L -
Roca, M.-Stavo-Debauge, J. (sous la direction de): Sensibilités pragmatiques. Enquêter sur l'action 
publique. Bruxelles, 2009, 71-92. 
13
 The principle of equality and non-discrimination is included in all human rights treaties and 
declarations. Non-discrimination is both a human right of its own and a constitutive element of all 
human rights. Non-discrimination rules are to be found at international, supranational (EU) and 
national level. The United Nations (UN), which was created in the aftermath of the horrors of racism, 
fascism and National Socialism, has since its very beginning placed the battle against discrimination 
in the forefront of its human rights activities. Indeed, one of the purposes of the UN, as they are 
enunciated in the UN Charter, is to promote and encourage the respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all "without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion". By now, the 
principle of non-discrimination has undoubtedly acquired the status of a fundamental rule of 
international human rights law. It has been expressly included in most international human rights 
documents and is implicitly embedded in almost all individual human rights provisions, which are 
usually worded in universal language, such as "everyone has the right to education" or "no one shall 
be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile". It is widely held that the principle of non-
discrimination is a principle of customary international law and. at least as regards discrimination on 
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non-discrimination principles the status of paramount values. Moreover Art. 3 provides a 
benchmark against which subsequent national and regional laws and regulations can be 
evaluated when the suspicion of discriminatory provisions exists. In this field, the action of 
judges is important, as on the basis of this national legislation has to be interpreted and can 
even be declared unconstitutional and disapplied. 
The Criminal Code of Italy contains provisions that expressly enable the racist or other 
bias motives of the offender to be taken into account by the courts as an aggravating 
circumstance when sentencing. In particular, Section 3(1 )(b) of Law 654/1975, as amended 
by Section 3 of the Law 205/1993 (which defines racial discrimination as both a crime in 
itself and as an aggravating factor in other criminal acts) introduces a general aggravating 
circumstance for all offences committed with a view to discrimination on racial, ethnic, 
national or religious ground or in order to help organizations with such purposes. 
The Italian legal framework against racial discrimination has been reinforced by 
Legislative Decree No. 215 of 9 July 2003 which foreseen the creation of the National 
Office Against Racial Discrimination (UN AR). UN AR was established by Decree of the 
President of Council of Ministers (PCM) of 11 December 2003,14 in accordance with Art. 
13 of Council Directive 2000/43/EC enshrining the principle of equal treatment of all people 
regardless of their race or ethnic origin.15 
UNAR carries out in an autonomous and independent way activity of promotion 
against any form of racism and intolerance. In particular, it provides judicial assistance, it 
carries out inquiries and it disseminates informations and knowledge on this topic. UNAR 
promoted the establishment of Agreement Protocols with lawyers' associations available to 
offer pro-bono juridical assistance to alleged victims of racial or ethnic discrimination. 
Very important in this context is the adoption of Law n. 101 of 6 June 2008 which 
provides for an explicit shift of the burden of proof from the complainant to the respondent 
(in civil and administrative law) in cases of "prima facie discrimination". 
4. Law n. 94/2009 on Public Security 
Recently, Law № 94 of 15 July 2009 titled "Regulations about public security", presents 
considerable amendments in matters concerning immigration.16 The most important 
amendment is the introduction of the new crime of "illegal entry and sojourn in the territory 
of the State" (Article 1, subpara. 16), entrusted to the competence of the Justice of Peace, 
which punishes the behaviour of a foreigner who enters or remains in the State, infringing 
the basis of sex, race and ethnic origin, that it also has a status of jus cogens. See Fredman, S.: Human 
Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties Oxford, 2008, 175-180; Janis, M. W.: 
International Law. New York, 2009, 65-67. 
14
 Italy / Decreto del Prcsidente del Consiglio dei Ministri (11.12.2003). 
15
 Council Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin-June, 29th 2000. O.J. L 180, 19 July 2000, 22-26. Article 19 of 
the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as amended in 
Lisbon, provides: "Without prejudice to the provisions of this treaty and within the limits of the 
powers conferred by it upon the Community, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat 
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation". 
16
 Published in the Official Journal (Gazzetta Ufficiale) no. 170, on 24 July 2009. 
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the regulations of the consolidating legislation on immigration and Law № 68/2007 
(regarding short-term stays) with a fine.17 
The offence is accompanied by a series of additional sanctions: expulsion, 
discontinuance of the crime once the "irregular" foreigner is outside Italian territory, the 
possibility of expelling the "illegal immigrant" even when there is no authorisation. The 
legal measures contained in this Law with other laws approved by the Italian Government 
and Parliament in 2008, becomes part of a whole "Security Package", that is, a group of 
provisions addressing security concerns and issues with a variety of different legal means. 
In particular, the provisions of Law no. 94 affect several laws already in effect, amending-
among others-thc Criminal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Highway Code, the 
Immigration Law. Adoption of Law no. 94/2009 represents a comprehensive legal action 
based on the necessity to deal with relevant-and quite heterogeneous-social issues, 
furthering protection for the weakest members of society-women and children-the fight 
against illegal immigration. The Law was supported by 157 votes in favour and 124 against 
and it was particularly opposed by left-wing parties within the Parliament and heavily 
criticized by the legal doctrine and the public opinion, due to its alleged discriminatory and 
racial contents.18 
Among the most important rules introduced by Law no. 94/2009, are worth noting, at 
the outset, some legal measures against illegal immigrants in the Italian territory whose 
rationale would lie in the enhancement of the fight against illegal immigration. The most 
relevant measure has been the introduction in the Italian Criminal Code of a provision 
making illegal immigration a crime. Indeed, Art. 1, s. 16, lett. a) of Law no. 94/2009 
amended Art. 10 bis of Legislative Decree 286/1998 (Immigration Law), qualifying as a 
penal offence-punished with a fine from 5 000 to 10 000 Euros-the entrance and stay in the 
State territory of a foreign national, performed in violation of the Italian Immigration Law's 
provisions on lawful entry and stay requirements. This provision is the most criticized of 
the whole Law and the Italian Constitutional Court has been already called upon to judge 
on its constitutionality. Indeed, as of today the Tribunals of Pescara, Torino, Bologna, 
Agrigento and Trento have challenged the Law before the Constitutional Court claiming a 
contrast with Art. 10 Cost-aff i rming that International Law principles are recognized in the 
Italian legal system,-since International Law provides that illegal entrance in a State must 
be subject to administrative sanctions and not criminal ones; with Art. 3 Const.-the equality 
clause, implying also a principle of reasonableness of the State action-, since Law no. 
94/2009 would lack any legal justification, in light of the fact that in the Italian legal system 
Criminal sanctions must be used only as extrema ratio; as far as the equality principle is 
concerned, the Law would also introduce an unreasonable difference between the treatment 
of illegal immigrants and of those already living in Italy; with Art. 2 Const., which 
establishes that Italy must guarantee fundamental human rights. 
The newly introduced Art. 61, s.l, num. 11 bis of the Italian Criminal Code (introduced 
by Art. 1, s . l . Law no. 94 and applicable to all crimes in the Criminal Code) provides that a 
sentence will be increased in case a crime is committed by an illegal immigrant on the 
17
 For a comment on this Law, see Hammarberg, T.: It is wrong to criminalize migration. 
European Journal of Migration and Law, 11 (2009) 4, 383-385. 
18
 For an analysis of the reasons of the outcomes of the Italian mechanisms of immigration 
controls see Finotelli, C.-Sciortino, G.: The Importance of Being Southern: The Making of Policies of 
Immigration Control in Italy. European Journal of Migration and Law, 11 (2009) 2, 119-138. 
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Italian soil. This rule applies only with regard to extra EU citizen and stateless people. 
Other restrictive regulations are provided for those foreigners who want to get married in 
Italy: indeed, the original formulation of Art. 116 of the Italian Civil Code, titled "Marriage 
with a foreigner within the State", requested that the foreigner, who wanted to get married 
in Italy-irrespective of getting married with an Italian citizen or a foreign national-had to 
show to the Italian public officer for the registry and marriage office, that no legal obstacles 
to the marriage were present, and that all other documents and requirements requested also 
to Italian citizens were present (e.g. publication of the banns). The new text of Art. 116 of 
the Civil Code, as modified by Art. 1 s. 15 of Law no. 94/2009, obliges a foreigner who 
wants to get married in Italy to both show that no legal obstacles are present, and to provide 
for a certification demonstrating the legitimacy of his/her presence in the national territory. 
Moreover, foreign and stateless spouses, applying for Italian citizenship, must show 
presence on the Italian territory for a period of at least 2 years (by way of difference with 
the six months' residence period formerly required) after the marriage. Citizenship will be 
granted only if the marriage is still valid and the couple is not separated. More restrictive 
regulations has been set out for special crimes directly affecting a natural person and in 
particular those affecting women and children. Among the most relevant, it is worth citing 
the provision qualifying as a crime (and no longer as a mere "offence") the employment of 
children for begging, and punishing it with a three years' imprisonment. 
The conviction for this crime, as well as the one for crimes of enslavement, female 
genital mutilation or sexual assault committed by a parent or by the legal curator, brings 
with it the automatic loss and the perpetual disqualification from guardianship. The purpose 
of these provisions is to enhance children's protection (in particular Roma and Sinti minors) 
and answer the increasing social concern deriving from crimes committed in schools. The 
means chosen to answer these concerns are the increase of punishment, provided mainly 
with the introduction of a common aggravating circumstance (Art. 61, s. l , n. 11 ter of the 
Italian Criminal Code), applicable to those committing a crime against a minor near or 
inside schools or other educational institutions. The same aggravating circumstance applies 
also for group sexual assault crimes committed near a school against an adult. 
5. Compliance of Italy with Human Rights Standards 
Italy is a party to the following international treaties that prohibit racial and ethnic 
discrimination and set standards for the treatment of aliens, refugees and asylum seekers: 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the International 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), the 
International Convention on the Rights of Children (CRC) and the Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees ("1951 Refugee Convention"). 
Italy is not a party to the United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW), the European Convention on 
Nationality and the United Nations 1964 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, the 
three key instruments that protect the rights of migrants and stateless persons. 
The CMW, adopted by the UN General Assembly with resolution 45/158 of 18 
December 1990 and in force since 1 July 2003, points out that "the human problems 
involved in migration are even more serious in the case of irregular migration" (Preamble). 
It therefore encourages "appropriate action... in order to prevent and eliminate clandestine 
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movements and trafficking in migrant workers" (ib.). It is worth noting that the measures it 
deems should be taken, within the jurisdiction of each State concerned, are not directed to 
irregular migrants, but to those who cause the phenomenon. It in fact calls for "appropriate 
measures against the dissemination of misleading information relating to emigration and 
immigration" and the imposition of "effective sanctions on persons, groups or entities which 
use violence, threats or intimidation against migrant workers or members of their families 
in an irregular situation" (Art. 68). It instead urges signatories to assure the protection of the 
fundamental human rights of irregular migrants (Preamble). Indeed, it affinus that "every 
migrant worker and every member of his or her family shall have the right to recognition 
everywhere as a person before the law" (Art. 24) and that appropriate measures should be 
taken "to ensure that migrant workers are not deprived of any rights ... by reason of any 
irregularity in their stay or employment".19 
The new Italian law, on the contrary, has tightened the norms related to the irregular 
status of foreigners, and has transformed irregular migration into a criminal offence instead 
of the administrative breach that it used to be. This change has significant repercussions in 
the concrete life of the migrant and his family. To start with, it will be difficult for the 
irregular migrant to find lodging, since whoever rents an apartment to people in his condition 
runs the risk of imprisonment. It will be difficult if not impossible for him to send 
remittances back home through money transfer services, since this requires the presentation 
of a regular permit to stay in the country. This is a serious concern for the welfare of the 
families who have stayed behind in the home country and also deprives their countries of 
origin of that income that their poor economies badly need. Law n. 94 does not seem to be 
"family-friendly". Since all legal acts regarding the civil status requires the presentation of 
a regular permit to stay, an irregular migrant cannot be registered as a parent of a child who 
may even have a legal status in Italy. The child will therefore have to be identified as one 
with unknown parent. 
At regional level, Italy is also a party to the Council of Europe's Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)20 and the European Social Charter, whose 
19
 For an overview on the implementation of the Convention see Abimourched, R.-Martin, S.: 
Migrant Rights: International Law and National Action. International Migration. 47 (2009) 5, 115-
138. 
20
 The European Court of Human Rights has recently developed its jurisprudence related to 
racial discrimination in highly significant ways. The Court has rightly been applauded for abandoning 
its requirement that racial discrimination be proved "beyond reasonable doubt" and for endorsing the 
concept of indirect discrimination, allowing it, in the last five years, to begin to find states from 
"Eastern Europe" in violation of the Convention for having discriminated against especially Roma 
applicants. While welcome, these new developments should not detract from the need to continue 
asking difficult questions, including the following: why has it taken decades for the Court to start 
finding a violation of Article 14 on grounds of race? Why are cases, such as Menson v. United 
Kingdom concerning the slow reaction of the police in investigating the lethal attack of a black man, 
not found admissible? Can we expect the Court, created in a region which largely built itself upon 
colonialism, to generate mechanisms fit to tackle racism? In the past, judges themselves have provided 
the most virulent critique of the Court's inability to tackle racism. Migrants still remain to benefit 
from their progressive stance in relation to Article 14 claims based on grounds of race. See Dembour, 
M.-B.: Still Silencing the Racism Suffered by Migrants. The Limits of Current Developments under 
Article 14 ECHR. European Journal of Migration and Law, 11 (2009) 3, 221-234. 
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preamble establishes the principle of non-discrimination and whose Art. 19 sets out 
obligations for the equal treatment of migrant workers. 
At European level, Chapter III of the EU Charter on Human Rights (included in the 
Lisbon Treaty, entered into force on 1 December 2009) is devoted entirely to equality. Italy 
is likewise bound by European Union Directives, in particular European Union Council 
Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (the "Racial Equality Directive") and European Union 
Council Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of European Union Member States 
(the "Freedom of Movement Directive").21 
The Directive sets out common standards and procedures in the Member States for 
returning irregularly staying third country nationals (the Returns Directive). While its 
impact in terms of harmonising national legal frameworks can be questioned, from the 
Member States' point of view the agreed standards will underpin their common efforts at 
removing a higher number of irregular immigrants. From the point of view of immigrants, 
it will mean longer pre-removal detention periods and a ban on re-entering legally the 
Union's territory for the foreseeable future.22 
The Emergency Measures, described above in paragraph 2, according to some scholars, 
have led directly to the impermissible discriminatory treatment of Roma and Sinti by: (a) 
defining the very presence of the Roma and Sinti (called 'Nomadi' in the Emergency 
Measures) as grounds for a state of emergency, creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading 
environment; (b) directly discriminating against Roma and Sinti by mandating a compulsory 
census on the basis of their accommodation in camps for nomads created by the government; 
(c) allowing the creation of an ethnic database of Roma and Sinti without adequate 
safeguards; (d) allowing unlawful searches of the homes of Roma and Sinti; and (e) 
permitting destruction of Roma and Sinti settlements and effective evictions without 
provision for adequate alternate housing.23 
As part of the Emergency Measures, the Italian government has conducted an official 
census of Roma and Sinti, which has included a collection of fingerprints, photographs, 
information on ethnic background and religion, and other personal data. This ethnicity-
specific census is in direct violation of ICCPR Art. 17 (guaranteeing the right to respect for 
family life), as well as ICCPR Art. 26 (the right to non-discrimination). Documentation 
carried out by non-governmental organizations indicate that many Roma and Sinti felt 
coerced into complying with this census, either because they felt they did not have any 
other choice, or because police and NGO census takers provided false information about 
the nature and purpose of the census to Roma and Sinti living in the camps. 
21
 For an overview of EU migration and non-discrimination policy see Peers, S.: Key Legislative 
Developments on Migration in the European Union. European Journal of Migration and Law, 9 
(2007) 4, 451—456. 
22
 See Baldaccini, A.: The Return and Removal of Irregular Migrants under EU Law: An 
Analysis of the Returns Directive. European Journal of Migration and Law, 11 (2009) 1, 1-17; 
Acosta, D.: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly in EU Migration Law: Is the European Parliament 
Becoming Bad and Ugly? (The Adoption of Directive 2008/15: The Returns Directive). European 
Journal of Migration and Law, 11 (2009) 1, 19-39. 
23
 See e.g.: Discrimination against Roma in Italy worries UN rights experts. UN press release, 
<http://www.un. org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=27373&Cr=Human> 
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There are documented cases in which both Italian and non-Italian Roma and Sinti were 
subjected to the census under explicitly forceful and intimidating circumstances. For 
example, in the semiformal Camp Tor di Quinto-Baiardo and the formal Camp Tor de Cenci 
in Rome, where part of the census was conducted in July 2008, officials were reportedly 
aggressive and violent toward residents, including searching residents' homes using dogs 
and without a court order. The Italian government has not made clear what it will do with 
the sensitive information, including fingerprints and information on minors, collected in the 
database. In the course of implementation of the Emergency Measures, Roma and Sinti 
communities were subjected to unlawful searches. A number of their settlements were 
destroyed without advance notice, consultation, or respect for due process of law. The 
authorities have carried out evictions without providing assurances of adequate alternative 
accommodations. Several such raids took place in Milan and Turin in 2007. These forced 
evictions without remedy are in direct violation of Articles 2 and 17 of the ICCPR as well 
as Art. 11 of the ICESCR. 
6. Conclusions 
Building equal opportunities for Roma and Sinti minorities requires the establishment of 
human living conditions. National governments must make clear their political will and 
support for the promotion of these minorities through the implementation of adequate 
infrastructure projects. The United Nations and other institutions, such as the European 
Union, must also make a considerable contribution to such programmes. Members of the 
minority and their own organizations should be included, from the planning to the 
implementation of an infrastaicture for such projects, to a far greater extent than has thus 
far been the case. Only if we systematically resist racism and discrimination will majority 
and minority groups be able to coexist peacefully, with equal rights in all countries of the 
world. 
Certainly, States have the right to control their borders and make sure that it is not a 
porous entry for criminals, who may also take advantage of the misery and desperate 
conditions of would-be immigrants. However, justice and solidarity are not antonyms, they 
come hand in hand, just like public security and welcome. National common good, in any 
case, has to be considered in the context of the universal common good. 
As seen in previous paragraphs, Roma and Sinti contribute to create an atmosphere of 
insecurity among citizens living in the suburbs of cities like Rome, Milan and Naples. As 
such, States have a duty to take effective measures to guarantee public security of their 
citizens. National counter-crime strategies should, above all, seek to prevent acts of violence, 
robberies, prosecute those responsible for such criminal acts, and promote and protect 
human rights and the rule of law. 
While the complexity and magnitude of the challenges facing States and others in their 
efforts to balance public security issues and human rights can be significant, international 
human rights law is flexible enough to address them effectively. Effective public security 
measures and the protection of human rights are complementary and mutually reinforcing 
objectives which must be pursued together as part of States' duty to protect individuals 
within their jurisdiction. At the outset, it is important to highlight that the vast majority of 
counter-crime measures are adopted on the basis of ordinary legislation. In a limited set of 
exceptional national circumstances, some restrictions on the enjoyment of certain human 
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rights may be permissible.24 These challenges are not insurmountable. States can effectively 
meet their obligations under international law by using the flexibilities built into the 
international human rights law framework. Human rights law allows for limitations on 
certain rights and, in a very limited set of exceptional circumstances, for derogations from 
certain human rights provisions. These two types of restrictions are specifically conceivcd 
to provide States with the necessary flexibility to deal with exceptional circumstances, while 
at the same time-provided a number of conditions are fulfilled-complying with their 
obligations under international human rights law. 
24
 See, Human Rights Committee, general comment № 31, para. 6, and Siracusa Principles on 
the limitation and derogation of provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(E/CN.4/1985/4, annex). 
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Law on Stage-Forensic Tactics 
in the Trial of Marcus Caelius Rufus 
A b s t r a c t . The present paper intends to highlight s o m e aspects of Cicero 's speech in defence of Marcus Caelius 
Rufus on 4 April 56 ВС on the first day of the Ludi Megalenses . In 56 ВС, as a result of pecul iar coincidence of 
political and private relations, Cicero was given the opportuni ty to deal a heavy blow on Clodius and Clodia in his 
Pro Cael io , w h o m he mocked in the trial with murderous humour using the means of Roman theatre , and, thus, 
arranged a peculiar theatre performance during the Megalensia , which anyway served as the t ime of the Ludi 
scaenici. After outlining the circumstances of the lawsuit (I.) and the background of the Bona Dea case that sowed 
the seeds of the conflict be tween Cicero and the gens Clodia (11.) in our paper we intend to ana lyse the rhetoric 
si tuation provided by the Ludi Megalenses and genial ly exploited by Cicero (111.) and the ora tor ' s tact ics applied 
in the speech in defence of Cael ius (IV.). 
K e y w o r d s : lex Plautia de vi. quaest io de vi. Pro Cael io , forensic tactics 
I. In Apr i l 56 ВС, the then twen ty - f ive -yea r old1 M . Cae l ius b e f o r e the quaestio de vi was 
c h a r g e d b y L. S e m p r o n i u s Atra t inus as m a i n prosecutor , a n d L. Hercnn ius B a l b u s and P. 
C l o d i u s as subscriptores. T h e d e f e n d a n t h i m s e l f m a d e a s ta tement o f t h e defence . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , M. L i c in iu s Crassus D i v e s a n d - t a k i n g the f loor in line wi th his hab i t as the 
last o n e 2 - C i c e r o ac t ed as counse l for the d e f e n c e . T h e cha rge w a s m a d e p r e s u m a b l y on the 
g r o u n d s o f the lex Plautia de vi (65/4) , 3 w h i c h had been d r a f t e d based on C i c e r o ' s account 
of e v e n t s agains t i n f a m o u s ci t izens w h o ra i sed riot, and w h o bes ieged the s e n a t e with 
w e a p o n s , used v i o l e n c e against a magis t ra te , a n d a t t acked the State.4 F rom a m o n g the acts 
C a e l i u s w a s c h a r g e d wi th , the first th ree , w h i c h w e r e e x p o u n d e d in m o r e d e t a i l s in the 
s t a t emen t o f the d e f e n c e m a d e by Cae l ius a n d Crassus , arc k n o w n to us on ly f r o m Cicero ' s 
s u m m a r y . 5 
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Cicero kept for himself the expounding of the assassination against the Alexandrine 
philosopher Dio.6 The counts of the indictment are connected in some form with the legates 
of Alexandria who intended to protest before the senate against Ptolemaios XII having been 
put back to the throne of Egypt by Rome (concerning the second and fourth counts of the 
indictment this can be established at first glance).7 The legates led by Dio arrived to Rome 
in 57, but king Ptolemaios supported by Pompeius made every effort to thwart the audience 
before the senate.8 The charge claimed that Caelius had been involved in these acts of 
Ptolemaios and Pompeius from the outset. The pulsatio Puteolana was probably an attack 
made against the legates of Alexandria immediately after they had arrived to Puteoli; it 
cannot be ruled out that the seditiones Neapolitanae are connected with that in some form 
or other. If the legates heading from Naples on Via Appia to Rome used protection by a 
magistrate, then it can be deservedly called seditio using the proper Roman terminus 
technicus since it denotes defiance against the power of the state.9 We cannot either prove 
or disclaim the relation of the bona Pallae with the legates of Alexandria.10 In this respect, 
it is necessary to refer to the view that asserts that the present lawsuit can be considered 
dispute at law of primarily political nature; so, it was meant to attack Pompeius, Ptolemaios's 
patron, and Cicero's task was to deprive the case of any implication of current politics." 
Contrary to this, the following points can be offered for deliberation: the prosecutors were 
motivated basically by private rather than political motifs.12 
In particular, the fact that in February 56 on count of ambitus Caelius accused at the 
time of the lawsuit seventeen-year old L. Sempronius Atratinus's11 blood father, L. Calpurnius 
Bestia,14 who was acquitted from the charge of election bribery, since he was defended by 
Cicero; he wanted him to be summoned again due to ambitus)5 This second accusation was 
prevented by Atratinus by charging him with vis; consequently, Heinze claims that political 
considerations in this lawsuit constituted the means rather than the aim.16 Pompeius's 
popularity reached its bottom;17 thus, for the prosecutors it was actually advantageous to be 
able to attack Caelius as Pompeius's adherent. In this respect, Cicero himself, as a matter of 
fact, tried to mitigate the political edge of dispute at law. (Pompeius's name does not occur 
on a single occasion in the Pro Caelio.)18 In addition to specific counts of the indictment 
Cicero touches several issues that do not actually belong to the scope of the charge: 
6
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7
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specifically, the alleged attempt by Caelius to murder Clodia, Metellus Celer's widow.14 He 
handles the attempt to poison Clodia in a somewhat separated form, but from a remark20 it 
comes out clearly that this element plays a material part in the chain of the demonstration of 
evidence. Consequently, Caelius had obtained money from Clodia to be able to hire Dio's 
murderers,21 and if later on he wanted to poison Clodia, from whom the money came form, 
then, its aim was to get rid of the woman who later on learned of the assassination.22 
II. The development of the hostile relation between Cicero and P. Clodius as well as his 
elder sister, Clodia cannot be understood without being aware of Cicero's testimony made 
in the so-called Bona Dea trial and the causes that made him do that. It was at the beginning 
of December 62 when highborn women of Rome, including the virgines Vestales, celebrated 
the festival of Bona Dea at the house of the pontifex maximus, Caesar. The name of Bona 
Dea is direct translation of the Greek Agathe Theos, who became generally known as a 
healing goddess;23 based on the inscription referring to her24 and the representations from 
Attica we are discussing here a figure of Hygeia.25 This ritual was held in Rome at the 
house of a magistratus cum imperio, and only the matronae of the ruling class and Vesta 
priestesses were allowed to take part in it.26 The festivity was led by the wife of the 
magistratus, so, Bona Dea did not have a priestess of her own.27 With respect to the present 
case, it is of special importance that each male being, be it human or animal, was strictly 
excluded from the ritual. No exact picture regarding each detail is provided by historical 
sources28 on what happened during this night; the following, however, can be established 
with acceptable certainty: Clodius somehow found his way into the house (Plutarch claims 
that he found the door open and that is how he entered). He pretended to be disguised as a 
woman with a Harp24 but the assertion made by Plutarch and Appianos that disguising was 
greatly facilitated by him not being compelled yet to shave in those days is false; they 
simply forget about the fact that at the time of the Bona Dea scandal Clodius was already 
twenty-nine/thirty years old. Dio Cassius claims that his purpose was to seduce Caesar's 
wife, Pompeia (which did happen as Dio Cassius asserts), but that is not certain at all. 
Anyway, the ritual was led by Caesar's mother: Aurclia and not by Pompeia.30 The disturbed 
festivity was later repeated by Vesta priestesses (instauratio)}] 
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In the senate the Bona Dea scandal was first put forth by 0- Cornificius, and the body 
referred it to the Vesta priestesses and the pontifices, who held a session under the 
chairmanship of the pontifex maximus, Caesar.32 In addition to Caesar, this body included 
one more member who played a part in the later trial: L. Cornelius Lentulus Niger, who 
fulfilled the dignity of thс flamen Martialis?2 The senate received a report stating that the 
disturbance of the Bona Dea ritual was deemed nefas. After this report, albeit, before the 
trial, Caesar divorced his wife and announced that he would not be willing to appear in 
court as a witness-thereby reassuring Clodius that there had been no break in the friendship 
they had entertained.34 The senate accepted the report, and resolved to set up a special venue 
of jurisdiction in order for it to investigate the incestum committed by Clodius.35 The 
members of the court of justice were not elected from album iudicum by drawing lots—as it 
was customary in the quaestiones-instead, the chairing praetor selected the participants 
from specific persons, which enhanced the suspicion that the judges must have been 
prejudiced against Clodius right from the first.36 For this reason, Fufius Calenus tribunus 
plebis vetoed the charge submitted by M. Piso.37 The matter was delivered to the public, 
from among Clodius's opponents three persons-Cato, Favonius and Hortensius-took firm 
action quite resolutely. Then, the senate was convened again, and having put down Fufius 
Calenus's resistance they decided to proceed in the form originally planned-it was this fact 
on which Cicero informed Atticus on 13th February.38 At the next session of the senate Fufius 
made two proposals: first, regarding the point that the trial on Clodius's case should be 
held; secondly, that the judges should be appointed by drawing lots.34 The first proposal was 
accepted, the second one was dismissed,40 the senate entrusted Fufius to submit the charge 
to the public. Cicero claims this happened, because Hortensius and his circle were fully 
certain that Clodius would be sentenced by any court.41 Accordingly, the formal accusation 
was made approx. before 15,h March, 61. Of the lawsuit itself rather few facts are known to 
us; the charge was expounded by three persons, three Cornelii Lentuli: L. Cornelius Lentulus 
Crus, L. Lentulus Cornelius Lentulus Niger (flamen Martialis) and Cn. Cornelius 
Marcellinus.42 
Against the charge Clodius intended to prove the alibi that on the day of the Bona Dea 
ritual he had been in Interamna and not in Rome. To refute this alibi several matronae 
participating in the Bona Dea festivity acted as witnesses, including Caesar's mother, 
Aurelia and Caesar 's elder sister, Iulia. Similarly, Cicero made a testimony pleading that on 
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the day of the ritual Clodius visited him in Rome-certain sources43 claim this visit was paid 
three hours before the scandal (i.e., late at night), other interpretations44 assert it took place 
during the salutatio in the morning. Eventually, Clodius was acquitted; several causes of 
such outcome of the lawsuit can be made probable: it cannot be ruled out that the members 
of the court were bribed, the money presumably was provided by Crassus (each member of 
the jury must have been given three-four hundred thousand sestertii)-bo\h Catulus45, and 
Cicero referred to this possibility.46 Besides possible bribery, the jury's fear might have also 
arisen, and there might have been doubt to what extent Aurelia was able to recognise 
Clodius exactly.47 Since the decision in the lawsuit was not adopted as Cicero had desired, 
and through his testimony he had made Clodius his deathly enemy, which resulted in a 
tragic tum in his later career-exile, it is worth highlighting the motifs that had made Cicero 
take such firm action in the lawsuit. Cicero himself emphasised unselfish and purely moral 
reasons of his procedure,48 however, his first account of the disturbance of the ritual written 
to Atticus was not free from certain cynical overtone.49 He describes the action taken against 
Clodius as one of the (subsequent) steps in the combat against Catilina, and alleged to have 
discovered connections between the Catilina's plot in 63 and the elements that supported 
Clodius in the Bona Dea trial.50 This explanation, however, does not seem satisfactory to 
the extent that Clodius had bcen-as we shall see-a long-time personal enemy of Catilina, 
and he personally had not taken part in the plot.51 
Plutarch52 identifies the following reasons for Cicero making a testimony incriminating 
Clodius in the Bona Dea trial. Cicero had been induced by his wife, Terentia to take this 
step, whose hatred was aimed not so much at Clodius but at his elder sister, Clodia due to 
the point that Clodia had purportedly wanted Cicero to divorce Terentia, and marry her, 
Clodia. Through Cicero's testimony Terentia wanted to deteriorate the relation so that this 
step could not be taken, and Cicero wanted to clear himself of the suspicion. Plutarch 
himself mentions this possibility merely as talk of the town, and mostly it is in accordancc 
with that that researchers of the modem age have refused this version.53 In spite of that, it is 
worth casting an investigating glancc at this explanation, too. Plutarch dates Clodia's 
intention regarding Cicero to the year 61. The chronology indicated by Plutarch is sometimes 
quite uncertain, but the event he gives an account of often constitutes a historical fact in 
spite of the erroneous determination of the point of time.54 The story appears in a more 
realistic light if we attempt to place it in the year 63 in stead of 61. After making a survey of 
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the political marriages entered into and planned around this time,55 the marriage entered 
into between Clodia and Metellus Celer can be dated to the end of 63.56 Through that 
Metellus Celer got in the circles of the optimates, and became the son-in-law of Pompeius's 
opponent, Lucullus. It cannot be excluded that the party of the optimates knowingly 
attempted to alienate his key supporters from Pompeius. In 63, Cicero having taken steps 
against the populäres became a man of political significance in the eyes of the optimates—it 
is possible to imagine that it was at that time when they tried to attain that Cicero should 
divorce Terentia and marry Clodia. And if after that the politically promising marriage to be 
entered into with Cicero was not accomplished, then they were satisfied with Metellus 
Celer. Cicero probably did not want to violate his marriage for certain temporary political 
advantages, and did not consider the marriage practice usually accepted in the circles of the 
notables of Rome a political trump card.57 Yet, even if we do not accept this hypothesis, 
Plutarch's thought that Cicero had been induced by Terentia to stand as witness against 
Clodius does not seem groundless if a former clash between the two families is taken into 
consideration.58 
The hatred between Terentia and Clodius comes from 73 when Clodius charged 
Catilina with incestum committed against Fabia. Fabia was a virgo Vestalis and Terentia's 
half-sister. Owing to Catulus's help, Catilina was acquitted; yet, the case highly damaged 
Fabia, and thereby Terentia's family. There are some loci available to us on the case: so, for 
example, Sallustius mentions incestum as a fact,59 and a reference to it is also available in 
Cicero.60 Presumably, the Bona Dca ritual held in 63 at the house of the consul at that time 
led by Terentia gave a push to Cicero to take action against Catilina since the participants of 
the Catilina's plot had already been arrested in Rome though, Cicero had not made a 
decision on their fate yet. The matronae celebrating the Bona Dea festival saw the altar 
bursting into liâmes, which qualified a prodigium, and it was interpreted by the virgines 
Vestales and Terentia taking part in the festival as a need for Cicero to take firm action 
against the conspirators in order to restore pax deorum.b] The priestesses and Terentia must 
have been inflamed also by Fabia having been put to shame through Catilina making 
mockery of her reputation.62 The attempt at providing the interpretation claiming that 
disgracing the Bona Dea festival in 62 might have been Clodius's political response to 
Cicero using the festival in 63 in order to influence him63 does not seem well-grounded.64 
First, because Clodius did not belong to Catilina's adherents; secondly, because it is hard to 
presume that he had had such a conscious political concept. 
Both the hypothesis of the jealousy due to the presumed plan of the marriage to be 
entered into with Clodia and the fact of the hatred felt because of Fabia having been shamed 
55
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by Catilina and Clodius clearly indicates that Terentia produced highly great influence on 
Cicero with respect to the testimony to be made against Clodius. Clodius also wanted to 
shift the responsibility of Cicero's action to Terentia; at least, in 58 as tribunus plebis he 
deluded Cicero65 that he should not flee from Rome-just to enjoy his revenge all the more.66 
Albeit, Caesar offered Cicero the position of a legátus so that he could leave Rome; it has 
not been clarified whether this had happened before Clodius was elected tribunus61 or took 
place after that.68 However, although being aware of the danger, he did not leave.69 The 
consequences not foreseen either by Cicero or Terentia are widely known. In 58, Clodius 
was elected tribunus plebis; to this end, he had had to be adopted by a plebeian family, 
which was implemented with the consent of Caesar as pontifex maximus, and he submitted 
the following bill: anyone who had caused any Roman citizen to be executed without court 
proceedings should be outlawed. This law (which was enacted with retroactive force!) was 
targeted at Cicero personally, who had caused Catilina's five accomplices executed in 
Tullianum during the Catilina's plot without court proceedings but with the approval of the 
senate.70 Cicero went into exile and on the site of his villa on the Palatine ravaged to dust 
Clodius had a temple erected for goddess Libertás. As Imre Trencsényi-Waldapfel remarks: 
"In the history of the world, it was not the first and not the last act of abusing the name of 
liberty but certainly it was one of the most repulsive ones."71 Since neither Cicero nor 
Terentia72 were able to foresee the fatal consequences of the testimony made in the Bona 
Dea trial that occurred in 58. It cannot be considered inconsistent for them to proceed in the 
action at law in 61 making an attempt to obtain redress through Fabia for the injury suffered 
by the whole family in 73. 
III. After having given a brief account of the historical/political situation and the stages of 
the hostile relation between Cicero and the gens Clodia, we should turn our attention to the 
rhetoric situation developed by the circumstances and to the point how Cicero handles it. 
De Saint-Denis calls the Pro Caelio the wittiest of Cicero's orations,73 which results to a 
great extent from the date when the speech was delivered (on 4th April), from the maximum 
exploitation of the somewhat contradictory situation provided by the first day of the Ludi 
Megalenses through the tools of humour.74 Ludi Megalenses (4-10 April) was the festivity 
of Magna Mater (Kybclë), whose cult was borrowed and introduced in Rome in 205/4 
immediately before the end of the second Punic war on the grounds of the instruction of the 
65
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libri Sibyllini.15 At that time, they turned to the seat of the cult,76 in the present case, to 
Attalos, king of Pergamon, who handed over the black stone representing the goddess, and 
equipped a ship for carrying it to Rome.77 Another tradition has it that the stone was taken to 
Rome directly from Pessinus.78 The goddess was brought to Rome with ritual ceremony, the 
senate entrusted Scipio Nasica to receive the Magna Mater. Certain sources assert that in 
order to prove her innocence the Vesta priestess Quinta Claudia herself set the boat-
transporting the stone, stuck on the sand bank of Tiberis-to sail.79 In her temple on the 
Palatínus Claudia also had a statue,80 this temple was completed in 191, and it was at that 
time when the Megalensia and the staged plays (ludi scaenici) held on this occasion were 
introduced. In the ritual of the Ludi Megalenses-just like in the entire Roman cult of 
Kybelë-no part was given to the raging gallus dance recalling Attis's self-mutilation.81 On 
the other hand, archaeological find proves the appearance of the Attis cult simultaneously 
with the cult of Magna Mater for during the archaeological excavations on the Palatine Hill 
in 1950/1 small statues representing Attis were found in the cell of the Kybelê temple from 
the layer from the 2nd с. ВС. This unambiguously refutes the standpoint which claims that 
Kybelë's cult had been borrowed and introduced in Rome without Attis's cult82 as this 
seemed doubtful merely on the grounds of philological findings.83 
As it has already been mentioned, theatre performances were held on the Megalensia 
right from the outset. Apart from stressing the two members of the gens Claudia being 
directly affected in the trial and the contrast between Clodia and Quinta Claudia,84 another 
link between the Megalensia and the history of the family existed. Clodius disturbed the 
festival of Magna Mater on several occasions. He caused the second scandal on 8lh, 9lh or 
10th April, 56,85 when accompanied by armed slaves he attacked and occupied the theatre 
where the performance was being held.86 Thus, this happened a few days after Pro Caelio 
was delivered. However, those who listened to the oration might have thought and most 
certainly did think of the first incident since in 58 Clodius was involved in an action against 
the Kybelê sanctuary in Pessinus87 when Brogitarus, who supported Clodius's gang with 
money, obtained the Kybelê priest dignity (accompanied by royal title) in Pessinus with 
Clodius's assistance, through having expelled the legitimate fulfiller of this office and broke 
75
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up the cult.88 This way, the gens Clodia was closely linked to the Megalensia both in terms 
of history and current political issues. 
IV. At the beginning of the speech Cicero as it were expresses his regret that it is a pity that 
judges are not granted any rest even on holidays,84 and cannot watch the theatre performance 
just being held. So, the orator is going to stage his own theatre performance, comedy for 
them, and puts Clodia4" defined as the source of the charge in the centre. By doing that he is 
not trying to make the defendant appear a nice person to the judges, instead, he drives the 
attention to the opponent's motive force, opes meretriciaefi and it is absolutely not doubtful 
to those listening to the speech whom the term meretrix covers. The chief witness of the 
charge of attempted murder of Dio, the Roman merry widow, Clodia Metelli known from 
her licentious way of life. Before responding to the actual charges (de vi), he deems it is 
important to reply to the invented defamation made to the detriment of Caelius.92 
From the part regarding vita ante acta93 the following key charges can be discerned. 
Caelius had violated pietas and fides, had not paid due respect to his father94, and had not 
acted properly concerning Calpurnius Bestia either when he had caused him to be 
summoned.95 The charge of luxuria,96 which he reproached both Herennius and Clodius 
Caelius for,97 and dissolute life in young age.98 Remarks of political nature: friendly relation 
to Sergius Catilina,99 alleged participation in the conspiracy,10" the crime of ambitus,101 and 
attack against a senator in the election of the pontifex,102 The grouping of the charges may 
be discretional but their order mostly follows Caelius's course of life.103 The third part104 
discusses the assassination against Dio; the accusation supports this by Clodia's statement 
claiming that Caelius had obtained money from her in order to bribe Lucceius's slaves, and 
then tried to get rid of her as an incriminating witness.105 
Cicero expounds these two statements made by Clodia as independent charges,106 he 
refutes the charges of aurum101 and venenumm separately.109 It is one of Cicero's clearly 
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perceptible objectives to alleviate the political overtones of the trial as much as possible, 
among others it is for this reason that he does not focus on the attack against Dio. Crimen 
veneni is properly known, presumably other persons' testimonies were available to support 
Clodia on the issue that Caelius had attempted to hand over poison to Clodia's slaves. Quite 
interestingly, during the entire oration Cicero does not provide any other version instead of 
this story; he is satisfied with making the inconsistencies in the opponent's pleading 
ridiculous, and emphasising that corpus delicti is not available to them. Although thereby 
he does not fully dispel suspicion regarding Caelius but at least he can take this detail out of 
its original context.110 
Several material questions arise in the middle part of the speech.1" After having 
covered the paragraphs de vita, or de moribus, the orator drives the attention to the actual 
counts of the indictment. With a few sentences he briefly presents the assassination against 
Dio. He refers to the point that king Ptolemaios was the author the murder, who used Asicius 
having been acquitted in the meantime as a tool-for this reason, even the shadow of 
suspicion could not be cast on Caelius."2 After that, he suddenly returns to the objections 
made against Caelius's conduct of life (deliciarum obiurgatio),"3 With respect to minor 
licentiousness he takes a liberal position believing that youth has the right to sow their wild 
oats as long as they do not cause any serious harm by that,"4 and in more serious cases he 
asks the judges to distinguish the subject (res) from the defendant (reus)', that is, to notice 
that the objections raised concern young people of the period in general and not specifically 
Caelius."5 Then, he passes on to a definite crimen luxuriae: the money obtained from 
Clodia allows the deduction of a quite intimate relationship, which ended with a bitter 
split.116 Instead of the continuation, logical at first sight (on the one hand, he might deny the 
existence of this love affair; on the other hand, he could fully doubt the authenticity of the 
two crimena due to its sudden break), Cicero chooses to follow another track: in what 
follows"7 he doubts the authenticity of Clodia's testimony on the grounds that as a left and 
jealous mistress she is not able to judge Caelius without bias. Thereby he anticipates the 
subject de vi that belongs to the argumentation8 through that vis and luxuria change turning 
into each other in paragraphs 23-50:119 vfs,120 luxuria,121 vis,122 luxuria,123 vis.124 
This point is highlighted by an excellent observation made by Heinze when he asserts 
that the construction of the charge is primarily and exclusively based on Clodia's testimony 
So, it could not ruin its authenticity by presenting Clodia as Caelius's left mistress, 
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consequently, it was only Cicero who could bring up this relation in the lawsuit.125 Thus, he 
defended Caelius against an accusation (since the liaison with Clodia is far from being so 
general as amores and libidines referred to) that had not been made against him.126 The 
whole thing seems all the more appropriate as there is no single point in the entire Pro 
Caelio where Cicero presumed that the love relation between Clodia and Caelius is a fact 
known to the general public listening to the case. At several places he keeps mentioning 
certain generally spread rumours regarding the sexual life of each of the persons separately 
but never concerning the affair between them. So, it is Cicero who reduces Clodia's and 
Caelius's licentious conduct of life engaged by both of them individually to a common 
denominator and invents connection between them.127 
The situation would have been exploited by a counsel for the defence less genial than 
Cicero as follows. First, he would decrease the significance of crimen luxuriae, and would 
point out the highly general nature of the charges and the right of youth to engage in free 
and easy way of life. Secondly, he would cast doubt on Clodia's authenticity-which is 
perhaps not so difficult since in 56 satirical poems on incestuous relation maintained with 
her brother Clodius had been rather widespread among the people'28-and thereby he would 
question whether the Roman court could grant great authenticity to the testimony of the 
meretrix. This orator, as we have said, less genial than Cicero would face the following 
difficulties. How can he measure by two measures; that is: why is he so forbearing regarding 
Caelius's lascivious conduct of life and why so strict regarding the same in case of Clodia? 
(It is a fact that whereas Caelius is merely a young man, Clodia is a consul1 s widow but the 
oration could possibly become inauthcntic through this duality.) Even if Clodia-exactly due 
to her conduct of life-were not a witness considered too authentic, this would by no means 
give reason for her to lie. And on the whole why would she have been up to make a false 
testimony against Caelius?129 
It is a brilliant construction by which Cicero takes the sting out of possible objections. 
How would the case look like if Clodia had been Caelius's lover? The edge of moral 
aversions against Caelius is actually eliminated by the fact that it is not possible to commit 
adulterium with a kind of woman like Clodia since she is ranked among amores meretricii. 
And thereby the question regarding the reason for Clodia's testimony is solved at one blow: 
the left lover is thirsting for revenge, and it is for this reason that she makes a false 
testimony; subsequently, it cannot be evaluated. On the other hand, at first sight, Cicero 
does not have too extensive background at his disposal to build the love relation between 
Caelius and Clodia: both of them live on the Palatínus, and it is not really their ascetic 
conduct of life that they are notable for. Cicero, however, finds one more point: the charge 
claims that Clodia had given money to Caelius, who later wanted to poison Clodia (aurum 
et venenum). According to Cicero's construction, which seems quite obvious, all this had 
taken place because of a highly intimate relationship and a quite stormy break. However, it 
is still hard to solve the dilemma: the claims made in the charge are either true and then 
Caelius is guilty in the assassination against Dio; or, if they are not true, then the Caelius-
Clodia liaison cannot be developed. Thus, Cicero must acquit the defendant (luxuria), and 
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must make Clodia's testimony inauthentic (vis). If the relation between the two of them had 
been widely known, then Cicero would have had to place the point on luxuria in the part of 
de vita ac moribus, and the attack against Clodia in the part of crimen de vi. This way, 
however, he deals with Clodia's authenticity under the points of crimina auri et veneni, and 
builds and manipulates the Clodia-Caelius relation.130 
Now, let us look at how Cicero creates this relation. At the beginning of the speech131 
he does not name Clodia yet, he refers to opes meretriciae only, which properly and 
excitingly rhymes with intolerabilis libido and nimis acerbum odium)32 When he mentions 
Caelius's moving to the Palatinus he formulates more clearly.133 Here, Cicero uses the well-
known Medea motif, which has already arisen a few times during the lawsuit since Atratinus 
called Caelius pulchellus Iason, and referred to the story of the golden fleece regarding the 
hired gold,134 and Caelius called Atratinus Pelia cincinnatus,135 And he continues to develop 
the thought.136 He refers the motif of money and poison (duo sunt autem crimina, auri et 
veneni) to the scope of subject of luxuria, and intends to draw conclusions from that 
regarding the relation between Clodia and Caelius. Yet, if he uttered this expressis verbis, 
then he would acknowledge that the charges are true.137 
Cicero repeats the opponent's charges with an ut dicitur phrase but he lets them appear 
real and true-more properly he suspends the response to be given to them-as long as they 
fit in with his aims.138 It is here where he conjures up Appius Claudius Caecus (prosopopoiia) 
from the underworld-which is no way a tool that belongs to genus grande139 in the present 
case140 but a trick full of comic circumstances141-in order to be able to compare ancient 
Roman virtues to Clodia's conduct of life. Seemingly, this does not serve defence since the 
ancestor conjured up is convinced of the justice of the charge of aurum et venenum,142 
However, the old censor's speech now unambiguously feeds the fact of the relation between 
Clodia and Caelius and Clodia's corruptness into the judges' head.143 
It is after this that the reprehensio testis may be implemented with respect to Clodia, 
which presents Clodia as a jealous, left lover, and proves that Caelius is not an adulter, that 
is, adulterer, but only an amator, that is, a lover. In accordance with the above cast (first, 
Cicero and then Appius Claudius Caecus spoke), here again the orator himself and then 
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Clodius Pulcher pleads; thereby Cicero shifts the burden of proof mostly to the two persons 
summoned. Cicero's tactic here becomes much clearer: if the charge of poison and gold is 
true, then Clodia was Caelius's lover; if she was his lover, then her testimony is useless, so 
the charge of poison and gold is not proved. Thus, the charge of poison and gold, which has 
been so summed up by Cicero in order for him to create a liaison, now becomes needless; 
therefore, it should be concealed, and that without being noticed, so that the judges should 
not remember on what premises their conclusions were based on.144 The crimina auri et 
veneni are merged with crimen luxuriae, and in the rest of the speech they are referred to as 
such. In the speech put into Clodius's mouth it is now considered a fact that Clodia is 
Caelius's mistress-whereas Appius Claudius deduced this only from various signs of 
suspicion.145 The level the two actors are informed corresponds to the listeners' seeming 
level of knowledge. Clodius details the love affair rather loosely-and thereby Cicero dealt a 
deathly blow on Clodia's confession.146 
In the editing of paragraphs 30-36 of the Pro Caelio we can see several threads running 
side by side. In terms of content: hypothetical deduction from gold and poison on the affair 
and split (here the speaker is Cicero),147 the actual (now not hypothetical) conclusion, Appius 
Claudius Caecus is the speaker,148 hypothetical conclusion from the affair and from the split 
on the inauthenticity of Clodia's testimony (here the speaker is Cicero),149 actual conclusion 
drawn by Clodius.150 In terms of the real aim of the demonstration of evidence: proving the 
existence of the affair,151 ruining Clodia's authenticity.152 In terms of the facts to be seemingly 
proved: acquitting Caelius from crimen luxuriae;153 ruining Clodia's authenticity.154 After 
that he frees Caelius from characterisation as an adulter since he has proved that Clodia is 
living a life not worthy of a Roman matróna', accordingly, it is not possible to commit 
adulterium with such a woman, a meretrix. Although in the points concerning the above155 
Cicero does not mention Clodia by name, and the formulation of the evaluation is somewhat 
hypothetical, later he states that Clodia is living meretricio more.156 By this response the 
orator replies to the thoughts of the two types of fathers involved in the proceedings. 
However, both fathers agree157 that young people have always been permitted to engage in a 
certain libidinous conduct, and this libertine conduct might include affairs maintained with 
the kind of women like Clodia, which belongs to the scope of amores meretricii.158 
In presenting the liaison with Clodia Cicero uses the rhetoric tools of humour and 
irony on several occasions. So it seems appropriate to review what role humour and irony 
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as orator's tool played in the theory of Antique elocution, in particular, especially in the 
Corpus Cicerónianum. The usefulness of fun, geloion was first discussed by Gorgias, who 
claimed that the opponent's seriousness should be contrasted by fun and his mock by 
seriousness in order to destroy its impact,159 as it is quoted by Aristotle, too.160 It is at this point 
where Aristotle refers to the fact that in the Poetica he has already expounded how many 
types of geloion there are; but the part of the Poetica where he discussed comedy has been 
lost. He adds that a part of that suits free men, and another part does not; therefore, the 
orator should use the former ones.161 The fact that several Greek authors have dealt with 
the issue of humour is mentioned in Cicero's works.162 These Greek writings, however, 
have not been preserved to us. Quintilian can see fundamental difference between the two 
greatest figures of Antique eloquence, Demosthenes and Cicero in terms of wit and humour: 
whereas Demosthenes lacked high spirits, Cicero could not keep within bounds in 
witticism.163 In the Orator164 Cicero touches on, in his work De oratore gives and exhaustive 
exposition165 on the issues of wit, jokes and humour. As sources he used his own practice, 
collections of Roman jokes166 and peripatetic writings.167 His scrivener, Tiro published a 
thesaurus of examples summed up in three books on this subject. 
Cicero starts the treatise by making the statement that jokes and humour are quite often 
very useful,168 then, he goes on by saying that he himself has seen that in lawsuits lots of 
things can be achieved through witticism.169 Cicero looks for answers to five questions 
regarding laughing. What is laughter? Where does it come from? Should the orator want to 
create jollity? How far may he go? What types of ridiculum are there?170 One of the actors 
of the dialogue C. Iulius Caesar Strabo claims that the first question does not belong to the 
subject;171 he answers the second one by citing Aristotle asserting that ridiculum should be 
applied in the field determined by the attributes: ugly and grotesque.172 To the third question 
the answer is clearly yes.173 To the fourth question he replies as follows: the orator shall not 
make fun of cither special turpitude or grave misfortune174; similarly, a person favoured and 
respected by the public shall not become the target of scorn.175 The prime law is thus 
moderation.176 From the answer given to the fifth question we learn that one of the types of 
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jokes is created by the thing itself, the other one by the formulation.177 After that, he 
identifies the sources of ridiculum the orator may draw on178 and of those he shall not.179 
Laughter is most often evoked, for example in jokes, by the orator saying something that 
nobody expects; in this case we are laughing at our own error.180 In defining the idea of the 
perfectus orator Cicero identifies three kinds of style-simple, medium and sublime-and he 
notes that, albeit, some persons are excellent in specific types of style, very few have 
mastered all of them.181 In Orator Cicero provides theoretical foundations for all the three 
kinds of style, however, he points out that, in addition to its other attributes (avoiding prose 
rhythm and complex sentence, dropping hiatus, munditia and elegantia, moderation in 
applying both ornament and word and thought figures), the most characteristic trait of 
simple style is witticism and sharp tongue. When using them the orator is to make sure that 
he should not cause irreparable harms, should thrust stings only into his enemies, should do 
that with moderation and ceaselessly, and he should not hurt all of them and not in any way. 
He calls this the purest Atticism, although in this respect none of the recent Atticists have 
reached any special elegance.182 
Several essential elements of Roman comedy have been highlighted by Segal, who 
claims that as a perfect opposition to Roman everyday life ruled by negotium and industria 
appears the so-called Plautian day, where the key attributes are Indus and voluptas.m 
During the period when theatre plays were performed, activity on the forum discontinued 
(Ludi Romani, Ludi Apollinares, Ludi plebei, Ludi Megalenses), so, a kind of exemption 
from gravitas that permeates the entire Roman life entered into force. In comedies, each 
player step out of the world of their everyday life: young people do not obey their father, 
matronae do not follow their husband's will, and slaves brief their masters without being 
punished. Education is sometimes aimed at the outsider, who will be integrated in society if 
he accepts criticism, whereas he will be definitely cast out as the hindrance of the play if he 
continues to be an outsider.184 The persons injured by Plautus's humour are often the milites 
gloriosi and the Cato Maior kind conservatives, puritan figures. In the works of Tercntius 
the opposition between strict fathers and jolly sons is a highly favoured motif (fathers 
mostly "improve" and start to tolerate their son's conduct of life).185 In the Pro Caelio,186 in 
the syncresis of the two father types Cicero quotes the words of two fathers from the 
comedies of Caecilius and Terentius. The former one is severe and tough, the latter one is 
well-intentioned and forbearing, it is not by chance that the quotation comes from Micio's 
speech in Adelphoe}%1 The words of the two fathers can be to some extent linked to the two 
actors conjured up in the previous paragraphs, Appius Claudius Caecus and P. Clodius 
Pulcher, and create an impressive parallel with the relation between Cicero and his 
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intcllectual/spiritual son, Caelius, which is a definite opposite of the relation between Clodia 
and her younger brother/husband, Clodius.188 
In Clodia's characterisation the orator quotes Ennius's tragedy entitled Medea exul, 
and uses the lines with tragic tone for producing the comic impact.189 That is how Caelius 
becomes Iason, his move to the neighbourhood of Clodia-Medea a mythical journey, and 
the left merry widow a sorceress.190 Later he presents the adventure of handing over the jar, 
not so much in the spirit of comedy, more as kind of mimus.m In this kind of plays (and 
this is highly significant in the characterisation of Clodia as meretrix) prostitutes entered the 
stage.192 The comedia dell' arte kind of mimus not having a definite story was far from 
being a form of entertainment to improve morals, it often produced the impact expressed in 
risus mimicus through its obscenity. Adultery and attempted poisoning constituted the 
cornerstone of its subject matter; accordingly, Cicero describes what has happened in the 
bath as obscenissima fabula.m He presents the events aimed at handing over and obtaining 
the pyxis as midiebre bellum, in the course of which Clodia becomes imperatrix and her 
men provincia hiding in the wooden horse of Troy.194 Clodia's characterisation as a 
meretrix145 constitutes a perfect contrast with the image of the obedient and ethical matróna 
who safeguards the purity of home. Clodia's whole appearance and behaviour fits in with a 
meretrix, and not with a mater fam i lias,196 but her Jam il iaris are her slaves and the bath 
master,197 and regarding this point Cicero refers to the nickname quadrantaria twice.198 
Plutarch claims this title has been stuck to her because she would be given one quadrans by 
her lovers as payment,199 and he calls Caelius by the name Quadrantaria Clytaemnestra.m 
Caelius is attacked by opibus meretriciis201 assisted by prostitutes; so, Clodia leads her army 
as a kind of miles gloriosa.202 
Summary 
In Cicero's career there were several more triumphant points and ones that formed history 
to a greater extent, yet-as it might have become apparent from some of the references made 
here-there were few moments when as an orator he was able to present such a gleaming 
theatre play and genially constructed composition to the judges as on the Megalensia in the 
year 56. The speech did not fail to reach its result: Caelius was, as a matter of fact, acquitted; 
and the lawsuit offered a great occasion for Cicero to take revenge-even if just in part and 
merely verbally-for the roguery committed repeatedly by Clodius and Clodia against him. 
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Deviances of Information Society 
About Harassment and Cyber-stalking 
A b s t r a c t . The fact of harassment is a remarkable step in the c o m p l e x protection of pr ivate sphere, but due to its 
novelty it is still diff icul t to adopt in pract ice. Among the mos t typical behaviours o f harassment, the Cr imina l 
Code itself names the commitment through telecommunication too ls that-referr ing to the t i t le-means ha rassmen t 
through internet as an infocommunicat ion system. The modem, digi tal communicat ion facilities enable an in fo rmal 
communicat ion a m o n g participants that h ides reality. The single w a y s of communicat ion (e-mail, chat) only have 
writ ten basis, other sensors of cognition, perception do not play any role. As a result o f the lack of social controi l , 
one of the most significant hurdles of aggression, the social dis t ress does not exist. Therefore some e m o t i o n s 
(anger, jealousy) or aggression can be directed straight towards the target of the harassor. The internet can be a tool 
as well that the principal can use in order to gather personal in format ion about the vic t im to make the subsequen t 
harassment easier. These circumstances provide different oppor tuni t ies to the harassor, therefore it is worth to deal 
detailed with this way of commitment . The suggestions and highl ights of the study a im to eliminate the d i f f icul t ies 
of law interpretation, to define the enforceab le concept of pr ivate life, and to enable the possible realisation of 
the facts. 
K e y w o r d s : cyber-cr ime, cyber-stalking, deviance, harassment, infocommunicat ion, internet, privacy, s ta lking 
Introduction 
T h e purpose o f th is s tudy is to i n t r o d u c e the legal r egu l a t i on of a l o n g - s t a n d i n g p h e n o m e n o n 
in a special r ega rd to h a r a s s m e n t e n a b l e d by i n f o c o m m u n i c a t i o n i n s t rumen t s . The n e w s t a t e 
o f a f fa i r s of the C r i m i n a l C o d e , t h e j unc tu re s of d e l i n q u e n c y s ta ted in paragraphs 1 7 6 / A . § 
(1 ) and (2) c a m e in to e f fec t o n 1 J a n u a r y 2008 and 2 February 2 0 0 9 . T h e action1 d e f i n e d in 
pa ragraph 176/A. § (1) has n e v e r b e e n punished b y a n y cr iminal act o f the Hungar ian l ega l 
sys tem, the law e n f o r c e m e n t p r a c t i c e o f in terpre ta t ion has not been d e v e l o p e d yet, t h e r e f o r e 
its c o m m o n u s a g e has c rea ted s eve ra l p rob lems , o f w h i c h I a m t r y i n g to d e m o n s t r a t e a 
f ew. 
I. Generally about Haressment and "Stalking" 
A s per the p lace , sp r ings and ta rge t of a c t i o n - l e g a l l y prohib i ted pe rsecu t ive b e h a v i o u r s 
h a v e several d i f f e r e n t c lass i f ica t ions . Accordingly , w e can talk a b o u t ha ra s smen t at w o r k or 
ha ra s smen t b a s e d on sexual , e thn ica l or pe r sona l intentions. C o n c e r n i n g this s tudy , 
ha r a s smen t b a s e d o n personal in t en t ion is the mos t r e l e v a n t - t h e so - ca l l ed " s t a l k i n g " 2 - w h e n 
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the principal, mostly according to the commonly used expression "harassment", does molest 
his/her victim for a longer time, permanently or frequently. 
In those typically western states where the social danger of this conduct has been 
recognized earlier, several definitions have been created to define the persecutive behaviours 
called stalking. Beáta Korinek-summarizing the legal and academic concept of harassment 
emerging in the legal system of the USA-defines the following: stalking is such a 
phenomenon where the harassor affects a certain person with his/her behaviour in a way 
that he/she evokes fear and distress by threathening this person.3 According to another 
deifinition stalking should be interpreted as a wilful, persistent threat or following that 
intents to a certain person and when the physical and psychical intact and safety of the 
aggrieved party gets in danger.4 
Principals of harassment can have different motivations; the following groups are 
typically worth to emphasize: a) rejected partners, those who are unlikely to accept the end 
of a former relationship; b) those searching for nearness of others, principals being intent 
on building intimate relationships, those in their otherwise desolated private life only have 
some kind of contact with their victim; c) non-compatible suitors, those who typically 
aspire only a one-night coition with the aggrieved; d) offended principals, those who would 
like to take vengeance on for their earlier real or fictional grievances; e) deliberate predators, 
those who collect information about their victim typically before commiting sexual 
violation.5 
Private sphere and the sanctity of private life are social values protected by the state of 
affairs. Since in the Hungarian legal literature no reasources are available to provide 
adequate help for the law enforcer in interpreting the facts of harassment, I have taken the 
concepts of a related field of law, namely data protection as a basis in order to understand 
the concept of private sphere and private life. András Jóri-referring to the research of 
Ferdinand D. Schoemann and Alan Westin-expounds it as a situation where "accessing the 
individual, with all related information, intimate facts, thoughts and body, is limited. "6 
Private sphere could mean the general freedom of action for the individual within the system 
of relations among the "individual" and "others".7 According to László Majtényi "protection 
of personal privacy primarily meant the protection of the individual's private life that 
usually covered the protection of private and family life, physical and psychical integrity, 
protection of honour, positive reputation and against exhibiting any fact of private life, 
protection of personal identity and against observation, protection of verbal 
communication..."* The concept of private sphere-with other words privacy-can visibly 
have several approaches; the expression has got newer and wider meaning parallel with the 
increasing emergence of the individual's autonomy. 
According to what has been stated in decree No. 56/1994 (10 November) of the 
Constitutional Court "the right to dignity of the human being is one of the definitions of the 
3
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so-called "general personality right", i.e. „ ancestor law" of personality rights, that in the 
modern constitutions and in the practice of constitutional courts appears named as the 
"right to the free emergence of personality", the "right to the freedom of autonomy", 
"general freedom of action" or "the right to private sphere" [8/1990. (23 April) decree 
ABJ. The constitution does not mention "the right to private sphere" as a concrete, 
subjective basic right, however the right to the freedom of private life is definitely a basic 
right that serves the protection of invidivual s autonomy and originates from the congenital 
dignity of the human being... ". 
Concepts of the system of private sphere and private life could include several 
interpretation levels, therefore considering the legal state of affairs of harassment and the 
aim of the legislator, 1 find the broad interpretation of this concept appropriate. Private 
sphere, private life covers the single person, the connection system of the person's family or 
household and the wider, freely chosen social network. In case of accepting the three-level 
system of private sphere, the conducts violating the private sphere also affect through one 
of the above-listed system elements, layers. 
As the legal subject of harassment is a right connectcd to the dignity of human being 
and to the respect of private sphere, therefore the law enforcer has placed it among the 
delinquencies against dignity of human being within the Criminal Code. In consideration of 
its personal nature it is a delinquency that is to be prosecuted for private proposal. 
II. Pcrpetrative conducts of harassment 
The act defines the persecutive actions of pharagraph (1) under the common name 
"disturbance", in everyday life most frequently occurring affair of these is when the 
principal frequently aims to establish relationships-through a telecommunication tool9 or 
personally. No relationship needs to be established, any effort intent to it is sufficient, i.e. 
any person who frequently and disturbingly rings the telephone of the aggrieved and then 
hangs up or aims to establish relationship with him/her using different network applications 
(Msn, Skype) commits harassment. The arbitrariness of interventional intention means that 
it dispenses with any legal authorization or any approval of the aggrieved. Further premise 
of facts is the purpose and that the disturbance happens frequently or persistently.10 
Principal of harassment defined in section (2) point a) is the person who "in order to 
evoke fear threatens another person or his/her relative with commiting any personal violence 
or indictable offence causing public danger". Before 1 January 2008, the principal of this 
action could be amenable for offence of dangerous threat." The act has raised point a) of 
the fact of offence to delinquency level and compared to harassment stated in section (1) 
punishes it more seriously, with up to 2 years of imprisonment, communal work or penalty. 
According to paragraph 138 of the Criminal Code, threatening is prospecting of a serious 
disadvantage that can raise drastic fear in the threatened person. This phrase of harassment 
9
 Besides telephone calls, sending text messages, e-mails and voice messages can also be 
mentioned here. 
10
 Complex DVD Jogtár commentary to § 176/A of the Criminal Code. 
11
 Before the 1 January 2008, according to § 151 of Act LX1X/1999 perilous threatening was 
committed by the person "who a) seriously threatens another person in order to evoke fear of 
committing such crime that is intended against the life, corporal integrity or health of the threatened 
person or his/her relative b) seriously threatens another person to evoke fear of widely publicizing 
facts, that are capable for defamation of the threatened person or his/her relative." 
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also premises the intention that the principal threatens the aggrieved party or his/her relative 
in order to develop fear in this person. Threat has to be qualified, only threatening with 
personal violence or indictable offence causing public danger is to be punished. So this 
paragraph does not concretely define which behaviours are to be considered as threat but 
point a) of section (9) in § 261 of the Criminal Code can be of assistance to us since in 
relations to terror action it lists what is reckoned among personal violence, offence causing 
public danger or weapon-related delinquency.12 
Harassment defined in point b) section (2) is commited by the person who "aims to 
suggest that an action occurs that threatens or violates the life, physical integrity or health 
of the aggrieved party or any (of) his/her relatives. " The new definition was introduced by 
the already mentioned Act LXXIX/2008 effective from I January 2009. The perpetrative 
behaviour of this definiton of harassment is a sort of veiled threat. In case of concrete threat, 
the principal is amenable (to law) according to section (2) point a). It is difficult to define 
the expression "aim to suggest" since suggestion can include all behaviours that make the 
aggrieved party believe that a non-occuring event has a real possibility to occur. Therefore 
it means a pretending behaviour that refers to the inchoation of an event either by the 
principal or another person, or to its occurrence independent from any person. Cases of 
adapting facts are expected to be highly influenced by practice of law enforcers adjusting 
them to the behaviours of real-life, which is worrying because behaviours that the legislator 
wishes to punish can not be clearly selected. 
Harassment is a subsidiary delinquency. Determination of phrase stated in section (1) 
is only possible if through certain behaviour-i.e. in case of formal aggregation-no more 
serious delinquency has been commited at the same time. However-as per the commentaries-
the act only refers to the alternative nature of harassment stated in section (2). Of course, 
realization of formal aggregation is possible. 
III. Cyber-stalking 
Among the most typical behaviours of harassment, the Criminal Code itself also names 
the commitment through telecommunication tools that-referring to the chapter-means 
harassment through internet as an infocommunication system. Internet and mobile technology 
create two basic cases-considering the relationship between the principal and his/her victim. 
On one hand access from a distance-i.e. his ability to reach his/her victim wherever he/she 
is; on the other hand permanent access-irrespectively of the location of his/her victim. 
Therefore it is worth to deal a bit more detailed with this way of commitment, 
12
 Cases of personal violence, offence causing public danger or weapon-related delinquency are 
homicide [§ 166. section (1) and (2)], battery [§ 170. section (1) to (5)], wilful endangering committed 
in the exercises of their activity [§ 171. section (3)], violation of personal freedom (§ 175), kidnapping 
(§ 175/A), criminal offence on security of traffic [§ 184. section (1) and (2)], endangering of railway, 
aerial or aquatic traffic [§ 185. (1) and (2)], violance against official person (§ 229), violence against a 
person performing public task (§ 230), violence against a supporter of an official person (§ 231), 
violence against internationally protected person (§ 232), causation of public danger [§ 259. section 
(1) to (3)], disturbance of public service facility [§ 260. section (1) and (2)], get mastery over aerial, 
railway, or aquatic public road transport or trucking vehicle (§ 262), misuse of blasting agents or 
explosives (§ 263), misuse of firearms or ammunition [§ 263/A. section (1) to (3)], smuggling of 
weapons (§ 263/B), misuse of radioactive substances [§ 264. section (1) to (3)], misuse of weapon 
prohibited by international agreement [§ 264/C. ( 1 ) to (3)], crime committed against infocommunication 
system and data (§ 300/C) , damaging (§ 324) and robbery (§ 321 ). 
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The communication facilities provided by the internet enable an informal 
communication among participants that hides the reality. Its speciality is that the single 
ways of communication (e-mail, chat) only have written basis, other sensors of cognition, 
perception do not play any role. All these circumstances provide different opportunities to 
the harassor. As a result of the lack of social controll, one of the most significant hurdles of 
aggression, the social distress does not exist. Therefore on one hand some feelings, 
emotions, desire (anger, jealousy, bittemess, thurst for possession and control) or aggression 
can be directed straight towards the target of the harassor; on the other hand with the 
possibility of the emergence of different fantasies, the victim can become the focus of the 
harasser 's imagination.13 
J. Reid Meloy also believes that the internet can play a role in the course of harassment 
in many ways. However his thoughts are only theoretic in many cases, these possibilities 
should also be taken into account in a few sentences. In the first case, the internet is a tool 
that the principal can use in order to gather personal information about the victim to make 
the subsequent harassment easier.14 An attribute of the trend marked as web 2.0is of the 
internet-usage is that the users build communities-such as iwiw, myvip, facebook and other 
services-when the users provide data-in most cases unconsidered. All this can be considered 
as an informational goldmine for a stalker during preparation. In the second case the internet 
is a medium or communication channel, through which the principal threatens his/her victim 
and communicates his/her desire, feelings to him/her. In the third case Meloy attributes a 
big role to the psychical role of astonishment since electronic messages can be send anytime 
to anyone, the message can exist timeless until the victim discovers it that depending on the 
timing can make the target person to feel that his/her harassor is in his/her near anywhere, 
anytime.16 Anonymity increases the subjection of the victim for the reason that he/she is not 
aware of who his/her harrasor is, therefore will suspect anyone in his/her environment. 
According to Bran Nicol one of the characteristics of our modem culture is that the 
motivators of persecutive behaviours become examples to follow. Under this Nicol means 
the following: accepted and supported is the conviction that from one hand we gather 
information about anyone, even foreigners and build intimate relationship with them; on the 
other hand the opposite of this is that we share even our most secret desire with everyone.17 
We live in a world where the border between the individual and others has dangerously 
obliterated therefore harassment itself has occurred as a sympthom and unavoidable product 
of our culture.18 Permanently attracting attention and the constant desire to belong to 
celebrities both indicate that our conception about privacy has changed. The surrounding 
digital culture pushes us into a constant, accepted harassment. The internet itself plays such 
a transmitting role, through which on one hand harassment is possible as a result of the 
action of the victims or by using the data published by themselves; or on the other hand 
13
 Meloy, J. R.: The Psychology of Stalking. In: Meloy, J. R. (ed.): The Psychology of Stalking 
Clinical and Forensic Perspectives. London, 1998, 11. 
14
 Ibid. 10. 
15
 The expression web 2.0 is a collective noun for such second generation internet services that 
are based on communities, so the users create content together or share each other's information. 
Contrarily, in earlier services-generation I and 1.5—the content was maintained by the service provider. 
http://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_2 
lfi
 Meloy: Ibid. 12. 
17
 Nicol, В.: Stalking. London, 2006, 8. 
18
 Ibid. 8. 
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through the persecutive "services" mentioned by Nicol as examples. Nicol mentions 
examples of websites like CelebFanMail.com or Gawkcr Stalker19 that informs us about the 
e-mail address and actual place of residence of nearly any celebrity based on the information 
published by the "everyday" people who spot them. In addition, a speciality of the 
functioning of the internet is that the anonymity provided is only illusory. Numerous traces 
arose in course of the services employed by the users that can be gathered by experts; the 
popularity of phising nowadays is beyond doubt. 
Within this chapter it is worth to mention a few words about the agreement that was 
signed in February 2009 by 17 larger internet companies in contribution with the Committee 
of the European Union in order to strengthen the security of users under 18 of social network 
websites. Parties of the agreement plan to roll back such undesired phenomenons like online 
harassment with the following tools: a) placing an easy to use "notification of misuse" 
button on the user interface, that is suitable to notify with a single click that the behaviour 
of another user is undesirable, b) personal data of users under 18 are not public by default, 
c) personal data of the users are not searchable the search engines, d) functions serving the 
protection of privacy are visible and easily accessable all the time, e) registration of users 
under 13 must be encumbered. However all these actions presume the sensitivity and 
awareness of users regarding personal data; this is not confirmed by the perceptible trends 
in Hungary-that for the lack of Hungarian expressions can only be described with new 
foreign keywords like cyberbullying, sexting. Cyberbullying is such a rude joke or teasing 
when members of age groups of 13-17 years disfigure each other on different platforms. In 
possession of a camera mobile phone any accident or unpleasant incident-irrespectively 
where it happened-can be watched by crowds on one of the popular websites already the 
same evening. Sexting is a phenomenon when young users publish pornographic, erotic or 
similar photos of themselves on social network websites. These two trends refer to the 
disappearance of private sphere, while cyberbullying is the ignorance of someone else's 
private sphere, and sexting means the complete opening of the user's own private sphere. 
IV. Remarks 
1. To paragraph 176/A section (1) of the Criminal Code 
Section (1) of paragraph 176/A in the Criminal Code can only be commited with direct 
intent. The aim is to threaten others or to arbitrarily encroach on someone else's private life, 
everyday life. It is difficult to interpret the same behaviour as aim and perpetration within 
the same state of affairs-when the principal with the aim to arbitrarily encroach on someone 
else's private or everyday life, arbitrarily encroaches on someone else's private or everyday 
life, e.g. disturbs someone else-therefore the defence of the principal can easily be 
successful as it explains the disturbing behaviour with unintentional but still likely and 
possible reasons.20 For this reason I think a redefining of legal wording would be more 
appropriate to the effect that-by dispensing the aim-it makes perpetration with indirect 
19
 Ibid. 9. 
20
 It's hard to deny the-not unprecedented-defence of the suspected which states that the aim of 
the suspected was to prepare for thievery by getting information through frequent overnight telephone 
calls whether the aggrieved was at home. According to the fact that preparation for thievery is not to 
be punished, and for lack of aim harassment defined in section (1) is not facts-like, the prosecutor has 
to decide on the abolition of the investigation during the phase of investigation. 
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intent also punishable. Proof is nearly impossible, when the principal-that is often in a bad 
relationship with the aggrieved-in order to retrieve their previous disagreements or financial 
arguments, or to interprete its anger or attraction to the aggrieved, aims to build such a 
relationship, that although results in the disturbance of the aggrieved but its aim is not the 
legally defined aim. 
Because of the uncertainty of the concept of private life, the case when the suspected 
person disturbs the aggrieved through his/her relatives needs to be interpreted.21 According 
to the broad approach of (the concept of) private sphere, arbitrary encroachment can hurt 
the individual's right to the undisturbed everyday life through all the three system elements 
mentioned. According to the commentary of the act that also underpins the above, "the 
following behaviours can be considered persecutive: the persistent twenty-four-hour-even 
anonymous-phone calls at home and at work; the often offending, obbroprious or threatening 
messages left on the answering mashine or sent by e-mail or SMS; frequent attendance in 
front of the victim's flat, workplace, etc.; shadowing the victim to public places. This can 
include the close relatives and friends of the victim."22 
The concept of "disturbance" is a subjective expression that-besides the opinion of the 
aggrieved-requires assessment of the law enforcers. László Korinek's thoughts about sexual 
harassment are sound since he is stating that it is difficult to do empirical research in this 
subject because the perpetrative behaviours-especially the sensitivity of the aggrieved 
parties or individuals are reasonably different. The problem is that it has to be decided by 
the law enforcers-in an individualized and consistent way-which impacts experienced as 
disturbance are to be considered as disturbance. 
Qualification of the case when the harassor disturbs the aggrieved exclusively through 
an infocommunication system, e.g. by sending e-mails or text messages, has not been 
clarified either. The question in this case is that if the aggrieved had the possibility to keep 
out the impact of the principal and does not take an advantage on it, is a criminal sanction 
necessary to be applied as an ultima ratio.23 The Criminal Code does require certain 
precautions from the aggrieved party in other cases, too-and only guarantees criminal law 
protection in case of their existence. An example for this is the state of affair stated in 
section (1) § 300/C of the Criminal Code, i.e. unauthorized access to an infocommunication 
system that can only be commited by bypassing the arrangement ensuring the security of 
the system. Meloy also disputes that the principal could be amenable to law only based on 
online harassment; he believes that in a persecutive state of affairs online conducts can only 
be subconducts of harassment.24 
2. To point a) of paragraph 176/A. § (2) of Criminal Code 
Repeal of point a) section (1) of § 151 in the Offence Act and shifting it to section (2) of § 
176/A of the Criminal Code that the place of act coming into effect meant that dangerous 
threathens commited before the 1 st January 2008 could not be punished from the 1 st January 
2008 on. According to § 4 of Act LXIX/1999 "actions has to be judged based on the laws 
21
 In cases when the relatives of the aggrieved are indirectly inclined to actions that does not 
harm their own privacy, but harms the privacy of the aggrieved. 
22
 Complex DVD Jogtár commentrary to § 176/A of the Criminal Code. 
23
 An example for this is the case when a love-letter sending admiring user can be disabled by 
the aggrieved with a single button click on the socal networking site called iwiw. 
24
 Meloy: Ibid. 11. 
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being in force at the time of commitment. If—according to the laws being in force at the time 
of judgement the action is not considered illegal or is to be punished lighter, the new law 
has to be applied. " Retrospective adaptation of section (2) of § 176/A of the Criminal Code 
is also impossible due to § 2 of the Criminal Code therefore a gap of law enforcing has 
arisen that makes the intention of legislator to punish the persecutive and threatening 
behaviours more strictly impossible. 
The commitment mostly happens in a verbal environment; its tools are words and 
phrases that can mediate different contents depending on culture and degree of education. 
In some subcultures accepted practice of cursing is often naturally accompanies the 
communication among those belonging to the community. However it names violence 
against persons, it cannot be considered as a dangerous action or a serious threat for the 
society under all circumstances only because of its common nature. Such cursings are 
the expressions referring to torture of others by variable traditional methods. The 
mctacommunicative way of threatening-e.g. showing a cutting finger move in front of the 
neck or playing funeral march on the phone-also needs interpretation. 
The new state of affairs tie down large resources of the detective authorities, their 
proof is rather difficult. The reason for difficulties among others is that usually there is no 
impartial witness avaliblc besides the aggrieved and the suspected parties or e.g. in case of 
harassments commitcd via telephone, the call list acquired from the operator does not 
include the conversation itself, only the time and length of the calls. 
V. Investigation of Harassment and its Control 
In case of harassment commitcd through a telecommunication tool, according to the data 
storage obligation regulated by § 159/A of Act C/2003 about electronic communications, 
the call lists of the aggrieved and the suspected parties have to be acquired through request 
from the communications operators in order to prove the fact of communication. Having 
the call list, both the suspected and the aggrieved party has to declare the content of phone 
calls made on certain days at certain times since besides getting informed about all external 
circumstances of action this is the way to conclude to the aim of the principal. On the other 
hand, the parties often know each other, and in many cases the aim of the defendant to 
communicate is not against the will of the aggrieved but because of the nature of the existing 
contractual relationship, relation or arguement between them. For example, in ordet to keep 
in touch with the common child, the defendant as ex-husband can often call the aggrieved-
if this really aims to keep and maintain the relationship with the child and not to encroach 
into the life of the aggrieved. Only in case of communications beyond the above aim and of 
late-time phone calls can we talk about the phrase of harassment defined in section ( 1 ) but 
understandably it cannot be identified based on the number of phone calls. 
Phone calls, text messages documented and written by the aggrieved that are no longer 
available electronically, in their original form must be handled under protest; but the number 
of communications can be determined based on the call lists. Evidences-carried by these data 
that are mostly stored in infocommunication systems-can be considered durable and in order 
to secure them and to keep them authentic Act XIX/1998 about prosecution also specifies 
certain procedures, e.g. inspection and search of premises. For the sake of the unequivocal 
proof we should not only accept the statements of the aggrieved regarding the content of the 
communication since in this case text messages are the basis of the aim of arbitrary 
encroachment. Often unintelligible and unrealistic is the action of aggrieved parties when 
they delete these messages that are obvious and direct evidences and then report an offence. 
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In case of harassment commited by using mobile phone-since the phone is the 
instrument of commitment-the proposal to confiscate the device owned by the aggrieved 
party according to point a) section (1) § 77 of the Criminal Code can seem a negligible 
sanction but because of legal regulation it cannot be ignored either. 
When analysing the behaviour of the principal, the possible influence of the victim has 
to be estimated and according to what has been outlined above the motivations of deviancics 
of information society should also be considered. The aggrieved who publishes several 
erotic photos of himself/herself on a popular social network website and therefore opens 
his/her private sphere to almost everyone-according to the rules of rational thinking-has to 
face the fact that with his/her behaviour as an "instigator" he/she almost authorizes the 
other users to aim to build an intimate relationship with him/her by entering his/her private 
sphere. In certain cases all these can be considered as mitigating circumstances. 
Summary 
The fact of harassment is a remarkable step in the complex protection of private sphere, but 
due to its novelty it is still difficult to adopt in practice. The law enforcers are facing a big 
challenge when they have to fill words like private life or everyday lifestyle with appropriate 
meanings that decisively determine the adaptability of the facts, or when the actual intention 
of the principal has to be resolved based on the evidences available. Therefore the 
suggestions and highlights of this study aim to eliminate the difficulties of law interpretation, 
to define the enforceable concept of private life, to enable the possible realisation of the 
facts and to widen the aggravating circumstances. 
1216-2574/USD 20.00 
© 2010 Akadémiai Kiadó. Budapest 
A C T A J U R I D I C A H U N G A R I C A 
51. No 3. pp. 223-230 (2010) 
DOl: 10.1556/AJw. 51.2010.3.5 
ZDENËK KOUDELKA* 
Changes in the Position of the Public Prosecutor's Office 
in the Czech Republic 
Since the transformation of the Prosecution into the Public Prosecutor's Office in Bohemia, 
Moravia and Silesia (Czech Republic), it has been discussed whether the current model is 
correct and what both the internal relations between the individual levels of the Public 
Prosecutor's Office hierarchy and the external relations of the Public Prosecutor's Office as 
a system with other supreme administrative bodies should be like. Supporters of various 
models can find foreign examples of these models because the patterns of functioning of the 
Public Prosecutor's Offices in various European countries are different. 
Basically, it is possible to specify several prototypal countries and rank them starting 
with the one where the Public Prosecutor's Office has the closest connection to the Ministry 
of Justice and ending with a system characterized by a total separation of these two bodies: 
1. Poland- Public prosecution is not mentioned in the Polish Constitution at all. The 
Law on Public Prosecution was changed in the year 2010 and the separated 
function of the Prosecutor General was established.1 Prosecutor General is 
appointed for six years by the President of the republic, the proposal comes from 
both the Prosecution Land Council and the Justice Land Council. The appointment 
is not a subject to contrasignation.2 The Prosecutor General cannot be appointed 
repeatedly. Both Land Prosecutor for Civil Prosecution who is appointed by the 
Prime Minister on the proposal of the Prosecutor General and the Supreme Military 
Prosecutor are subordinated to the Prosecutor General. 
In the period 1990-2010 the Prosecution was subordinated to the Ministry of 
Justice and the Minister performed the function of the Prosecutor General at the 
same time.3 This American model was applied also during the Second Polish 
Republic 1919-1939, when the Minister of Justice performed the function of the 
Prosecutor General at the same time. 
2. Ireland - the Supreme Prosecutor is not personally linked to the Government. The 
Supreme Prosecutor is not a member of the Government. However, he or she is 
defined as the Government's adviser. He or she is appointed by the President on 
the proposal of the Prime Minister and is obliged to resign on the Prime Minister's 
* Deputy Prosecutor General of the Czech Republic. Masaryk University, Faculty of Law. 
E-mail: koudelka@law.muni.cz 
1
 On 31 March 2010 Andrzej Seremet took the office of the Prosecutor General. 
2
 It is a controversial matter because the decisions of the President of the republic are subject to 
contrasignation on the basis of a common law. A change of the Constitution is being considered-it 
should be directly mentioned in the Constitution that the President of the republic appoints the 
Prosecutor General without the need of the contrasignation of the Prime Minister. 
3
 Kudma, J.-Banaszkiewicz, В.: Postavení prokuratury v právním rádu Polské republiky 
(Position of the Public Prosecutors's Office in the Polish Legal System). Státní zastupitelstvi, (2008) 
1 1 - 1 2 . 
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request. If he or she does not step down, the President recalls him on the proposal 
of the Prime Minister.4 
3. Austria - the Public Prosecutor's Office is a part of the Ministry of Justice 
department. There is a Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office in Austria with the 
Supreme Prosecutor at its head. However, the Supreme Prosecutor's Office 
operates only within the framework of the Supreme Court and is not a part of the 
common hierarchical system together with the lower High Land Prosecutor's 
Offices, which arc directly subordinated-as well as the Supreme Prosecutor's 
Office-to the Ministry of Justice. The Minister is superior both in terms of 
administration and in terms of competence. This model had been applied in our 
country since the middle of the 19th century until 1952. The Public Prosecution 
has been ranked to the judiciary since 20085 by the Amendment to the Constitution. 
Nevertheless, the administration of the public prosecution has not changed. 
4. Czech Republic (Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia) - there is a system of the Public 
Prosecutor's Office with the Supreme Prosecutor at its head who is appointed by 
the Government. Relations of superiority and subordination exist between the 
hierarchical levels, particularly between two immediately subsequent levels and 
with respect to superior levels in the areas specified by law. The whole system is a 
part of the Ministry of Justice department, while the Ministry is not superior to the 
Public Prosecutor's Office in terms of compctcncc but it is superior in the matters 
of administration, especially budgetary administration. 
5. Slovakia - the Prosecution is an independent system of administrative bodies with 
the Prosecutor General at its head who is appointed by the President on the 
proposal of the Parliament. The Prosecution has a separate chapter of the state 
budget. This model had been applied in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia since 1953 
until 1993. 
6. Hungary - the Prosecution is an independent system of administrative bodies and 
it is not subordinate to the Government, as in Slovakia. However, the Constitution 
provides for the accountability of the Prosecutor General to the Parliament, by 
which he or she is also elected.6 
7. France, Italy - the Public Prosecutor's Office is a part of the judicial authority. 
It is ncccssary to emphasize that, from the perspective of the current understanding of 
a material liberal democratic state, a good administration of public matters, which also 
concerns the Public Prosecution, is determined by the political regime of the state rather 
than by the legal characteristics of the individual bodies of public authority. It cannot be 
denied that the Public Prosecution participated on the commission of judicial crimes in our 
4
 Art. 30 of the Constitution of Ireland. Klokocka, V.-Wagnerová, E.: Ústavy statu Evropské 
unie (Constitutions of the EU Member States). 1st ed., Praha, 1997, 170. 
5
 Judiciary itself is ranked as Part В together with Part A (Administration) to the Catch III of the 
Constitution which is called Executive Power. Art. 90a of the Constitution of the Republic of Austria 
from the 10. 11. 1920 in the statutory text of the Constitutional Law No. 2/2008 BGBl. 
6
 Art. 52 para. 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary of 1949. Klokocka, V,-
Wagnerová, E.: Ústavy státü Evropské uni (Constitutions of the EU Member States). 2nd ed., Praha, 
2005, 168.; Halasz, L: Postavcnie generálnej prokuratúry v mad'arskom ústavnom système po roku 
1989 (Position of the General Prosecutor in Hungarian Legal System after 1989). Státnízastupitelstvi, 
(2008) 11-12. 
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country in the period between 1948 and 1952, while its legal definition originated in the 
relatively liberal and legally consistent Austrian state of second half of the 19th century and 
continued to be in force in the democratic first Czechoslovak Republic (1918-1938). On the 
contrary, the Public Prosecution established according to the Soviet model by the statutes 
adopted during the period of the worst totality in 1952 managed to function in an 
organizationally unchanged form after the end of totality within the framework of the 
democratic state in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia until 1993 and continues to function in 
Slovakia or Hungary until today. The outcome of the activity of a state administration body, 
including the Public Prosecution, is not primarily determined by its legal and organizational 
regulation but instead by the essence of the regime of the State; whether it is a democracy, 
totality, dictatorship or even despotism. 
However, if we think about possible changes in the legal regulation of the position of 
the Public Prosecutor's Office in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, we can identify three basic 
areas of change: one of them is formal-constitutional regulation, and two of them arc 
budgetary and personal administration. 
Constitutional Regulation 
The present constitutional regulation in the Czech Republic is very brief and is limited to 
one article within the chapter dealing with the executive power in the section regulating the 
Government.7 The Constitution provides-without a possibility of the legislator to change 
it-that the Public Prosecutor's Office: 
1. is a part of the executive power and has to have a relationship with the government. 
However, this relationship is not further specified. 
2. represents the Public Prosecution before the criminal courts. 
All other areas of regulation are entrusted only to a statute by the Constitution, 
including the possibility to extend the competence of the Public Prosecutor's Office on non-
criminal issues as well, which is actually realized under the current legal regulation. 
There is a requirement to extend the constitutional regulation of the Public Prosecution, 
e.g. according to the Slovakian model. However, briefness of the Constitution can be an 
advantage for any institution if the Constitution enables the desired situation to be 
accomplished by an ordinary statute, as in the Czech Republic. Almost all changes of the 
regulation of the Public Prosecutor's Office can be realized through amendments of statutes 
without a necessity to amend the Constitution. The Constitution only provides for the 
criminal competence of the Public Prosecution in criminal proceedings. Although this can 
seem obvious, for example the Slovak Constitution paradoxically does not provide for such 
a competence of the Public Prosecution.8 The absolutely dominant activity of the Slovak 
Public Prosecution in criminal proceedings is provided for only by a statute. Theoretically, 
the law could withdraw the criminal competence of the Slovak Public Prosecution and 
entrust it to a newly established Public Prosecutor's Office. The Slovak Public Prosecution 
which is provided for in the Constitution could therefore be deprived of its competence by a 
statute and be left with a minor competence to protect the rights of the people and the State 
without any further specification of measures available to realize its authority. It would 
become another Public Defender of Rights (Ombudsman) as it would protest against 
unlawful actions without a capability to provide a remedy for the unlawfulness as it would 
7
 Art. 80 of the Constitution of the Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia No. 1/1993 Coll. 
8
 Art. 149 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic No 460/1992 Coll. 
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only be left with a limited entitlement of the Slovak Prosecutor General to file a petition to 
the Constitutional Court in Kosice9 e.g. regarding the unlawfulness of generally binding 
regulations of local self-administration. 
Briefness and comprehensibility of the legal language are good qualities of the Czech 
Constitution. If all the so-called reasonable requirements for amendments of the Constitution 
(referendum, Supreme Audit Office, local self-administration) were summarized, the 
Constitution would be extended to the enormous size of the Portuguese Constitution.10 
Moreover, enforcing amendments of the Constitution is always very difficult. Not only the 
qualified three-fifth majority of all Members of the Chamber of Deputies and the present 
Senators is required, but the Senate also cannot be outvoted and it is moreover not bound 
by the 30-day period for discussing the proposal as it is with regard to ordinary statutes. An 
amendment of the Constitution can therefore easily "fall under the table" without being 
formally dismissed. This can happen if the Senate does not discuss the proposal until the 
election of Members of the Chamber of Deputies take place. Due to the principle of 
discontinuity in the legislative process," all the draft laws, including constitutional laws, 
which had not been discussed until the election of the Members of the Chamber of Deputies 
have taken place, cannot be discussed in the newly elected Chamber of Deputies. This is 
also the case with the draft laws returned from the Senate or the laws vetoed by the President 
of the Republic. The veto of the President or the Senate thus becomes absolute.12 
Also the statistics shows that everyone who proposes a constitutional amendment asks 
for its non-acceptance. During the term of office of the Chamber of Deputies from 2002 
until 2006, eighteen proposals of constitutional laws have been filed while only three of 
them have been accepted; two concerning the change of borders with Austria and Germany 
and one concerning the referendum on the accession of the Czech Republic to the European 
Union.13 During the term of office of the Chamber of Deputies from 2006 until 2009, 11 
proposals of the constitutional amendments have been filed while none of them has been 
accepted.14 This reflects a stability of the Constitution, which is positive. It can be concluded 
that if it is possible to achieve a certain objective by a statute, it is necessary to do it in this 
way and not by extending the Constitution. It can be compared to a situation when someone 
climbs up to the fifth floor while the door is open with the functioning stairs behind it which 
he or she could use to get to the fifth floor more easily. If we make another comparison with 
Slovakia concerning the Public Defender of Rights (Ombudsman), whose position is even 
regulated together with the Prosecution in Slovakia in the common Chapter 8 of the 
Constitution, wc can see that there is no difference in the content of competence between 
9
 Art. 130 para. 1 let e) of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. 
10
 The Constitution of the Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia has 115 articles. The Constitution of 
the Republic of Portugal of 2nd April 1976 has 298 articles. 
11
 Sec. 121 para. 1 of the Act No. 90/1995 Coll., on the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of 
Deputies. 
12
 Filip, J.: Vybrané kapitoly ke studiu Ustavního práva (Selected chapters. Study of the 
Constitutional Law). 2nd ed., Brno, 2001, 283. 
13
 Prints of the Chamber of Deputies 4th term of office Nos 20, 50, 81, 90, 95, 115, 172, 192, 
208, 249, 349, 485, 513, 609, 914, 937, 980, ИЗО, prints Nos 50, 249, 609 have been accepted. 
14
 Prints of the Chamber of Deputies 5th term of office Nos 16, 42, 134, 146, 169, 192, 332, 
381, 524, 747 and 795. Also constitutional law about referendum to particular questions has not been 
accepted-Prints of the Chamber of Deputies Nos 147, 477, 490. Only the constitutional law No. 
195/2009 Coll. about shortening of 5th term of office of the Chamber of Deputies has been accepted. 
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the Slovak Ombudsman, whose position is regulated by the Constitution, and the 
Ombudsman in the Czech Republic (Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia), whose position is 
regulated by a statute only. No constitutional amendments are necessary for changes in the 
position of the Public Prosecutor's Office. The present Constitution allows to establish the 
Public Prosecutor's Office which is identical with the Minister of Justice as in Poland, but 
also to establish the Public Prosecutor's Office which is independent of the Government to 
a great extend as in Slovakia. 
Concerning the extend of the constitutional regulation, all constitutions are generally 
very brief and usually, in contrast to the Czech Constitution, contain provisions on the 
appointment of the Prosecutor General into office while the appointment of other Public 
Prosecutors as well as other organizational issues are left to be regulated by statutes.15 This 
is the case of the Slovak Constitution which regulates the Public Prosecution together with 
the Ombudsperson in Chapter 8,16 but there are only three articles not subdivided into 
paragraphs which actually deal with the Prosecution. The text of the one article of the Czech 
Constitution which deals with the Public Prosecutor's Office, which is however subdivided 
into two paragraphs, is not much shorter. Moreover, the Slovak regulation actually contains 
only a provision on the appointment of the Prosecutor General by the President. As regards 
the content of the constitutional regulation, the Slovak Constitution regulates, if something 
at all, only a small part of the personal administration concerning the appointment of the 
chief of the Public Prosecution. Concerning the budgetary administration, constitutions do 
not regulate this issue. 
Budgetary Administration 
Money makes the world go round but it is not polite to talk about it on solemn occasions. 
From this point of view, it does not come as a surprise that the constitutions which regulate 
the basics of the functioning of the State do not mention money very often, with the 
exception of the state budget procedure. Only a minority of constitutions contains more 
detailed provisions dealing with financing of the State. Above all, they regulate the 
relationship between the State and local self-administrative units.17 Constitutions do not 
regulate the budgetary administration of the Public Prosecution; its regulation is left to 
statutes. The Public Prosecution as a system of state organs always draws its resources from 
the state budget which is passed by the Parliament. It is crucial whether the Prosecution has 
a separate chapter of the state budget or whether it is included in the chapter of the Ministry 
of Justice. Whatever the personal administration of the Prosecution is, the budgetary 
autonomy strengthens the position of the Public Prosecution in all models and its absence 
weakens it on the contrary. 
15
 A sole exception is the Art. 51 Sec. 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary of 1949 
which even establishes the supervision of the Public Prosecutor's Office over the service of a sentence 
on the constitutional level. See Klokocka, V.-Wagnerová, E.: ibid. 168. 
16
 Moreover, since the Chapter 8 of the Constitution of Slovak Republic No. 460/1992 Coll. 
came into force until the establishment of the Public Defender of Rights by the Constitutional Act No. 
90/2001 Coll., the whole chapter dealt solely with the Prosecution. 
17
 Chapter 10 of the Organic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany of 23 May 1949 which, 
compared to a standard constitutional regulation, regulates the public finances in great detail, is an 
exception in this regard. In: Klokocka, V.-Wagnerová, E.: Ústavy státii Evropské unie (Constitutions 
of the EU Member States). 1st ed., Praha, 1997, 273-279. 
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A separate chapter of the state budget for the Public Prosecution allows for a better 
satisfaction of the needs of the system with regard to a deeper understanding of its problems 
and prevents the transferring of the saved money outside the system. It actually removes the 
well-known pressure on spending everything as the savings would otherwise be transferred 
to satisfy other needs than those of the Public Prosecution. Moreover, a separate chapter of 
the state budget for the Public Prosecution fulfills the principle of subsidiarity preferred by 
the European Union18 which provides that the public authority including the administration 
shall, if possible, be performed on the level which is concerned. This is usually presented 
within the framework of local administration14 but the principle can be applied to the public 
administration as a whole including the administration of individual government 
departments. 
As the proverb says, let every man praise the bridge he goes over. It is possible that the 
Public Prosecutor's Office will tend to be more open to the views of the Minister who 
decides over financing of its needs. This is one of the reasons why it is preferable to 
introduce an autonomous budgetary administration of the Public Prosecutor's Office through 
a separate chapter of the state budget. However, administrative autonomy is connected with 
responsibility for the entrusted financial resources. In that case, the Public Prosecutor's 
Office would have to perform all the duties of an administrator of a chapter of the state 
budget and its management would be controlled like the management of other state organs 
who are administrators of chapters of the state budget, including the supervision of the 
Supreme Audit Office. The Public Prosecutor's Office would also have to defend its 
requirements against both the Minister of Finance and the Government when the state 
budget is being drafted as well as during the subsequent budget procedure in the Parliament. 
Currently, the Constitutional Court is the only judicial organ which has a separate chapter 
of the state budget although the number of employees of the Constitutional Court is by far 
smaller than the number of employees of the system of the Public Prosecutor's Office. The 
Office of the Public Defender of Rights or the Office for the Protection of Competition, 
which are also much smaller, have separate budgetary chapters as well because the 
importance of a certain budgetary autonomy is accented in these areas, too. 
When introducing the budgetary autonomy it is either possible to establish a single 
chapter of the state budget under the administration of the Supreme Prosecutor's Office or 
to establish three chapters with a separate chapter for the Supreme Prosecutor's Office and 
two other chapters for the High Prosecutor's Offices, a part of which would be the budgetary 
18
 Art. 3b of the Treaty on European Union and Protocol on the Application of the Principles of 
Subsidiarity and Proportionality as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon. See Novotná, M.: Princip 
subsidiarity v právu Evropskych spolecenstvi (Principle of Subsidiarity in the EC Law). Právník, 
(1995) 3. and Marcou, G.: New Tendencies of Local Government Development in Europe. In: Bennett, 
R. J.: Local Government in the New Europe. London, 1993. 
19
 Art. 4 para. 3 of the European Charter of Local Self-Government No. 181/1999 Coll. 
determines that the administration of public affairs shall be above all entrusted to the administrative 
bodies which are closest to the citizens while admitting the responsibility of other subject has to 
correspond with the scope and character of the task as well as with the requirements of effectiveness 
and economic efficiency. Slovakia has made a reservation to provide for a non-biding effect of this 
article because of the strong Hungarian minority in the south of Slovakia. See Kadecka, S.: Svobodná 
normotvorba obcí 1 (Free legislation of the local communities). Moderni obec, (2000) 9, 35. and 
Kadecka, S.: Právo obcí a krajû v Ceské republice (Law of the municipals and districts in the Czech 
Republic). Praha, 2003, 8-9. 
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administration of the subordinated Regional and District Prosecutor's Offices. There is a 
historical analogy as there was a separate administration of the Supreme Prosecutor's Office 
and the High Land Prosecutor's Offices (one for Bohemia and one for Moravia and Silesia), 
to which the Regional Prosecutor's Office was subordinated, during the monarchy and 
Czechoslovakia although the Supreme and High Provincial Prosecutor's Offices did not 
have separate chapters of the state budget as they were-independently on one another-
connected to the budget of the Ministry of Justice. This was repeated, already with separate 
chapters of the state budget, in the period from 1969 until 1992 when there was a separate 
administration of the General Prosecutions of the Republics and their subordinated Public 
Prosecutions which existed in parallel with the Prosecution General of Czechoslovakia. 
Personal Administration 
A majority of constitutions do not deal with the appointment of lower-level Public 
Prosecutors and leave this issue to be regulated by ordinary statutes. Prosecutors are 
appointed to their functions either by the Minister of Justice or by the Prosecutor General. 
As regards the Prosecutor General, constitutions often contain regulation of his appointment 
to function. He or she is usually appointed by the Head of State on the proposal of the 
relevant body. Appointment of the Prosecutor General by the Head of State corresponds to 
the appointment of other chiefs of supreme bodies in the European countries.20 Such bodies 
are usually the Government (the Prime Minister), the Parliament or other body. Even though 
the subject that makes the proposal differs, the rule for appointing the Prosecutor General 
provides that an agreement of two subjects is required which ensures greater agreement on 
the appointment of a particular person. Because the process of removing from office is 
analogical to the process of appointing, unless it is provided for otherwise, it also ensures 
greater independence of the appointed person on the appointer as an agreement of a 
minimum of two subjects is required also with regard to dismissal. 
As regards the Czech regulation, a change in the appointment of the Supreme 
Prosecutor is possible. Currently, the Supreme Prosecutor is appointed by the Government 
on the proposal of the Minister of Justice.21 Although these are two subjects as well, they 
are politically close. A possible change could provide for the appointment of the Supreme 
Prosecutor by the President on the proposal of the Government. The appointment would be 
subject to countersignature by the Prime Minister.22 It is clear, even without an explicit 
regulation, that the proposal within the Government would be made by the Minister of 
Justice as a chief of the representing-even though not the governing-department of justice. 
It is unusual for the Czech statutes to provide explicitly that if the government has a certain 
right to make proposals, it has to do so on the basis of a proposal of a particular Minister. It 
is a custom that the suggestion regarding the Government's proposal is made by the Minister 
20
 The Hungarian Prosecutor General, who is appointed by the National Assembly on the 
proposal of the President, is an exception. Art. 52 Section 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Hungary of 1949 which even provides for a supervision of the Prosecutor's Office over the service of 
a sentence on the constitutional level. Klokocka, V.-Wagnerová, E.: Ustavy statu Evropské unie 
(Constitutions of the EU Member States). 2nd ed., Praha, 2005, 168. 
21
 Sec. 9 of the Public Prosecutor's Office Act, No. 283/1993 Coll. 
22
 Art. 63 paras 2 and 3 of the Constitution of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. 
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of the department which is concerned, however, it is not explicitly regulated in the statutes.23 
When the law provides that the decision of the President of the Czech Republic is 
conditioned by the proposal of the Government, there is no provision regarding the 
Government being bound by the proposal of a particular Minister. 
Of course it is possible to involve the Chamber of Deputies into the system of 
appointing as well. However, the experience shows that the appointment to positions which 
are appointed by the Chamber of Deputies become subject to bargaining between political 
parties and a part of a political trade-off. So we will elect you the Supreme Prosecutor if 
you elect our candidates into the Czech Television Council etc. Moreover, the experience 
has already shown that the Chamber of Deputies is sometimes not able to elect the successor, 
as in the case of the President and the Vice-President of the Supreme Audit Office.24 
However, even if the Chamber of Deputies was involved in the appointment process, the 
Government cannot be excluded from it, even though it is only in the position of a proposer, 
because the Public Prosecutor's Office is subsumed under the Government within the 
framework of the executive power in the Czech Republic. It is also not possible, under the 
current model of personal and budgetary administration of the Public Prosecutor's Office 
by the Ministry of Justice, that the Minister of Justice would not have an opportunity to at 
least express his or her opinion regarding the appointment of the Supreme Prosecutor. From 
a long-term perspective, the mutual permanent conflictual relationship between the Minister 
of Justice and the Supreme Prosecutor, as it was between the Minister Pavel Nëmec and the 
Supreme Prosecutor Marie Bcnesová in the period from 2004 to 2005, is not sustainable. 
Such a conflict does not lead to a good administration of the Public Prosecutor's Office. The 
most suitable solution within the framework of the present constitutional regulation is to 
make a change in the personal administration of the Public Prosecutor's Office so that the 
Supreme Prosecutor is appointed by the President of the Czech Republic on the proposal of 
the Government. Two subjects should also be involved into the appointment procedure of 
other chief Prosecutors. Preferably, they should be from the Public Prosecutor's Office, i.e. 
the District Prosecutor would be appointed on the proposal of the Regional Prosecutor. The 
Regional Prosecutor would be appointed by the Supreme Prosecutor on the proposal of the 
High Prosecutor and the High Prosecutor would be appointed by the Supreme Prosecutor 
with the consent of the Minister of Justice or by the President of the Czech Republic with 
the countersignature of the Prime Minister on the proposal of the Supreme Prosecutor. The 
President of the Czech Republic appoints not only the Presidents of the Supreme Court and 
the Supreme Administrative Court but also the Presidents of the High Courts25 (in Prague 
for Bohemia and in Olomouc for Moravia and Silesia). 
23
 For example the President appoints the Chief of the General Staff on the proposal of the 
Government without being explicitly provided, that it is the Minister of Defense, who initiates the 
proposal in the government; it is a legal custom. Sec. 7 para. 4 of the Armed Forces Act No. 
219/1999 Sb. 
24
 The President, Lubor Volenik, died on 19 June 2003 and his successor, Frantisek Dohnal, was 
appointed by the President only on 4 November 2005 on the proposal of the Chamber of Deputies of 
26 October 2005. The Vice-president, Dusan Tesnar, resigned on 10 September 2007 while the 
Chamber of Deputies elected the candidate on his position, Miloslav Kala, only on 30 October 2008 
and he was appointed by President of the Republic on 13 November 2008. 
25
 Art. 62 let f) of the Constitution of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. Sec. 13 para. 2 of the 
Administrative Justice Code No. 150/2002 Coll. Sec. 103 para. 1 of the Courts of Justice and Judges 
Act No. 6/2002 Coll. 
1216-2574/USD 20.00 
© 2010 Akadémiai Kiadó. Budapest 
MÁRIA BORDÁS* 
The Efficiency of State Property Management 
and Public Money Utilization' 
Introduction 
In past decades the question of efficiency has been a central issue in public law literature. 
The current public policy rhetoric also greatly emphasizes the importance of an efficient 
state and of efficient public administration. But do we actually know what expectations 
efficiency makes towards organizations in the public sphere? 
Efficiency, as an abstract concept, is of American roots and carries various meanings. 
Business enterprises arc usually considered efficient when they manage to achieve the 
largest output with the smallest input, then being the most profitable. In public administration 
efficiency is not defined in terms of profitability, but of accomplishing the goals set. 
American literature considers public administration as efficient when it manages to 
drain the least resources from economy, which is a fundamental condition for market 
mechanisms to be implemented to their fullest. The American approach deeply believes in 
the omnipotence of the market and thus sees a close correlation between market institutions 
and economic efficiency. 
Beyond the realization of market mechanisms, however, the influence of public 
administration exerts on economic processes through economic policy, competition 
supervision, regulations, etc. is neither ancillary. Even in the most liberal economies, the 
state tends to extensively interfere into economic processes to avert market failure. Yet, in 
return, the state also has to live up to wide ranging efficiency expectations, such as expert 
government, a high standard of legal regulations, the application of business principles, 
the managerial approach, the absence of red tape in law application, low administrative 
burdens, etc. 
A question arising with respect to our theme is what relationship is there between the 
utilization of public money, the management of state property, or collectively termed: 
administering public wealth and economic efficiency. 
There is general consensus in public administration literature regarding the state being 
justified to intervene in economic processes in order to eliminate market failures. As far as 
state property is concerned, no such expressed market failures may arise, since the most 
benefit that maintaining public utility companies and public services in state ownership 
offers is the provision of better access to public services. Similarly, the utilization of public 
money is also in the service of an economic cause, namely facilitating that the state, through 
an efficient utilization of resources drained from the economy, may be able to discharge its 
responsibilities at the lowest cost while meeting the highest standards. 
Associate Professor, Corvinus University Budapest, Faculty of Public Administration. 
E-mail: maria.bordas@t-online.hu 
1
 Habilitation lecture held at the Faculty of Law of the University of Pécs on 24 February 2010. 
A C T A J U R I D I C A H U N G A R I C A 
51. No 3. pp. 231-244 (2010) 
DOI: 10.1556/AJur. 51.2010.3.6 
232 MÁRIA B O R D Á S 
An overview of the current practice of developed market economies clearly 
demonstrates that there is still no consensus regarding what the optimal ratio of state 
property is, what regulations ought to govern the management of public money, or in other 
words which state assets are to be retained in state ownership, and which, along what 
guidelines and what procedures are to be privatized, furthermore what institutions would be 
best suited to enforce efficiency requirements when utilizing public money. It is no accident 
that even European Community Law has no provisions on state ownership, and as regards 
public money it also tends to rather focus on budget indicators. 
1. The History of Administering Public Wealth 
In the course of history there have been various reasons for establishing state wealth, and 
even the guiding principles for administering it have been rather diverse. 
In Antiquity and in the Middle Ages no public wealth in its current form existed yet, 
even though Roman Law did already recognize the Caesar's public wealth, which was, as 
regards both its legal status and management, clearly distinguished in the treasury from the 
Caesar's private wealth. 
In Europe the separation of the monarch's private wealth from public wealth only 
ensued at the end of the 18th century. The monarch's wealth was then managed, controlled 
and supervised by organs distinctly detached from one another and by persons personally 
designated for the task by the monarch. The legal regulation for administering the monarch's 
wealth had not yet been created, and neither had the management of its various types, land 
property, the regalia, and tax based revenues been set apart yet. 
1.1. The Issues of State Ownership Efficiency 
Ever since the economic system of capitalism evolved, the American and European models 
have taken different courses of development. In America no state ownership developed, 
whereas in Europe, the scope of state ownership was continually widened. 
On the European continent the state's entrepreneurial wealth, in addition to treasury 
wealth, evolved in the age of liberal capitalism. In America the state had not run any 
business enterprises, which even in England could not be considered prevalent. 
Liberal capitalism developed a new type of state ownership in Europe as a result of the 
appearance of infrastructural public services. Early on infrastructural public services, such 
as postal and telegram services, the railway, due to their high level of capital demand, by all 
means, needed state subsidies, which on the European Continent finally led to the state 
operation and the state ownership of public services. Hence, the creation of state property 
on Continental Europe in the public service sector was closely related to the acknowledgement 
of the state s caretaking function. 
In Continental Europe, infrastructural public services were operated in state monopoly, 
and it was a matter of debate whether public utilities, mostly affixed to some fonn of public 
wealth, ought to be state-operated or rather economic activities operated by private 
enterprises as well. The state, out of economic considerations, e.g. due to mass demand, 
would sometimes give public services into concession. 
The central issue, however, was not yet related to whether state-owned public works or 
public service concessions were more efficient, but whether the public service ought to be 
governed by public law or private law regulations, and whether the concession agreement 
ought to contain public or private law elements. The broadening of the scope of public 
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service concessions was, however, a tacit acknowledgement of the conviction that business 
enterprises operated at higher efficiency. 
In England no clear distinction was drawn between public and private law, for it was 
public corporations, bodies independent of public administration organs that controlled 
state-owned public services. Certain efficiency requirements could already be traced in the 
operation of public corporations, since public utilities were consciously withdrawn from the 
control of the rigid and red-tape dominated public administration, as public utilities were 
increasingly regarded as self-governing bodies requiring a large degree of independence in 
reaching their business decisions. 
The state in America facilitated the creation of infrastructural public services by 
subsidizing privately owned public utility companies. Privately owned land was only 
expropriated to allow the state to grant land to railway construction companies. The US 
Constitution, rather early on, already at the end of the 19th century, would afford the federal 
government authority to extensively regulate economic activities with public significance, 
yet it still did not create a constitutional basis for nationalization, which therefore never 
became common practice. In America, thus, no state ownership of land, public utilities, and 
entrepreneurial wealth evolved. 
Economic ideology in America has ever since the beginnings been of the viewpoint 
that state property is inevitably of low efficiency in both the business and the public sectors. 
All this is closely related to the traditions of decentralized US public administration and the 
American approach averse to centralized governance. Infrastructural public services have 
since the very beginnings been privately owned business enterprises, which received 
exclusive rights from the state, and which, due to the public nature of service provision and 
the absence of market competition were subjected to state regulation. 
The communist economic system triggered the most drastic changes in state ownership. 
In the full nationalization of privately owned entrepreneurial wealth, war communism saw 
an instrument of centralizing assets. Yet, when the forthcoming collapse of the economy 
resulting from having eliminated market institutions could no longer be denied, the 
communist economic management was forced to compromise. In order to ensure economic 
efficiency, it returned small entrepreneurial property to private ownership and created 
collective ownership in agriculture. In the plan command economy state companies attained 
a certain level of economic independence through the application of the system of 
independent accounting. 
The economic ideology of communism saw in the exclusive state ownership of 
entrepreneurial wealth a chance to create an increasingly productive economic system. Yet, 
as it soon became apparent, the profitability of state enterprises was in reality by no means 
related to their economic performance. Factors, such as planning and political bargain 
mechanisms were to replace the economic judgment earlier exercised by the market. 
Reforms to the communist economic system aimed at a greater economic independence 
of state companies, which they hoped to achieve through a looser control exercised by 
public administration, in order to, in turn, also increase the company's efficiency. 
These reforms turned out to be furthest reaching in Hungary. The 1968 reform created 
a system of economic regulators, which differently from the plan command system, did not 
directly determine the economic activity of state companies, but centrally developed an 
incentive system. The organizational-legal reform of 1984 withdrew the competence of 
exercising property rights from public administration bodies that controlled state companies, 
and conferred them onto the self-governing bodies of companies. However, a self-governing 
body composed of company employees had no ownership interests, nor any managerial 
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experience or approach. Neither could a state company organized and managed in a unified 
manner operate as a business enterprise. 
Therefore, Hungarian reforms aiming at reforming economic control did not manage 
to establish an intcrcst-directcd system that could have brought about significant changes in 
economic efficiency, which proved that in the absence of market institutions, e.g. economic 
associations, market competition, the dominance of private property, the efficient operation 
of state companies was illusory. 
In the first half of the 20th century various categories of public wealth were 
distinguished in Europe. The state's private wealth, as a private enterprise, was to be 
responsible for the state's revenue-making activity. Treasury wealth used to be connected to 
the public responsibilities of infrastructure! public services, such as roads, public utilities, 
networks, or to the activity of state organizations, public buildings and institutions. Assets 
in public use constituted part of treasury wealth, e.g. natural assets, like rivers, lakes, the 
seaside, or artificially created assets, like parks and public areas. 
At the beginning of the 20th century in each one of the European states a process of 
nationalization commenced, increasing the state's entrepreneurial wealth and state 
ownership related to public services. The increasing ratio of state wealth was closely related 
to this process, whereby the state, in order to resolve market difficulties, would intensively 
interfere with economic processes. Public utility wealth attached to public services was 
nationalized so as to achieve and maintain tighter state control over public services. 
Nationalization would continue following the Second World War, too, especially in the 
United Kingdom, where the British Labour Party forming the government in 1945 
nationalized the majority of industrial and infrastructure! public services. As a result of the 
nationalization the ratio of state property in the public sector grew to over 70 per cent, and 
in the industry to over 30 per cent. Following the Second World War the application of the 
Keynesian economic policy became widespread in Western European countries, where state 
property was an instrument in the hands of the welfare policy. At the time, the nationalization 
of public services served as a safeguard for ensuring access to public services, the scope of 
which was further extended by welfare institutions. 
From the 1980s onwards the neoliberal economic policy would also bring about a 
significant change in state ownership. 
In the US, neoliberalism subjected public services to market mechanisms, believing 
that the removal of the limitations on entering the market as well as market competition 
would result in a higher efficiency functioning of public services, than public administration 
regulations had guaranteed them when they were still considered to be natural monopolies. 
The issue of ownership was not a matter of debate in the US, since infrastructural public 
services functioned as business enterprises, whereas local public services-such as rubbish 
collection, the maintenance of public areas-were not linked to assets available for 
privatization. 
In contrast, in the 1980s economic efficiency was not expected to be achieved by 
market competition in Europe, but by privatising state-owned companies. Profit-orientation 
was believed to lead to more efficient functioning than state ownership had done, since the 
state must, by its nature, be a poor manager. In the 1980s in most Western European 
countries the state's entrepreneurial wealth was sold through privatisation. The United 
Kingdom was at the vanguard of this movement, where privatisation was not constrained 
by law, and where even the majority of the infrastructural public utility companies changed 
bands. In most countries on the Continent state ownership was protected by constitutional 
and legal regulations against the state's privatising ambitions, and privatisation tended to 
take the form of concession. 
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Consequently, however, privatization, either through the sale of state wealth, or through 
granting the right of use, proved to be insufficient to provide a solution to the question of 
efficiency on its own, as long as monopoly positions were maintained. Furthermore, profit-
orientation would often lead to higher priced public services, than state ownership had done, 
for in the latter case the state, for political reasons, had more stake in taking consumer 
interests into account as well. 
Neither did the competition sector's tools modelled for competition supervision prove 
adequate to resolve the monopoly positions of the public sector, since competition 
supervision organs, in the absence of market prices, were not fitted to establish, whether the 
service fee was high or not, and were neither authorized, nor equipped to screen public 
utility companies. 
The state did neither manage to fully enforce the efficient operation of public service 
companies through concession contracts. Despite the fact that the entitlement to concession 
is granted through tendering, and concession agreements may ensure the state the rights of 
pricing and quality control, a concession agreement can only difficultly be adjusted and 
amended to adapt to changes of the economy. 
After about a decade's delay, the European Union did eventually adopt the practice of 
liberalization common in the USA, and even made a policy statement that public services 
could not be efficiently performed when provided by state-owned, monopolized public 
utility companies. Community Law therefore extended the rules of competition law to 
public services, and forbade EU member states to ensure a monopoly status to public service 
companies. The removal of the limitations on entry to the market and establishing market 
competition have obliged the owner or user of a public works company or network within a 
given public service provision branch to allow access to any enterprise joining the market. 
Neither in the competition sector, nor in the public service sector does Community 
Law regulate the ratio of state ownership. Maintaining the state ownership of public utility 
companies and networks has no relevance, since any one enterprise is eligible to entering 
the market, and to having access to public service provision. In other words, in the European 
Union emphasis has shifted from the choice between public or private ownership to market 
competition with a view to achieve efficiency. 
1.2. Forms of Public Money Management 
In Europe, towards the end of the 19th century, so as to combat corruption, the system of 
state accounting was established, with detailed legal regulations to govern budget 
management and supervisory institutions. Lawful and regular operation was then the main 
guiding principle for utilizing budget resources. Cash-flow oriented accounting supervision 
was suitable to enforce proper revenue and expense regulations. 
It was only in the 1980s, owing to neoliberalism in America that the issue arose of 
what efficiency the state could display when performing its functions beyond simply 
complying with the regulations, in other words, whether the money incurred for delivering a 
task was proportionate to the size of the task and what efficiency state organs could perform 
when discharging their responsibilities. 
American neoliberalism, which aimed at draining fewer resources from the economy 
and to correspondingly reduce budget expenses, developed the system of New Public 
Management which described more efficient methods for discharging state functions, i.e. 
with lower costs and a larger output. A smaller and cheaper state spending less public money 
can also be achieved by making the operation of public administration itself more efficient. 
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This has twofold implications: the more efficient discharge of public administration duties 
on the one hand, and the more efficient functioning of public administration bodies on the 
other. 
New Public Management finds business principles the appropriate means to achieve 
higher efficiency in performing public functions. Thus, it confers the responsibility of 
discharging the duties of a public administration body onto business enterprises. These state 
functions-as opposed to public services-cannot be discharged in a competitive environment, 
therefore market competition is replaced by tendering, meant to guarantee that the most 
competitive enterprise win the right of deliverance. The business enterprise performing a 
thus 'outsourced' state function is expected to enforce a customer-centred approach, and 
through its profit-orientation to achieve an optimum of expenses. 
There are numerous dissenting opinions as regards where the boundaries of the 
outsourcing of state functions can be drawn, whether only the functional activities 
complementary to the operation of public administration bodies, or whether also fundamental 
public functions can be subjected to business principles. Today there are numerous examples 
of the latter, as well: in many instances business enterprises operate prisons, implement 
court decisions, carry out food safety management and tax collection. 
According to a vision of developing cooperation between the public and private sectors 
certain state responsibilities ought to be discharged jointly by public administration bodies 
and business enterprises, in the course of which cooperation they could mutually count with 
the other's advantages. This arrangement has been successfully applied in completing state 
investments. Public Private Partnership (PPP) investments offer the state access to financial 
resources, while allow business enterprises access to orders placed by the state. A novel 
feature of the PPP construction, in comparison to concession, is that the investment is 
completed jointly by state organs and business enterprises, often in the framework of a 
business association. The risks of the investment are bom by the business enterprise, in 
exchange for which it is entitled to utilize the facility created by the investment, or may 
require to be paid a lease by the state. 
With respect to outsourcing and PPP investments, it is actually the contract concluded 
by the state and a business enterprise that will determine whether the application of business 
principles will indeed lead to higher efficiency. Considering that the compulsory content of 
these contracts-unlike in the case of concession agreements-is not specified by civil law, a 
lot depends on to what extent state bodies can assert state interests during business 
negotiations. The danger of corruption is also increased, since state supervisory bodies can 
only exercise posterior supervision of these contracts, while having to scrutinize business 
decisions. It is not accidental that the European Union has developed the practice of 
concluding PPP investment contracts along principles and model contracts, which already 
offer the state guidance on how to conclude the contract while seeking the most efficient 
solution. Another EU expectation is that once the contract has been signed an independent 
court of auditors should supervise its implementation according to well-determined 
principles, so as to ensure the efficient use of public money. 
New Public Management has proposed the direct application of management principles 
even in the operation of public administration bodies to assure a more efficient utilization of 
public money. Such principles are, for example: a performance and quality oriented budget, 
the application of democratic leadership methods, providing incentive to public employees 
and measuring their performance. Public administration responsibilities are now discharged 
in accordance with the public policy approach in most developed countries. Public policy is 
in other words the implementation of public administration responsibilities, e.g. economy 
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development, or combating social problems along managerial principles, taking account of 
the given political and cultural conditions. The public policy approach nevertheless does 
focus on efficiency, and develops the relevant methods for achieving it, such as determining 
strategic goals, precisely defining the task, working out alternative solutions, and finally 
assessing the execution of the decision according to performance and efficiency. 
There were no limitations on applying New Public Management in the American 
public administration system, for it has since the very beginnings applied the principles of 
company management, has not laid great emphasis on differences between public and 
private administration, and has not found legal regulations essential for the operation of 
public administration. The application of a public policy which lays a great emphasis on 
managerial principles inevitably provides sufficient incentive, even in the absence of legal 
obligations, to public administration bodies, hence no special legal regulations are needed 
to be in place. 
Contrarily, in public administration systems on the European Continent, where the 
traditions of centralized and legally regulated public administration have evolved, the 
application of business principles created a challenge. It was not clear how business 
principles could be applicable. The values of the Weberian model of public administration 
tend to lay emphasis on legality and serving the public interest rather than on efficiency. 
Many find the business approach contrary to Weberian values, since they identify business 
principles with the profit aspirations of business enterprises.2 
In the Weberian model public administration is legally overregulated, and the greatest 
expectation towards public administration bodies is that the norms pertaining to the 
competences, functions and procedures of the body should be fully complied with. The 
traditional instruments used by European public administration are controlling, direction, 
supervision, monitoring, individual decision making, normative direction, which tools, due 
to legal regulation, have attained a level of extreme sophistication. The legal regulation of 
public administration has thus not much in common with efficiency requirements, apart from 
wanting to regulate those, too. All this, of course, does not mean that legal regulations 
would be contrary to efficiency considerations, or that they would make them superfluous. 
In Western-European states management principles have in many instances been successfully 
applied in public administration.3 
Public money can neither be adequately utilized without the most fundamental 
principles being regulated by the constitution and laws, nor without parliament exercising 
its supervisory function. New expectations for the efficient utilization of public money have 
been formulated, too, the enforcement of which can suitably be ensured by legal regulations. 
Such are transparency, publicity, and accountability in the utilization of public money. 
These requirements can be fulfilled by legal regulations establishing institutions. An 
independent supervisory body's competences ought also to be extended to the supervision 
of efficiency. Their traditional supervisory function ought to be transformed into a 
2
 Lőrincz, L.: A kormányzás modernizációja (The Modernization of Governance). Új Magyar 
Közigazgatás, (2006) II, 650-652. 
3
 Hajnal, Gy.: Hatékonyság és teljesítmény az Európai Unió országainak közigazgatásában 
(Efficiency and Performance in the Public Administration of European Union Countries). In: Lőrincz, 
L. (ed.): Közigazgatás az Európai Unió tagállamaiban. Összehasonlító közigazgatás (Public 
Administration in the Member States of the European Union. Comparative public administration). 
Budapest, 2006, 469-475. 
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consultative relationship aiming at cooperation. The outcome of supervision must be 
publicized and the legal consequences of abuses be determined. 
Many people are apprehensive of applying business principles in public administration, 
partly, because facts have clearly shown that this approach has not anywhere yet resulted in 
a cheaper state, since the size of public administration has thereby not been reduced. Nor do 
they find the elaboration of methods which could objectively measure efficiency feasible.4 
Others would make the discharge of public administration responsibilities cheapcr and 
more efficient by e-government alongside deregulating legal regulations. Nowadays the 
expenses of the discharge of public administration functions would incur for the national 
economy are quantifiable, and if they largely exceed the acceptable limit the wastefulness 
of public administration in spending public money cannot be denied. If, however, public 
administration bodies were burdened with less red tape, i.e. did not unnecessarily have to 
issue permissions, supervise processes or keep records, or could do so more simply and 
more cheaply, through electronic means, the size of public administration could also be 
reduced. 
The efficicncy of utilizing public money is also greatly endangered by corruption, 
which often results in manifold costs incurred by state investments, orders placed by the 
state, or a loss of wealth through privatization. Surveys conducted by international 
organizations stress that there is a strong correlation between corruption, the level of an 
economy's development and the extent of democratic functioning, as well as the strength of 
the non-govemmental sector. The European Union has even laid down rules regarding what 
kind of an institutional system ought to be established. 
2. The Management of State Property, the Efficiency of Public Money Utilization 
in Hungary 
2.1. Slate Property and Privatization 
By the end of the 1980s state and cooperative property had ceased to be of an exclusive 
nature. In the so-called second economy-in the market of small enterprises-and also within 
the framework of state companies and cooperative farms, various kinds of enterprises 
developed, in spite of which development, however, state and cooperative ownership 
remained prevalent. 
The process of privatization started in 1989, when self-governing state companies that 
had been granted the right of ownership were authorized to decide about their own 
transformation and privatization. From 1991 onwards privatization was drawn under tight 
state control, and was implemented by privatization organizations under government 
direction. 
Hungarian privatization is not easy to assess as regards efficicncy, since hardly any 
reliable data and analyses are available. The only figures so far publicized arc based on the 
surveys of the Hungarian Court of Auditors, in accordance with which the loss of state 
wealth constituted 40%, out of which the loss of value amounted to 10%, and the loss 
through corruption to 30%. 
4
 Lörincz, L.: A kormányzás modernizációja, op. cit. 645-646, and Lőrincz, L.: Közigazgatási 
reformok: mítoszok és realitás (Public Administration Reforms: Myths and Reality). Közigazgatási 
Szemle, 1 (2007) 2 - 3 , 54-55. 
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There are counter arguments claiming that the wealth of state companies was not 
assessable at the beginning of the 1990s for various reasons. On the one hand, the accounting 
was not carried out in line with market economy requirements, on the other, there was 
oversupply in the market of communist countries, and furthermore, the loss of wealth would 
anyhow, regardless of privatization, have taken place owing to unfavorable processes in the 
world economy. References are also made to the small number of corruption cases that 
were revealed.5 
Surveys conducted by the Court of Auditors go against the above claim, purporting 
that privatization in Hungary was one of the main areas of state corruption. 
Undeniably no legal remedy could be sought against privatization decisions. In the 
early stage of spontaneous privatization this was due to the fact that it was the self-governing 
companies, the practitioners of ownership rights that decided about privatization, whereas, 
later on ownership rights were conferred onto the State Privatization Agency under 
government control and later on to the state agency, APV Rt. (APV Shareholding 
Company). 
There was, in fact, no control available by seeking legal remedy against privatization 
decisions at the time of spontaneous privatization, since self-governing companies, as those 
entitled to exercise ownership rights decided about privatization, and later on ownership 
rights were conferred onto the State Privatization Agency and then to the State Privatization 
and Asset Management Agency, APV Shareholding Company. 
Therefore, no external supervisory organs were in place to oversee the operation of 
privatization organizations. Not the economic rationality, but only the accounting aspects of 
privatization decisions were at that time subjected to the scrutiny of the State Privatization 
and Asset Management Agency. Parliamentary committees were, by nature, unsuitable to 
rule on complex business matters. Additionally, the supervisory committee in the State 
Privatization and Asset Management Agency, APV Rt. was also constituted of members 
delegated by political parties. 
Hence, it is not surprising that even though from early on privatization processes have 
been overshadowed by corruption, only few corruption cases have been publicly disclosed. 
Since the beginnings of the 1990s attempts have been made at reforming privatization 
in order to ensure the property acquisition of Hungarian small and medium sized enterprises. 
Such attempts included the introduction of 'use privatization', the legal regulation of 
privatization techniques and economic priorities, or the separation of state wealth retained 
long term in state ownership, the management of which was entrusted first to AP Rt. (AP 
Shareholding Company or State Privatization Agency), and then to APV Shareholding 
Company or the State Privatization and Asset Management Agency). The privatization of 
the public service sector was then fundamentally implemented in accordance with the 
Concession Act, which ensured the right of use to those entitled to concession instead of 
selling state property. 
Even despite the reforms executed, no privatization organization, made up of experts, 
functioning independently of the government was established, which would have been 
overseen by external supervisory organs, exercising in merit supervision to ensure economic 
rationality and legality. Thus, privatization was implemented along political and not 
efficiency considerations. 
5
 Mihályi, P.: A magyar privatizáció enciklopédiája 1989-1997 (The Chronicle of Hungarian 
Privatization: 1989-1997). Budapest, 1988, 397-398. 
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In some people's opinion it is questionable whether even a mention of the economic 
efficiency of privatization could be made, since at the beginning of the 1990s most emphasis 
was laid on establishing the institutions of market economy, and thus privatization had to, 
by all means, in the shortest possible period of time be performed, even though there was 
no privatization strategy in place, and state companies were bound to be sold at a loss.6 
Expectations towards privatization are not easy to distinguish from political 
considerations and from the issue of economic rationality. 
As regards the ratio of wealth remaining in state ownership, in one opinion, the practice 
of liberal economies, restricting the scope of state ownership to treasury wealth is alien 
from Hungarian traditions, whereas in another opinion, the state is by nature a poor manager, 
implying that the entrepreneurial wealth of the state should be privatized. These viewpoints 
tend to be dependent on party affiliation. 
The privatization of the energy sector did not take place through concession at the 
beginning of the 1990s, but through the sale of public utility wealth to foreign investors. 
This seems to prove the assumption that if the state sells its strategically important 
assets, it will not be in the position to assert the interests of the national economy as well as 
it ought to. Energy prices will become a constant political issue, and although it is hard to 
decide whether they are low or high compared to world market prices, it is nevertheless a 
tell-tale sign that despite a European Commission recommendation, in Hungary no 
independent, elected, financially autonomous price-regulating body, having the authority of 
in merit supervision, operating according to a transparent and clear procedural system has 
yet been established. The Hungarian Energy office-which cannot be claimed to be 
independent of the government, moreover, it is indeed a government agency-has only the 
right of proposal regarding pricing, actual decisions are made by the Minister of Economy. 
Earlier pricing issues in the energy sector were decided in the framework of background 
bargaining between the government and the privatized public utility company, then a 
confidential matter, although later on stipulated by a government decree. 
However, the state did manage to abolish the right of motorway operation, even if only 
by compensation, when it was not functioning successfully as a public service, and did 
manage to conclude a new agreement. 
The theory of the state being a poor manager is also proved by the corruption cases 
connected to transport companies and the postal services which are even now in state and 
local government ownership. 
The debate on whether state or private ownership is more beneficial with respect to 
infrastructural public services will soon be history as a result of market liberalization. 
Political considerations have clearly replaced the aspects of economic efficiency, when 
privatization took place in order to increase budget revenues or to assist the wealth 
acquisition of political circles favoured by the government. If our starting point is that 
privatization is only justifiable when state wealth is operated better by a business enterprise, 
we must conclude that the privatization solutions were contrary to these objectives. No 
reliable figures exist regarding what the ratio of those is who became beneficiaries of 
privatization due to their political affiliation. 
6
 Sárközy, T.: A korai privatizációtól a késői vagyontörvényig. Az állami tulajdon jogának 
fejlődése (From Early Privatization to the Late Asset Act-The development of the Right of State 
Ownership). Budapest, 2009, 73. 
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It is clearly a matter of economic policy and not a matter of economic efficiency 
whether it is foreign or domestic enterprises that ought to be favoured by privatization. One 
argument is that in the absence of Hungarian entrepreneurs with a strong capital, the 
involvement of foreign capital and management know-how was greatly needed at the 
beginning of the 1990s, whereas a counter argument is that this strengthened the tendencies 
of globalization contrary to the interests of the national economy. 
In the course of privatization the requirement of economic efficiency was set against 
the requirement of justice. 
One standpoint held that according to the principle of justice everyone should receive 
an equal share from the state wealth. The principle of justice justified the rejection of 
voucher privatization as the main type of privatization, claiming that it would split state 
wealth and could be used for speculation purposes. In its stead, schemes, which offered 
some kind of discount to individuals and small enterprises purchasing state wealth were 
introduced. 
With respect to re-privatization a conflict of the following three principles: efficiency, 
justice and constitutionality also arose. According to the standpoint that emphasized 
efficiency considerations, re-privatization means an outpour of revenues from the budget 
without adequate performance in exchange, therefore it is economically unreasonable. It 
was later on proved that the re-privatization of arable land also worsened economic 
efficiency, since in the absence of capital no operable family-run farms could develop, thus 
also contributing to the decline of agriculture. The law interpretation by the constitutional 
court-which could theoretically have overwritten other considerations-could eventually not 
lead to precise and consistent legal decisions, rather looked for legal solutions suitable for a 
political compromise. 
The Constitution makes a legally assessable statement as regards state ownership, 
claiming that the scope of exclusive state property is specified by law. Consequently, it is 
simple majority laws that govern state ownership, which can be amended any time at a 
government party's or government initiative. Hence, privatization, has no constitutional 
limitations beyond the binding limitation dictated by laws. 
In the past twenty years the ratio of state wealth has decreased not only as regards the 
state's entrepreneurial wealth, but also its treasury wealth. At the beginning of the 1990s 
numerous public services were non-negotiable, such as agricultural land. Earlier on, the Act 
establishing the Hungarian State Holding Company grouped the majority of assets falling 
under the National Land Fund's authority among the state's entrepreneurial wealth, thereby 
making them open to privatization. The scope of strategically important assets was also 
immensely reduced to its third within twenty years. 
2.2. The Management of Public Money and the Efficiency of the Economy 
It is common knowledge that in Hungary the state drains many resources from the economy 
in the form of public burdens, though it is also true that the burdens of the underground 
economy and of multinational companies are largely compensated by state subsidy. At the 
same time public administration is huge, red tape dominated and of low efficiency. Instead 
of implementing efficiency oriented reforms, the methods used for achieving efficiency in 
public administration have so far only been attempts to abolish certain public administration 
organizations and to apply administrative methods, redundancies and hiring freezes. 
The application of managerial principles is still entirely absent in the operation of 
public administration. Public administration is legally overregulated, while legal regulations 
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fundamentally focus on the operational, competence, and procedural rules of public 
administration bodies, whereas the requirements of efficiency play no role. Additionally, the 
administrational culture is also of a low standard. 
State functions arc also performed at a low standard by public administration. 
The infrastructural public services still run under the authority of the state, are of poor 
standard, whereas the public utility companies in state and local government ownership 
utilize public money in a wasteful manner. In recent years, there have obviously been 
concrete aspirations to restrict the scope of transport company services, while increasing the 
fee of these services. Neither has there been a solution found for the efficiency issues of 
health service financing. Only administrative measures have been taken to reduce the 
number of beds, to close down hospitals and restrict the scope of services. At the same 
time, as regards the increase of affixes, sufficient action has been taken to extend them to 
everyone and to collect them efficiently. 
On the basis of all this, however, the image of a state-owned public service model 
seems to be unfolding combining neoliberal principles that encourage self-care with a high 
level of the public burdens of welfare states, clearly showing that the state can only utilize 
public money at very low efficiency. 
While the state discharges its responsibilities, it extensively applies business principles, 
but in most cases not successfully. 
State investments are known to incur the manifold of the real costs, or are completed 
in areas that have no justification with respect to economic rationality. 
The outsourcing of the professional responsibilities of public administration organs is 
often abused to utilize public money for private purposes by concluding feigned contracts. 
The same purpose is served by using public foundations and public benefit companies 
to discharge state responsibilities. Financing in these cases is based on individual decisions, 
and as the investigations of the Hungarian State Audit Office have established, often no in-
mcrit performance is delivered in exchange. 
Frequently the environment in which development resources are utilized does neither 
enhance efficiency. Regions with an elected body, equipped with political and decision 
making authority, determined in accordance with Community Law cannot be created due to 
the two-thirds majority legislation requirement. In their place centrally directed development 
councils are in operation, having no real authority. Although no reliable data are available, 
there is a high level of likelihood that instead of efficiency requirements party political 
considerations matter most in utilizing development resources. 
There are several reasons, why public money is spent at such low efficiency. 
- A decisive factor is probably the standard of legal regulations. There is no unified 
legal regulation in place for involving business enterprises in discharging state 
responsibilities. 
The Concession Act provides for the rules, concession tenders and the conclusion of 
concession contracts in a detailed manner. The public procurement act, although it is also 
thoroughly detailed, contains numerous and substantial legal gaps, making it possible for a 
pre-selected applicant to become the winner, or simply to avoid the public procurement 
procedure. Legal regulations for most of the recently completed PPP investments, and for 
outsourcing public administration responsibilities are totally missing, or to be more precise 
it is provisions of the civil code governing the conclusion of contracts in general that arc in 
place. 
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The presence of legal regulations itself does not directly imply that there ought to be a 
close connection between legal regulations with detailed stipulations for guaranteeing an 
efficient utilization of public money, since even the most sophisticated statutory provisions 
can he evaded, if the legal environment and culture has a long standing tradition of not 
respecting laws, but rather evading them. 
- According to international surveys, the extent of state corruption in Hungary already 
constitutes a serious obstacle to economic growth. Its main areas are privatization, 
orders placed by the state and development resources. Corruption typically takes 
placc in the highest levels of politics and of public administration, within the 
framework of confidential relationships. This is largely facilitated by the political 
spoils system which increasingly penetrates the public administration personnel, 
thus the acquisition of public administration positions is a means of deepening 
contacts based upon corruption. 
Corruption based on confidential relationships is hard to uncover, since the methods of 
leaving the person who discloses the corruption case unpunished, or disclosing the case 
with an anonymous report cannot be applied here. Therefore most probably the cases that 
have so far been revealed might well just be the tip of the iceberg. 
The political elite has apparently no interest in creating a system of anti-corruption 
institutions and has not even established one yet. 
- The requirement of accountability has neither been set. 
The State Audit Office has not only been delegated the power of legality supervision 
by the Constitution, but the requirements of 'justifiability, necessity, expedience and 
efficiency' are also listed among efficiency considerations. Even though the State Audit 
Office fully complies with its duties, its publicized reports also submitted to Parliament are 
left without any legal or factual consequence. Deciding whether state investments incurring 
the manifold of the real costs, or PPP contracts containing detrimental conditions for the 
state are actually the outcome of unprofessional performance or of corruption does not fall 
under the purview of the State Audit Office, but rather under courts'jurisdiction in criminal 
proceedings. Yet only in one instance so far has a State Audit Office report resulted in 
initiating a criminal lawsuit. 
Accountability is rendered difficult by laws, such as the glass pocket act, which yet 
again does not attach any legal consequence to wealth declarations not in harmony with 
lawful incomes. Neither do party financing regulations clearly define costs incurable for 
election campaigns, making it impossible for the State Audit Office to compare campaign 
costs with money allocated from the budget. 
Apart from the State Audit Office there is no other organ responsible for supervising 
public money which could be regarded independent. It is not accidental that the Government 
Supervisory Office has so far not been able to detect an abuse to be disclosed in the 
operation of government organs. The Parliament's ad hoc committees, as regards their 
organizations and composition, are not suitable for this purpose either. The same applies to 
the institution of the state secretary for public money management as well. 
The judicial system, too, ought to play an important role in sanctioning abuses of 
public money utilization. Facts, however, show that the judicial system is not up to meeting 
this requirement. State corruption cases often last even ten years long with the eventual 
judgments totally defying the sense of justice. Often is the charge dropped despite obvious 
evidence, or no criminal proceeding is initiated in cases publicized by the State Audit Office 
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and the media, even though the judicial bodies are ex officio obliged to launch these 
proceedings. In state corruption cases, judicial bodies no longer examine entanglements of 
leading politicians and senior public administration officials, not even when there is 
sufficient evidence, or when they nevertheless do, there is a strong likelihood of political 
revenge. 
In summary it can be stated that: 
- In the public service sector the significance of the management of state property has 
largely decreased as a result of liberalization processes. The debate regarding 
whether state or private ownership was more efficient has lost its significance, since 
market competition seems to solve the question of efficiency. 
- The American approach, New Public Management, has worked out the most varied 
methods for utilizing public money. Applying managerial principles has never been 
alien to American public administration based on business principles. In the 
Weberian model in Europe-despite the diverse traditions of public admin istration-
the business approach is in many respects realizable. 
- In Hungary, it is strongly debatable whether efficiency requirements were indeed 
considered and met during the privatization of the state wealth, or else in what way 
they should have been. There is no constitutional limitation on the privatization of 
state wealth, therefore, the scope of state wealth has been drastically reduced. 
- No institutional system ensuring the efficient utilization of public money has yet 
been established. Consequently, business principles have not been successfully 
applied, and state corruption has gained ground. Public administration is 
overregulated and managerial principles are totally absent. 
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HANS-JOACHIM HEINTZE* 
Limits of the Freedom of Speech: 
Propaganda Advocating Racism and Hatred 
Clear Obligations of European States 
Abstrac t . The prohibition o f "advocacy o f nat ional , racial or rel igious h a t r e d " by modern internat ional law 
demons t r a t e s more than any other provision conce rn ing mass media a r e sponse effected by the horrors of 
Nat ional Socialism. It is p r imar i ly conceived of a special duty by States to take prevent ive measures to enforce 
the pr inc ip le of non-discr iminat ion and the r ight to life. This provision s eems n o w a d a y s of special importance 
all ove r Europe. After the revolut ions in fo rmer c o m m u n i s t countr ies in the 1990s the democrat ic governments 
and m o v e m e n t s are sea rch ing for new app roaches to guarantee individual f r e e d o m , peace and social just ice. 
F reedom of expression p lays a decisive role in these condi t ions . People have eager ly embraced this f r eedom, so 
long wi thhe ld from them, a n d are using it to express their democra t ic aspirat ions . At the same t ime , this newly 
w o n f r e e d o m of expression has being misused to d i s semina te fascism and racial hatred. In the Ba lkans terrible 
c r imes against humanity w e r e commit ted. "E thn ic c l eans ing" was one of the results of this m i s u s e of the 
f r e e d o m of expression. But a lso in post W W 11 d e m o c r a c i e s - l i k e in G e r m a n y - o n e can find books and papers 
wi th racist und neo-fascis t propaganda, s o m e t i m e dis t r ibuted by internat ional networks . The a t t empt of the 
G e r m a n government to prohib i t the r ight-wing "Nat iona l Party of G e r m a n y " ( N P D ) shows that t he poli t ics try 
to under t ake some action aga ins t neo-fascist act ivi t ies and propaganda. This pape r examines the legal basis for 
internat ional prohibit ions agains t media conten t advoca t ing war, racism and fasc i sm and shows the ways in 
which democra t ic countr ies have handled (or fai led to handle) this thorny issue. 
Keywords: civil law notary, notary publ ic , civil law codification, Civil Code , civil procedure law, register, 
payment order, non-litigious proceeding, deed 
The international legal standard 
The United Nations Charter prohibits the threat or use of force and establishes universal 
respect for and observance of human rights. These principles have their application in the 
field of communication in three binding instruments of international law that prohibit 
warmongering, racist and genocidal media content. The 1948 Convention of the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide makes punishable direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide. The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits 
propaganda and advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred. The 1965 International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination makes punishable by 
law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial 
discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race. At 
the European level also the European Convention on Human Rights is of relevance if media 
as used to infringe human rights. If mass media incite racial discrimination then they violate 
Article 17 of the convention which prohibits any activity aimed at the destruction of any of 
the rights set forth in the convention. Even if an international agreement does not contain an 
express obligation of member States to enact legislation, it is implicit in all human rights 
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conventions that the States internal legal order must secure the rights expressed in those 
international law agreements. 
Who is included under these prohibitions? States themselves, including state-controlled 
or state-financed mass media (for example, government broadcasting stations) are forbidden 
from disseminating war or racial propaganda. Private media are also included in this ban. 
The argument heard often is that international law does not apply to private media firms. 
However, Article 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties emphasizes that 
states have general obligations in the sphere of international law which they cannot evade 
by pointing to domestic laws. The manner in which international law is enforced on private 
media is a matter of a state's sovereign decision-making; the point is that these measures 
must be promulgated. Private media must comply with the laws of the state in which they 
operate. If international law prohibits propaganda for racism, the state has an obligation to 
regulate the private media in this regard. 
It is a well-accepted rule of international law that the only barriers to private 
dissemination of information across borders which States are responsible for ensuring under 
international law is the prohibition on incitement of violence against foreign States, 
genocide, and racist propaganda. 
Prohibition of hatred propaganda versus freedom of opinion? 
In the 1940s, these prohibitions were objects of considerable international debate. States 
party to the 1948 Genocide Convention had no reservations about making direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide punishable by law. But during the drafting of the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDIIR), most delegates supported the US "free 
flow" position, that all ideas, regardless of their content, should be freely disseminated. The 
majority voted against including a clause prohibiting propaganda for racial hatred in Article 
19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This famous article states: 
"Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interferences and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers." 
Despite this formulation, we must keep in mind that Article 19 does not guarantee 
absolute freedom of opinion and expression. All freedoms guaranteed by the UDHR are 
qualified by Article 29, which declares that freedoms necessarily carry with them a duty 
toward the community. Article 29 para. 3 asserts explicitly: "These rights and freedoms 
may in no case be exercised contrary to the purpose and principles of the United Nations." 
In the 1960s, during the drafting of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), the West once again insisted that the "free flow" doctrine meant 
that freedom of expression should also guarantee propaganda for racism. Article 19 of the 
ICCPR restates the UDHR formulation: 
"1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression-, this right shall include 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of 
frontiers, cither orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other 
media of his choice." 
LIMITS OF T H E F R E E D O M O F SPEEC11 247 
But the majority of states agreed that there were certain kinds of information content 
that should be absolutely forbidden. Article 20 of the ICCPR declares: 
"1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law. 
2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law." 
Even Article 19(3) of the ICCPR goes on to qualify the rights to freedom of expression 
and opinion: 
"The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it 
special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, 
but these shall only be such as provided by law and are necessary: (a) for respect of the 
right or reputations of others: (b) for the protection of national security or of public 
order, or of public health or morals." 
Thus, both the UDHR and the ICCPR demonstrate the incontrovertible link between 
freedom and responsibility. Freedom of expression goes hand in hand with a ban on certain 
communication contents. While the UDHR is implicit, the ICCPR is explicit—with one 
complication. Article 20(2) of the ICCPR implies that a casual relationship must be 
established between media advocacy of racial hatred and actual carrying out of violent 
acts. This leaves the clause open to varying interpretations since it is not always easy to 
provide evidence of this causal connection. 
Sometimes the connection is unmistakable. Under present international law, German 
media of the time between 1933 and 1945 could have been punished for incitement to racial 
hatred. After World War II, the Nuremberg Tribunal tried, convicted and executed Journalist 
Julius Streicher, editor of the anti-semitic Der Stürmer newspaper. He was accused of 
"crimes against humanity" under the 1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal. 
The Nuremberg judges interpreted "crimes against humanity" to include Propaganda and 
incitement to genocide. Based on a content analysis of articles from Der Stürmer, the judges 
found that causal connection and determined that Streicher had aroused the German people 
to active persecution of the Jewish people. 
Another binding international legal instrument does not have the complicating factor 
of the ICCPR. The 1965 International Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Anti-Racism Convention) contains a sweeping ban on dissemination of any 
racist ideas, with no causal connection demanded. It also categorically outlaws all racist and 
neo-fascist organisations. In Article 4 of the Anti-Racism Convention, states party 
"condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of 
superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which 
attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and under-
take to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, 
or arts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles 
embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 5 of this 
Convention [Emphasis added] ... inter alia: 
(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on 
racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of 
violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another 
colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, 
including the financing thereof; 
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(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other 
propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall 
recognize participation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable by 
law. 
(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to 
promote or incite racial discrimination." 
During the drafting of the Anti-Racism Convention, the question arose among the 
Western delegations: does not freedom of expression guarantee freedom even for the most 
abhorrent statements of racial hatred? In the end, Article 4 was included only on the 
condition that the additional "due regard clause" proposed by the US be accepted as well. 
Scholars summarize the prevailing thinking on this: 
"The format of Article 4. which focuses primarily on protecting persons from racial 
discrimination, implies that in cases of conflict the balance between competing 
freedoms should be struck in favour of persons' rights to freedom from racial 
discrimination."1 
To conclude, then, these conventions enshrine in binding treaties basic indisputable 
principles of international law. The ICCPR and the Anti-Racism Convention, binding for 
more than 160 States, ban any form of racist propaganda. The Genocide Convention forbids 
direct and public incitement to commit genocide. 
The implementation of the obligations differs 
These principles enjoy near-universal respect. In today's political environment, no politician 
or governmental leader would dare to oppose these principles. Yet the actual implementation 
and the enforcement of these enshrined principles has been irregular at best. 
How do the various states parties to these conventions implement the bans in do-
mestic law? 
As previously mentioned, most western states opposed these prohibitions in the first 
place. Even after the conventions were adopted by the UN General Assembly, a variety of 
adherence patterns has become evident, particularly in regard to "reservations" and 
"statements of interpretation". In general, international law allows a state to make 
reservations to a treaty that is to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of 
the treaty in their national application in that state. Reservations to treaties must receive the 
consent of other signatories. In contrast, statements of interpretation-deriving from the 
principles that contracting states should themselves interpret the convention which they 
conclude with one another-do not require such consent. 
Let us now examine how different countries have enforced, or failed to enforce, the 
prohibitions against war, racial and genocide Propaganda. 
The United States hesitated a very long time to ratify and implement international UN-
human rights conventions. For years, the US Senate rejected human rights treaties on the 
grounds that they diminish basic rights guaranteed under the US Constitution: violate states' 
rights; promote world government; subject citizens to trial abroad; threaten their form of 
1
 Mahalic, D.-Mahalic, J. G.: The Limitation Provisions of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Human Rights Quarterly, 9 (1987) 1, 89. 
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government, infringe on domestic jurisdiction-, and increase international involvement. In 
1988 the United States ratified and enacted into national law the Genocide Convention 
Implementation Act. After that it became illegal under US law for any group or individual 
to "directly and publicly incite another" to violate the 1948 Genocide Convention. 
This is the only international human rights norm with media consequences to be 
incorporated into US law. There has been endless discussion in the United States about 
legal limits on the mass media. We sometimes hear views that "there can be no 'free speech' 
or 'balanced news' unless those who advocate racism and apartheid and, yes, war are also 
free to speak".2 
At the centre of the discussion is the question of how to reconcile the law with freedom 
of opinion and expression. The argument goes that the First Amendment supersedes any 
international legal restriction, even for such worthy goals as prohibiting racism and war. As 
a consequence, the American Civil Liberties Union even defends the First Amendment 
rights of such groups as the Ku Klux Klan, whose views are prohibited from media discourse 
in scores of countries. Consequently, President Carter signed ICCPR and the Anti-Racism 
Convention in 1978 and submitted them to the Senate for ratification with many reservations, 
among them one concerning rights to free speech. During the ratification procedure the 
Senate declared the following reservation: 
"That the Constitution and laws of the United States contain extensive protections of 
individual freedom of speech, expression and association. Accordingly, the United 
States does not accept any obligation under this Convention, in particular under Articles 
4 and 7, to restrict those rights, through the adoption of legislation or any other 
measures, to the extent that they are protected by the Constitution and laws of the 
United States." 
Other countries have not been so hesitant. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) 
ratified both conventions without reservation. In contrast, Belgium has ratified and 
implemented both but has presented statements of interpretation concerning both articles. 
The United Kingdom is an illustrative example of these tensions between freedom and 
responsibility. The UK made a reservation to Article 20 of the ICCPR. Nothing in the UK 
law forbids propaganda for war as such. To this extent, the law fal Is short of the requirements, 
as many members of the Human Rights Committee have pointed out during dialogues on 
the UK's periodic reports. The standard response was always that this propaganda is not a 
problem in the UK and that any problems which arise might be expected to be dealt with 
under the law of sedition or the Public Order Act 1986. 
Britain made not a reservation but a "statement of interpretation" on Article 4 of the 
Anti-Racism Convention, namely, that further legislation would only be passed in Great 
Britain if compatible with other rights - especially the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression. Why the UK did this is difficult to discern since the statement is in principle 
merely a repetition of the "due regard clause" of that Article 4 itself. Therefore several 
members of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the organ 
of the parties to the Anti-Racism Convention, rejected the claim. 
The British case in the CERD revealed two things. First, British ratification and 
implementation of the Anti-Racism Convention did not necessarily mean the United 
Kingdom had overcome its original opposition to the prohibition of racist propaganda. 
2
 New York Times, 27 Nov. 1978, A35. 
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Second, the case made the CERD adopt a clear position concerning the obligations of 
Article 4. 
In 1972, the CERD adopted General Recommendation 1, which determined that a 
number of states parties had not passed any Legislation in accordance with the provisions 
of Article 4 of the Anti-Racism Convention. States were called upon to bring their 
domestic laws in line with the Convention. Already in 1980, after analyzing over 100 
states' reports over 16 years, CERD reported that there were still some states parties who 
had failed to introduce the legislation called for in the Convention. The CERD once again 
endorsed its General Recommendation I, pointed to the preventive effect of law in acts 
of racial discrimination and called on states parties to implement Article 4 in their 
domestic law. 
An analogous experience occurred in the Human Rights Committee, composed of 
states parties to the ICCPR. When France ratified the Convention, it at first presented a 
statement of interpretation to Article 20(1), namely that French Legislation was already in 
accordance with the Covenant in this respect. France later wanted this to be considered a 
reservation. Non-compliance is as much a problem in the ICCPR as it is in the Anti-Racism 
Convention, for in 1983, the Human Rights Committee called on states parties to the 
ICCPR to 
"adopt the necessary legislative measures prohibiting the actions referred to therein ... 
In the opinion of the Committee, these required prohibitions fully compatible with the 
right to freedom of expression ... the exercise of which carries with it special duties 
and responsibilities." 
Most states parties have complied with the Anti-Racism Convention, though the route 
implementation oftentimes has been circuitous. The Latin American states have been 
particular pace-setters. Ecuador incorporated Article 4 in its penal code almost verbatim and 
Brazil went so far as to make any incitement to racial prejudice punishable by law. Both 
Italy and Greece enacted laws in accordance with the prohibition on racist propaganda. 
But many western states are lagging behind. Although Canada banned the public 
dissemination of racist ideas, no legislation was passed to ban private fascist and racist 
groups. British Legislation made a similar distinction. In Britain, dissemination of racist 
ideas is permitted as long as it does not incite racial hatred. Though this still contravenes 
Article 4 of the Anti-Racism Convention, it nevertheless represents some progress. Britain 
no longer claims that it has submitted a reservation, and has also reported that laws in 
accord with Article 4 were in the process of revision. 
In 1985, the CERD renewed its appeal to the United Kingdom to bring its legislation 
in line with the Convention's obligations. The CERD criticised the British position in two 
ways: it said that Article 4 and freedom of opinion do not contradict one another. It also 
disputed that a state only has a duty to enact Legislation if there are specific problems in 
race relations. In the end, though, the CERD reported that progress had been made toward 
implementing Article 4 around the world. 
The Anti-Racism Convention also bans organized groups from inciting racial hatred. 
In this regard subsection (b) of Article 4 qualities subsection (a) to a certain extent. Using 
this as an excuse, most western countries have pointed to this provision in their attempt to 
avoid outlawing racist and fascist organisations. For example, in Canada the fascist "Western 
Guard Party" still operates. Some of its members have been charged with illegal possession 
of arms and some racist propaganda was seized, but the organisation was never actually 
banned. Over a number of years this "Party" had used public telephone services to warn "of 
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the dangers of international finance and Jewry leading the world into wars". The only result 
was that they were precluded from using the telephone services, in conformity with the 
express authority in the Canadian Human Right Act. The Human Rights Committee 
supported this preclusion because the "Party" seeks to disseminate through the telephone 
system opinions which clearly constitute the advocacy of racial hatred which Canada has an 
obligation under Article 20 (2) CCPR to prohibit.3 
Many signatories have openly stated their intention not to forbid racist and fascist 
organisations. The Federal Republic of Germany, for instance, allows the "National 
Democratic Party of Germany" (NPD), the "National Assembly", and other neo-fascist 
organisations to operate freely. CERD criticised this non-compliance. Contrary to its 
obligations under the Anti-Racism Convention, Germany believes that banning the NPD is 
not a judicial issue but rather a question of political opportunism. The FRG admitted that 34 
neo-fascist organisations exist in the country. At the same time it claimed that the neo-Nazi 
groups have slipped into political oblivion. This position has been accepted by CERD. It 
needed as long as the year 2001 after many racist attacks all over Germany that the German 
government decided to apply from the Federal Constitutional Court the prohibition of the 
NPD. It is the Federal Constitutional Court alone that decides on the unconstitutionality of 
political parties. Only applications can be made by the Parliament, the Federal Council or 
the government. 
The United Kingdom violates its obligation to the Convention by allowing neo-fascist 
and extreme right-wing groups to operate freely. At the CERD, the British representative 
did not deny these groups' existence. He argued that such organisations were tolerated 
because they did not have a great following and that banning them would contradict freedom 
of opinion and expression. He did not answer whether such organisations would be banned 
if they did attract a mass following. The status of British compliance has not changed. 
Therefore the CERD expressed in 1996 again its concern over the British interpretation of 
Article 4: "Such an interpretation is not only in conflict with the established view of the 
Committee, ... but also amounts to a negation of the State Party's obligation ... to outlaw 
and prohibit organizations which promote and incite racial discrimination" (UN-Doc. 
С E RD/C/304/Add. 9 ). 
In general, Western countries find it difficult to comply with the provisions of Article 
4(b). Most do not deny that they are violating international law by failing to take judicial or 
administrative measures to ban racist or neo-fascist organisations. Instead, they ask for 
understanding regarding their domestic obligations. Clearly, states parties' obligation to 
Article 4 of the Anti-Racism Convention will remain a central issue in CERD. 
On closer scrutiny, though, this argument of the freedom of opinion is faulty. When, 
for example, Iceland's representative to the Human Rights Committee maintained that 
prohibiting of racist propaganda would violate freedom of expression, some committee 
members asked him to justify that country's ban on tobacco and alcohol advertisements. He 
was not able to give an answer. In like manner, the United Kingdom refused to withdraw its 
reservations to Article 20(1) of the ICCPR when called upon to do so by the Human Rights 
Committee. The government maintained that propaganda posed no problem for the United 
Kingdom and that there was no need to adopt legal measures banning it. 
3
 Manfred Nowak, CCPR Commentary, see supra note 1, 367. Nowak, M.: U.N. Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. CCPR Commentary. Kehl, 1993; UNO-Pakt über bürgerliche und politische 
Rechte und Fakultativprotokoll - CCPRKommentar, Kehl-Straßburg-Arlington, 1989. 
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Also the newly democratic States in Europe like Croatia have some problems with the 
prohibition of hatred propaganda and racist organizations, especially after civil wars. 
Therefore the CERD articulated in 1999 concern at incidents of hate-speech directed at the 
Serb minority in Croat media and the failure of the State party to take adequate measures to 
investigate and prosecute those responsible for promoting hatred and ethnic tension through 
print and audio-visual media. The CERD noted also with concern the lack of legal provisions 
required in order to implement to prohibition of racist organizations, because it is the 
absence of legislative measures declaring those organizations illegal which promote and 
incite racial discrimination (UN-Doc. CERD/C/304/Add.5). 
Conclusion 
There are still some gaps between international law standards and the practice on some 
States concerning hatred propaganda. But it is very important that we have nowadays a 
whole body of international law dealing with information and established clear prohibitions. 
Clearly, the concept of free expression as reflected in the human rights instruments is non-
absolute and may be subjected to impairment in certain circumstances. These norms are 
binding to more than 150 States which belong to the Genocide Convention, the CCPR and 
to the Anti racism Convention. Some aspects of these conventions represent without any 
doubt customary international law. This is reflected by regional instruments. The American 
Convention on Human Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, and the Helsinki Accords each codify the right to free speech 
with specific limitations. However, it is true that one can observe some hesitation on the 
side of many States to implement all components especially of the UN-conventions in a 
correct way, because they are convinced that there are other ways to deal with racist 
propaganda. On the other hand there is an increasing public awareness worldwide and 
stronger involvement of the civil societies in the States. This gives hope that international 
law will be implemented in the future in more proper way. 
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Taxonomy of Law and Legal Mapping 
Patterns and Limits of the Classification of Legal Systems 
A b s t r a c t . Attempts from the 17 th century onward anticipate the 20 l h -century mood of legal mapping. They classify 
legal ar rangements by languages, races and genet ic roots , then by their ideologies and technicali t ies. Later on they 
do so by separating the Western from the Soviet /social is t law, by their correspondence to underlying general 
cul tures , as well as according to legal families. It is the insufficiency of resorting to d i cho tomy contrasting the 
Western " U s " to any di f fer ing Eastern "Others" tha t has recently resulted in typologising in te rms of the dynamism 
and direct ions of legal development in the duali ty o f professionalism and traditionalism or in the cross-reference of 
what is established/stable and unestablished/instable, and of what is d rawn from Western and non-Western sources. 
Material taxonomy cannot be accomplished in law through genuine class-concepts. Characterisation through 
concep t s of order can be achieved at most. In wan t o f any meta-system, cultures formed to idealise and hypostasise 
ideas of order by independent principles can p rov ide no common basis of division for law. Accordingly, only some 
divis ion to major and minor sets and subsets can be achieved. The own arrangement will be better cognised by 
other s chemes ' understanding. The gradual t r anscendence of rule-fet ishism by identifying law with some specific 
cul ture may prevent the coming "clash of c iv i l iza t ions" from reaching aggressive self-assert ion and care for the 
sustainabil i ty of the laws ' diversity. 
K e y w o r d s : family resemblences. legal fami l ies , civi l /common law, Western/Soviet law, characterisation/ 
defini t ion, comparative law theory, comparative jud ic ia l mind 
1. Preliminaries 
Applying a theatrical metaphor characteristic of the Baroque age, it is Leibniz' ambition 
(1667) regarding the early recognition of the need to describe the "theatre of the legal 
world" that was transmitted to us, informing us that the more humanity's intellectual world 
broadened throughout history, the more pressingly humanity felt the need to classify its 
diverse elements. For example, the English Saint German perceived the difference between 
Roman English 
laws, while also presenting the correlation between their development, as early as in 1531, 
pointing out that what is jus naturale in case of the former recurs as reason in the latter.1 
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1
 Chr. Saint German: Dialógus de fundamentis legum Anglie et de conscientia. The Dialoges in 
English between a Doctor ofDiunity, and a Student in the lawes of England. Londini, 1528. {Plucknett, 
T. F. T.—Barton, J. L. (eds): St. Germain s Doctor and Student. London, 1974}, quoted-remarking that 
we remember now the moment underlying such development as the need of reasonable man-by 
Chloros, A. G.: Une interprétation de la nature et de la fonction de la philosophie juridique moderne. 
In: Archives de Philosophie du Droit III. Le rôle de la volonté dans le droit. Paris, 1958, 189. 
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Seventy years later, in 1602 William Fulbeck described a legal world rooted in three laws,2 
such as the 
Anglo-Saxon Continental canon 
ones; and a century later, in 1701 Lord Holt wrote that "the principles of our law are 
borrowed from the civil law, and therefore grounded upon the same reason in many things".3 
This reflects Europe's view of itself in the early modern age, which with respect to the 
worlds beyond the countries on the two sides of the Channel scarcely perceived anything 
more than the papacy's somewhat comprehensive influence. Yet the above division is 
typologically correct and valid up to the present day. 
Almost two centuries later, in 1880 Glasson proposed4 a tripartite classification derived 
from historical origins again, namely, laws developing 
from barbarian from Roman law from the former two's 
customary law (Italian, Romanian, amalgamation 
(English, Scandinavian, Portuguese, Greek, (French, German, 
Russian) Spanish) Swiss) 
- , a grouping that, not being based primarily on extant and actually prevailing features, has 
remained worthy of being taught up to our day. In a typologically characteristic manner, 
Glasson perceives, when mapping Europe's inner division, the particularity of the Nordic 
and the Russian Plateau. Remarkably, the classification also draws the English and the 
Scandinavian legal systems within a single category while putting the French and the 
German together, differentiating both from the actual Romanist heritage. 
2. Proposals 
Drawing up a legal map of the Earth-by classifying the various legal systems according to 
the lasting features of family resemblance(s) expressed by their basic mission, form, 
structure and mode of operation-would be a task for 20th century comparative law, matured 
enough to have become a genuine movement by then. 
When we look at such attempts from closer quarters, some standing representatives of 
the laws' variety will be conspicuous from the beginning, placed in the centre as constant 
members that launch our interest in mapping at all, by defining the typification's entire 
contcxture and final orientation. When the mapping is completed, further members will be 
attached mostly as additional items, exemplifying the law's diversity, the cffect of which is 
rather to testify to some loose interest in remote countries (by naming their species) than to 
cognise the world's richness in actual depth and describe it exhaustively. 
2
 Fulbeck, W.: Parallele or Conference of the Civill Law, the Canon Law. and the Common Law 
of this Realme of England. Parts I—II. London, 1601-1602. Cf. also <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
William_Fulbecke>. 
3
 In: Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. 472, 482 (1701). 
4
 Glasson, E.-D. : Le mariage civil et le divorce dans les principaux pays de l'Europe, précédé 
d'un aperçu sur les origines du droit civil moderne: Etudes de législation comparée. Paris, 1879. 
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So, in the early 20th century Esmein (1905) thought, for instance, that language and 
species would constitute the most appropriate basis of the divisio5-
Romanist Germanic Anglo-Saxon Slavic Muslim 
(French, Belgian, (Scandinavian, (English, 
Italian, Austrian, American, 
Spanish, Portuguese, Hungarian) English-speaking 
Romanian, colonies) 
Central & South-
American) 
- , which, despite being rather influential for a while as an early attempt, proved to be too 
sketchy and limited in outlines. However, at the peak of European imperialism or politico-
economic expansion, this analysis theoretically encompassed the world through the historical 
prism of Europe. Interestingly enough, it also involved Arabic culture-having in mind its 
presence in the Hispanic Peninsula for centuries in the Middle Ages-as a partner on an equal 
footing.6 We see here for the first time the Germans separated as a block from the Roman 
legal tradition, perhaps owing to the clashes with which the Gentian Empire, with the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy in the background, confronted the rest of the world. At least, there can 
scarcely be any other explanation in that allusion was also made to Hungarian law. 
In another attempt at grouping, Sauser-Hall (1913) accepted the exclusive criterion of 
race as the principle for classification, in a manner not alien to the dominant spirit of the 
age7-
Aryan, Indo-European Semitic Mongoloid barbarian 
• Hindu-Iranian (Amir, • Chinese customary 
(Persian, Armenian) Egyptian, (Chinese, (Negro, 
• Celtic Jewish, Indo-Chinese, Melanesian, 
(Celtic, Gallic, Irish, Gaelic) Arabic- Tibetan) Indonesian, 
• Greco-Latin Muslim) • Japanese Australian, 
(Greek, Roman, Canonic, neo-Swiss) Polynesian, 
• Germanic American 
• Anglo-Saxon & Hyperborean 
(English, Anglo-American, native) 
new Saxon) 
• Lithuanian-Slavic 
(Russian, Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian, 
Czech, Polish, ancient Prussian, 
Lithuanian, Ruthenian, Slovak, 
Bulgarian) 
5
 Esmein, A.: Le droit comparé et l'enseignement du droit comparé. In: Procès-verbaux des 
séances et documents I. [Congrès international du droit comparé tenu à Paris du 31 juillet au 4 août 
1900], Paris, 1905,451 et seq. 
6
 Cf., e.g. Brague, R.: Europe. La voie romaine. Paris, 1992. 
7
 Sauser-Hall, G.: Fonction et méthode du droit comparé. Genève, 1913. 
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- , and his categorisation remains of a revealing force in several respects notwithstanding 
the fact that it keeps silence about the specific similarities and differences in the legal nature 
of the arrangements that he grouped so. Nevertheless, he undoubtedly provided a pioneer 
attempt at describing the known totality of legal regimes in both their historical development 
and actual diversity on the globe. Actually, he drew a comprehensive picture of the popular 
force that may have generated known cultures, inserting for the very first time a "closing 
category" of visibly "mixed" contents in his scheme. He was also pioneering in drawing a 
broad and overall framework, albeit he too had a start from his own regime (labelled as the 
historical performance of peoples, to be identified as "Western" in a cultural sense later on). 
In this endeavour, he may have been guided by a logically inspired "aesthetical" wish that 
the borders of his own legal regime should not be defined too narrowly in separating it from 
the rest of the world. 
In the interwar period, Lévy-Ullmann (1922) was the first to divide laws, acknowledged 
as civilised, along the lines of their respective developmenf-
Continental English-speaking Muslim 
[written law, [customary law, [on a religious basis & 
with parliaments & developing through with an almost absolute 
codification legal practice] immobility] 
in the background] 
-with a conciseness that may increase posterity's suspicion that he (like so many before and 
after him) actually made the only distinction between his home arrangement, acccpted in 
the natural course as serving as a starting point, on the one hand, and everything else 
separated from the former, on the other. Or, he proceeded as if for him anything else could 
be nothing but embellishment, decoration or flourish, with the sheer aim of aesthetic 
completeness. - From the vast three volumes of the historico-comparative tableau Wigmore 
(1928)9 drew for the American legal profession, one simply cannot ascertain whether or not 
the author indeed wished to classify or simply alluded to items by exemplification, when in 
an all-inclusive overview-
Egyptian Mesopotamian Hebrew Chinese Hindu 
Greek Roman Japanese Muslim Celtic 
Slavic 
(Czech, Polish, Yugoslavian, 
Russian) 
German marine 
Papal Romanesque Anglican 
-he presented the huge variety of past and contemporary legal systems. 
8
 Lévy-Ullmann, H.: Observations générales sur les communications relatives au droit privé dans 
les pays étrangers. In: Les transformations du droit dans les principaux pays depuis cinquante ans 
(1869-1919). [Livre du cinquantenaire de la Société de législation comparée], Paris, 1922, 85-87. 
9
 Wigmore, J. H.: A Panorama of the World's Legal Systems l-Ul. Chicago-Saint Paul, 1928. 
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Finally, Martinez Paz (1934) took alleged genetic roots (with a quite telling progressive 
gradation) as the basis for his division l 0-
barbarian barbarian- barbarian- Romanist-canonic-
customary Romanist Romanist-canonic democratic 
(English, Swedish, (German, (Spanish, (Swiss, Latin 
Norwegian) Italian, Portuguese) American, Russian) 
Austrian) 
—in a European developmental perspective, while any other arrangement remained simply 
unnamed. 
In the historical sequence of classifications, the categorisation of Anglo-Saxon and 
Nordic developments as members of a single group emerges as a recurrent feature, while 
the separation of Latinic-German Central Europe from Western Europe proper within the 
Romanist coverage is a novel recognition. 
The series of classifications produced during the half-century following World War II 
was opened by a magnificent theoretical conspectus, authored by a triad in France. As is 
well known, the primary aim of Arminjon, Nolde and Wolff (\950i) was to lay the theoretical-
methodological foundations of legal comparatism rather than to accomplish any description 
of the extent of the legal world. Accordingly, these authors excelled in elaborating private 
law as a group with criteria of categorisation given in a most promising manner. As an 
unavoidable by-product, however, they disregarded ideals of order (e.g. of the Far East) 
where any conceptualisation was abhorred. Eventually, they saw the historical evolution of 
private law in Europe as stemming from, and represented by, seven independent types. All 
in all, their classification1 
French German Scandinavian English Russian 
Islamic Hindu 
-has (with its separation of the Nordic region12) remained an exceptionally mature 
accomplishment for a long time. 
David (1950), whose work in due course became the number one classic of the 
international comparative law movement, paved a somewhat different road. Although 
starting, too, with a dedication to civil law, he extended his research interests from the civil 
law technical instrumentality to entire legal arrangements as unities organised into a system, 
with various components gaining specific roles. In parallel with the rise of the Iron Curtain 
between East and West in Europe and the threat of nuclear devastation with the increased 
sense of danger through the menace of a Third World War, the ideology or philosophical 
10
 Martinez Paz, E.: Introducción al estudio del derecho civil comparado. Córdoba, 1934, 154 
et seq. 
11
 Arminjon, P.-Nolde, B.-Wolff, M.: Traité de droit comparé I. Paris, 1950, 49. 
12
 "Regarding its origins and development, the Scandinavian law is neither Roman, nor French, 
nor German." Ibid. 50. 
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worldview underlying the given legal regime became his primary concern for classification, 
only to be seconded with the technique of law in supplementation.13 His proposition-
Western Soviet Muslim Hindu Chinese 
• French 
• Anglo-American [based on the 
[based on the moral rules Socialist [on a [on a specific 
of Christianity, the economy & religious philosophical 
political & social related basis] basis] 
principles of liberal political, 
democracy & the social & 
economic order of moral 
capitalism] principles] 
-has exerted a long-standing influence through the basic polarisation implied, despite its 
elementary simplicity in structure. Or, it constituted a plain reflection of the Cold War 
ideology raging at the time, whose basics were defined by the opposition of the Western 
European and Atlantic world to the Third Rome, the Muscovite Empire. And again, as 
already seen elsewhere, the occasional reference to one or two remote cultures from faraway 
peripheries (which were starting to loom on the horizon) could only serve as sheer 
complementation. David's subsequent analysis (1961) did in fact alleviate the harshness of 
this categorical opposition. Following its own path-he admitted-the West might also be 
inclined to move towards Socialism; moreover, even Africa and Asia (without Christianity 
in their past) might commit themselves to the same direction.14 Ironically enough, the 
deadly menace by the Soviet superpower (accompanied by the West's growing slump into 
the pragmatism of realpolitik, having relinquished Hungary in the dramatic days of 1956) 
made Soviet ambitions respected worldwide, compelling the West to cowardly submission. 
Finally, the very cause of Socialism as a method of building a global system could obtain 
worldwide acknowledgment by granting its own typological locus to itself, while the Soviet 
terminology renamed its counter-pole, the "Western" law, as "bourgeois" one. 
It is by no mere chance, therefore, that Sola Cahizares ( 1954) would propose a version 
resulting in minor corrections while exhibiting extreme simplification15-
13
 David, R.: Traité élémentaire de droit civil comparé. Introduction à i'étude des droits 
étrangers et à la méthode comparative. Paris, 1950, 8, 214-226. 
14
 "By the way, the nations of the West are to different extents all committed to the road of 
socialism, moreover, I think they can make much progress on this way without having to renounce 
belonging to the system of Western law at the same time. After all, a number of non-Christian 
countries of Africa and Asia could adhere to the system of Western law without adherence to the 
principles of Christian morality." David, R.: Existe-t-il un droit occidental? In: Nadelmann, К. H.-von 
Mehren, A. T.-Hazard, J. N. (eds): XXth Century Comparative and Conflicts Law. Legal Essays in 
Honor of Hessel E. Yntema. Leyden, 1961, 59. 
15
 de Sola Canizares, F.: Iniciación al derecho comparado. Barcelona, 1954, quoted by Rodière, 
R.: introduction au droit comparé. Strasbourg, 1963, 13. 
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Western Soviet religious 
[Christian but [atheist & • derived from religious 
not authoritative] collectivist] principles 
(canonic, Hindu, Muslim) 
• Chinese 
[with a pseudo-religious 
philosophy in which the 
law is ethically coloured] 
- , almost reminiscent of the tripartite vision by Lévy-Ullmann during the earlier peace time 
in 1922. 
It is by no mere chance, either, that the Romanist sociologist Lévy-Bruhl (1961) would 
come forward, with an outsider's ambitions, to propose a new theoretical scheme-
Western Soviet Theocratic feudal primitive 
• ancient Jewish 
• Muslim 
- , applying his typological model in order to outline a legal sociological panorama with a 
historical approach in the background.16 Albeit being otherwise conservative as permeated 
by respect for traditional values, this typology may astonish us by presenting both the West 
and the anti-West, i.e. Bolshevism, with equal taxonomic weight, moreover, in a way mixed 
sublimely with arrangements originated in world religions that had in their time set our 
civilisational path for millennia. However, assessing the atmosphere of cosmic threats with 
expectations of a coming cataclysm, such western submissiveness still needs to be explained 
in terms of social psychology rather than in cool detachment with some apparent 
objectivity. 
Yet, in the meantime the world opened itself up to the Western mind, and theoretically 
inspired attempts at a philosophical classification emerged. In a classical manner, Northrop's 
typification (1959) l7-bascd on an understanding of the specifically Far Eastern-discerned 
the following groups: 
" in tu i t ive media t ional" 
(CoNFUcian, Buddhist , 
Taoist, 
non -Aryan Hindu) 
accorded to natural history 
(classic China, M A N U , 
ancient Indian Aryan 
conquerors, Islamic law codes, 
those preceding the Stoic 
Roman law) 
- , in terms of which, in the Far Eastern arrangement denominated as intuitive mediational, 
16
 Lévy-Bruhl, H.: Sociologie du droit. Paris, 1961, 116. 
17
 Northrop, F. S. C.: The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Experience. Studies in the Methods 
of Normative Subjects. Boston, 1959, 184. 
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"[t]he procedure [.. .] is to push legal codes into the background, preferably dispensing 
with them altogether, and to bring the disputants into a warm give-and-take relationship, 
usually by way of a mediator, so that previously made demands can be modified 
gracefully, and a unique solution taking all the exceptional circumstances of the case 
into account is spontaneously accepted by both disputants. Codes there may be, but 
they are to be used only as a last resort, and even then recourse to them brings shame 
upon the disputants. [...] Not only is there no resort to a legal rule; there is also no 
judge. Even the mediator refuses to give a decision. Instead, the dispute is properly 
settled when the disputants, using the mediator merely as an emissary, come to mutual 
agreement in the light of all the existential circumstances, past, present, and future. 
[...] Not the abstract universals of a legal code, but the existential particularity of the 
concrete problematic situation [...] is the criterion of the just and the good."18 
By contrast, in an arrangement developed in accordance with natural history in a naive 
realistic way-
"Its codes [.. .] are expressed in the syntactical grammar of the language of common-
sense objects and relations [...;] the codes describe the biologically conceived 
patriarchal or matriarchal familial and tribal kinship norms of the inductively and 
sensuously given status quo." 
—, realistic universals are applied.19 Finally, in a law according to an abstract contractual 
ideal, there is some 
"technical terminology [...] permitting the construction of legal and social entities and 
relations [...while...] its identification of the ethical and the socially legal with 
abstractly and imaginatively constructed [...] human norms and relations [...] makes 
possible ethical and legal reform." Because "[bjefore this code all men are equal; they 
are instances of the same universals; their existential particularity is ethically 
irrelevant." "Thereby [...] a contractually constructed norm cannot be regarded as 
ethical unless if it holds for any one individual it also holds for any other."20 
At just about the same time a new upswing occurred also, due to reform initiatives 
addressed at classical comparative law. Schnitzer, as the pioneering first, claimed 
( 1961)2 '-after having revised his earlier suggestion ( 1945)22—that there were five great 
blocks of civilisation-
18
 Ibid. 184—185. As he remarks on 186, all this is akin to the radical empiricism and nominalism 
of Dewey, Kierkegaard, and Sartre as well, as "behind this intuitive, mediational type of law in Asia 
there is a Confucian, Buddhist and pre-Aryan Hindu epistemology which affirms that full, direct and 
exact empirical knowledge of any individual, relation or event in nature reveals it to be unique". 
19
 Ibid. 186. 
20
 Ibid. 188, 188, 189. 
21
 Schnitzer, A. F.: Vergleichende Rechtslehre I. 2. auf!., Basel, 1961, 133. et seq. 
22
 Schnitzer, A. F.: Vergleichende Rechtslehre. Basel, 1945, 86 et seq. 
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primitive antique cultural European- religious Afro-Asian 
peoples peoples American • Asian 
(Egypt, • Romanist • Jewish • African 
Mesopotamia, • Germanic • Christian 
Hellas, Rome) • Slavic 
• Anglo-
American 
• Islamic 
- , within which each and every "great cultural circle" [große Kulturkreise] could generate a 
corresponding "circle of law" [Rechtskreis]. Accordingly, the respective cultures are to be 
separated historically in a way that encompasses the whole of legal development. Probably 
only this can explain, why the Nordic region was not differentiated within a Euro-Atlantic 
civilisation taken as a coherent block. 
It is remarkable that the classification by Zweigert, published about the same time 
(1961), concentrating on the present when distinguishing variations in the middle-term of 
"circles of law",23 repeated almost word for word the scheme once formulated by Arminjon, 
Nolde and Wolff in 1950, while exclusively adding the Far-Eastern variant to it.24 His 
division-
Romanist German Nordic Anglo-Saxon Communist 
Eastern (non-Communist) Islamic Hindu 
- is not only conclusive but also justified, in as much as he clarifies his pre-suppositions. 
Avoiding unifactorality (but presuming that differing results will ensue depending on 
whether public law or private law has been taken into consideration), the style of the overall 
legal system is selected as the basis of classification, which is a compound of its (1) 
historical origin and (2) characteristic mode of thinking, as well as of its (3) legal institutions 
(especially in case of developed Western law) and (4) sources of law, taken together with 
their interpretation (especially in case of Islamic and Hindu laws), and, finally, also of the 
(5) ideological attributes underlying the ideal of the respective legal order (especially in 
case of laws with religious background or Socialist roots).25 
As already remarked once, the Socialist (or, in its original inspiration, the Soviet) law 
appeared as a separate type in the work of DAVID , the first author of the Cold War, as early 
as in 1950, and remained a recurrent component until the fall of the Socialist world system. 
Moreover, the term would also be utilised in addition to instances of over-ideologisation 
or over-politicisation-through theoretical generalisation. For example, Kulcsár ( 1961 )26 
would suggest a dichotomic division from the outset-
23
 Zweigert, К.: Zur Lehre von den Rechtskreisen. In: XXth Century Comparative and Conflicts 
Law. op. cit. 48-54. 
24
 Ibid. 55. 
25
 Zweigert, K.-Kötz, H.: Einfuhrung in die Rechtsvergleichung auf dem Gebiete des 
Privatrechts I. Tübingen, 1971, 69, 74. 
26
 Kulcsár, К.: A jog nevelő szerepe a szocialista társadalomban [The educative role of law in a 
socialist society], Budapest, 1961, 9-12. 
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exploitative 
[protection of the status quo, 
affecting external behaviour only 
by setting limits to it] 
Socialist 
[also building a new society 
with targeted education 
transforming the whole man] 
- , which would consolidate as precisely an expression of timely need.27 
Even if from some opposite starting point-based not on the futurism of forming man 
according to Socialist utopianism, but on exactly that which Socialism denies from the 
Western achievements of several millennia of civilisational development-, Western thinkers 
arrived at a similar result in a typological sense. Thus, according to the Indian Bose (1962), 
the only criterion of division cannot be but the nature and degree of "adherence to the rule 
of law ",28 Accordingly, there are two opposing poles and various transitions distinguished-
Western transitions Communist 
• West-related 
[so solid that (India, Malaysia, Jordan, partly Africa) 
no change • partial 
in foundations (Burma, Pakistan, Turkey) 
is conceivable] • dictatorship behind a mere legal façade 
(Indonesia, Guinea) 
• total chaos 
(Congo) 
- , in which the dynamism of the intermediate sphere (with the value-orientation of the 
tendencies of development that may forecast recent directions) seems to be the most 
progressive element. 
Gorla (1963) substantiated the world's division into two, taken as the hegemony of 
one definite standard expected to be a force capable of suppressing anything else, while 
introducing in his typological foundation the concept that the opposition between the 
capitalist and the Socialist law overwhelms the one between the Civil Law and the Common 
Law. As he explicates by a lucid distinction-
27
 As a doubtlessly number one authority, Szabó remarks that "it is the discrepancy of 
characteristics that prevails over formal similarities" see Szabó, L: Ellentmondások a különböző 
társadalmi rendszerek joga között [Contradictions between the laws belonging to different social 
systems]. Állam- és Jogtudomány, 6 (1963) 2, 160 {also see Szabó, I.: Des contradictions entre le 
droit des différents systèmes sociaux. Dialectica (Revue internationale de philosophie de la 
Connaissance), 18 (1964), 351-371}-, therefore "there is no basis for legal comparison between the 
two types of law that would theoretically »stand beyond« this extent of class determination"-and 
Szabó, I.: Az összehasonlító jogtudomány. In: Szabó, I. (ed.): Kritikai tanulmányok a modern polgári 
jogelméletről [Critical studies about modern western legal theory], Budapest, 1963, 72 {also as La 
science comparative du droitm. Annales Universitatis Budapestinensis de Rolando Eötvös nominatae 
Sectio juridical, 5 (1964), 91-134}. 
28
 Bose, V.: Legal Education as a Basis for the Rule of Law in Africa and Eastern Countries. 
Columbia University Law Alumni Bulletin, 7 (1962) 2. 
T A X O N O M Y OF LAW A N D L E G A L M A P P I N G 263 
formal difference difference of substance 
Continental Anglo-Saxon Socialist 
- , "The difference between »continental (or Romanist) law« and »common law« is certainly 
rather formal, i.e. drawn by a criterion that distinguishes and approaches forms (structures, 
techniques and concepts), rather than »substance«."29 
The debate addressing the issue for a quarter of a century as to how much the distinctive 
features are expected to stem from a common basis and their ideological background-in 
addition to the separation of the distinctive ones from within a single entity-compelled the 
French master of post-war legal comparatism to change his stand definitely. Having left 
behind the community of ethos indicated by the category of "Western law", David then 
proposed (1964) the introduction of two mutually supplementing criteria, namely "legal 
technique" (including vocabulary, concepts, hierarchy of the sources of law and juridical 
methods) as well as "philosophical, political or economic principles desired to be 
implemented "~on\y providing that "[t]he two criteria are to be used subsequently and not in 
isolation."30 Accordingly, he re-formulated his taxonomy, using the middle term of "legal 
family" [famille de droit] in the following way: 
Romanist- Socialist Anglo-Saxon religious or traditional 
German • Soviet • English • Muslim 
• peoples' • USA • Indian 
democracies • Far-Eastern 
(Chinese, Japanese) 
• African & Madagascan 
Albeit this separates what is obviously distinct from within the diverse formations (or 
Soviet deformations) of Western civilisation, yet in a scholarly indefensible manner it 
relegates everything non-Western into one single and improperly defined notional category. 
For indeed, any reference to "philosophical, religious or traditional"31 laws is hardly more 
in the final analysis than a mere pretext for separating what is "other" or "different". 
Following such logic, any comparatist-from the Far East via the Muslims to the Malagasy 
and Hova tribes in Madagascar-might arrange a cliché to group Berlin, Paris, Rome, 
London and New York into the same category of esoterica alongside with Moscow and 
Tirana. 
So it is not by chance that critical self-reflection had to continue. For instance, Rodière 
(1963) responded to the challenge by narrowing the circle of legal regimes to be classified. 
29
 Gorla, G.: Intérêts et problèmes de la comparaison entre le droit continental et la Common 
Law. Revue internationale de Droit comparé, 15 (1963) 1, 9. 
30
 David, R.: Les grands systèmes de Droit contemporains. Paris, 1964, 16. 
31
 David is also inconsequent in that his Table of contents indicates "droits religieux et 
traditionnels", while the text relates to "systèmes philosophiques ou religieux" (ibid. 23.), albeit some 
justification will follow in his presentation, for "These systems, quite independent from each other, 
are not to qualify as genuine families. [...] Even the claim whether they are to mean law at all can be 
doubted." Ibid. 
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He opined that as to the prospects of foreseeable future harmonisation, there is no common 
basis of comparison beyond the reach of Christianity,32 Accordingly, only a threefold 
partition-with the types of 
French Anglo-Saxon Soviet 
—is suitable for comparison. Moreover, he even remarked that regarding terminology, it is 
French and Soviet laws, and regarding principles, French and Anglo-Saxon laws, that arc 
genuinely comparable to one another. And he added: Soviet law seems to harmonise with 
western continental law in formal tradition with well-developed solutions and techniques 
defining a common direction; Anglo-Saxon law differs from the French one solely by its 
specified techniques; and the Soviet law sharply separates from the French and the Anglo-
Saxon ones mostly by their guiding principles.33 
Following this line of thought, grouping in terms of the variations of a definite 
correlation amongst the above elements had by then become the standard pattern. The 
classification put forward by Malmström (1969), based principally upon historical 
characteristics with varying subdivisions3 4-
Western Socialist Asian African 
(European-American) (Communist) (non-
• Continental • Soviet Communist) 
• Latin American • peoples' • Anglophone 
• Nordic democracies • Francophone 
• Anglo-Saxon • Chinese 
-proposed the most enlarged version since David's early attempt in 1950, as the very first to 
grant the laws of Latin America a named status, while he grouped distinct civilisations 
under one bland collective notion to typify regimes in Africa that have managed to survive 
as faint copies of their English or French colonisers' law. The other variation produced at 
that time was the typology improved by Zweigert-Kötz (1971)35-
Romanist German Anglo-American Nordic Socialist 
Far Eastern Islamic Hindu 
32
 Rodière: Introduction... op. cit. 26-27. 
33
 Ibid. 14-16. 
34
 Malmström, A.: The System of Legal Systems: Notes on a Problem of Classification in 
Comparative Law. Scandinavian Studies in Law, 13 (1969), 127-149. 
35
 Zweigert, K.-Kötz, H.: Introduction to Comparative, Law I. (trans. Weir, T.) Oxford, 1987. 
The first edition in German in 1971 (note 25, 74.) still emphasised that "Common historical sources 
which exist at the beginning of the evolution, lose their importance with regard to the »style« of the 
legal systems when later events exert a more determining influence on them". A sharp and justified 
criticism of such a separation of Romanist and Germanic arrangements up to their roots is provided 
by Zajtay, I.: Reflections on the Problem of Grouping the Families of Law [1973] in his Beiträge zur 
Rechtsvergleichung. Ausgewählte Schriften (hrsg.: Kreuzer, K. F.). Tübingen, 1976, 70-73. 
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- , which in fact is a version of the proposition by Zweigert in 1961, scarcely modified but 
expressly worsened, as the Scandinavian law, put in-between the Anglo-American and the 
Socialist arrangements, is definitely cut from both its Romanist and Germanic roots.36 
The proliferation within a few decades of attempts bearing the marks of fashion may 
have discredited the undertaking itself and the merits of the whole enterprise; at least no 
new proposal could be heard about during the subsequent quarter of a century. Eörsi's 
distinction with sensitivity to civil law (1973)37 represented again a Marxist historical 
perspective, while adding to Kulcsár's typology ("exploitative / Socialist") framed a decade 
ago-
natural capitalist Socialist 
communities • English & Nordic 
• French 
• Germanic 
• Central & Southeast-
European 
- , and excelling by the presentation of Anglo-American and Scandinavian laws in one 
common category as well as by the very naming of the Central and Southeast-European 
region. 
The other comparatist endeavours at the time mostly contributed to the clarification of 
the fact that Common Law is a genuinely faithful heir of the richness of Roman law, 
nurturing exactly both from, and further on, its roots. (Ironically enough, this realisation 
coincided with the gradual relocation of the scholarly cultivation of Roman law from its 
one-time exclusivity in the Latin-Germanic region of Middle Europe to the English-
speaking areas, calling for common law mentality as local sensitivity.) Accordingly, 
Schlesinger (1960) pointed out that "in spirit and method, and also in many particulars, 
classical Roman law is closer to the Common Law than to the modern civilian codes." Or, 
"in a common law system the case law, made binding by the doctrine of stare decisis, 
represents an element of stability, and [...] change is brought about mainly by statutory 
law. [.. .] In the civil law, on the other hand, the codes provide some certainty (at least 
verbal certainty) and structural stability, while judicial »interpretation«, unfettered by a 
formal rule of stare decisis, constitutes an element of flexibility."38 
36
 It is not by chance that the British critic sees in such a grouping more of chaos than of 
systemic taxonomy. See Twining, W.: Globalization and Comparative Law. Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law, 6 (1999) 3, 232. 
37
 Eörsi, Gy.: On the Problem of the Division of Legal Systems. In: Rotondi, M. (ed.): Inchieste 
di diritto comparator II. Padova-New York, 1973, 196. 
38
 Schlesinger, R. В.: Comparative Law. Cases-Text-Materials. 2nd ed., London, 1960, 174, 
187, note 2. Even if striking by its lucidity, probably all this is by far not new. Rabel, E. asserted as 
early as sixty-five years ago-Schriften aus dem Nachlaß: Vorträge - Unprinted Lectures. Rabeis 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, 50 (1986) 1-2, 322—323—that 
"English and Roman [...] analogies in their policies of building an empire, and also in basic 
qualities of their legal habits. Customary law is paramount; the case law method, progress from case 
decision to case decision, prevails; a cautious tradition forms crude beginnings into refined justice, 
supported by the dualism of customary strict law and equitable practice of magistrates /!« civile and 
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In the last decade of the second millennium, some faint attempts at providing at least 
some didactic indication amongst altered conditions eventually re-cmerged. The Czech 
Knapp was among the first to dispense with Socialism (1991) and to acknowledge Western 
law had survived in its old dual form after the collapse of the Soviet empire-
continental Anglo-American Islamic 
—, remarking that Civil Law and Common Law, in company with the Islamic legal culture, 
arc now the global systems developed enough to be worthy of dedicated jurisprudential 
analysis.39 - At Lund, Bogdan (1994) was even more cautious and pragmatic, as if 
pondering: why talk about more than is worthy of introduction at a certain depth anyway? 
His specification and treatment in a Swedish textbook-
English American French German Socialist 
Chinese Islamic 
—did not waste space with Nordic generalisation but saw Socialist law surviving in 
peripheries, and even proposed Chinese law for analysis.40 
Conceptions following in time were scarcely more than variations on traditions brought 
about by predecessors. Thus, for example, Van Hoecke and Warrington (1998) openly re-
proposed the scheme dividing "us" from "others "4I-
Western other 
• Asian • Islamic • African 
praetorium, common law and equity-and the entire doctrine is devoted to the question of what action 
or defense a party has in court; whereas we now ask with Justinian: what is a party's right without 
any litigation?" 
This is a basic truth according to which "The common law establishes its general principles by 
considering how a reasonable man would act in particular circumstances while the natural law method 
is to state general principles and then to assume that the reasonable man would act in accordance with 
them." Goodhart, A. L.: English Contributions to the Philosophy of Law. New York, 1949, 35. 
It is to be noted how much the characterisation building on the Anglo-Amcrican reconstruction 
of the Roman legal tradition is more sophisticated and alive, compared to continental approaches 
exhausted by inductivity contrasted to deductivity. For instance, Pound's opinion that the "essential 
difference between the civil law and the common law is one not of substance but of method" was not 
interpreted simplistically by Lawson, F. H.: A Common Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law. Ann Arbor 
(Ml), 1953, 46 (whereas "a code is not a necessary mark of a civil law system nor the absence of one 
a mark of a common law system") but all this is to signify a difference in the "type of mind", meaning 
that "a civil law system is favorable to codification", a circumstance "more important than codes" 
themselves. 
39
 Knapp, V.: Základy srovnávacíprávní vèdy [Outlines of comparative jurisprudence], Praha, 
1991,52-53,58. 
40
 Bogdan, M.: Comparative Law. Stockholm, 1994. 
41
 van Hoecke, M.-Warrington, M.: Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Dogmatics: 
Towards a New Model for Comparative Law. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 47 
(1998) 3 ,495-536. 
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- , linking (without any originality of thought as simply identified by geographical areas) 
immensely diverse, vast cultures that have nothing in common beyond merely being "non-
Western", with the rest of human culture simply amalgamated. - Glenn's grouping (2000)42 
also met a call for practicality -
chtonic Talmudic of civil law Islamic 
common law Hindu Asian 
-with the additional feature that, by referring to genuine traditions, (a) he intended to 
separate philosophically clearly identifiable historical patterns of thought, within the 
framework of which (b) he started with the chthonic (i.e. ancient, primitive, organic [chthön 
= earth]) model of order, notwithstanding the fact that hardly any institutional law could 
have developed within it. 
Approaching the new millennium, typological experiments re-appeared in a renewed 
guise that associated the dedication of legal mapping with the present, while including 
historical developmental overviews. At the same time, they enriched the static reflection of 
the past or present with an indication of the formation's dynamic motion from somewhere 
to somewhere. All this may have been motivated by the realisation that everything 
momentarily prevailing can only be interpreted as the section given at a single moment of 
ceaseless formation. At the same time, there is a practical need to find comprehensively 
substantive categories expressing the directions and limits of globalising legal effects, both 
actual and potential. For instance, Mattéi, the Italian comparatist active in the United States, 
made a proposition ( 1997) to amalgamate politics, law, and philosophical and religious 
tradition in one schcme of classification,43 suitable to provoke passionate debates. In the 
final analysis, this scheme-
professional law political law traditional law 
(Western legal tradition) (law of development) (oriental view) 
[separation of legal & [unstable] • Islamic 
political decision (ex-Socialist, • Indian and Hindu 
making, secularisation Southeast European, • other Asian / CoNFUcian 
of law] Cuban, (Chinese {diverging 
• British & American unestablished African towards the political] 
• Roman & Germanic & South American) & Japanese {developing towards 
• Nordic the professional},1 post-Soviet-
• mixed Asian, ex-Socialist Asian) 
42
 Glenn, H. P.: Legal Traditions of the World. Sustainable Diversity in Law. Oxford, 2000. Cf. 
also Varga, Cs.: Comparative Legal Cultures? Renewal by Transforming into a Genuine Discipline. 
Acta Juridica Hungarica, 48 (2007) 2, 95-113 {and <http://www.akademiai.com/content/ 
gk485p7w8q5652x3/fulltext.pdf>). 
43
 Mattéi, U.: Three Pattems of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World's Legal Systems. The 
American Journal of Comparative Law, 45 (1997) 1,19. 
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-contrasted the West to the East, that is, the law of secular autonomous professionalism to 
the law of traditionalism, rigidified in its past, both standing for permanence and stability as 
benchmarks of conceivable alignment, only in order to insert in-between that which is in 
flux, which is instable and dependent, dominated by mere politics, yet able to evolve in 
either of the above directions. In addition, Mattéi did not even consider his scheme as a 
system of commensurable subjects but rather as a viewpoint or a recommendable notional 
approach for possible grouping. This is so because its components are seen to be in constant 
movement, as subjects that are not homogeneous entities but sets strained by inner conflicts, 
bound to diverge in various directions. For 
"[t]he same system may belong to the rule of traditional law if we consider family law, 
while belonging to the rule of professional law as far as commercial law is concerned, 
and to the rule of political law when we look at its criminal justice system."44 
In the ethos and drift of debates induced by Mattéi, the Finnish Husa (2004) presented 
the available configurations in a cross-referential frame. His grouping of a double 
division45-
Strengthening/established Weakening/uncstablishcd 
Western • civil law • Socialist 
• common law 
non-Western • Islamic • African 
• Hindu • Asian 
Mixed (Israeli, of Québec) (Scottish, Louisianan) 
-polarised about the centrifugality of becoming established and the centripetality of being 
unestablished, and the substantiation through Western and non-Western models or impacts, 
at the same time. It treated Socialism as a transitional phase from the outset, an inherent 
product of the West, for "socialist law is culturally a European innovation [...] of European 
Marxism", independently whether taken as generation or degeneration.46 As to the Eastern 
tradition, only the Muslim and Hindu laws were specified as sufficiently established and 
worthy of analysis. Or, Korean, Chinese and/or Japanese Confucianism were portrayed as 
weakening and vanishing in law, therefore relegateable to a category with the uncertainties 
of Africa, and as left without doctrinal analysis. Finally, in his mixed category it is 
reassuringly realistic to encounter Scottish law as foreseen to change (certainly reviving 
again its Roman roots), Louisiana (presumably weakening in resistance to Américanisation), 
and Israel (as settled in multiculturality). 
44
 Ibid. 16. 
45
 Husa, J.: Classification of Legal Families Today: Is It Time for a Memorial Hymn? Revue 
internationale de Droit comparé, 56 (2004) 1, 11-38. 
46
 Ibid. 30. 
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3. Impossible Taxonomy, or the Moment of Practicality in Legal Mapping 
While in theoretical legal thinking one may notice the progressive historical accumulation 
of philosophical-methodological foundations, legal comparatism needs, apparently as part 
of each step, to be restarted anew, although a major part of its literature has ever been 
engaged in resolving the riddle of what comparison may mean at all in law. 
The expressive simile that the laws' classification still "finds itself in the condition of 
botany and zoology before Linnaeus and of anatomy before Cuvier"41 highlights the 
unsettled nature of the preliminary issues of legal mapping. For natural objects exist as 
evolved timelessly and autonomously, with underlying structures forming the principle of 
sensible separation, describable by some physicality. In contrast, legal systems are 
historically forming objectivations. They evolve in various communities belonging to 
separate civilisations, contextualised by various cultural media, scarcely featuring anything 
in common. Their common denominator (or genusproximum) can only be the need for, and 
organisational force of, abstracting human conceptualisation on the social ideal of ordo. Or, 
from the variety of ways in which human organisations can be arranged with the help of 
various (religious, ethical, economic and political) means, that which our conventionality 
calls 'law' or phenomena 'embodying the law' will be selected-as differentia specifica-from 
the realisation that (a) the law is a global phenomenon by embracing the whole of society 
when (b) it settles (resolves) society's basic conflicts of interests (c) in its quality of serving 
as society's final regulatory and controlling force.48 Consequently, being a heterogeneous 
set resisting any taxonomy, it is exclusively the practical human need that may, if at all, 
force it to be classified, in order that minor groups of components can be characterised as 
some kind of unity. Therefore, stating that grouping "[f]or some comparatist [...] may serve 
[.. .] a utility [...] similar to [...] taxonomies."49 or that it is resorted to "above all, for 
taxonomic reasons"50 can at most be a figurative expression. We get closer to a feasible 
answer by simply declaring that "classifications are made for the purpose of simplification",51 
that is, that conglomerations will be dissected into minor units with the view of rendering 
their heterogeneous components more manageable in practice. 
Literature is clear in realising that "it is impossible to establish a uniform system of 
classification which is ideal from every point of view and implies a clear distinction between 
»families« or groups".52 In conclusion, it is not our knowledge, or initiation into scholarship, 
that is insufficient-even if this was the case before Carolus Linnaeus or Georges Cuvier, or 
(in describing the set of elementary material components) Dmitri Ivanovich Mendeleev. 
What is at stake here is the brutal fact that our object can only be seen as a section of 
incidental sets, emerged from incidental processes with incidental components, that may, its 
being in constant formation notwithstanding, yet be projected notionally as a fixed block. 
47
 Constantinesco, L.-J.: Traité de droit comparé 3. La science des droits comparés. Paris, 1983, 
21, note 5. 
48
 For further explication, see Varga, Cs.: The Paradigms of Legal Thinking. Budapest, 1999, 
para. 6.1, 204. 
49
 Husa, J.: Legal Families in Comparative Law-are they of any Real Use? Rettfcerd 
[Copenhagen], 24 (2001), 95, 18. 
50
 Zweigert-K.ötz: Introduction to Comparative Law... op. cit. 63. 
51
 Örücü, E.: Mixed and Mixing Systems: A Conceptual Search. In: Örücü, E.-Attwooll, E . -
Coyle, S. (eds): Studies in Legal Systems. Mixed and Mixing. The Hague, 1996, 335. 
52
 Malmström: The System... o/x cit. 138. 
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stable enough to be subjected to systematic investigation without, however, any self-closing 
theory being justified. 
Whether the notional designation of a historical epoch, an artistic style, a group of 
legal systems or the implementation of any other artificial human ordering principle is at 
issue, this can only be the middle category of some comprehensive socio-cultural description, 
which is most suited for characterisation rather than for definition.53 Any such notional 
designation is the conventionalised issue of classifying objects, a generation of human 
culture to project some sensible order. As to such designations, the dilemma whether they 
represent a real or an ideal type is not to be resolved by them. Likewise, it is not a sine qua 
non characteristic whether or not they have a reference in reality. In the sense of 
epistemological reflection (or correspondence), they are not necessarily either true or false, 
nor need they be without alternatives. Instead, they are suitable for purposes of 
comprehensive typological characterisation, thanks to the classification performed. Any 
such description is open-ending as "there can never be any final proof of what is »important« 
or »essential«"54 in a grouping. Therefore, the obvious fact that all such operations "are 
generally embedded in local cultural and social systems, and serve various social functions"55 
is neither an auxiliary feature nor mere historical coincidence but the expression of their 
plain practicality. 
Even though categories like "cultural and legal circles" with varying "styles" may 
seem somewhat rudimentary,56 nevertheless all this embodies a decisive step departing from 
the false objectivity of rule fetishism57 to arrive at the law's inner understanding as a 
basically cultural phenomenon. This is an elementary conjecture of the recognition of law 
as culture, culture of thought, of ordering, etc., to foster also, among others, an interest in 
the comparative judicial mind.5* 
In sum, in order to speak distinctively about past and present legal systems, as arranged 
in some groupings that may allow us to characterise their minor sets in a generalising way, 
53
 For example Cassirer, E.: The Logic of the Humanities [Logik der Kulturwissenschaften], 
(trans. Smith Howe, C.) New Haven, 1961. 140 separates the culture-concepts from the nature-
concepts with reference to the pioneering groundwork of Wölfflin, H.: Kunstgeschichtliche 
Grundhegriffe. Das Problem der Stilenentwicklung in der neueren Kunst. München, 1915 [Principles 
of Art History. The Problem of the Development of Style in Later Art. (trans. Hottinger, E. D.) New 
York, 1950}, by stating that the former "characterize but [...] not determine; for the particulars which 
they comprehend cannot be deduced from them." The same conclusion is reached in logic by 
distinguishing concepts of order (suited for characterisation exclusively) from class-concepts (which 
define inclusion in a conceptual extent), by Hempel, C. G.-Oppenheim, P.: Der Typushegriff im Licht 
der neuen Logik. Leiden, 1936. 
54
 Spiethoff, A.: Die Allgemeine Volkswirtschaftslehre als geschichtliche Theorie. In: Spiethoff, 
A. (hrsg.): Festgabe für Werner Sombart zur siebenzigsten Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages 19. Jänner 
1933. München, 1933, 57. quoted by Zweigert-Kötz: Introduction... op. cit. 69. 
55
 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taxonomy>. 
56
 Cf., e.g. by Constantinesco, L.-J.: Die Kulturkreise als Grundlage des Rcchtskreise. Zeitschrift 
für Rechtsvergleichung. 22 (1981) 80, 161-178 and Über den Stil der »Stiltheorie« in der 
Rechtsvergleichung itt Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft, 78 (1979), 154 et seq. 
57
 This recognition as an intuition is hardly formulated expressly in comparatism yet. Even the 
harsh criticism by Hoecke-Warrington: Legal Cultures... op. cit. 502 stops at stating that "It is doubtful 
whether the traditional »law as rules« is able to offer sound basis for »legal family« classifications". 
58
 Cf., e.g. Varga, Cs. (ed.): Comparative Legal Cultures. Aldershot-New York, 1992, 331 A 4 7 
and Gessner, V.-Hoeland, A.-Varga, Cs. (eds): European Legal Cultures. Aldershot, 1996, 87-166. 
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first we have to reckon what we are talking about at all. That is, we have to re-construct 
them within a typology set up for exactly such a purpose, that is, as subordinated to (quasi) 
class-concepts in a (quasi) logical form. This very form still will remain empty as, in want 
of any meta-culturc suitable for derivation, there is no criterion or framework that could 
serve as a bridge between differing cultures. Consequently, the result of any classifying 
enterprise can only be some characterisation fluctuating in terms of more or less, in the 
course of which we commeasure independent phenomena by provoking them to respond to 
questions that are alien to their specifics-even if making sense from some practical point of 
view. Or, the criticism as to the necessary deficiency of classification is in the final analysis 
nothing but self-criticism of the presuppositions generated by the Western Utopia of 
rationalism, ready to logify everything within its one principled perspective. Eventually it 
tells less about its subject than about ourselves: the predomination of our thought by 
logifying rationalism and natural-science-pattemed theoretical epistemology. 
This is one of the cases of enchantment in scholarship. For, in the final analysis, we all 
live with some "us"-consciousness59 and-using a double standard in classifications-we put 
"Western legal culture at the top of some implicit normative scale".60 By the same gesture, 
in fact, we deprive ourselves of the "critical potential"61 of any objective evaluation. 
Nevertheless, this very bias is not blameworthy. We are mapping legal systems precisely for 
the sake of perceiving them as contrasted to our familiar one, in the specific characteristics 
and direction that distinguish them as differing from the one we are accustomed to. Frankly 
speaking, it is neither a critical distance proposed by the objectivity of scientific description, 
nor an external observer's position by which we approach such arrangements that we deem 
to be different. Quite to the contrary, we do so in order to cognise our own better, that is to 
say, to compare the latter with the former, upon the basis of our own culture. So we are 
neither neutral nor in want of sympathy but, contrariwise, we wish simply to cognise, for 
ourselves, on the basis of knowledge we have acquired so far. Consequently, in the 
meantime, in order to know the other, too, we have to act "against the natural tendency to 
use without reflection the ideals of one's own system as the normative measure".62 
Considering the extent to which the Soviet/Socialist law could come into focus during 
the Cold War epoch through also predominating the efforts to group legal arrangements 
during that period,63 we can now regard it either as a historical accident or as a contingency 
of politico-scholarly considerations that almost no typology proposed that the laws of the 
Bolshevism, Fascism and National Socialism be recognised between the two World Wars, 
notwithstanding the fact that their expansion was spectacular, and their self-identity, 
rejecting and surpassing the Roman ideal of law, combative and firm. Maybe the torpidity 
59
 Husa: Classification... op. cit. 17. 
60
 Frankenberg, G.: Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law. Harvard International 
Law Journal, 26 (1985) 2, 422. 
61
 Peters, A.-Schwenke, H.: Comparative Law Beyond Post-modernism. International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 49 (2000) 4 ,821 . 
62
 Reitz, J. C.: How to Do Comparative Law. The American Journal of Comparative Law, 46 
(1998) 4, 623. 
63
 Cf., as a Hungarian case study by Varga, Cs.: A szocializmus marxizmusának jogelmélete 
[Legal philosophy of the Marxism of socialism]. Világosság, 45 (2004) 4, para. 1.3.d., 96-97. A 
Hungarian overview: Institutionalisation accompanied by relaxation (from the 1960's: Comparatism 
on the international scene, the legitimisation of socialist law as a sui generis type and, in Hungary, the 
professionalisation (in rehabilitation) of law taken as a separate scholarly subject. 
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of comparatism's classifying inclination and the alarm generated by the interwar Bolshevik/ 
Fascist/NationalSocialist experiments-or, in brief, realpolitik alone-can explain the 
selectivity in terms of which at given periods of time, certain phenomena may actually be 
filtered through conceptual generalisation to become a general category of classification, 
while others may perhaps not. Therefore, in social matters, the reason why certain features 
become conceptualised does not lie necessarily and exclusively in se and per se but, in part 
at least, also in our desire to make them be classified. 
4. Diversify as a Fundamental Qualify of Human Existence 
Extremities such as the dichotomisation separating "us" from "them" (standing for what is 
different) may easily lead to subjection by the prevailing mainstream, which frequently 
changes, by the way. The very threat of World War Two might have let the world's diversity 
be seen as a potential danger itself, in which even the national particularisation of laws 
could seem irrational-
"the diversity of laws [...] is an obstacle to commerce and communications, created by 
misunderstandings of all kinds, which does not correspond to the economic and 
spiritual interdependence of the modem world"64 
- , while we today, after the liberally rooted dogma of humankind's unity and uniformity has 
broken up, easily tend to antagonise the different as enemy. As a result of this, even a 
simplifying conclusion drawn from the clash of civilisations65 may potentially expose the 
legal map's variegation as foreshadowing some "clash of legal families".66 True, such fears 
and aversions may have indeed been supported by the Western law's rule-fetishism, forced 
to sense its own multiplication when it encountered the plurality of non-western laws. 
However, once we recognise behind alienating reifications the strength of culture in 
law, and in the law's specificity the relative autonomy of how to find ways and paths to the 
order (re-)established,67 we may come closer to understanding why it is necessary that the 
world's civilisational and cultural diversity be seen as a prerequisite of human existence, 
fundamental to survival. 
64
 Schnitzer, A. F.: De la diversité et de l'unification du droit. Aspects juridiques et sociologiques. 
Bâle, 1946, 1. 
65
 Huntington, S. P.: The Clash of Civilizations. Foreign Affairs, 72 (1993) 3, 22-28. 
66
 Scholler, H.: Vorwort. In: Scholler, H.-Tellenbach, S. (hrsg.): Die Bedeutung der Lehre vom 
Rechtskreis und der Rechtskultur. Berlin, 2001, 7-11. 
67
 Cf., e.g. Varga, Cs.: Jogfilozófia az ezredfordulón. Minták, kényszerek - múltban, jelenben 
[Philosophy of law at the millennial turn: Patterns and coercions in the past and present], Budapest, 
2004, 9-66. 
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A b s t r a c t . Rules of origin mechanism used to determine the origin o f a product. Rules of origin serve many purposes 
such as collecting data on trade flows, implement ing preferential tariff treatment, and apply ing anti-dumping duties . ' 
Rules of origin can be divided into preferential and non-preferential rules. Preferential rules of origin are used to 
de te rmine whether a p roduc t originates in a preference-receiving country or trading area and hence qualifies to enter 
the importing country on better terms than p roduc t s from the rest of the world.2 Non-preferential rules of origin are 
used for all other purposes , including enforcement of product- and country-specific trade restrictions that increase 
the cos t of, or restrict or prevent , market entry. Preferential rules of origin differ f rom non-preferential ones because 
they are designed to min imize trade deflect ion.3 With rapid increase of bilateral and regional trade agreements, the 
role of rules of origin has become more evident . In the context of bilateral and regional trade agreements, rules of 
origin prevent free-riders f rom enjoying the benef i t s negotiated between the countries concerned. In other words, 
once the origin of a p roduc t is known, a count ry can extend the benefit of its free t rade agreement to its trading 
par tners thus excluding non-partners. In principle, rules of origin are supposed to be straightforward and easy-to-
fo l low methods used to determine origin especia l ly when a product is manufactured in one country, which rarely 
happens in reality. However , more than often, ru les of origin are complex and protectionist method used a barrier to 
trade. As another case study, the purpose of this article is to examine rules of origin in the U.S . -Arab countries free 
t rade agreements (FTAs). T h e article begins wi th a brief discussion of the concept of f ree trade, its evolution through 
the G A T T and then the W T O , and the recently concluded FTAs between the U.S. and Arab countries. Then, in 
sect ion three, the article analyzes in details rules of origin in the U .S . -Arab countries FTAs. The analysis includes, 
a m o n g other things, substantial transformation and value-added tests, product specific processes, and other relevant 
rules o f origin. Sections four and five address the documentations and procedures required to prove origin and the 
costs involved in this process . Finally, the art icle provides a set of conclusions. 
Keywords : Rules of origin, GATT, W T O , U.S. -Arab countr ies FTAs 
I. B a c k g r o u n d : U . S . - A r a b C o u n t r i e s Free Trade A g r e e m e n t s 
F r e e t r ade resides o n the notion of " c o m p a r a t i v e a d v a n t a g e , " a theory p r o m u l g a t e d b y A d a m 
S m i t h and a d v a n c e d b y David R i c a r d o . 4 Count r i es that p roduce ce r t a in p roduc t s m o r e 
e f f i c i e n t l y than o t h e r countr ies h a v e a compara t i ve advan tage a n d can p rov ide those 
p r o d u c t s to the n e e d y countr ies in e x c h a n g e for a d i f f e r e n t set of p r o d u c t s that the n e e d y 
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2
 See LaNasa III, J. A.: Rules of Origin and the Uruguay Round's Effectiveness in Harmonizing 
and Regulating them. American Journal of International Law, 90 (1996) 4, 625, 627. 
3
 Trade deflection occurs when a company undertakes minimal processing or assembly in a 
preference-receiving country to take advantage of preferences. See McCall, K. L.: What is Asia Afraid 
Of? The Diversionary Effect of NAFTA's Rules of Origin on Trade Between the United States and 
Asia. California Western International Law Journal, 25 (1995), 389, 393. 
4
 See Davis, M. H.-Neacsu, D.: Legitimacy, Globally: The Incoherence of Free Trade Practice, 
Global Economics and their Governing Principles of Political Economy. University of Missouri-
Kansas City Law Review, 69 (2001), 733, 749. 
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country has a comparative advantage for producing.5 This system of exchange of products 
is designed to increase prosperity in each of the trading nations, to raise trading nations' 
standards of living by infusing them with goods, to increase the supply of unavailable 
products, and to increase competition. 
The GATT was born on October 30, 1947, after an aborted attempt at creating the ITO. 
The GATT 1947 was the principal multilateral agreement regulating trade among nations 
by reducing tariffs.6 The GATT 1947, an open, multilateral trading system, worked welU 
However, the multilateral trading system had its limitations. GATT members launched the 
Uruguay Round in 1986 whereby they sought, among other things, to liberalize trade in 
textiles, apparel, and agriculture. 
On April 14, 1994, trade ministers from more than 100 countries met in Marrakesh, 
Morocco, and signed "The Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Negotiations."8 The Final Act was the culmination of the negotiations launched 
in Punta del Este, Uruguay in September 1986. Unlike the GATT 1947, the WTO is 
recognized as an organization.9 In addition, unlike the GATT 1947 which covered trade in 
goods only, the WTO covers trade in services and intellectual property.10 The WTO tries to 
lower barriers to world trade by negotiating and establishing rules to help facilitate and help 
increase world trade." By lowering barriers to worldwide trade, the WTO is raising 
opportunities for increased global economic growth. More trade makes more individual 
choices possible. The WTO secures the smooth How of trade among nations, settles trade 
disputes among governments, and organizes trade negotiations.12 The WTO created a more 
potent dispute settlement process than had existed previously. 
5
 Ibid. 754—755. 
6
 See Kasto, J.: The Function and Future of the World Trade Organization: Internationa! Trade 
Law between GATT and WTO. London, 1996, 4. 
7
 See Croome, J.: Guide to the Uruguay Round Agreements. Geneva, 1999. (Since 1950, world 
trade has grown fourteen times to more than S6.5 trillion in 1997. In the same period the proportion of 
world economic output attributed to trade increased from eight percent to twenty-six percent.) 
8
 Over 100 Nations Sign GATT Accord to Cut Barriers to World Trade, see InternationaI Trade 
Reporter) BN A), Apr. 20, 11 (1994), 61. 
9
 The WTO consists of primary and subsidiary organs. The four primary organs are the 
Ministerial Conference, the General Council, the Secretariat, and the Director General. The Subsidiary 
Organs of the WTO are the Council for Trade in Goods, the Council for Trade in Services, the Council 
for TRIPS, the Committee on Trade and Development, and the Committee on Budget, Finance, and 
Administration. 
10
 See Quaeshi, A. H.: The World Trade Organization. 1996, 5. 
11
 See Bacchus, J.: Lone Star: The Role of the WTO. Texas International Law Journal, 39 
(2004) 3 ,401,403. 
12
 The WTO agreement contained in approximately twenty-three thousand pages of agreements 
that incorporate by reference the GATT 1947, amendments to the GATT made in 1994 (GATT 1994), 
seventeen multilateral agreements, four plurilateral agreements, Ministerial Decisions and Declarations. 
The WTO agreements regulate tariffs on trade in manufactured goods and agriculture, services, 
intellectual property, food, customs, dispute settlement system, and government procurement. Special 
provisions for developing nations include longer time periods for implementing agreements and 
commitments, special measures to increase trading opportunities for these countries, provisions requiring 
all WTO members to safeguard the trade interests of developing countries, and technical assistance and 
support to help developing countries build their infrastructure. See General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. 
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Al though the W T O remains as a relevant a n d impor tan t ins t i tu t ion , the cur ren t era is 
cha rac te r i zed by t h e prol i fera t ion o f regional t r ade ag reemen t s ( R T A s ) and bi lateral f r e e 
t r a d e agreements ( F T A s ) around t h e world.1 3 M o s t of these F T A s a re t r iggered and 
c o n c l u d e d by the U . S . 1 4 In the p r o c e s s , the U.S. i n d u c e d other c o u n t r i e s to c o n c l u d e m o r e 
F T A s . 1 5 
Within A r a b coun t r i e s con tex t , t h e U.S. has c o n c l u d e d several t r ade a g r e e m e n t s . For 
e x a m p l e , the U .S . c o n c l u d e d FTA w i t h Jordan in 2 0 0 1 which w a s t he first FTA to be eve r 
c o n c l u d e d with an A r a b country.1 6 T h e U.S. has l a u n c h e d a 10-year e f fo r t to f o r m a U S -
M i d d l e East f ree t r a d e area.1 7 T h e U . S . will e m p l o y a " b u i l d i n g - b l o c k " approach . 1 8 Th i s 
a p p r o a c h requires , a s a first step, a M i d d l e East c o u n t r y to accede to t he W T O or c o n c l u d i n g 
T r a d e and Inves tmen t F ramework A g r e e m e n t ( s ) ( T I F A ) . Then , the U . S . will nego t ia te FTA 
w i t h individual c o u n t r i e s . Finally, p r e f e r a b l y b e f o r e 2 0 1 3 , a crit ical m a s s of bi la teral FTAs 
w o u l d c o m e toge the r to form the b r o a d e r U S - M i d d l e Eas t FTA. To a c h i e v e this end result , 
t h e U . S . negot ia ted a n d signed F T A ' s with Bahra in (2006) , M o r o c c o (2006) , a n d O m a n 
( 2 0 0 9 ) . 1 9 
T h e r e are seve ra l reasons tha t led the U.S. to negot ia te f r ee t r ade a g r e e m e n t s wi th 
A r a b countr ies . T h e fa i l ed W T O Min is te r i a l C o n f e r e n c e in 1999 lead U . S . t rade of f ic ia l s to 
a n a l y z e the poss ib i l i t i es for f ree t r ade ag reement s tha t w o u l d inc lude cer ta in p rov i s ions that 
13
 Looking at regional integration, one can immediately see the upward pattern of the trend. 
Between 1978 and 1991, the number of RTAs remained nearly static. Since the beginning of the 
1990s, the trend was reversed and one could observe a constant dramatic increase in the number of 
RTAs that are being formed. From 42 RTAs notified to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) according to Article 7(a) of the GATT in 1991, the number increased by 107% to 87 
Agreements in 1998. See Barrier, M. W.: Regionalization: The Choice of a New Millennium. Currents 
International Trade Law Journal, 9 (2000) 2, 25, 27. According to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), there are currently 170 RTAs in force. The WTO expects the total number of RTAs to rise to 
nearly 400 by the end of 2015. 
14
 See O'Neal Taylor, Ch.: Regional Trade Agreements: Current Issues and Controversies: The 
U.S. Approach to Regionalism: Recent Past and Future. ILSA Journal of International and 
Comparative Law, 15 (2009) 2, 411,415—418. (The United States has developed an entire system for 
negotiating economic integration agreements over the last two decades. Before the 1980s, the United 
States focused more on multilateralism and unilateralism than regionalism. In every year from 2003 
to 2007, the United States completed, and Congress approved, at least one free trade agreement.) 
15
 These agreements include for instance North American Free Trade Agreement (NA FTA),the 
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and Free Trade of the Americas (FTAA). See Gantz, D. A.: 
The Free Trade Area of the Americas: An Idea Whose Time Fias Come-and Gone? Loyola International 
Law Review, 1 (2004), 179. 
16
 See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I. L. M. 
63 (entered into force Dec. 17, 2001). 
17
 See Yerkey, G. G.: President Bush Lays Out Broad Plan for Regional FTA with Middle East 
by 2013. International Trade Reporter (BNA), May 15, 20 (2003), 856. 
18
 See Allen, M.-DeYoung, K.: Bush Calls Trade Key To Mideast; President launches Plan For 
U.S. Pact in Region. Washington Post, May 10, 2003, AOL 
19
 See Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S.-MENA Trade Facts, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-middle-east/middle-east/north-africa (last visited Feb. 
20, 2010). 
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are resis ted at the multi lateral t rading level.20 Moreover , the U.S. has signed several trade 
and investment f r amework agreements , which arc usually a precursor for FTAs.21 
T h e selected Arab countr ies , thus far, were also the right candida tes for FTAs in terms 
of economics and politics. Economical ly , based on regulatory impac t analysis reports , U.S. 
expor t s to these Arab countr ies would increase as a result of the FTA while impor t s to the 
U.S. wou ld not threaten U.S. industries.2 2 The FTAs could a lso spur Arab count r ies ' 
e c o n o m i c growth, a l lowing for the possibili ty that it would b e c o m e less dependan t on 
fore ign aid-especial ly for Jordan and Morocco. Moreover , the U.S. needed to negot iate 
FTAs because it was losing ground to the EC which , which had concluded associat ion 
ag reemen t s with several Medi ter ranean countries.2 3 By signing these FTAs, the U.S . could 
catch u p to the EC with respect to economic dominance in Arab countr ies . 
Politically, the FTAs reflect a desire to fur ther the historic bonds and f r iendship 
be tween part icipating countries.2 4 Also, these FTAs reflect U .S . ' s appreciat ion for the role 
of these Arab countr ies and their coopera t ion in international counter- terror ism activities. 
E c o n o m i c growth will a lso enhance political stability and encourage peace in the Middle 
East. In sum, the FTAs would help alleviate or reduce potential securi ty risks in the region. 
20
 In the wake of protests by environmentalists and human rights activists at the WTO summit 
in Seattle in late 1999, then president Clinton promised to link future trade accords to labor, 
environmental, and human rights issues. See Uslaner, E. M.: The Democratic Party and Free Trade: 
An Old Romance Restored. NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas, 6 (2000), 347, 359. 
21
 See for example Yerkey, G. G.: U.S., Jordan Sign Framework For Trade and Investment Pact. 
International Trade Reporter (BNA), Mar. 17, 16 (1999), 468. See also Yerkey, G. G.: U.S., Oman 
Sign Framework Trade Pact, Agree to Begin Free Trade Negotiations. International Trade Reporter 
(BNA). July 8,21 (2004), 1163. 
22
 Arab countries' exports to the U.S. would not have a measurable impact on U.S. industries, 
U.S. employment, and production. For one sector, textiles and apparels, a likely rise in U.S. imports 
of apparel is expected to have a negligible effect on total U.S. imports. See The Office of Economics 
and the Office of Industries of the USITC, U.S. International Trade Commission, Economic Impact on 
the United States of a U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, 5-1 Pub. No. 3340 (Sep. 2000). See U.S. 
International Trade Commission, U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement: Potential Economy wide and 
Selected Sectoral Effects, Pub. No. 3726 (Oct. 2004). See U.S. International Trade Commission, 
U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement: Potential Economy wide and Selected Sectoral Effects, Pub. 
No. 3704 (June 2004). Sec also U.S. International Trade Commission, U.S.-Oman Free Trade 
Agreement: Potential Economy wide and Selected Sectoral Effects, Pub. No. 3837 (Feb. 2006). 
23
 The official movement towards a closer relationship between the EC and its Mediterranean 
neighbors was launched at a meeting of the European Council in Lisbon in 1992. It takes place 
between the EC and 12 countries to the east and south of the Mediterranean. The major premise 
of the partnership is to create an enormous zone of free trade between Europe and several 
countries of the Middle East by the year 2010. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was created 
in 1995 in Barcelona with the signing of the Barcelona Declaration by the E C and 12 
Mediterranean Countries. The 12 Mediterranean countries are as follows: Morocco, Algeria, 
Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan. Israel, The Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, Syria, Cyprus, Malta, and 
Turkey. This partnership will lead to a series of Euro-Mediterranean association agreements. The 
purposes of this partnership is EC's recognition that peace and security in the Middle East is of 
great interest and concern to the EC and creation of the world's largest free trade zone-comprising 
more than 800 million people-by the year 2010 to rival NAFTA. See Klosek, J.: The Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. International Legal Perspectives, 8 (1996) 173. 
24
 See Lawrence, R. Z:. A US-Middle East Free Trade Agreement: A Circle of Opportunity? 
Washington, 2006, 4-9, 12-14. 
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In terms of their design, the U.S.-Arab countries FTAs include general definitions 
appearing at the beginning of the agreement text and every chapter, followed by a section 
on general obligations, and ending with lengthy tariff schedules and detailed annexes that 
contain either exceptions or reservations to the general obligations.25 These FTAs also 
consist of chapters that cover trade in goods, trade in services, competition, investment, 
intellectual property rights, agriculture, sanitary and phytosanitary standards and technical 
barriers to trade, safeguard measures, dispute settlement mechanism, and rules of origin and 
customs procedures.26 
II. Rules of Origin in the U .S .-Arab Countries FTAs 
Among the most important provisions included in the bilateral trade agreements between 
the U.S. and Arab countries is the one related to rules of origin. Rules of Origin in the 
U.S.-Arab countries FTAs help the parties to the agreements to ascertain that goods traded 
between them "originate" in these countries. Since a principal goal of these FTAs is to 
eliminate or reduce the tariffs on goods traded between trading partners, rules of origin 
provide certain requirements for an article to be considered "originating" in the territory 
and entitled to preferential tariffs. 
A. Wholly Obtained or Produced 
Under the "wholly obtained or produced" rule of origin, in order for a product to qualify for 
preferential treatment, the product must be "wholly" the growth, production or manufacture 
of the FTA party.27 The concept of "wholly" should be interpreted narrowly since all the 
inputs must be produced in the exporting country to qualify for preferential treatment; third 
party inputs are not allowed. Moreover, inputs of a product must not have undergone 
processing in any other country at any stage of production. 
The "wholly obtained or produced" rule of origin is relatively straightforward since it 
provides that a product is obtained or produced in one country, the product originates in that 
country. The U.S.-Arab countries FTAs provide a list of products to be considered wholly 
obtained. The list covers primary products, raw minerals, lumber, and unprocessed 
agricultural commodities.28 
25
 See United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, supra note 16; United States-Morocco 
Free Trade Agreement (2006), available at http://www.moroccousafta.com/ftafulltext.htm; United 
States-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement (2006), available at http://www.fta.gov.bh/categoryList. 
asp?cType=Texts; and United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement (2009), available at http://www. 
omanusfta.com/documents.html. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 See United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, Annex 2.2, Article l.a; United States-
Morocco Free Trade Agreement, Article 5.1(a); United States-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, Article 
4.1; and United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement, Article 4.1. Wholly growth, product, or a 
manufacture of a party means a product that has been entirely grown, produced, or manufactured in a 
party and to all materials that are incorporated in the product, that have been entirely, grown, produced, 
or manufactured in the party's territory. 
28
 A list of primary products for example would include mineral products, vegetable plants, and 
sea fishing products such as fish or shellfish. See United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, Annex 
2.2, Article l.a; United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, Article 5.14; United States-Bahrain 
Free Trade Agreement, Article 4.14; and United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement, Article 4.14. 
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В. Substantial Transformation Criterion 
If a product is "not wholly the growth, product, or manufacture of the party", then it must 
be "substantially transformed" into a "new and different article of commerce", having a 
new name, character, or use distinct from the article or material from which it was 
transformed.24 The language of the U.S.-Arab FTAs regarding substantial transformation is 
based on U.S. law.30 Substantial transformation means fundamental change in form, appearance, 
nature "or" character of article which adds to value of article an amount or percentage which is 
significant in comparison with value which article had when exported from country in which it 
was first manufactured, produced or grown.31 
The disjunctive "or" means that one of three parts of substantial transformation test 
(change in name, use, or characteristic) must occur.32 Additionally, the phrase "substantial 
transfonnation" is composed of two words. First, "transformation", whether modified by an 
adjective or not, means a fundamental change, not a mere alteration, in the form, appearance, 
nature, or character of an article. Second, "substantial" means more than "fundamental" because 
if that were its only meaning it would be redundant because transformation also means 
fundamental change. Therefore, "substantial" means a very great change in the article's "real 
worth value". 
There are factors that can be used to determine "substantial transformation" other than 
change in the "name, character or use". These factors include the value added to the product 
at each stage of manufacture, degree and type of processing in each country, manner in 
which the article was used before and after processing, durability of the article before and 
after processing, and tariff classification of the article before and after processing.33 
While the U.S.-Arab countries FTAs apply the "substantial transformation" standard if 
a product is not wholly the growth, product, or manufacture of one party, North American 
29
 See United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, Annex 2.2, Article 1; United States-
Morocco Free Trade Agreement, Article 5.1(b); United States-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, Article 
4.1(b); and United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement, Article 4.1(b). 
30
 See Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1304 (West 1930). 
31
 The U.S. Supreme Court defined substantial transformation further in Anheuser-Busch 
Brewing Association case. See Anheuser-Busch Brewing Assn. v. U.S., 207 U.S. 556, 561 
(1908) (the case involved corks imported from Spain to be incorporated in bottles for re-export. 
The court decided that manufacture implies a change, but every change is not manufacture, and 
yet every change in an article is the result of treatment, labour, and manipulation. There must be 
transformation: a new and different article must emerge, having a distinctive name, character, or 
use. Therefore, the careful selection and thorough treatment of corks would render corks a new 
article of commerce). 
32
 Change in name only could not be in and of itself the determinative factor to meet the 
"substantial transformation" test. The CIT decided that the name factor in meeting the "substantial 
transformation" test is the weakest evidence of meeting the test. See Juice Prod. Assn. v. U.S., 628 F. 
Supp. 978, 989 (Ct. Intl. Trade 1986). Change from producer's product to end-use product may not be 
of significance in determining that an imported product has undergone substantial transformation. See 
U.S. v. Murray, 621 F.2d 1163, 1170 (1st Cir. 1980) (Although Chinese glue was blended with other 
glues in Holland that changed from processor's good to consumer's good, it did not increase in 
value). 
33
 See Maxwell, M. P.: Formulating Rules of Origin for Imported Merchandise: Transforming 
the Substantial Transformation Test. George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics, 
23 (1990), 669, 673. 
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Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) adopts the "tariff shift" rule, i.e. non-originating materials 
must shift from one tariff heading/subheading into another as a result of production that 
occurs in a NAFTA party.14 In other words, the "tariff shift" rule examines specified changes 
in the tariff classification of the product before and after processing in a particular country. 
Under this rule, if the components or raw materials used to produce a product undergo the 
specified change in tariff classification for the imported product in a country, the product is 
deemed to originate in that country. 
The "substantial transformation" test is subjective as it leaves to the custom authorities 
of the importing country the discretion to determine on a case-by-case basis whether a 
certain product has undergone substantial transformation. The "name, character or use" 
factors have been weighed and applied inconsistently, and that supplemental factors are 
selectively employed according to the context in which the substantial transformation test is 
applied.35 Because of the "substantial transformation" subjectivity, it is unclear at what time 
and to what extent a product has to undergo a substantial transformation. Adopting several 
factors in the "substantial transformation" test would confuse importers and does not 
provide helpful precedents. 
Origin determinations under the substantial transformation rule arc highly individual 
fact intensive exercises. The "substantial transformation" rule imposes potentially higher 
transactions costs on importers because all components, ingredients, or inputs used in a 
manufacturing process will need to have their origin traced and documented. Moreover, 
"substantial transformation" is itself a complex, highly technical, and uncertain endeavor. 
As a result, these requirements may have a major adverse impact on companies importing 
products with components or inputs originating from different countries. 
It is argued that the use of a specific tariff schedule to measure change in the commodity 
status enjoys transparency, predictivity and to an extent, objectivity.36 There is less 
possibility to use rules of origin as instruments of industrial policy.37 Thus, in its bilateral 
FTAs with Arab countries, the U.S. should have adopted a uniform system of "tariff shift" 
rules based on the NAFTA country of origin rules to simplify the process of country of 
origin determinations. 
34
 For the first time in the U.S., the concept of change in tariff heading was used first in the 
U.S.-Canada FTA and then NAFTA. Chapter Four (rules of origin) in NAFTA has a general rule that 
applies to all products exported from one party to the other. The general rule determines that a good is 
considered to originate in North America if 1) the good is wholly obtained or produced entirely in the 
territory of one or more of the parties to NAFTA 2) the non-originating materials used in the production 
of the good undergoes an applicable "change in tariff classification" as a result of production occurring 
entirely in the territory of one or more of the parties to NAFTA. See St. Fort, M. K.: A Comparison of 
the Rules of Origin in the United States under The U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CFTA), and 
Under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Wisconsin International Law Journal, 
13 (1994), 183. 
35
 See Cao, L.: Corporate and Product Identity in the Postnational Economy: Rethinking U.S. 
Trade Laws. California Law Review, 90 (2002) 2, 401, 463, 471. 
36
 See Favely, R.-Reed, G.: Economic Effects of Rules of Origin. Review of World Economics, 
134(1998) 2, 209,212-213. 
37
 See Bhagwati, J.-Hudec, R. E. (eds): Eair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free 
Trade. Cambridge (MA), 1996, 306-309 (the United States has not had an avowed industrial policy. 
However, some critics have contended that the U.S. does in fact have an industrial policy in the broad 
sense. The U.S. has an implicit and decentralized industrial policy. Instruments of industrial policy 
include subsidies and tax breaks). 
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С. Value-Added Test 
The substantial transformation rule may not suffice by itself to confer origin. Specifically, 
substantial transformation rule may not ensure that a sufficient amount of local materials 
and value-added processing would be required in order to qualify for preferential treatment.38 
Arab countries partners may be used as a platform for shipment of products to the U.S. 
though the products in question could have gone through minor processing. Thus, the U.S.— 
Arab countries FTAs contain a mathematical requirement, known as the value-added or 
percentage rule.39 A value-added test commonly stipulates a minimum percentage of the 
total value of a product which must be accounted for by the value of materials, labor, and 
other processing costs originating or performed in a particular country in order for that 
product to qualify as originating in that particular country. 
The U.S-Arab countries FTAs applied the value-added test in conjunction with or in 
lieu of the substantial transformation rule. Under the value-added test, thirty-five percent of 
the appraised value to produce the good must be based upon costs incurred in the FTA 
partner country.40 The appraised value is defined to include materials and direct cost of 
processing operations.41 Thus, according to these FTAs, the value excludes overheads, 
expenses for sales promotion, royalties, shipping and packing costs, and non-allowable 
interest costs. By way of comparison, the local value requirement of the U.S. Arab countries 
FTAs is similar to the net cost method of calculating regional value content under NAFTA, 
except that only thirty-five percent of the value must be local.42 
38
 In some instances substantial transformation may confer origin by itself, but with low value 
such as 10 percent. 
39
 See United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, supra note 16, Annex 2.2, Article 1(c); 
United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, Article 5.1(b); United States-Bahrain 
Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, Article 4.1 (b); and United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement, 
supra note 25, Article 4.1(b). 
40
 Ibid. The appraised value of an imported product will be its transaction value. The transaction 
value generally approximates the ex-factory price of a good sold to an independent buyer on an arms-
length basis. 
41
 There are indirect materials that are deemed to be originating regardless of their origin. An 
"indirect material" is defined to mean a product that is used in the production of a good which is not 
physically incorporated into the good, or which is used in the maintenance of buildings or in the 
operation of equipment used to produce the good and any good that is not incorporated but whose use 
can be demonstrated to be part of the production of the good. Examples of indirect materials are fuel, 
dies, and safety equipment. See United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, Annex 2.2, Article 6(a) 
and (b); United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, Article 5.6; United States-Bahrain Free Trade 
Agreement, Article 4.16; and United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement, Article 4.6. 
42
 NAFTA provides that if the good is produced entirely in the territory of one or more of the 
parties to NAFTA but one or more of the non-originating materials provided for "as parts" of the good 
does not undergo a change in tariff classification because the good 1) was imported into the territory 
of a party in an unassembled or a disassembled form but was classified as an assembled good or 2) the 
heading for the good describes both the good itself and its parts and is not further subdivided into 
subheadings, or the subheading for the good describes both the good itself and its parts provided that 
the regional value content (RVC) is not less than 60 percent under transaction value method or 50 
percent under net cost method. Under the transaction value method, RVC = TV - V N M / TV X 100. 
RVC is the regional value content, expressed as a percentage, TV is the transaction value of the good 
adjusted to a F.O.B, basis, and VNM is the value of non-originating materials used by the producer in 
the production of the good. Under the net cost method, RVC = NC - VNM / NC X 100. NC is the net 
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The previous discussion of the value-added test is simplification of what happens in 
practice. Calculation of value-added depends upon complex accounting issues which can 
raise significant uncertainty. The reason for this uncertainty is due to the fact that an origin 
is never finally determined until audits are completed, a process that can take years. If the 
auditors disagree with the calculations of the parties involved, enormous and unexpected 
demands for payment of duties may result.43 In addition, there is a need to verify value 
added claims as it is necessary to carry out audits after the event to certify the costs of work 
carried out. 
The value-added test is designed to ensure that the process of transformation has resulted 
in the inclusion of a significant degree of Arabian content. However, operations that will 
confer origin in one country may not do so in another because of fluctuation in costs of 
materials and different labor costs. For example, if a U.S. worker applies eight hours labor 
to an imported input, the valued-added test could be met easily because of high productivity 
and wage. An Arab worker, on the other hand, may fail to raise the value of the product 
when employing the same amount of hours because of lower level of productivity and wage. 
Therefore, the value-added test may be internally discriminatory when evaluated in light of 
Arab countries' wages and productivity.44 In summation, the value-added test takes into 
account factors relevant to the total production cost of the product and not relevant to the 
nature of the producing country' economy with its varied economic development. 
D. Specific Rules of Origin for Certain Product(s) 
The U.S.-Arab countries FTAs include specific rules that confer origin when certain 
production methods have been carried out.45 These rules apply for a variety of products 
such as milk, vegetable product, foodstuffs, plastics, and automotive products. In addition, 
these FTAs have specified production methods for textiles and apparels.46 
cost of the good and VNM is the value of non-originating materials used by the producer in the 
production of the good. NAFTA defines the net cost as the total cost less the following specific costs: 
sales promotion, marketing and after-sales service costs, royalties, shipping and packing costs, and 
non-allowable interest costs that are included in the total cost. In calculating the net cost, the producer 
may use several allocation methods. The difference between the two RVC methods in NAFTA is that 
the transaction-value method includes some costs that are excluded in the net cost method. NAFTA 
bases the transaction-value method on the price actually paid or payable for a good or material, and 
may thus include all costs plus profits. To compensate for this difference, the transaction value method 
requires a higher percentage of RVC. NAFTA rules provide for calculations based on the total price or 
the total cost, with deductions for certain cost items and/or the value of non-originating materials. See 
Ramirez, J. A.: Rules of Origin: NAFTA's Heart, But FTAA's Heartburn. Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law, 29 (2004) 2, 617, 624-633. 
43
 See Palmeter, D.: The Honda Decision: Rules of Origin Turned Upside Down, Free Trade. 
Observer, June 1992, 32A. 
44
 See Vermulst, E.-Waer, P.-Bourgeois, J. (eds): Rules of Origin in International Trade: 
A Comparative Study. Ann Arbor, 1994, 446-448. 
45
 See United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, supra note 16, Annex 2.2, Article 9; United 
States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, Annex 4-A and Annex 5-A; United States-
Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, Annex 3-A and Annex 4-A ; and United States-Oman 
Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, Annex 3-A and Annex 4-A. 
46
 See United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, supra note 16, Annex 2.2, Article 9; United 
States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, Chapter Four; United States-Bahrain Free 
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Although U . S . - A r a b count r ies FTAs claim duty free access for textile and apparel 
products , the specific rules of origin for these products are protect ionist and enac ted to 
mitigate the likely effects of texti les and appare ls t rading on the U.S. clothing industry.4 7 
These rules were taken verbat im f rom U.S. regula t ions on rules of or igin for textile products . 
When analyzing rules of origin for textiles and appare ls one must distinguish be tween the 
U .S - Jo rdan FTA on the one hand and U . S . - B a h r a i n FTA, U . S - O m a n FTA, and U . S . -
Morocco FTA on the other hand. Rules of origin for textiles and apparels under the latter 
FTAs are far more restrictive w h e n compared wi th the U .S . - Jo rdan FTA. 
The old U.S. rules of or igin for textiles and appare l products are found in subparagraph 
9.b.iv of annex 2.2 of the U . S . - J o r d a n FTA.4H T h e old U.S. rules o f origin for text i les and 
apparels are k n o w n as the " f o u r operat ions" rule.4 9 Under the " f o u r opera t ions" rule, 
a textile product will be cons idered a product o f Jordan if the fabr ic is dyed and pr in ted in 
Jordan and the dyeing and pr int ing is a ccompan ied by two or more of the fo l lowing 
operations: bleaching, shr inking, ful l ing, napping, decat ing, pe rmanen t stiffening, weight ing , 
permanent emboss ing or moi re ing . Under the " f o u r opera t ions" rule, it does not mat ter if 
the fabric is actual ly woven in Jordan. For example , the fabric cou ld be woven in Syria , but 
the dyeing, pr int ing, bleaching, and shrinking can occur in Jordan. 
Under the U .S . - Jo rdan FTA, the application o f the " four opera t ions" rule is l imited to 
silk, cotton, m a n - m a d e fiber, or vegetable fiber. Wool is excluded f r o m the "four opera t ions" 
rule, but subject to the Breaux-Card in rule.50 U n d e r the Breaux-Card in rule, it m a y not 
Trade Agreement, supra note 25, Chapter Three and United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement, 
supra note 25, Chapter Three. 
47
 The reasons for protectionist policies in the textile sector are to be found in the importance of 
the textile sector for employment policy in developed countries. Textile is a labor-intensive industry 
which requires low skilled workers who if laid off could encounter hard time to find a new job. 
Dehousse, F. et al.: The EU-USA Dispute Concerning the New American Rules of Origin for Textile 
Products. Journal of World Trade, 36 (2002) 1, 69. 
48
 See Textiles and Textile Products, 19 C.F.R. § 12.130.(e) (i) (2005). 
49
 In a case of first impression, first before the U.S. C1T and then the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1987 elaborated more on the U.S. textiles country of origin rules. 
The Court decided that "marginal operations" performed on the cotton fabric in Hong Kong did not 
substantially transform the fabric originated in China allowing it to enter to the U.S. duty-free. An 
article usually will not be considered to be a product of a particular country by virtue of merely 
having undergone dyeing and/or printing of fabrics or yams. The court decided that there must 
substantial transformation: dyeing of fabric and printing when accompanied by two or more of the 
following finishing operations: bleaching, shrinking, fulling, napping, decating, permanent 
stiffening, weighting, permanent embossing, or moireing. See Mast Indus., Inc. v. U.S., 882 F. 2d. 
1069 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (the case involved cotton fabric in greige form [fabric before it is bleached, 
dyed, or processed] from China processed in Hong Kong. The court noticed that the textile regulation 
was adopted in a regulatory vacuum where ad hoc determinations had been the rule of the day, 
resulting in inconsistent import treatment). 
50
 In order to offset the liberalization the U.S. took by agreeing to the WTO Agreement of 
Textiles and Clothing, it hardened the rules of origin for textile. The new U.S. rules of origin for 
textile products, the same as in Annex 2.2 of the US-JO FTA subparagraph (a)(i), (a)(ii), or (a)(iii), 
under title "general rale", states that a product is considered to originate in Jordan for example if the 
product is 1) wholly obtained or produced in Jordan 2) the product is a yarn, thread, twine, cordage, 
rope or braiding, and the "constituent staple" fibers are spun in Jordan or the continuous filament is 
extruded in Jordan 3) the product is a fabric and the "constituent fibers", filaments or warns are woven, 
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enough for the fabric to be dyed and printed in Jordan rather in some cases the constituent 
fibers must be actually woven in Jordan. 
The restrictive rules of origin for textiles and apparels in the U.S.-Jordan FTA are not 
an exceptional. The U.S.-Bahrain, U.S.-Oman, and U.S.-Morocco FTAs have even more 
restrictive rules of origin for textiles.51 Under these FTAs, textiles and apparels must be 
produced from yarn or fiber produced in the partner country, known as the "yarn or fiber 
forward" rule.52 This means that everything from the yarn forward up the production chain 
of an article must be of U.S., Bahraini, Omani, or Moroccan origin. The "yam forward" rule 
restricts the ability of a manufacturer to source its inputs. Furthermore, the "yarn or fiber 
forward" rule may cause tariff escalation since the cost of using foreign yam from a non-FTA 
party results in a higher tariff for the entire product. In comparison, the U.S.-Jordan FTA allows 
the use of unlimited third-country yarn, fiber, or fabric components in the making of 
apparels that may be eligible for preferential treatment. 
As an exception, known as Tariff Preference Level (TPL), the U.S.-Bahrain, U.S.-
Oman, and U.S.-Morocco FTAs allow for importation of apparel containing third-party 
content.53 This exception is similar to the TPL in NAFTA which allowed up to 25 million 
square meter equivalents of apparel made from yarn originating outside NAFTA region to 
be imported into the U.S. duty-free as long as the fabric is first cut in the U.S. and then sent 
to Mexico for assembly before shipped again to the U.S.54 However, unlike NAFTA, the 
TPL under U.S.-Bahrain, U.S.-Oman, and U.S.-Morocco FTAs is temporary. The TPL in 
these FTAs is scheduled to expire after ten years from the date on which the agreements 
enter into force.55 
The specific rules of origin incorporated into the U.S.-Arab countries FTAs are detailed 
and complex due to the variety of products covered. Moreover, the specific rules of origin 
can be seen as having been driven by the protectionist interests of domestic U.S. industries. 
These specific rules have their own limitations which deny their usefulness as a technique 
to determine origin. 
knitted, needled, tufted, felted, entangled or transformed by another fabric-making process in Jordan 
or 4) the product is any other textile or apparel product that is "wholly assembled" in Jordan from its 
component pieces. 
51
 See United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, Chapter Four; United 
States-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, Chapter Three and United States-Oman Free 
Trade Agreement, supra note 25, Chapter Three. 
52
 See Gantz, D. A.: A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction to International Trade Law in the 
United States. Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, 12 (1995) 1, 7, 141. 
53
 See United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, 4.3(9); United States-
Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, Article 3.2(8) ; and United States-Oman Free Trade 
Agreement, supra note 25, Article 3.2(8). 
54
 See Legierski, R. T.: Out in the Cold: The Combined Effects of NAFTA and the M FA on the 
Caribbean Basin Textile Industry. Minnesota Journal of Global Trade, 2(1993), 305, 314. See also 
Escoto, J. A.: Technical Barriers to Trade under NAFTA: Harmonizing Textile Labeling. Annual 
Survey of International and Comparative Law, 7 (2001), 63, 82. 
55
 See United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, 4.3(14); United States-
Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, Article 3.2(12); and United States-Oman Free Trade 
Agreement, supra note 25, Article 3.2(12). 
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E. De Minimis Rule of Origin 
A de minimis rule allows for a specified percentage of non-originating materials to be used 
in producing the final product without affecting its origin.56 The U.S.-Jordan FTA does not 
mention a de minimis rule. Accordingly, a product would be disqualified from being "wholly 
originating" ifit contains any foreign input, no matter how insignificant. As for non-wholly 
originating products, the product in question has to qualify according to the value-added 
test, among other criteria, if any non-originating part did not undergo the required substantial 
transformation. 
The other U.S.-Arab countries FTAs also do not include a de minimis provision. 
However, these FTAs adopt a de minimis exception for textiles and apparels. If a textile or 
apparel good does not qualify for preferential treatment because a non-originating material 
did not undergo the specified tariff classification change, the good will still be considered 
originating in these Arab countries as long as the total weight of non-qualifying materials is 
not more than seven percent of the total weight of the good.57 In other words, at least ninety-
three percent of the textiles or apparel components must undergo the required tariff change; 
only seven percent may be exempted. In these U.S.-Arab FTAs, the de minimis provision is 
limited in scope since it covers only textiles and apparel and excludes all other products. 
The de minimis rule of origin permits products to benefit from preferential treatment 
provided in FTAs even if these products contain minimal amounts of non-originating 
materials. In this context, a de minimis rule provides clemency by making it easier for 
products with non-originating materials to qualify. However, the U.S.-Arab countries 
complicate already complex rules of origin by ignoring any reference to a de minimis clause. 
Even when these FTAs mention the de minimis rule, it is limited in application to textiles 
and apparels and does not extend to some or all other products. The inflexibility provided in 
the U.S.-Arab countries FTAs regarding de minimis rule raises huge alarm. 
E Cumulation 
Cumulation allows producers of one FTA country to use non-originating materials from 
another FTA member without losing the preferential status of the final product. There are 
three types of cumulation.58 Bilateral cumulation operates between the two FTA partner 
countries and permits them to use products that originate in the other FTA country as if they 
were their own when seeking to quality for preferential treatment. Diagonal cumulation 
means that countries tied by the same set of preferential origin rules can use products that 
56
 See Hirsch, M.: International Trade Law, Political Economy and Rules of Origin: A Plea for a 
Reform of the WTO Regime on Rules of Origin. Journal of World Trade, 36 (2002) 2,171. 
57
 See United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, 4.3(7); United States-
Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, Article 3.2(6); and United States-Oman Free Trade 
Agreement, supra note 25, Article 3.2(6). The language in these FTAs is similar to that of NAFTA. 
For textiles and apparel, the item will be considered NAFTA-originating if the non-originating 
material constitutes not more than seven percent of its weight. See North American Free Trade 
Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Article 405(5), 32 l.L.M. 289. 
58
 See Baldwin, R.-Evenett, S.-Low, P.: Beyond Tariffs: Multilaterising Deeper RTA 
Commitments. 2007, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/con_sep07_e/baldwin_ 
evenett_low_e.pdf (last visited May 20, 2010). 
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originate in any part of the area as if they originated in the exporting country.59 Full 
cumulation extends diagonal cumulation.60 Full cumulation provides that countries tied by 
the same set of preferential origin rules among each other can use goods produced in any 
part of the area, even if these were not originating products. All the processing done in the 
free trade area is then taken into account as if it had taken place in the final country of 
manufacture. As such, diagonal and full cumulation can notably expand the geographical 
and product coverage. 
In terms of bilateral cumulation, all U.S.-Arab countries FTAs provides that a producer 
may cumulate the production value in each country for purposes of establishing that the 
good is originating, provided that all non-originating materials used in the production of the 
product have undergone substantial transformation and that the other applicable requirements 
are satisfied.61 The presence of bilateral cumulation helps developing trade relations between 
FTA countries. 
However, in terms of regional cumulation or cumulation with other trading partners, 
the U.S.-Arab countries FTAs show differences. The FTAs with Morocco and Bahrain, 
which use identical language, contain only a commitment for a discussion on the issue at 
some future date.62 In the FTAs with Morocco and Bahrain, the language on regional 
cumulation was drafted broadly. It does not carry any specific methods, any legal obligation, 
and has no timeline within which the discussion must be completed or implemented. In 
summation, the language is vague and exhortatory.63 By contrast, the FTAs with Jordan and 
Oman include a commitment to develop a regional cumulation within six months of the 
agreement coming into effect.64 Until this date, no regional cumulation regime was 
developed. 
59
 Ibid. See also De Wulf, L.-Sokol, J. В.: Customs Modernization Handbook. Washington, 
2005, 194-195. 
60
 In bilateral cumulation, the use of the partner country components is favored; in diagonal 
cumulation, all the beneficiary trading partners of the cumulation area are favored. While diagonal 
cumulation and, even more so, bilateral cumulation, promote the use of materials originating within 
the FTA, full cumulation is more liberal than diagonal cumulation by allowing a greater use of third-
country materials. It is, however, rarely used. 
61
 See United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, supra note 16, Annex 2.2, Article 5; United 
States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, 5.4; United States-Bahrain Free Trade 
Agreement, supra note 25, Article 4.4 and United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, 
Article 4.4. 
62
 The US-Morocco FTA and US-Bahrain FTA state that at a time to be determined by the 
parties, and in the light of their desire to promote regional integration, the parties shall enter into 
discussions with a view to deciding the extent to which materials that are products of countries in the 
region may be counted for purposes of satisfying the origin requirement under the agreement as a step 
toward achieving regional integration. See United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, supra note 
25, 5.13; United States-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, Article 4.13. 
63
 One may argue that leaving the language without specificity would work better rather than 
being ceteris paribus. It ought to be vague to remain flexible and useful because it could be 
adapted to necessary changes. However, lack of specificity lends itself to uncertainty and 
insecurity. The reason for this uncertainty is the lack of test that would guide the parties leading 
to discretionary interpretation. 
64
 See United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, supra note 16, Annex 2.2, Article 13; and 
United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, Article 4.13. 
286 B A S I I A R H. MALKAWI 
G. Other Relevant Provisions 
The U.S.-Arab countries FTAs include several provisions that have an impact on the 
determination of product origin. These provisions relate to packing operations, transshipment, 
non-qualifying operations, drawback, and roll-up. 
No product is deemed eligible for the FTA's benefits merely by undergoing simple 
operations such as sorting, assembling, or packing.65 Thus, packing will disregarded when 
applying the required rules of origin whether substantial transformation or value-added 
tests. There are trivial operations that even if they are undertaken will not affect the origin 
of the product and this will be discounted. For instance, a product may not be deemed 
originating by virtue of either an operation involving mere dilution with water or other 
substances which does not materially alter the characteristics of the product.66 
A product will lose its originating status if, subsequent to meeting applicable rules of 
origin, the product undergoes further production outside the territories of the FTA parties, 
other than operations related to shipment of the good when in transit to the territory of a 
party, such as loading or unloading.67 The purpose of these rules is to prevent non-FTA 
parties from enjoying its fruits through trivial processing methods and transshipment to 
claim origin. 
The U.S.-Arab countries FTAs do not mention anything about drawback.68 In other 
words, these FTAs do not reimburse tariffs paid on non-originating components that are 
subsequently included in a final product exported to another FTA country. There is no 
obvious reason why the FTAs in question exclude from their coverage duty drawback. It 
could be that any drawback rule in the FTA could favor producers who direct their products-
using non-originating components- toward export over producers who direct their products 
to the domestic market. Producers for the domestic market are put at disadvantage. Thus, to 
ensure equal footing in treatment, the FTAs parties ruled in favor of excluding duty draw 
back from coverage. However, the absence of duty drawback leads an increase in the cost 
of final product as a result of incorporating non-originating components with no drawback. 
65
 See United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, supra note 16, Annex 2.2, Article 2; United 
States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, 5.3; United States-Bahrain Free Trade 
Agreement, supra note 25, Article 4.3 and United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, 
Article 4.3. 
66
 See United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, supra note 16, Annex 2.2, Article 9; United 
States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, 4.3(9); United States-Bahrain Free Trade 
Agreement, supra note 25, Article 3.2(8) and United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement, supra note 
25, Article 3.2(8). 
67
 See United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, supra note 16, Annex 2.2, Article 8; United 
States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, 5.9; United States-Bahrain Free Trade 
Agreement, supra note 25, Article 4.9 and United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, 
Article 4.9. 
68
 Drawback can be defined as the refund or remission, in whole or in part, of a customs duty 
which was imposed on imported merchandise under because of its importation. See Page Hall, M. -
Lee, M. S.: International Trade Decisions of the Federal Circuit. American University Law Review, 57 
(2008) 4, 1145, 1158. Countries use duty drawback to attract investment and encourage exports. 
See Easson, A. J.: Tax incentives for foreign direct investment. The Hague, 2004, 155-156. See 
also Panagariya, A.: Input Tariffs, Duty Drawbacks, and Tariff Reforms. Journal of International 
Economics, 32 (1992) 1-2, 131. 
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Moreover, the U.S-Arab countries FTAs do not mention the roll-up or absorption 
principle. The roll-up principle is a process whereby non-originating materials are subsumed 
during the manufacture of new and different products.69 When shipped across borders, the 
new product is said to originate where the conversion occurred.70 Thus, the costs of non-
originating material are rolled-up into the value of the final product. Again, there is no 
obvious reason why U.S.-Arab countries FTAs excluded from their coverage the roll-up 
principle. It could be to reduce the possibility of counting the full value of the components 
incorporated into a finished product as originating or non-originating even though these 
components may consist of a combination of originating and non-originating inputs. 
Because of the roll-up absence, non-FTA input remains non-originating throughout the 
manufacturing process until the calculation of value-added is made. 
III. Certificate of Origin and Customs Matters 
The U.S.-Arab countries FTAs provide interested parties with a balanced framework for 
resolving customs matters. Regarding certificate of origin, when a product meets the 
required rules of origin, the trader then seeking preferential tariff treatment must declare 
that his product is originating and obtain certification(s) that verify his declaration.7' A trader 
must maintain records related to origin claims for five years.72 Thus, the burden is placed 
upon the trader to satisfy origin requirements and prove it rather than on the customs 
authority of the importing country. Additionally, it can be deduced that these FTAs are based 
on good faith by first entrusting the documents presented by traders. However, if there are 
doubts regarding the origin of a product and any associated claims, the U.S.-Arab countries 
FTAs established mechanisms for verifying origin claims. 
To verify origin, the importing country can verify origin through written determinations 
that include facts of the matter and issues of law.73 The U.S.-Arab countries FTA tackle 
administrative review procedures. For example, interested parties are entitled to inquire 
about the application of rules of origin.74 Also, these FTAs provide a notice-and-comment 
69
 The opposite of roll-up is roll-down which allows for a component to be treated as non-
originating merely because it included third country parts. When such a component was incorporated 
into a finished good, the component sometimes was treated as containing zero percent originating 
goods, even though it actually contained substantial originating parts. Cantin, F. P.-Lowenfeld, A. F.: 
Rules of Origin, The Canada-U.S. FTA, and the Honda Case. American Journal of International Law, 
87 (1993) 3 ,375 ,379 . 
70
 Ibid. 
71
 See United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, supra note 16, Annex 2.2, Article 10; United 
States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, 5.10; United States-Bahrain Free Trade 
Agreement, supra note 25, Article 4.10 and United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement, supra note 
25, Article 4.10. 
72
 Ibid. 
73
 See United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, supra note 16, Annex 2.2, Article 10; United 
States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, 5.11; United States-Bahrain Free Trade 
Agreement, supra note 25, Article 4.11 and United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement, supra note 
25, Article 4.11. 
74
 See United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, supra note 16, Annex 2.2, Article 11 ; United 
States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, 6.1(2); United States-Bahrain Free Trade 
Agreement, supra note 25, Article 5.1(2) and United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement, supra note 
25, Article 5.1(2). 
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opportunity for affected parties prior to issuance of regulations or customs determination.75 
The FTAs require customs authorities first to provide administrative review and second to 
allow access to judicial review.76 Civil, administrative, and criminal penalties may be 
imposed for non-compliance with the requirements of local customs laws including rules of 
origin.77 
With the exception of the U.S.-Jordan FTA, other U.S.-Arab countries FTAs provide 
that the customs authorities of each party shall provide written advance rulings concerning 
matters such as tariff classification, customs valuation, and rules of origin.78 Advance ruling 
allow traders to obtain an origin ruling prior to the importation of a product. Hence, advance 
ruling saves time and energy. The FTAs require customs authorities to issue advance ruling 
within 150 days of a request.79 The 150 days seem a long period. Therefore, expeditious 
determination is required to maximize the benefits of advance ruling. Penalties are imposed 
against a requesting party that has omitted or misrepresented material facts in its request for 
a ruling.80 Thus, parties seeking an advance ruling must exercise caution in formulating 
their requests. 
U.S. companies are very familiar with the mechanisms of advanced rulings but for 
Arab companies the concept and its mechanics could seem novel. Thus, FTA parties agreed 
that the U.S. would provide technical assistance that help Arab countries implement the 
advance ruling provisions.81 However, the technical assistance provision is lacking the 
methodological and operative specificity to ensure that Arab countries implement the 
advance ruling efficiently. 
75
 See United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, supra note 16, Annex 2.2, Article 11 ; United 
States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, 6.1(3); United States-Bahrain Free Trade 
Agreement, supra note 25, Article 5.1(3) and United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement, supra note 
25, Article 5.1(3). 
76
 See United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, 6.8; United States-Bahrain 
Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, Article 5.8 and United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement, 
supra note 25, Article 5.8. 
77
 See United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, 6.9; United States-Bahrain 
Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, Article 5.9 and United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement, 
supra note 25, Article 5.9. 
78
 See United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, 6.10(1); United States-
Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, Article 5.10(1) and United States-Oman Free Trade 
Agreement, supra note 25, Article 5.10( 1 ). 
79
 See United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, 6.10(2); United States-
Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, Article 5.10(2) and United States-Oman Free Trade 
Agreement, supra note 25, Article 5.10(2). 
80
 See United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, 6.10(7); United States-
Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, Article 5.10(7) and United States-Oman Free Trade 
Agreement, supra note 25, Article 5.10(7). 
81
 US-Morocco FTA, Chapter Six, Article 6.11. See United States-Morocco Free Trade 
Agreement, supra note 25, 6.11; United States-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, Article 
5.11 and United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, Article 5.11. 
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The FTA parties agreed to consult regularly with respect to the administration of rules 
of origin.82 Where a party believes that a modification to a provision in is required due to a 
change in production processes or other developments, the party may submit a request for 
modification along with supporting arguments and materials such as studies for consideration 
of the concerned parties. 
IV. Administrative Costs of Rules of Origin 
There are administrative costs associated with fulfilling rules of origin requirements. These 
relevant costs include maintaining book-keeping procedures to trace origin of inputs, 
issuance of certificate of origin, and providing all necessary invoices and information. 
Unfortunately, there are no specific studies that address costs of rules of origin for U.S . -
Arab countries FTAs.83 However, costs for such agreements are expected to be high. This 
conclusion is based on studies of other FTAs to which the U.S. is party and similar in 
content to the U.S.-Arab countries FTAs. For example, the administrative costs for NAFTA's 
rules of origin account for approximately approximate two per cent of the value of Mexican 
exports to the U.S. market.84 While in some countries origin certification is free of charge, 
in many the costs are hardly trivial and can cost $40.85 
Producers face the added administrative complexity of fluctuations in exchange rates 
and changes in production costs.86 Besides increasing unpredictability, changes in relative 
prices complicate the verification of origin by customs, and may give rise to subjective 
administrative discretion on the part of the importing country customs. 
In theoretical terms, compliance with rules of origin in the U.S.-Arab countries FTAs 
could prove as complex and expensive process for the parties involved (producers and 
exporters). For small firms in Arab countries, the FTAs seem to be out of reach, due to 
administrative costs among other things, and thus they opt out of enjoying the FTAs 
preferential treatment. Rules of origin make it difficult or even impossible for otherwise 
82
 See United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, supra note 16, Annex 2.2, Article 12; United 
States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, 5.12; United States-Bahrain Free Trade 
Agreement, supra note 25, Article 4.12 and United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement, supra note 
25, Article 4.12. 
83
 This is a natural feature of papers dealing with rules of origin. Indeed, the paucity of empirical 
studies may reflect methodological difficulties as well as inadequate recognition of the potential 
importance of rules of origin. If tariffs are used, the impact of rules of origin is relatively straightforward 
to measure: it could be calculated as the proportion of imports that in principle satisfy the rule but 
which pay the duty. The problem is to determine which exports satisfy the rule, something that will 
generally be difficult for a researcher to determine. If quotas are used rather than tariffs it is even 
more difficult to measure the effect of origin rules. See Hoekman, В.: Rules of Origin for Goods and 
Services. Journal of World Trade, 27 (1993) 4, 81, 86. 
84
 See Cadot, O.-Estevadeordal, A.-Suwa-Eisenmann, A.-Verdier, Th. (eds): The Origin of 
Goods: Rules of Origin in Regional Trade Agreements. London, 2006, 230-243. A study in connection 
with EC-EFTA agreement suggested that the cost of border formalities to determine the origin of 
products has amounted to at least three percent of the value of the goods. See Vermulst, supra note 
43, 158. 
85
 See Choi, W.-M.: Defragmenting Fragmented Rules of Origin of RTAs: A Building Block to 
Global Free Trade. Journal of International Economic Law, 13 (2010) 1, 111, 115. 
86
 Augier, P.-Gasiorek, M.-Lai Tong, Ch.: The Impact of Rules of Origin on Trade Flows. 
Economic Policy, 20 (2005) 43, 567, 578-594. 
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qualified parties to obtain the preferential duties under these FTAs. The technical nature of 
rules of origin and the high the costs for an exporter or producers to comply with these 
rules mean lower incentives to seek preferential treatment offered by these FTAs. 
Conclusions 
The U.S.-Arab countries FTAs include several kinds of rules of origin. These rules of origin 
relate to substantial transformation, value-added, specific rules for certain products, 
cumulation, transshipment, and packing and non-qualifying operations. The most 
challenging aspect of these rules is the "substantial transformation" test, which is based on 
U.S. common law. The rule of substantial transformation is too imprecise, too subjective 
requiring further interpretation.87 Furthermore, substantial transformation requires case-by-
case determination. Minimum differences in manufacturing processes or techniques may affect 
the treatment of products exported from Arab countries. 
The FTAs rules of origin for textiles and apparels are restrictive rules designed to 
protect the U.S. textiles industry. Not only the U.S. adopted the "four operations" and "yam-
forward" rules for most textiles and apparel products, but also the U.S. designated that 
textiles and apparels are subject to longer tariff phase-outs. 
The inclusion of other rules of origin -de minimis and advance ruling for origin-in the 
FTAs tends to balance against the objectives of predictability and flexibility. In addition, the 
favorable method to implement is the "tariff shift" rule adopted in the case of NAFTA. 
Theoretically, in the "tariff shift" rule, customs authorities of the importing country can 
look at the tariff schedule to see if non-originating materials shifted from one heading to 
another as a result of the manufacturing process.88 Even with the inclusion of other rules of 
origin, every rule or test has its own shortcomings and is subject to discretionary powers in 
implementation resulting in the fact that rules of origin can act as a trade barrier thus 
hindering trade. The selection of a "tariff shift" rule seems to be in many ways the selection 
of a lesser evil rule. 
Reform measures should be adopted to ease the complexity and costs of rules of origin 
in the FTAs. One reform measure is to liberalize rules of origin for certain products that are 
subject to very low or zero Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) tariff rates. Whether these products 
are exported from FTA party or a non-FTA party is irrelevant because these products will 
enter the U.S. at a low tariff rate. Alternatively, the U.S. and Arab countries may conduct a 
study of different industries and use the results as a basis to potentially allow deviations 
from rules of origin of the FTAs. 
U.S.-Arab countries FTAs should implement full cumulation which allows for the 
development of regional production networks and deeper integration. The roll-up principle, 
which permits materials that have acquired origin by meeting specific processing 
requirements to be considered an originating good when used as input in a subsequent 
transformation, should also be adopted to simplify rules of origin. 
Another reform measure that pertains to de minimis rules which allow for a specified 
maximum percentage of non-originating materials to be used without affecting origin. 
Currently, the de minimis rule is used for certain products. A wider use of the de minimis rule, 
87
 See Simpson, J.: Reforming Rules of Origin. Journal of Commerce, Oct. 4, 1988, 12A. 
88
 As a matter of fact, the advantage of the harmonized tariff schedule is its classification of 
goods into heading and subheading of four digits that would make it easier to certify shifting among 
headings as a result of manufacturing processes. 
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not only for specific products, will simplify rules of origin. There is also a need for a concrete 
and mutual agreement between the U.S. and Arab countries to improve and streamline 
customs procedures in order to facilitate trade. 
These reform measures seem to be workable when compared with other suggestions, 
such as lowering value-added content, creating a government-sponsored trade manuals 
published via the internet, or establishing FTA education and outreach activities to educate 
small and medium size firms about these FTAs. 
The U.S. could have adopted a more enlightened, transparent, and fairer approach 
tailored to Arab countries' specific circumstances. Simpler, least restrictive rules of origin 
accompanied with streamlined customs procedures would greatly reduce the cost of 
compliance and maximize benefits from the FTAs. Ultimately, these FTAs will promote 
trade and international competitiveness of Arab countries. 
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I. In troduct ion to the wor ld o f "legal g h o s t s " 
A c c o r d i n g to U N H C R es t ima t ions , 12 mi l l ion people 1 still c o n t i n u e to be d e n i e d the right 
to nat ional i ty , and the pe r s i s t ence o f "legal g h o s t s " is likely to b e the case e v e n o n the long 
run. T h i s p a p e r a i m s at d r a w i n g a pic ture on t h e legal s tatus o f stateless p e r s o n s , granted 
p r inc ipa l ly by publ ic in ternat ional law and par t ly , indirectly t h e l aw of the E u r o p e a n Union 
( E U ) . T h e s ign i f i cance of th is topic s tems f r o m the fact t h a t a s a c o n s e q u e n c e of the 
d i s so lu t ion of the Soviet U n i o n a n d the state success ions in Cen t ra l -Eas t e rn E u r o p e during 
the ' 90s , lots o f pe r sons h a v i n g no na t iona l i ty arr ived in t h e E U f rom the ex -Yugos lav 
coun t r i e s or f r o m the C o m m o n w e a l t h of I n d e p e n d e n t Sta tes , b o t h to the " o l d " and the 
n e w l y a c c e d e d M e m b e r S ta tes . Moreover , w i t h the 2004 e n l a r g e m e n t , c o u n t r i e s having 
cons ide rab l e n u m b e r of s ta te less persons r e s i d i n g on their t e r r i to ry (e.g. B a l t i c States) 
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 UNHCR: 2009 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaces and 
Stateless Persons. Division of Programme Support and Management, 15 June 2010, 2. (available: 
http://www.unhcr.org/4cl If0be9.html). By the end of 2009, UNHCR had identified some 6.6 million 
stateless persons in 60 countries. However, the UNHCR estimated that the overall number of stateless 
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million people. According to estimations of the Open Society Institute, being recently involved in the 
issue of statelessness, this number is even higher, around 15 million (http://www.soros.org/indepth/ 
stateless/where it_happens.html). 
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became Member States of the Union. Europe is one of the regions being highly affected by 
this phenomenon, since around 640 thousand stateless individuals live on the old 
continent.2 
II. Responses of the international community to tackle statelessness 
In public international law, after the creation of the United Nations (1945), two parallel 
approaches have been formulated to tackle this negative phenomenon. The first focuses on 
identifying the magnitude of the problem; preventing statelessness pro future and reducing 
the existing number of stateless persons as much as possible. This attempt is marked 
principally by the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness^ on the universal 
level; and with some other not so comprehensive treaties on the regional (European) level.4 
This specific legal framework is embedded in the general human rights law and completed 
by provisions relating to the right to nationality.5 
Nevertheless, despite all these efforts, it is a matter of fact that the number of stateless 
persons will never reach zero. Therefore a new, autonomous legal status has been created 
by virtue of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons,6 aiming at 
providing an appropriate standard of international protection, a status comparable to other 
forms of international protection such as refugee status. In today's international law, it is 
still the 1954 New York Convention alone, almost sixty years later, under which stateless 
people enjoy specific international legal protection, containing the basic rules and rights 
determining their legal status. 
III. Scope and content of the 1954 New York Convention: 
an overview 
As for its scope ratione personne, the 1954 New York Convention applies to non-refugee 
stateless persons (the stateless refugees being covered by the 1951 Geneva Convention 
2
 "No one should have to be stateless in todays Europe"-Viewpoint of 9 June 2008 of the 
Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (available: http://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/ 
viewpoints/080609_EN.asp). 
3
 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness of 30 August 1961 (UNTS No. 14458, vol. 989, 
175.), entered into force on 13 Dec. 1975. 
4
 See, in chronological order, the CIEC Convention No. 13 to reduce the number of cases of 
statelessness (signed in Bern, 13 September 1973); then two Council of Europe instruments: the 1997 
European Convention on Nationality (CETS No. 166), Chapter VI. and the 2006 Council of Europe 
Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in relation to State Succession (ETS No. 200). 
5
 See the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 15—right to a nationality;-the 
1965 Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (Article 5-non-discrimination; right to 
a nationality); the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 24-right to 
acquire nationality); the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination aga ins t 
Women (Article 9-non-discrimination, re-acquisition, change, retention of nationality, nationality of 
children); the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (Articles 7 and 8-birth registration, right to 
acquire nationality, avoidance of statelessness); or the regional human rights treaties such as the 1969 
American Convention on Human Rights or the 1990 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child etc. 
6
 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons of 28 September 1954 (U.N.T.S. No. 
5158, Vol. 360. p. 117.), entered into force 6 June 1960. 
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relating to the Status of Refugees7) and its definition strictly covers the so-called de iure 
stateless persons.8 The International Law Commission (ILC) has observed that the definition 
in Article 1(1) is now part of customary international law.9 It should be noted however, that 
not all stateless persons falling under the definition of Article 1(1) are entitled to benefit 
from this protection regime. According to the exclusion clause, the Convention shall not 
apply to a) persons receiving from UN agencies other than the UNHCR (e.g. UNRWA) 
protection or assistance so long as they are receiving it; b) persons recognized by the 
competent authorities of the country of residence as having the rights and obligations which 
are attached to the possession of the nationality of that country; and c) persons having 
committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity or a serious 
non-political crime outside the country of their residence prior to their admission to that 
country or having been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN.10 
The set of rights provided for in the Convention is similar to those in the 1951 Geneva 
Convention. Some 30 provisions of the Convention set out a minimum standard of treatment 
for the stateless, without discrimination, beyond which States are free to extend additional 
protection and rights to them." Three different levels of protection are established: first, 
treatment at least as favourable as that accorded to aliens generally, secondly, treatment on 
a par with nationals; thirdly, the absolute rights which are not contingent upon the treatment 
of any other group, but guaranteed directly.12 The main absolute rights are identity papers 
(if the person does not possess a valid travel document) (Article 27); travel documents 
(Article 28); access to courts (Article 16); naturalization (Article 32). The stateless persons 
shall enjoy the same protection as is accorded to nationals of the country of residence with 
respect to elementary education [Article 22(1)], public relief and assistance (Article 23), 
social security [Article 24(1)] or duties, charges or taxes [Article 29(1)] etc. The rights in 
respect to which the treatment at least as favourable as accorded to aliens generally apply 
are, inter alia, acquisition of movable and immovable property (Article 13), right of 
association (Article 15), right to engage in wage-earning employment [Article 17(1)], right 
to self-employment (Article 18); right to housing (Article 21) or the right to choose the 
place of residence and to move freely within the country (Article 26).13 It is to be underlined 
that since there is no persecution (risk of persecution) in case of statelessness, no similar 
protection against refoulement like in the 1951 Geneva Convention is provided for stateless 
persons. However, the 1954 New York Convention sets forth in Article 31 that the 
Contracting States shall not expel a stateless person lawfully in their territory save on 
7
 Convention relating to he Status of Refugees of 28 June 1951 (U.N.T.S. vol. 189, 137), entered 
into force: 22 April 1954, Article 1A(2). 
8
 Article 1(1): "For the purpose of this Convention, the term 'stateless person' means a person 
who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law." 
9
 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with commentaries. In: Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission. 2006, Vol. 11, Part Two, 49. 
10
 Article 1(2). 
11
 Article 5. 
12
 See also: Van Waas, F.: Nationality Matters: Statelessness under International Law. 
Antwerpen, 2008, 230-231. 
13
 For a comprehensive analysis of protecting civil, political, economic, cultural and social 
rights of stateless persons under the 1954 New York Convention and general human rights law, see: 
Van Waas: op. cit., Chapters 1X-XI. 
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grounds of national security or public order, and such an expulsion shall be only in 
pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with due process of law.14 
The international protection regime of stateless persons cannot be compared with 
international refugee law where apart the 1951 Refugee Convention, the UNHCR ExCom 
and other judicial and non-judicial bodies developed and detailed the conventional rules, 
interpreted on several occasion the meaning of different concepts such as the non-
refoulement etc. International refugee law has been constantly evolving since its creation, 
while the only one international instrument on the protection of the stateless is the 1954 
New York Convention; and we cannot witness such a rich documentation, soft law and 
jurisprudence in this field either. Another weakness of the system is that the 1954 New York 
Convention is, by substance, not a self-executing treaty, States have to adopt domestic 
implementing legislation to make it effective. Moreover, the Convention does not contain 
provisions on the statelessness determination procedure cither (it is up to the individual 
States to establish such legal channels), which gap makes claiming those rights more 
difficult if one cannot officially obtain that status. To sum up, statelessness law has almost 
been forgotten for long decades. 
IV. Subsequent developments of the protection regime 
1. In spite of the above, progressive developments on specific issues, rather sporadically, 
are enshrined in certain instruments. Going through these thematically, the progress made 
in the field of consular and diplomatic protection of stateless persons is worth attention. 
Our starting point is the Schedule to Article 28 of the 1954 Convention, which declares that 
the delivery of travel document "does not in any way entitle the holder to the protection of 
the diplomatic or consular authorities of the country of issue, and does not ipso facto confer 
on these authorities a right to protection."15 As a sign for a different approach, the 1967 
Council of Europe Convention on Consular Functions16 is the first to mention, since Article 
46(1) of this Convention stipulates: 
[a] consular officer of the State where a stateless person has his habitual residence, 
may protect such a person as if [the consular officer is entitled to protect the nationals 
of the sending State], provided that the person concerned is not a former national of 
the receiving State. 
This Convention, applying the same definition as introduced by the 1954 New York 
Convention [referring to the latter in Article 46(2)], makes a significant step forward and 
this rule can be considered as a progressive development of international law in this domain, 
since according to the classical standpoint of public international law, States are entitled to 
grant consular protection only to their own nationals. What makes the picture a bit shaded 
is, however, that the Convention has never entered into force due to the low number of 
14
 The ILC is now dealing with the topic of "expulsion of aliens". The new, restructured draft 
workplan, presented by the special rapporteur, Maurice Kamto in July 2009 (A/CN.4/618) would 
devote a separate draft article to the non-expulsion of stateless persons (draft article 6). 
15
 Para. 16 of the Schedule to Article 28. 
16
 European Convention on Consular Functions (ETS No. 61). 
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ratifications.17 This right is therefore not a treaty law in force, but still shows the tendencies 
of legal developments. 
One had to wait a couple of decades until the issue of protecting stateless persons 
abroad has been put again on the international law-making agenda, this time on the universal 
level (within the UN system). The ILC included the topic of diplomatic protection into its 
agenda in 199518 and adopted the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection in 2006, endorsed 
also by the UN General Assembly.19 As draft article 1 is definitional by nature it does not 
mention stateless persons. Article 3 does, however, make it clear that diplomatic protection 
may be exercised in respect of such persons.20 Draft Article 3(2) opens the door generally 
for certain categories of persons not being nationals of the State concerned,21 including 
stateless persons. This is explicitly expressed in draft Article 8 which relates to stateless 
persons and refugees. By virtue of paragraph 1 of this article, 
A State may exercise diplomatic protection in respect of a stateless person who, at the 
date of injury and at the date of the official presentation of the claim, is lawfully and 
habitually resident in that State. 
This is clearly an attempt for progressive development of international law, because 
traditionally the general rule was that a State might exercise diplomatic protection only on 
behalf of its nationals. This is well illustrated in the Dickson Car Wheel Company v. United 
Mexican States case ( 1931 ) when the United States -Mexican Claims Commission held that 
a stateless person could not be the beneficiary of diplomatic protection: "[a] State ... does 
not commit an international delinquency in inflicting an injury upon an individual lacking 
nationality, and consequently, no State is empowered to intervene or complain on his behalf 
either before or after the injury".22 As the ILC found, this dictum no longer reflects the 
accurate position of international law for stateless persons. Contemporary international law 
reflects a concern for the status of this category of persons, evidenced by specific conventions 
on statelessness.23 In line with these efforts, according to draft article 8(1), a State may 
exercise diplomatic protection in respect of a stateless person, regardless of how he/she 
became stateless, provided that the person was lawfully and habitually resident in that State 
both at the time of injury and at the date of the official presentation of the claim. The 
requirement of both lawful residence and habitual residence sets a high threshold, notions 
17
 As of 10 July, 4 States have ratified it and an additional 5 States have signed it without 
ratifying yet (source: http://conventions.coe.int). 
18
 First, a Working Group was created dealing with this topic in 1995. Then, in 1998 after two 
reports of the Working Group, a special rapporteur was designated who prepared several; interim 
reports on the subject. Finally, The Commission subsequently adopted the draft articles on Diplomatic 
Protection on second reading as well as decided to recommend to the General Assembly the elaboration 
of a convention on the basis of the draft articles. 
19
 A/RES/62/67. Diplomatic Protection (General Assembly of the United Nations). 
20
 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with commentaries (2006), 26. 
21
 Draft Article 3(2) reads: "Notwithstanding paragraph 1, diplomatic protection may be 
exercised by a State in respect of a person that is not its national in accordance with draft article 8." 
22
 UNRIAA, vol. IV, 669 at 678. See also Weis, P.: Nationality and Statelessness in International 
Law. Alphen aan den Rijn-Germantown (Md.), 1979, 2nd ed., 162. and Draft Articles on Diplomatic 
Protection with commentaries. 2006, 48. 
23
 Ibid. 48. 
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borrowed from the 1997 European Convention on Nationality24 Habitual residence in this 
context is intended to convey continuous residence. Although this threshold is high and may 
lead to a lack of effective protection for some individuals, the combination of lawful residence 
and habitual residence is, as pointed out by the ILC in the Commentaries, justified in the case 
of an exceptional measure introduced de lege ferenda,15, since States are more likely to accept 
such a new rule if enlarging the scope ratione personae of diplomatic protection is not without 
limitations and conditions. I also draw attention to the temporal requirement for the bringing 
of a claim: the stateless person must be a lawful and habitual resident of the claimant State 
both at the time of the injury and at the date of the official presentation of the claim, even if 
quite a long time has already elapsed between the two acts. Finally, it is to be noted that the 
"may clause" contained in draft Article 8( 1 ) emphasizes the discretionary nature of the right. 
In other words, it is not an obligation of States, but an option to include legally and habitually 
residing stateless individuals into the sphere of diplomatic protection, but States have 
discretion whether to extend such protection to a stateless person. 
By concluding, it can be stated that consular protection and diplomatic protection 
operate as additional elements of their protection in abroad, even if these rules have not 
become legally binding yet, but clearly indicate the developments and the will of the 
international community to move forward. 
2. As for other domains or set of rights having been extended to de iure stateless human 
beings by international treaties, the page is blank except intellectual property rights. From a 
human rights perspective, the right to intellectual property forms an element of a cluster of 
rights broadly referred to as "cultural rights". For the stateless, a cultural identity distinct 
from that of the majority of the population is often a contributing factor to their plight; 
similarly difficulties enjoying that distinct cultural life are not uncommon.26 
In 1971, Protocol No. 1 was annexed to the Universal Copyright Convention as revised 
at Paris on 24 July 1971,21 which assimilated stateless persons having habitual residence in 
a State Party to the nationals of that State (paragraph 1). By doing so, this Protocol builds 
upon the provisions of the 1954 New York Convention. Article 14 of the latter sets forth the 
rights concerning artistic rights (which is a synonym for copyright) and industrial property, 
stating that stateless persons shall be accorded in the country in which they have the habitual 
residence the same protection as it accorded to nationals of that country. However, they also 
enjoy protection in any other Contracting Party: they shall be accorded the same protection 
as provided for the nationals of their country of habitual residence in the territory of that 
Contracting Party. It can be seen that Protocol No. 1 determines the same level of protection 
(stateless persons are on equal footing with nationals) and the same condition for benefiting 
from this right (habitual residence in a Contracting Party). The purpose of these rules is to 
provide protection of the "totality of creations of the human mind".28 Although the 1954 
24
 Article 6(4), point (g), where they are used in connection with the acquisition of nationality. 
25
 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with commentaries. 2006. 49. 
26
 Van Waas, op. cit. 346-347. 
27
 Protocol 1 annexed for Universal Copyright Convention as revised at Paris on 24 July 1971 
concerning the application of that Convention to works of Stateless persons and refugees 1971 (UNTS 
No. 13444), entered into force on 24 July 1974. 
28
 Robinson, N.: Convention relating to the status of stateless persons-Its history and 
interpretation. New York, 1955 (reprinted by UNHCR, Geneva in 1997), 55,—in relation to Article 14 
of the 1954 New York Convention. 
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New York Convention does not specify the type of protection and it can thus be assumed 
that all aspects of protection arc covered, the Universal Copyright Convention as revised at 
Paris on 24 June 1971 lays down specific rules in this regard. Even if the scope ratione 
materiae of the two provisions are roughly the same, the two treaties have significantly 
different number of State Parties. While Protocol No. 1 has only 38, the 1954 New York 
Convention has 67 State Parties as of now. Moreover, the geographical coverage is different 
as well, since despite the lower number of ratifications, Protocol No. 1 also applies to India, 
the Russian Federation, or the United States not becoming parties to the 1954 New York 
Convention. 
3. Finally, two treaties on the equal treatment of nationals and non-nationals in social 
security matters develop the related provisions of the 1954 New York Convention. The 
treaty with universal vocation (unfortunately not widely ratified)29 was elaborated by the 
ILO in 1962 (Convention No. 118 concerning Equality of Treatment of Nationals and Non-
Nationals in Social Security30). The Convention refers to the 1954 New York Convention 
definition of "stateless person"31 and applies to them "without any condition of reciprocity"32 
and without the requirement of residence. It prescribes equal treatment between nationals 
and stateless persons in different branches of social security (medical care; sickness benefit; 
maternity benefit; invalidity benefit; old-age benefit; survivors' benefit; employment injury 
benefit; unemployment benefit; and family benefit). However, the scope of the obligations 
varies from State to State, since "each Member shall specify in its ratification in respect of 
which branch or branches of social security it accepts the obligations of this Convention".33 
As a similar regional international instrument, the 1972 European Convention on 
Social Security34 is worth mentioning shortly. After the European Interim Agreements on 
Social Security done in 1953 under the aegis of the Council of Europe (CoE), the CoE 
Member States left open the possibility of extending the Agreements to give non-nationals 
and migrants more complete and effective protection. Thus in 1959, it was decided to draft 
a multilateral convention to co-ordinate the social security legislations of the CoE member 
States.35 The Convention, using the 1954 New York Convention definition of „stateless 
person", covers stateless persons resident in the territory of a Contracting Party36 who have 
been subject to the legislation of the Contracting Parties, together with the members of their 
families and their survivors. It affirms the principle of equality of treatment with nationals 
in the fields of application of the Convention, such as general and special schemes, whether 
contributory or non-contributory, including employers' liability schemes providing benefits. 
This instrument can be considered as building upon, between a limited number of States in 
29
 As of 10 July 2010, it has only 36 State parties (the Netherlands denounced it in 2004). 
However, with important countries of concern such as Iraq or Pakistan. See: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/ 
cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?C 118. 
30
 Entered into force on 25 April 1964. 
31
 Ibid. Article 1(h). 
32
 Ibid. Article 10(1). 
33
 Ibid. Article 2(3). 
34
 1972 European Convention on Social Security (ETS 078). It is not a widely ratified 
convention, with 8 State parties as of 10 July 2010. 
35
 Explanatory Report to the 1972 European Convention on Social Security, para. 7. 
36
 Article 4. 
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Europe, on the provisions relating to social security of the 1954 New York Convention, 
without prejudice to the provisions of the 1962 ILO Convention.37 
V. Statelessness and EU law 
1. With the emerging corpus of acquis communautaire in field of migration and asylum, 
stateless people-even in an indirect or implicit manner-have also been treated by the 
Community legislator. Some legal texts assimilate them with third-country nationals (e.g. 
the EU-level readmission agreements), and some grant them rights under EU law similar to 
EU citizens (e.g. the EU social security legislation). As for the definition of "stateless 
person", EU law does not have a specific definition but refers to the 1954 Convention.38 
The EU thus does not alter the substance of this definition (covering de iure stateless 
persons), the relevant EU legislation, as a main rule, simply reflects international obligations 
already undertaken. As a consequence, this paper will not deal with stateless refugees under 
EU law, because this category is not covered by the 1954 New York Convention, but falls 
under the protection regime of the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees. In line with the international refugee law obligations, the EU asylum acquis39  
covers stateless refugees, too, but this is a distinct group of people, with different need of 
international protection as well as with different legal regime applicable to them. 
2. In course of time, the EC law has, in a hidden way, enriched the rights enjoyed by 
stateless persons residing in the territory of the Member States. In the '70s, Community 
rules have already been applicable to them by virtue of Regulation (EC) No. I408/7140 
granting them social benefits. The Regulation lays down equal treatment for stateless 
persons and nationals of the Member States in different matters of social security, such as 
sickness and maternity benefits; invalidity benefits, including those intended for the 
maintenance or improvement of earning capacity; old-age benefits; benefits in respect of 
accidents at work and occupational diseases; unemployment benefits etc. This Regulation 
can be conceived as implementing Article 24(1 )-(3) of the 1954 New York Convention on 
the Community level. It was replaced by Regulation (EC) No. 833/20044] which, with 
almost identical content, is now the legislation in force in this domain. 
37
 Article 6(1). 
38
 See e.g. Article 1, point (e) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1408/71 and Article 1(h) of the 
new Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004 replacing the former since 1 May 2010. 
39
 Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application 
lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national; Council Regulation No. 2725/2000 of 
11 December 2000 concerning the establishment of "Eurodac" for the comparison of fingerprints for 
the effective application of the Dublin Convention; Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 
laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers; Council Directive 2004/83/EC 
of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third-country nationals and 
stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content 
of the protection granted; and Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum 
standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status. 
40
 Regulation No. 1408/71/EC of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social 
security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community [OJ L 149, 
5.7.1971, 2-50.]. 
41
 OJ L 166, 30.4.2004, 1-123. 
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Some jurisprudence has also been developed concerning the intra-Community status 
of the stateless in this respect. In the Khalil and others case42 the plaintiffs were Palestinians 
from Lebanon who, in flight from the civil war in the Lebanon, had arrived in Germany in 
the middle of the '80s where they have since lived continuously. Under German law, they 
were regarded as stateless persons. Since those persons had the grant of child benefit 
discontinued under new German legislation during the period from December 1993 to 
March 1994, they submitted in support of their actions challenging the decisions depriving 
them of those advantages that they and/or their spouses had to be regarded as stateless 
persons. Consequently they should enjoy family benefits in accordance with Community 
law, which would enable them to be treated in the same way as German nationals or other 
nationals of the EU Member States. According to them, payment of those benefits should 
not have been made conditional on possession of a specific residence document. 
The ECJ pointed out in its judgment in 2001 that, in 1957, the original six Member 
States were all contracting parties to the 1954 New York Convention. The Court also found 
that the Council cannot be criticized for having included stateless persons resident on the 
territory of the Member States, even though those persons do not enjoy the right of freedom 
of movement according to the EC Treaty, within the scope of the Community regulation on 
social security for migrant workers and their families. The Council did so in order to take 
into account the international obligations of all the Member States. The inclusion of this 
category into the Regulation simply reflected international obligations already undertaken 
(both at the level of the United Nations and within the Council of Europe43). Furthermore, 
coordination excluding stateless persons ... would have meant that the Member States, 
in order to ensure compliance with their international obligations, had to establish 
a second coordination regime designed solely for that very restricted category of 
persons 44 
As a result of those international obligations, national law already assimilated stateless 
persons to nationals for social security purposes, whereas the treatment of foreign nationals 
depended upon reciprocity or bilateral as well as multilateral arrangements. As the Advocate 
General argued, in Europe of the 1950s, 
grappling with the aftermath of the Second World War, it was undoubtedly felt that it 
would be politically and morally unacceptable for one of the very first regulations 
adopted by the fledgling European Economic Community to exclude a category of 
persons who had been expressly included in and protected by the earlier agreements 
and conventions binding on the original Member States.45 
Another question was to decide whether stateless persons may rely on the rights 
conferred by the Community regulation where they have travelled to that Member State 
directly from a third-country and have not moved within the Community. The Court held 
42
 Joined Cases C-95/99 to C-98/99 and C-180/99 Mervet Khalil. Issa Chaaban and Hassan 
Osseili V Bundesanstalt für Arbeit et al. ECR [2001] 1-07413. 
43
 See the 1972 European Convention on Social Security (CETS No.: 078). 
44
 Khalil and others: para. 57. 
45
 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 30 November 2000, Joined Cases C-95/99 
to C-98/99 and C-180/99 Mervet Khalil, Issa Chaahan and Hassan Osseili v Bundesanstalt jiir Arbeit 
et al.: para. 39. 
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that the objective of Community law in respect of migrant workers is coordinating the social 
security schemes of the Member States and payment of benefits under those coordinated 
schemes. Regulation No. 1408/71/EC lays down a whole set of rules founded upon the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality or residence and upon the 
maintenance by a worker of his rights acquired by virtue of one or more social security 
schemes which are or have been applicable to him. The Court referred to its earlier case-
law according to which those rules do not apply to situations which have no factor linking 
them to Community law. The advantages derived from the status of migrant worker within 
the European Union cannot be granted to stateless persons residing in a Member State 
where they are in a situation which is confined in all respects within that one Member 
State?6 In other words, the "external element" (élément d'extranéité) required for EU 
citizens to benefit from the rights granted by Community law is also a precondition for 
stateless persons: without moving form a Member State to another, they are in a purely 
internal situation where EC law does not come into play. 
3. In the middle of the first decade after the new millennium, facilitation was made in 
favor of stateless persons concerning their right to travel within the European Union. The 
reason behind was that the EU enlargement with ten new Member States on 1 May 2004 
had the paradoxical effect of reducing the scope of the possibility of granting a visa 
exemption, since Regulation No. 539/2001/EC47 did not provide for a visa exemption for 
stateless persons residing in a Member State that does not yet fully apply the Schengen 
acquis, who have to cross an external Schengen border when entering into the Schengen 
zone or other non-Schengen Member State. To remedy this situation,48 Regulation No. 
1932/2006/EC included a new type of automatic visa exemption for stateless persons 
recognized by the EU Member States. Article 1(1), point b) of the Regulation says as 
follows: "stateless persons and other persons who do not hold the nationality of any country 
who reside in a Member State and are holders of a travel document issued by that Member 
State" shall be exempt from the visa requirement. This means that stateless residing in a 
Member State in possession of a travel document (not necessarily that prescribed in the 
Schedule annexed to the 1954 New York Convention) are not required to have visa in order 
to enter into other Member States and reside in their territory up to three months after the 
first entry within any six-month period (short-term stay). Beside this automatic (compulsory) 
visa exemption category, the Regulation goes even farther when giving the discretion to 
Member States to exempt those stateless persons from the visa requirement who reside in a 
third country listed in Annex II ("the white list") of Regulation No. 539/201/EC having 
issued their travel document. So does Hungary with regard to stateless persons residing in 
any Annex II (visa-free) third-countries.49 
46
 Khalil and others: paras 65-72. 
47
 Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose 
nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals 
are exempt from that requirement [OJ L 81, 21.3.2001, 1-7.]. 
48
 The European Commission has been expressly asked to do so by Parliament and the Council 
in the course of the negotiations on the proposal of the Schengen Borders Code (Regulation No. 
562/2006/EC). This exemption was mainly aimed at resolving the situation of "Latvian non-citizens" 
[see: COM 2006(4) final, 5.]. 
49
 Government Decree No. 114/2007. (V.24.), Article 4, point (a). 
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It is an innovative element in these rules on visa-free travel that they cover all stateless 
persons, both those under the 1954 New York Convention and those outside of the scope of 
that Convention.50 For example, non-citizens of Latvia are given a special passport (not the 
one according to the 1954 New York Convention) which not only grants them the 
constitutional right to belong to the State, but it has also been recognised by the EU as valid 
for visa-free travel.51 This is thus the first time in EU legislation where a larger personal 
scope (including eventually the de facto stateless as well) applies than that defined in the 
1954 New York Convention. 
4. Nevertheless, despite all these developments, provisions of European Union law 
only lay down sporadic rides; a well-developed European system as in case of refugees 
(beneficiaries of subsidiary protection) does not exist with regard to stateless persons. The 
Community legislator should put more emphasis on their legal protection. Just to mention 
an example: the majority of the Member States do not have specific procedures governing 
the recognition of stateless status (exceptions are Spain or Hungary), which shortage was 
highlighted by UNHCR as well.52 As a result, it is impossible to determine the magnitude of 
this problem within the EU. Knowing the fact the 1954 Convention does not provide a 
comprehensive regulation (old treaty-new challenges, lack of detailed rules, no procedural 
rules), the EU should make steps with a view to strengthening the status of these "legal 
ghosts". 
The most progressive EU institution in this regard, the European Parliament has 
already started raising awareness and putting this issue on the higher political agenda. In the 
summer of 2007, it organised a seminar on issues relating to statelessness,53 then in 2009, 
the EP passed a non-legislative resolution on the situation of fundamental rights in the EU 
(2004-2008),54 which devoted a paragraph for the stateless as well. These recommendations 
call on the Member States concerned "to ratify the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons (1954), and on the reduction of statelessness (1961)" as well as call on 
"those Member States which gained or regained sovereignty in the 1990s to treat all persons 
previously resident in their territory without any discrimination, and [call] on them to 
systematically bring about just solutions, based on the recommendations of international 
organisations, to the problems encountered by all victims of discriminatory practices"; and 
finally "condemns, in particular, practices of deliberate erasure of registered permanent 
50
 Regulation No. 1932/2006/EC amending Regulation (EC) No. 539/2001/EC listing the third 
countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those 
whose nationals are exempt from that requirement [OJ L 405, 30.12.2006, 23-34.]. 
51
 Bauböck, R.-Perchinig, B.-Sievers, W. (eds): Citizenship Policies in the New Europe: 
Expanded and Updated Edition. Amsterdam, 2009, 73. 
52
 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons: Implementation within the European Union Member States and Recommendations for 
Harmonisation, October 2003 (available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/415c3cfb4.html), 4, 
6, 12, 19. 
53
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residents within the European Union and [call] on the governments concerned to take 
effective measures to restore the status of those stateless persons".55 
These recommendations arc, however, not urging the setting up of the EU-level 
framework for the protection of stateless people, but highlight the importance of undertaking 
the relevant international obligations by all Member States.56 It is not surprising, since there 
was no legal basis in the founding Treaties, even after the Treaty of Amsterdam, for adopting 
such specific secondary legislation, exclusively focusing on the protection of the stateless. 
The existing rules protect stateless in an indirect way, where the legal basis is linked to a 
fundamental freedom (freedom of movement of workers; their social security) or other EC 
policy (entry and stay of third country nationals). As a consequence, this category of people 
has been covered as a result of side effects of the legislation. 
Nonetheless, the Treaty of Lisbon opened a new era, since it explicitly refers, for the 
first time in the primary law, to stateless persons, which can be a basis for further 
developments. Article 67(2) TFEU stipulates that "[f]or the purpose o f . . . Title [V], stateless 
persons shall be treated as third-country nationals". It is promising that generally speaking 
they are on equal footing with the third-country nationals in the area of justice, freedom and 
security, and this will surely be reflected in the personal scope of the new secondary EU 
legislation adopted under the provisions of Title V. We will see in the future how far the 
Union legislator will go on the basis of this treaty provision in order to provide an area of 
justice, freedom and security for this hardly visible group of human beings. 
55
 Ibid. para. 50. 
56
 As of 1 July 2010, 21 EU Member States are parties to the 1954 New York Convention and 
only 14 of them have ratified the 1961 Convention on the Reduction on Statelessness. 
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Introduction 
Consumer protection is really an emphatic policy issued by the European Union. The latest 
principal achievement in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union is the 
policy of consumer protection, stating that "Union policies shall ensure a high level of 
consumer protection ",1 which stresses again the intention of a higher protection. It is logical 
and plausible, because an efficient internal market needs common consumer policy, hence 
the development of consumer protection law in the European Union since the beginning of 
the seventies. 
Several rules, among others, of the Hungarian contract and tort law were changed 
under those EC directives, which had focused on the interest of consumers. New contract 
forms were established, for instance "door to door sale", "distance selling", "time-sharing", 
and thus traditional types have changed. We can detect basic changes in the field of liability, 
for instance in product liability, the EC legislation has changed the negligence base for 
these cases, and constituted a new strict liability form. I wish to highlight the system of 
strict liability for defective products, and draw attention to the practical problems and 
criticism of the regulation through a few cases and studies. Last but not least, I will 
summarize the predictable changes in the new Civil Code of Hungary. Can the law be the 
watchdog of people, who are not able to protect themselves against consumerism? It is still 
a vital question of this theme. Some studies (especially the thoughts of private lawyers) 
highlight the side-effects of this protection. The main problem is the artificial balance 
between the consumer and the seller or producer. The law is unable to make the consumer 
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smarter, it can only change the rules, within those the purchasers can enforce their rights. 
Why should a typical private law relation be modified with public law instruments? Is this 
the way of the future, or education, prevention? The EU wished to harmonise the national 
rules by setting minimum standards, yet why is it still disputed? One reason is the fact, that 
the model of the regulation is essentially based on the economical and legal traditions of 
welfare states. These rules can be barely implemented by the countries of Eastern Europe, 
but it does not change the fact that the consumer society is not sufficiently developed at the 
time of the implementation. It raises further but very significant questions, for instance: 
who is actually the ideal type of consumer, who is to be protected? The American type of 
consumer, a real Européer, the "reasonable man" or a Hungarian pensioner? We should 
avoid characterizing them as silly, reckless people, who cannot protect themselves, instead 
of developing a positive, self-conscious civilian ideal. 
The evolution of the strict liability concept 
In this study I try to embrace the main statements and critical opinions concerning product 
liability. First of all I want to discuss some aspects of the historical background, and the 
evaluation of this liability form. The so-called product liability (in other words: strict 
liability for defective products) has been adopted into the EU law with the Product Liability 
Directive 85/374/EEC. Before this directive none of the member states had special rules 
regarding the liability of the producer, only court decisions, which had established a higher 
protection and liability level (a specialized duty of care).2 Let me illustrate it with an early 
case from the United Kingdom. 
Before the regulation in the United States or Europe began, there was a case in the 
United Kingdom, which was actually a forerunner of the present product liability form.3 
This was the decision in the case Donoghue vs. Stephenson in 1932.4 In 1928 Donoghue 
and her friend took their seats in a cafe in Paisley. They ate ice cream, and the friend of 
Donoghue ordered a ginger beer. It was claimed that the remains of a snail in a state of 
decomposition dropped out of the bottle. After this incident Donoghue became ill, suffered 
from shock and complained of stomach pain and several other symptoms. She brought an 
action against the manufacturer, named Stephenson, and claimed 500 pounds as damages 
(which she was awarded). The dispute between Donoghue and Stevenson was eventually 
decided by the court in Donoghue's favour. "But in fact, the importance of the case went 
far beyond the correction of this wrong; it changed the distribution of wealth in society in a 
significant way by deciding that in future, manufacturers would have to bear costs associated 
with the manufacturing process which, on the assumption we have made, were previously 
borne by consumers") This highlights some economical aspects of this topic, which I 
explain in details later. 
One of the curiosities of this case was that the jury subsumed the "duty of care" 
doctrine without any contractual relationship between the two parties. Because Donohue 
was not the person, who ordered the ginger beer and neither did she pay for it. This concept 
existed before this case, but it was generally held that a "duty of care" was only owed in 
2
 Benacchio, G.: Az Európai Közösség Magánjoga (Private Law of the European Community). 
Budapest, 2003, 289, 241, 242. 
3
 It should be noted that the decision was based on the general Rile of negligence. 
4
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5
 Cane, P.: The Anatomy of Tort Law. Oxford, 1997, 18. 
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very specific circumstances, for instance where a manufacturer made dangerous products 
(the ginger beer was obviously not such a product) or was acted fraudulently. Thus the jury 
set aside the usual conditions, and developed the common law therefore. Consumers in the 
position of Donoghue could not recover damages from manufacturers in the position of 
Stevenson, while after the decision they could, thus it becomes clear that one result of the 
case was to alter the distribution of resources in society by giving consumers a right of 
action against manufacturers which they did not have before.6 It can be considered to be a 
revolutive change, because outsiders, such as the recipient of goods as a gift, or the user of 
goods, who was not also the purchaser, had no remedy in contract until the changes 
introduced by the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. This Act, in certain 
circumstances, allows third parties to enforce or rely on contractual provisions.7 
Product liability is a strict liability form for defective provision. In Hungary, there was 
a controversial issue by jurisprudence and praxis identifying the substance of product 
liability. Is it a contractual relationship between the two parties, or a delictual one? It had 
been determined as a delictual relation, and established a special liability form in a special 
Act X of 1993, which implemented the formerly referred EEC Directive.8 The new 
Hungarian Civil Code will probably contain this liability form, in the chapter of torts.9 
Otherwise the former judicial practice usually emphasizes the delictual character of 
product liability. We can detect it in few court decisions, for example: it shall be owed the 
general duty of care standard, if the person or entity, who causes the damage, is a producer 
of a good, and the defect of this product is the cause of the damage. Notwithstanding the 
lack of a contractual relationship between the consumer and the producer, or rather the 
claimant can bring an action against third parties because of breaching the contract. The 
reference to the lock of relevant legal relation between the parties is incorrect, as the 
causation creates this relation itself (ergo the obligation between the consumer and the 
producer).10 So the jury could determine stricter standard through subsuming the general 
rule of delictual liability: "A person who causes damage to another person in violation of 
the law shall be liable for such damage. He shall be relieved of liability if he is able to 
prove that he has acted in a manner that can generally be expected in the given situation." 
(Act IV of 1959, hereinafter: HCC) Therefore we can achievc the same result in different 
ways (via strict liability or subsuming the general rules. It should be noted that not all of the 
6
 Ibid. 
1
 Harpwood, В.: Principles of Tort Law. London, 2000, 329. 
8
 Before 1993 in the Hungarian law it has not been decided that this kind of damages could be 
recovered under the Section 310 (on contractual base) or 339 (on delictual base) of the Hungarian 
Civil Code. The Hungarian courts usually based their decisions on delictual rules, for example, BH 
1984/208. In Germany, the firstly preferred contractual or semi-contractual theories were considered 
and rejected by the Supreme Court in its decision of 1968. (See more: Markesinis, B. S.-Unberath, 
H.: The German Law of Torts. A Comparative Treatise. Oxford, 2002, 94-99; and "Liability for 
defective products is an area where contract and tort meet and overlap" see Samuel, G.: Tort: Cases 
and Materials. London, 2008, 183.) 
9
 The former Act on the new HCC (Act CXX. of 2009) had not come into force on schedule 
(1 May 2010) according to the decision of the Hungarian Consitutional Court. Let me conclude the 
taxonomical emplacement of this former Code, as to suspect the incorporation product liability and 
the further category of this institution. 
10
 BH 1986/12/501. 
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states adopted the delictual concept. For instance, in France and USA the product liability 
was emplaccd in the field of the contractual liability. 
Deficient performance 
Firstly, we should deal with the nature of deficient performance, because product liability is 
based on it. Deficient performance is, in short, the non-conformity of goods with the 
contract, which occurs if the parties owe mutual services to one another and the goods or 
provisions do not, at the time of performance, correspond to the characteristics stipulated by 
law or by the contract. For example, contract specifications can be sumptuous as well (for 
instance special colour or feature of the goods). The consumer needs to prove that the fault 
existed at the time of performance. However, the Directive 99/44 EC has changed this rule 
by means of a presumption, which 1 will review below. Thus who has to prove the time, 
when the goods became faulty? A rebuttable presumption of non-conformity was established 
for the first six months after the time of the performance. It is a form of strict liability (to be 
more exact: a duty), thus the obliged party cannot exculpate himself. However, the 
conformity can be proved, therefore the presumption can be rebutted, and the duty won't 
exist at all. 
The obligee shall be entitled to request repair or replacement of the good according to 
his or her choice. Unless the choice is impossible or its accomplishment causes 
disproportional costs. If the obligor is unable to fulfill either of the former alternatives, the 
consumer can request appropriate price reduction or can rescind the contract. Both of these 
should obviously be fulfilled free of charge. 
Furthermore, there is special three-day period for replacement in relation to goods 
designed for long term use. If the consumer bases his claim on this rule, the obligor cannot 
invoke disproportional costs. Except that the rights are the same regarding express and 
implied warranty. If the consumer signs a special consumer contract, he will be entitled to 
rescind the contract within a more favourable period without stating any reason. Last but 
not least, the consumer shall be entitled to claim damages, if damage has been caused, 
because deficient performance is a kind of breach of contract. There is a special commerce 
practice in Hungary, according to which the seller should refund the price if the contract is 
rescinded. But the Hungarian seller typically urges the consumer to purchase some other 
goods, because they do not wish to reimburse the customer. What can the consumer do? 
Basically, nothing, because it is not worth initiating a lawsuit in case of cheap goods. 
What is the difference between the general rules of deficient performance and the rules 
of product liability? "The injured person shall be required to prove the damage, the defect 
and the causal relationship between defect and damage. " " As we can see no such 
presumption exists, which can be especially problematic, because the burden of proof falls 
on the claimant and it can be difficult, especially in medical and pharmaceutical cases.12 It 
is the first occasion, where the producer can find a loophole in the law, the second is 
definitely in the rules of development risk defence, which I explore later. 
11
 Article 4 of the Directive 85/374/EEC, we can find the same in Act X of 1993 of Hungary, or 
the Consumer Protection Act (1987) of UK, or the Produkthaftungsgesetz of Germany. 
12
 See, for exmple, the case Kay vs. Ayrshire andArran Health Board (1987) cited by Woodroffe, 
G.-Lowe, R.: Consumer Law and Practice. London, 2010, 65. 
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In which circumstances is the product defective? We can find different rules in the 
relating Directive13 and the Hungarian Product Liability Act. Let us see the former first: 
A product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to 
expect, taking all circumstances into account, including: 
(a) the presentation of the product; 
(b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the product 
would be put: 
(c) the time when the product was put into circulation. 
The Hungarian Product Liability Act implemented these articles, but one extra 
condition was added to the former ones: a product is defective when it does not provide the 
safety which a person is entitled to expect, taking the state of scientific and technical 
knowledge into account. This provision is favourable to the consumer, because of the 
discussed rules of the burden of proof. Moreover the producer can refer to the state of 
scientific and technical knowledge to defend himself. 
Differences could be detected concerning the concept of the defect in the rules of 
deficient performance and product liability. As it was stated, the defect means relating to 
deficient performance (and the consequence of this: several warranty and guarantee forms), 
if the provided goods do not, at the time of performance, correspond to the characteristics 
stipulated by law or by the contract. If the character is stipulated by the law itself, the 
general rules of performance should be invoked. Briefly these are the followings in the 
HCC: if the parties have not stipulated the quality of the object defined, performance must 
be made in accordance with commercially available things of standard good quality.14 
Furthermore, services shall be suitable for their intended purpose or for use that is otherwise 
in conformity with the purpose known to the obligor at the time the contract is concluded. 
So the HCC states an average quality, if the parties do not stipulate specialized terms. Also, 
if the claimant proves the defect and therefore the breach of contract, it does not support the 
defect concerning product liability. The situation is different for instance in British law, 
where the definition of "defective goods" of the Consumer Protection Act (1987) is broadly 
similar to the definition o f ' satisfactory quality" of the Sale of Goods Act (1979). 
Immanent problems with the rules of product liability 
Turning to the scrutiny of the rules, let me outline and sum up the controversial articles 
regarding the cited liability form. J. Macleod summed up the chief problems, which arose 
in the United Kingdom and divided these into five several categories: the state-of-the-art 
issue, burden of proof, the cost of civil litigation, liability for acts of another, the international 
dimension.15 This division is fully asserted, and being applicable to describing a wider range 
of regulation, as for example the problems in other member states. Discussion of the 
problems of the last two issues is beyond the scope of this essay, because these are relating 
not immanent problems. 
13
 Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act (1987) and the same Section of the German 
Produkthaftungsgesetz broadly follows the three main categories of Directive 85/374/EEC. 
14
 See more in para. 277 of the HCC. 
15
 Macleod, J.: Consumer Sales Law. The Law Relating to Consumer Sales and Financing of 
Goods. London, 2002, 516. 
310 ÁKOS K Ö H I D I 
The relating directive creates a scheme of strict product liability for damage arising 
from defective products. The producer (or if the producer cannot be identified, each supplier 
of the product shall be treated as its producer unless he informs the injured person, within a 
reasonable time, of the identity of the producer or of the person who supplied him with the 
product) shall be liable for damage caused by a defect in his product.16 The liability of the 
supplier is consequently subsidiary (in addition joint and several), but it can be defended 
according to the Article 7 (which I review below in detail). This complex concept of the 
producer is not a satisfactory solution, if the manufacturer or the supplier will be terminated 
without a legal successor. 
The liability, as I stated earlier, is a kind of strict liability, in Hungary that is to say 
objective liability. But the obligor can defend with reference to the Article 7: 
The producer shall not be liable as a result of this Directive if he proves: 
(a) that he did not put the product into circulation; or 
(b) that, having regard to the circumstances, it is probable that the defect which caused 
the damage did not exist at the time when the product was put into circulation by him or 
that this defect came into being afterwards;17 or 
(c) that the product was neither manufactured by him for sale or any form of 
distribution for economic purpose nor manufactured or distributed by him in the course of 
his business; or 
(d) that the defect is due to compliance of the product with mandatory regulations 
issued by the public authorities', or 
(e) that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when he put the 
product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the defect to be 
discovered; or 
(f) in the case of a manufacturer of a component, that the defect is attributable to the 
design of the product in which the component has been fitted or to the instructions given by 
the manufacturer of the product. 
The reasoning of sections (a), (b) and (c) are logical and plausible. But the others are 
not so easy to justify, because these commands are not really favourable to the consumers. 
Firstly, we should explore section (e), which is in other words the development risks 
defence. The producers obviously have the pull over the consumers regarding the proving, 
because they know the construction process, the characteristics of the product. It is hard to 
imagine, that the claimant can successfully prove the contrary. (And it is not only about the 
fee of an expert.18) 
Therefore the risk of the scientific and technical development our Act in accordance 
with the regulation model of most states place upon the consumers. However, they feel it 
very much, because of their lower bearing capacity of economic sense. Non plus ultra, the 
producer can calculate the higher risk concerning the product liability with less effort, 
16
 Article 3 of Directive 85/374/EEC. 
17
 The origin of this article can be found in the case Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills of 1936, 
where the Court rejected the claim, and exlicated, that the maxim of res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable 
because the manufacturer loses control after the relase of the article upon the market and intermediaries 
handle it before it reaches the consumer. 
18
 We can face similar statements concerning the anglo-saxon praxis, where this trouble of proof 
is mentioned as the erosion of the principle res ipsa loquitur. Ср.: Harpwood: op. cit. 331. Furthermore 
the burden of proof regarding medical damages raises a lot of especially vital questions. 
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through signing an insurance contract. On the contrary, not every citizen has personal 
insurance, nor a general asset insurance (various forms of insurance can be signed, but these 
probably do not cover every sort of damage). In summary we could likely state, that 
insurance is more readily available to the manufacturer than it is to the consumer. It is not a 
wonder, that Directive 85/374/EEC, the written origin of the regulation caused serious 
argument among the representatives of consumers and sellers. The reason being was that 
we could find in the draft of the Directive published in 1976 the following: the producers 
are also liable, if the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when they put 
the product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the defect to be 
discovered. The member states made a compromise at the end, therefore the directive gives 
member states the option of excluding the development risks defence, this is permitted in 
all member states except Luxembourg, Finland and Norway. Reasons can be found, why 
most states reserve the former type of defence. If it were not adopted, it would raise the 
prices, because the development defence would be calculated as a part of the price. 
Therefore a state without this defence can preserve or increase its competitiveness.19 "The 
development risk defence was the prime reason why the EC draft Directive took nearly ten 
years to become a Directive. There was strong lobbying from United Kingdom industries 
(especially pharmaceutical industries) on the basis that without such a defence, research and 
development would be severely hampered. The other side of the argument is equally 
compelling - such a defence would leave victims of a future Thalidomide-type tragedy 
without a remedy."20 
Furthermore, there is an other debuted form of defence that the defect is due to 
compliance of the product with mandatory regulations issued by the public authorities. The 
consumer can only claim against the state itself for damages caused by legislation. 
The concept of damage is different than the generally used private law concept, this 
does not embrace every kind of damage. The damage caused by the defective21 product can 
be divided into two different categories22 
- death or by personal injuries; 
- damage to, or destruction of, any item of property other than the defective product 
itself, with a lower threshold of 500 EUR, 
provided that the item of property: is of a type ordinarily intended for private use or 
consumption, and was used by the injured person mainly for his own private use or 
consumption. 
It must be noted, that the damage should be caused to an item of property different 
from the item, which was the first link of causation (for example, the consumer is not 
19
 "Even the development risks defence was introduced into the legislation because of the self-
interest of the Conservative government which feared that British goods would not be competitive in 
Europe if price increases were required to meet the cost of insuring against liability for possible 
defects in newly developed products." See Harpwood: op. cit. 341. 
20
 Woodroffe-Lowe: op. cit. 72. 
21
 What is actually the product under the referred Act? According to it, any movable goods and 
the electricity. Albeit the graving crops and things comprised in land by virtue of being attached to it, 
and pharmaceutical products had been excluded, later these were included due to the consideration of 
the legislator. The definitions of the memberstates are really diversified (e.g. the graving crops are 
almost everywhere excluded, except Sweden and Luxembourg). 
22
 Article 9 of Directive 85/374/EEC. 
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entitled to claim for damages relating to the damage of defect of the product itself, or the 
delay of repairing or replacing).23 
Two cases around the former issue have been collected just for curiosity. In the one 
there was a component built into the car after finishing the original construction. Should the 
producer be liable for such a damage, which was caused by a fault in the original construction 
to the subsequently built in part?24 G. Woodroffe and R. Lowe give the example: "C buys a 
defective car. It crashes and injures. The car is a write-off. С can recover for his injuries but 
not for the cost of replacing the car."25 In my opinion, "C" shall be entitled to claim for 
damages to the car, just not under product liability rules, but the general rules of breaching 
the contract. 
The source of the problem is the following. If defect of the final product, which a 
component built in subsequently, caused the damage, then-although product liability cannot 
be stated concerning the component-under the theory of complexity the product liability 
form cannot be adopted relating to the damage of the final, nor the component product. 
Because it cannot be determined as damage to another item of the property. 
A contrario, would the producer be liable if the component caused a short circuit in the 
electric system of the vehicle and the damage is due to this fact? It is nearly impossible to 
answer this question. There are an infinite number of similar questions. Would the producer 
of the final product be liable, because the quality of the component should probably have 
been tested before building it in? Is it relevant, that the producer of the component 
considered the special instructions of the producer of the final product in the construction 
process? Who will be actually liable, if the damage is not caused directly through the defect 
of the component, but the way of building into the final product?26 The questions can only 
be answered case by case, not in general. The problem traces back to the concept of 
causation. It is not favourable for the consumer, because the causation - under the general 
rules of liability - shall be proved by the claimant. The dilemma exists in spite of the 
normative regulation. Para. 7(2) of Act X of 1993 or para. 1(3) of the German 
Produkthaftungsgesetz, for instance, stated in the same way, that the manufacturer of the 
component can defend himself, if he proves, that the defect is attributable to the design of 
the product in which the component has been fitted or to the instructions given by the 
manufacturer of the product.27 
Turning back to the concept of damage, the economical loss cannot be requested under 
the cited Acts. Otherwise the actual damage can only be requested, if the product is of a 
type ordinarily intended for private use or consumption. As the former the following section 
is hard to be explained too: the product shall be used by the injured person mainly for his 
own private use or consumption. The reason is, that not only the consumers can become 
claimant, the legislator tried to impound the social relations, which aimed to be used. The 
privity was not created by a consumer contract between the claimant and the defendant, 
23
 In the Anglo-Saxon praxis could these damages recovered, too, the so-called "pure economic 
loss" could be requested from the case Junior Books vs. Veitchi (1983) to the case Murphy vs. 
Brentwood DC (1990). 
24
 Ср.: Markesinis-Unberath: op. cit. 93. 
25
 Woodroffe-Lowe: op. cit. 69. 
26
 See more: Markesinis-Unberath: op. cit. 100-101. 
27
 "Die Ersatzpflicht des Herstellers eines Teilprodukts ist ferner ausgeschlossen, wenn der 
Fehler durch die Konstruktion des Produkts, in welches das Teilprodukt eingearbeitet wurde, oder 
durch die Anleitungen des Herstellers des Produkts verursacht worden ist. " [ProdHaftG para. 1(3)]. 
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therefore the inequality relation should have been considered by establishing the concept of 
the damage. It may have happened under too broad a meaning, the private person (who is 
actually a consumer in a contractual relation) cannot claim for damages to the items of the 
property, which ordinarily not intended for private use or consumption, but it was used 
mainly for his own private use or consumption. These kinds of problems can be raised, if 
objects are in the focal point of the regulation. 
Economical and critical theories 
Firstly, let me explain some dogmatic aspects of the discussed liability form. Some cases 
could be noted for curiosity, where more than one strict liability form should be applied. 
Ergo the product liability rule should be examined correlate to other strict liability forms. It 
occurred for instance, if a car were to cause damage to a third party through an inner defect. 
Strict liability rule is traditionally applicable for the damages caused by cars and other 
similar vehicles. However, the person who carries out an activity involving considerable 
hazards could not avoid the danger through having the car serviced the car, the cause would 
not certainly be beyond the realm of activity and the person could not therefore defend it. 
The liability of the producer can also be stated, thus the case of the claimant is under the 
cover of several liability forms. They caused the damage together, thus their liability is 
qualified as joint and several. Obviously, this is only theoretically noted, the claimant would 
certainly tum against the insurance company. 
This liability form is usually reviewed in scope of economy, I wish to contrast some of 
the thoughts and treatises, which arise nowadays. 
It shall be noticed, how the producer tries to handle the economic effects of the strict 
liability rule. The next citation serves as food for thought: could the goal of prevention be 
reached or not? It is worth invoking the relevant thesis of economics. 
"A manufacturer produces automobile fuel additives that demand careful control over 
quality. If quality control is maintained at a high level, the chemical mixture in the product 
is correct, and it never causes damage to automobile engines. If, however, quality control is 
relaxed and allowed to fall to a low level, some batches of the chemical mixture will be 
flawed. A few of the cars using the flawed batch will be harmed; specifically, the engine 
will throw a rod and tear itself to pieces. After a rod is thrown, an alert mechanic can detect 
the cause of the harm by examining the car 's fuel and other signs. The manufacturer 
determines that a high level of quality control costs more than the harm to some automobile 
engines caused by a low level of quality control, so the manufacturer adopts a low level of 
quality control. The owner of the damaged car sues the manufacturer and asks for punitive 
damages."28 
Some scholars argue against the rule of strict liability by asserting that consumers 
would not voluntary buy insurance at the price imposed by the tort liability system.29 
Nowadays disputes are involved by similar issues between lawyers and scholars. One of 
these was published by Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell reflecting the contributions of 
Professor Goldberg and Zipursky.30 
28
 Cooter, R.-Ulen, T.: Law and Economics. California, 2000, 288. 
29
 Ibid. 338. 
30
 Polindsky, A. M.-Shavell, S.: A Skeptical Attitude about Product Liability is Justified: 
A Reply to Professors Goldberg and Zipursky. Harvard Law Review, 8 (2010) 123, 1919-1948. 
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They analyzed empirical studies of the effect of product liability on product safety.31 In 
their article all of the empirical literature that they could locate was considered that sought 
to identify the effect of product liability on product accident rates, and they focused attention 
on studies that were concerned with specific products. These products were general aviation 
aircraft, motor vehicles, and childhood vaccines. In none of the studies did researchers find 
that increased product liability litigation resulted in a measurable decrease in accident 
rates.32 
The researchers failed to uncover a beneficial effect of product liability on product 
safety even though product liability litigation increased greatly during the periods studied 
(spanning the 1970s and 1980s). 
In support of their point that individuals receive significant compensation for product-
related accidents from insurance, they observed that most Americans have private or public 
insurance coverage for medical expenses, loss of life, disability, and property damage. In 
the referred study was noticed that about 85% of the population possesses health insurance, 
approximately 78% of families own life insurance, at least one-third of the workforce holds 
some form of disability coverage, and 96% of homeowners have property insurance. They 
also observed in the article that individuals do not obtain as much compensation through 
the product liability system as might first appear.33 Benefit-cost evaluations are usually 
made, they cited in their article a number of studies that documented the high legal costs of 
tort liability. They also discussed indirect costs stemming from product price increases due 
to product liability.34 
As Anthony J. Duggan stated35 that the economic efficiency reason for creating product 
liability is based on two grounds, the "pricing effects argument" and the "deterrence 
argument". The pricing effects argument means, that consumers systematically under-
estimate the risk of accidents relating to defective products. The imposition of this strict 
liability form will cause them to raise their prices, through the explicit price of the product 
includes a component for accident costs. The result should be a drop in demand to the 
optimal level, and a consequent reduction in the number of accidents. The deterrence 
argument could be described as follows. The imposition of liability on a manufacturer 
should persuade producers to avoid accidents (for example due to design improvements, 
provisions of warnings, or the adoption of testing procedures) and consequently less 
damages would be paid. Thus it will be worthwhile for the manufacturer to take precautions 
as long as the cost of this is less than the reduction achieved in the expected accident cost. 
If product liability were eliminated, the manufacturers should at least be liable in negligence 
(for instance because of the failure to take cost-justified accident precautions). However, 
plaintiffs may have difficulty in proving negligence and therefore, in the interests of 
effective deterrence, a strict liability regime may be warranted. The corollary of the 
deterrence argument in favour of manufacturers' liability is that in so far as there are cost-
justified accident precautions that can more easily be taken by the plaintiff (for example, 
31
 Ibid. 1956. 
32
 Goldberg and Zipursky claimed that they were selective in the empirical studies and choosing 
the examined goods, citing studies examined only the influence of the adoptation of modem product 
liablitiy law, without the fomer on negligance based rule. 
33
 Ibid. 1962. 
34
 Ibid. 1967. 
35
 Duggan, A. J.: Saying Nothing with Words. In: Ziegel, J. S.-Lerner, S. (eds): New 
Developements in International Commercial and Consumer Law. Oxford, 1998, 479-480. 
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careful handling of the product), the manufacturer should not be liable. Otherwise, the 
plaintiff may have an insufficient incentive to take such précautions. 
Nowadays the number of critical opinions concerning consumer liability is constantly 
increasing, these can easily be supported by the "legal achievements" of American 
consumerism, which would hopefully not be adopted into the European legal systems. It 
could be called "consumer overprotection". One of the favourite shocking cases of frivolous 
lawsuits involves McDonald's. An irresponsible woman spilled coffee on herself and then 
collected millions. The claimant, Stella Liebeck, suffered third-degree burns that required 
skin grafts and a week of hospitalization, because McDonald's served its coffee thirty 
degrees hotter than its competitors, too hot to drink but hot enough to burn. Prior to 
Liebeck's case, McDonald's had received more than seven hundred complaints about the 
temperature. Even then, the jury reduced Liebeck's compensatory damages by twenty 
percent because she was partly at fault, and the judge cut the jury's punitive damage award 
from USD 2.7 million to USD 480,000.36 
In addition, the enforcement process should be shortly examined, it is enough to touch 
upon the probably most crucial questions concerning the enforcement of the rights. To be 
more specific the most vital problem is the out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes (or 
in other words: alternative dispute resolution), which should be officially endorsed (duly 
stating the financial background and the legal personality of these) as it is usually not worth 
taking up a lawsuit. For this reason, mediators and specialized quasi judicial bodies have 
been created. However, these solutions are faster, easier and cheaper than the traditional 
legal procedures, their decisions cannot be enforced in Hungary, because they are not real 
courts. It is worth to outlining the relating solutions of the British law, because this system 
seems to be fine tuned. If the consumers could not solve the problem through contacting the 
supplier, they can call a solicitor or a Citizen's Advice Bureau or they can turn to the Office 
of Fair Trading (hereinafter: OFT) helpline Consumer Direct. As the next step, one assistant 
of the Office will contact the supplier playing "the part of conciliator rather than advocate".37 
After this they can contact the trade association. As we can see, there is a multi-level out-
of-court settlement, it is at the first sight similar to the Hungarian system, however we can 
highlight a relevant difference: the codes of practice, which were approved by the OFT. 
These optional rules are more likely to be followed, because the suppliers set these for 
themselves. 
Conclusion 
The question could be raised concerning the directive on product liability too: whether the 
consumer protection policy is a social political or economic political issue? We can imagine 
it as a policy, which addresses both of them, but it can hardly realise one of them. At first 
the European Union tried to fix the side-effects of free movement of goods and services, but 
later it became a separate, self-supporting legislation focusing on the interest of consumers.38 
It should be added to my opinion, that contrary interests are usually articulated in the case 
of each legal instrument, depending on the intervention of the market regulators. As we 
could see in the first draft of the product liability directive, a higher protection level was 
36
 Feinman, J. M : Un-making Law. The Conservative Campaign to Roll Back the Common Law. 
Boston, 2004, 24. 
37
 Woodroffe-Lowe: op. cit. 187. 
38
 Ср.: Benacchio: op. cit. 202-203. 
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established, than at present. This has been decreased under pressure from manufacturers. 
Hence the recent directive states only the minimum level of protection and gives the 
handling of this problem back to the judicature. In the countries, where the liability of 
manufacturers could effectively be handled within the frames of negligence, the aspect of 
the interpretation has not been changcd substantially just by the directive. The directive 
could effect powerful changes, where the jurisdiction was not based on negligence, 
notwithstanding the fact, that in these countries the diversity of legal culture will challenge 
the possibility to achieve a common level of protection. 
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In the spring of 2010, an impressive book was published to celebrate the 80lh birthday of 
professor Zoltán Péteri. The first part comprises short personal greetings from internationally 
known colleagues-Attila Harmathy, Géza Herczegh, Vanda Lamm, Ferenc Mádl, Csaba 
Varga and János Zlinszky. The second part offers a panorama of professor Péteri's most 
important writings related to the theoretical questions of comparative law. 
In the early years of his career, Zoltán Péteri focused his research on the questions of 
legal and political theory. Following this period he turned to problems of the rule of law, 
human rights and constitutional law. However, the focus of his oeuvre has always been 
related to the world of comparative law. He edited several volumes of the Hungarian 
national reports submitted to the international congresses of comparative law and he has 
been teaching at the Faculté internationale de droit comparé for long decades. 
1. In the first essay-The Beginnings of Comparative Law in English Jurisprudence-
following a well-developed historical introduction, the author points out that the comparative 
method was adopted in English jurisprudence due to the influence of Maine. Pollock, who 
also accepted the interconnected nature of historical and comparative methods, warned that 
comparison only makes sense among institutions of civilizations being at the same stage. 
Another important step was the establishment of the Society of Comparative Legislation-
following the example of the French Société de legislation comparée-m 1894. The main 
aim of this scholarly society was to study the law of people living in the British 
Commonwealth and to make the findings of these studies applicable for practice. It must 
also be mentioned that this society did not neglect the study of European legal systems 
either, e.g. for the reform of English criminal law. 
2. In the introduction of the second paper-Theoretical Questions of Comparative Law 
in Soviet Jurisprudence-, Péteri refers to the process during which the rejection of 
comparative law gradually turned to the acceptance of a socialist version of comparative 
law. Then he discusses the fundamental questions of comparative law in the light of a 
monograph written by A. A. Tille, the leading personality of Soviet comparative law of the 
time. Concerning the origins of comparative law, Péteri rejects both the antique and 
medieval origin of comparative law, and points out-contrary to Tille and others-that the 
birth of comparative law dates back to the turn of 19th and 20th century. Péteri bravely 
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advocates the autonomy of the theory of comparative law against those approaches of 
Socialist jurisprudence emphasizing its secondary and applied nature. Last but not least, the 
author does not even share the conception of Tille about the existence of comparative law 
within the frontiers of a given country. The solution of collisions of the different legislative 
levels within the Soviet Union is a problem of the system of legal sources rather than one of 
legal comparison, since the precondition for comparison is the existence of at least two 
legal systems. 
3. The next essay-Some Preliminaries to the Comparison of Legal Cultures-inspiringly 
discusses one of the most important questions of today's comparative law, the role of legal 
cultures in the comparison.2 In the introduction, the author rightly stresses that the 
connection between law and cultural phenomena was already recognized by the philosophical 
schools of the late 19th century. In the literature of comparative law, the approach to law as 
a cultural phenomenon was related to Köhler, who was otherwise named Hegel-redivivus 
by his contemporaries. One of Kohler's main points was that law should always adapt to 
the culture of a given people, including its transformations, and it should also offer solutions 
to new challenges. Péteri shows that culture also has a value-function in Kohler's 
approach. 
A leading personality of Neo-Kantian philosophy, Radbruch, defines law as cultural 
power, thus improving Kohler's thesis. He also explains that the type of law (Rechtstyp) 
and the idea of law are the two standards that have to be applied in the comparison of 
different legal systems. 
During the first international Congress of Comparative Law (Paris, 1900) the whole 
issue got a new interpretation in the discussions related to the emergence of the new 
discipline of droit comparé. Kohler, for one, pointed out that a nation can only accept 
foreign rules which are in harmony with its conditions and institutions. Moreover, Zittelmann 
argued that the main value of comparative law was its capacity to approach law as a cultural 
phenomenon. 
The author concludes by claiming that the advantage of the approach called 
"comparative legal cultures" consists in enabling comparative law to find a way out of the 
uncertainties related to a recent paradigm shift. It also seems possible, however, that the 
"comparative legal cultures" approach may make comparative law lose its relationship to 
law and assimilate to legal theory, legal anthropology or even to the sociology of law. 
4. The fourth essay-Paradigm Shift in Comparative Law?-analyses an exciting and 
important problem. Péteri draws attention to the fact that the analysis of the paradigms of 
comparative law is part of the history of comparative law not yet written. Furthermore, he 
cannot accept the approach in the history of ideas which declares that the beginnings of 
comparative law could be discovered even at the earliest stages of human thinking. 
The dominant view suggests that comparative law—called droit comparé in the years of 
its birth-has a relatively short history. Some scholars say it starts with the First International 
Congress of Comparative Law (Paris, 1900), others date it back to the 1860s or the 
2
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establishment of the first scholarly society (Société de legislation comparée, 1869) devoted 
to the field. 
From the aspect of the history of ideas, Maine's Ancient Law can be regarded as a 
starting point. However, as the author points out, the so-called legal ethnology was also 
seriously related to the first paradigm of comparative law. This first paradigm had been 
dominant until the First International Congress of Comparative Law (Paris, 1900). 
According to the new concept or paradigm emerging at this congress, it was reasonable 
to draw a dividing line between the formerly dominant, mostly theoretical comparative law 
and droit comparé properly understood. As Lambert argued, the former is strongly related 
to legal history or sociology of law, while the other is a new branch of the study of positive 
law. During the interwar period, the research of similar or different solutions in Common 
Law and Civil Law systems came to the fore at the levels of both written and case-law. This 
transformation was a sign of paradigm-shift in itself and it could imply that Far-Eastern or 
even Socialist laws could also be compared. After World War II, scholars tried to find some 
convergence between Socialist and Western laws, some of them even regarded Socialist law 
as a degenerated branch of Western Law. But from the 1950s, the new paradigm identified 
Socialist Law as an independent legal family on the basis of ideological factors, and it 
focused on the research of the style of legal families as well as their "determining" and 
"interchangeable" elements. 
If a new paradigm shift may happen in the close future, it will be lead by advocates of 
the so-called "comparative legal cultures" approach-Péteri argues. 
5. The fifth study-Sociological Questions in Comparative Law-discusses the problems 
of sociological approach in comparative law. Péteri starts by emphasizing that the failure of 
promising opportunities in legal unification based on comparative law was related to socio-
economic relations behind the legal regulation. There is, however, a serious question related 
to this point. Does the research of sociological background of the legal institutions in the 
context of Socialist legal system mean the twilight of the classical approach in droit 
comparé? The author answers negatively, since the sociological approach was also applied 
by representatives of Western droit comparé, mostly in order to achieve practical means. 
The reason why the earlier, unilateral normative approach was replaced with a 
sociological one is the fact that the main goals of comparative law cannot be achieved 
nowadays by simply juxtaposing legal rules. Consequently, one really needs the sociological 
approach. Moreover, this complex approach allows for a better consideration of value 
elements in the theory of comparative law. By way of a conclusion, Péteri points out that 
this approach is the essence of comparative law, and it could also serve as the proper basis 
for a "realist" comparative law capable of studying the sociological roots of legal and state-
related phenomena. 
6. In the sixth essay-Theoretical Questions of the Application of the Comparative 
Method in the Sphere of State Phenomena-the author highlights that this issue has been 
rather neglected in the literature of comparative law thus far. However, new behaviorist 
approaches show a comprehensive departure from the rule-centered approach in comparative 
law. Furthermore, the view has also been spreading among scholars that the aim of 
comparative law is not only the observation of similarities, and that the study of differences 
is equally of scientific value. 
The sociological aspect in general or in particular can be the starting point of any 
comparison. As Péteri emphasizes, the real task is to give some relevance to the sociological 
aspects of state phenomena in terms of comparison. The term "state phenomenon" refers to 
legally defined state phenomena or institutions. This special socio-legal approach has the 
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following main criteria: ( 1 ) besides the legal framework, also principles have to be taken 
into account, (2) in the study of a given state institution, historical, moral and other traditions 
should also be considered, and (3) the function of the given state institution should also be 
analyzed. 
7. The following pages-Goals and Methods of Comparative Law-introduce the reader 
to the goals and methods of comparative law. The author begins by asserting that there is no 
"Chinese Wall" between the fields of theoretical and applied comparative law, but their 
intersection is increasingly typical. However, the extension of comparative law to the legal 
practice and other factors influencing both legislation and practice enriched the so-called 
"legal approach" with sociological elements. Last but not least, the emergence of Socialist 
state and law also enforced the reinterpretation of the goals and methods of 
comparative law. 
One of the fundamental questions of modern comparative law is whether Western and 
Socialist legal systems can be compared at all. According the position of Péteri, the 
opportunities of the comparison of earlier legal systems are limited since their social 
principles arc rather different. Thus, a sociological approach has to be applied in research, 
as a simple declaration of formal similarities does not make much sense in a comparative 
study-he argues. This is also relevant when one investigates the development of states and 
legal systems or evaluates state and legal phenomena. 
8. The next paper-Comparative Law and Legal Theory-analyses the relationship 
between comparative law and legal theory. The first important problem discussed here is the 
recognition of comparative law as an independent discipline. Emphasizing the significance 
of Maine's oeuvre, Péteri also points out the important role of Pollock, who stated that 
jurisprudence has to be historical and comparative at the same time. Thus, comparative law 
was regarded as an autonomous field of research. Moreover, from the 1870s it had a 
department in Oxford under the direction of Maine and his fellows. 
A new approach to the scientific nature of droit comparé was formulated during the 
First International Comparative Law Congress (Paris, 1900). Lambert claimed that the task 
of comparative law is to help the formulation and emergence of the so-called common 
legislative law (droit commun legislative). This position was refined in the following 
decades by dividing comparative law to two fields of study: comparative legal history and 
comparative legislation. 
In Hungary, comparative law occupied a central position in the oeuvre of Szalay and 
Wenczel. In a few decades, however, another approach became increasingly popular. It 
emphasized the subordinate nature of comparative law to general legal theory, and was 
advocated by scholars like Pikier or Moór. The jurisprudence of the Socialist era regarded 
comparative law as a method or transitory science. Péteri convincingly refutes this view 
and stresses the independence of comparative law. 
In the concluding section, the author formulates an interesting and important position: 
"If one can speak of some kind of plurality within general legal theory, the basis for that 
can only be the different levels of abstraction. On the basis of that, one could even speak of 
general legal theories belonging to different legal families (as the Romano-Germanic, 
Common Law or Scandinavian legal families). Yet for formulating the most general 
theoretical conclusions, the best instrument is a legal theory having the most general scope 
and embracing all the legal systems. Thus, plurality within legal theory is possible and we 
think that a general legal theory has to be developed, which recognizes the different groups 
of legal systems." 
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9. The work continues with a discussion of the concept of "Western Law"-Some 
Remarks about the "Decline of Western Law". After an overview of the main ideas 
concerning the taxonomy of legal systems, Péteri quotes an opinion, according to which the 
simple comparison of all the legal systems is impossible and unnecessary. Therefore, what 
is really needed, is their classification. The approach based on the concept of legal culture 
can enrich comparative studies with new insights. 
But what does the concept of "West" mean for comparative law? On the basis of the 
widely spread distinction between Common Law and Civil Law, Péteri reminds the reader 
that the term of Western Law was introduced in comparative law by David in 1950. The 
aim of David was to distinguish it from Socialist Law. It also has to be mentioned that by 
using this term David emphasized the unity of Civil Law and Common Law due to 
capitalism, liberalism, and Christian ethics. Even though David did not think this concept of 
Western Law was applicable in 1969, the concept of a common Western Law is still used in 
comparative law. 
10. The author discusses the question of whether Hungarian Law can be integrated into 
any legal family of the world in a most interesting and scholarly paper-Hungarian Law and 
the Legal Families of the World. He thinks this question can be answered by focusing on 
the "styles" of the different periods of Hungarian legal history. 
Medieval Hungarian law was part of the so-called Romano-Germanic legal family, but 
it also had some peculiarities. Either the doctrine of the Holy Crown and the lack of a 
codified constitution, or the resistance to the codification of private law can be regarded as 
differences from the general features of this legal family. 
In the wake of World War II, Hungary got under Soviet influence and rule and 
consequently it became a member of the Socialist legal family. However, this was a 
somewhat unusual situation, since the Hungarian legal system underwent serious 
transformations, not only in a material, but also in a formal sense. Péteri points out that this 
formal transformation disrupted both the ancient roots and the former style of Hungarian 
law. In this process of transformation the newly enacted Socialist codes and the consequent 
rejection of both customary law and judge-made law played an important role. The 
constitution of 1949 symbolized a rupture with the former historical constitutional system. 
Moreover, Péteri adds, this constitution-contrary to many changes-remains the constitution 
of Hungary up to our days. The democratic transition in 1989 meant the return to the 
Romano-Germanic legal family in a legal sense. 
11. As a first problem of the next paper-Traditions and Human Rights in Hungary-
Péteri mentions three factors which influenced the formation of political and human rights 
in Hungary: first of all the English, French and German ideas, secondly the historical 
Hungarian constitution, and thirdly the Marxist ideology. 
Imposing limits on the king's power, the Golden Bull of András II is rather similar to 
the English Magna Carta. This act, indeed, codified the legal position and privileges of the 
nobility emerging in the 13th century. The Tripartitum of 1514 also comprised these and it 
was living law until the 19th century. The improvement of the position of the peasantry 
could happen relatively slowly, mostly by the abolition of the feudal tenures in the 19th 
century. In the reformist movement emerging at the end of the 18th century, it was not the 
so-called third class {tiers état) but the nobility which acted as the leading force of the 
socio-political transformation. 
As an example of the 20lh-century Marxist interpretation of civil and human rights, the 
author gives a detailed analysis of the constitution and statehood of both the Soviet Council's 
Republic and the People's Republic. Lastly, Péteri points out that the main feature of the 
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recent developments is that the role of human and civil rights includes the limitation of 
state intervention as well as the protection of the individual sphere of liberty. 
12. In what fol lows-Comparative Aspects in the Administration of the Law-the author 
scrutinizes the responsibility of judges and other functionaries dealing with the application 
of law. He first defines the three main features of the application of law: it is (1) not a 
mechanical activity, it is (2) obligatory for the judges, and (3) it has a comprehensive 
nature. 
Placing the issue into a more general framework, Péteri continues his discussion with 
the comparison of European legal families. In so-called "Continental" legal systems, the 
"birth" of law is basically limited to the process of parliamentary legislation. However, 
Common Law systems look for the origin of law in the conventions, customs and traditions 
of society, that is, in the real behavior of people living together. 
There arc further differences between the two legal families in terms of the relationship 
of legislation and application of law. The prohibition of judge-made law is still a valid rule 
in Continental systems, although one can mention certain efforts to change this attitude.3 
Without doubt, Common Law is judge-made law. 
The author reminds that if we look for the road leading back to Europe, we should 
harmonize our ancient traditions with the determining factors of European legal development. 
And we can count on the fact that both legal families are parts of what is called Western 
Law. Moreover, we should recall Zlinszky's dictum: the more legal knowledge, the more 
empowerment from the society, and the more responsibility. 
13. One of the most important challenges to both European and Hungarian legal 
development is legal unification and legal harmonization. In the theoretical foundations of 
these processes, certain aspects of comparison can play a prominent role. 
As the author rightly points out, legal harmonization only means the application of 
similar or equivalent solutions, while legal unification implies more. It implies that a new 
common regulation replaces former-divergent-rules. In terms of legal unification, one can 
speak of "internal" (within the national law) or international ones, while legal harmonization 
can be bilateral, regional or multilateral. 
For all kinds of legal unification or harmonization, there are two fundamental questions 
to be discussed. Are they possible and desirable at all? 
Obviously, the simple knowledge of legal rules is insufficient for legal unification. 
Their social, economic, political and ideological context has to be studied as well. For 
instance, unification is much less difficult between two countries having the same or similar 
ideological and political background. It is not mere coincidence that the traditionally 
successful fields of international legal unification were private and commercial law, while 
the unification of public law was considered as a mere dream by the participants of the First 
International Congress of Comparative Law. The author concludes that the activity of EU 
member states in the field of legal unification is really facilitated by the fact that their 
common intellectual heritage is strongly related to the Mediterranean culture with Jewish 
and Christian roots. 
14. The last paper-Teaching of Comparative Law and Comparative Law Teaching-is 
devoted to the problem of legal education. The author starts from two premises. Firstly, he 
3
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declares the necessity of a reform of legal education. Secondly, he accepts that the challenges 
of globalization render the spreading of a comparative attitude necessary. 
When dealing with the question of comparative law in legal education, one has to 
discuss two different aspects: the teaching of comparative law as an independent subject on 
the one hand, and the reform of the entire legal education by applying a comparative attitude 
on the other. 
Nowadays there exist different models of comparative law teaching in the law schools 
of the world: (a) the teaching of comparative law within the framework of legal theory, (b) 
the teaching of the main legal families of the world, (c) the teaching of national law 
compared to a foreign legal system, and lastly (d) the teaching of a given legal institution 
on a comparative basis. 
According to Péteri, it is more suitable to talk about two different courses: (a) an 
introductory and theoretical course and (b) the comparative discussion of foreign legal 
systems. The first has its own place in the curriculum of legal theory classes, while the 
second is related to the teaching of various fields of law. The author endorses the proposal 
that an independent introductory comparative law course should be integrated into legal 
curricula. 
Discussing the history of comparative law teaching in Hungary, Péteri points out that it 
started in 1850 at the law faculty of Pest (Wenczel). Subsequently, there were two main 
tendencies. Some scholars studied the kinship between Hungarian and Common Law 
(Grosschmid), while others interpreted comparative law as one of the methods of studying 
positive law (Pauler, Somló and Pikier). 
As for the developments after 1945, it should be mentioned that besides the courses 
concentrating on the comparative aspects of a given legal institution, also introductory 
classes on general comparative law appeared in Hungarian law faculties. 
In addition to the above chapters, the book also includes a bibliography of the author 
and the abstracts of the papers, in French or English. 
* * * 
One final remark. This volume is an important piece of droit comparé for many 
reasons. Its value is, first of all, due to its subject and methodology, then to its insightful 
findings, and finally to the fact that it deals with some of the most fundamental and current 
questions of comparative law. These questions are analyzed with a critical attitude. One 
may conclude by saying that this book deserves a place in the library of everyone-legal 
academics as well as practitioners-who deals with questions of legal theory, legal history, 
or EU law. 
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